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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis assesses aquaculture’s actual and potential poverty impacts and the 
institutions required for aquaculture development in Ghana. Data were collected 
using a survey of 69 small-scale fish farming households and 74 crop farming 
households in Ashanti Region, a survey of cage farms (19 small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) and 2 large-scale farms) in Lake Volta, focus group 
discussions and key informant interviews. The hypotheses tested are: i) small-
scale aquaculture has positive direct poverty impacts; ii) indirect impacts (e.g. 
economic multiplier effects) from SME development have more poverty 
reduction potential than direct and indirect impacts from small-scale aquaculture; 
and iii) aquaculture development requires complementary technical and 
institutional development.  
 
The results suggest that small-scale pond aquaculture increases household 
income of non-poor farmers who are trained and/or use better management 
practices (termed fish farming type A). Fish farming type A by non-poor farmers 
has strong indirect poverty impact pathways and thus, for equivalent increases 
in scale, higher potential poverty impact than small-scale aquaculture by poor 
farmers (who have difficulties achieving equivalent productivity), or SME cage 
aquaculture (where indirect poverty impacts are weaker). However growth of fish 
farming type A is constrained by high transaction costs and risks. Institutional 
innovation is thus required to facilitate coordinated value chain development and 
enable farmers to access services and more lucrative markets.  
 
The findings support the current move in aquaculture development away from 
focusing on poor producers towards a broader value chain perspective and 
emphasis on developing more commercial aquaculture. This perspective is 
important due to the benefits of employment generation along value chains and 
the need for simultaneous and complementary value chain investments for 
aquaculture system growth. However the findings highlight ambiguities within the 
emerging paradigm and the need to target aquaculture systems and farmer 
categories with the highest poverty impact potential in different contexts.  
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 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Aquaculture is the fastest growing animal food-producing sector worldwide, 
contributing 47 percent of global food fish supply in 2010. Between the early 
1950s and 2010 aquaculture grew from under one million to 60 million tonnes 
(valued at US$119 billion). Between 1980 and 2010 per capita farmed fish 
consumption increased on average by 7.1 percent annually (from 1.1 kg to 
8.7 kg) while the world’s population grew on average 1.5 percent annually 
(FAO, 2012). Aquaculture’s rapid expansion is often referred to as the ‘blue 
revolution’ and the sector is now poised to overtake capture fisheries as a 
global source of food fish.  Global aquaculture is dominated by Asia which 
produced 89 percent of global production in 2010, the majority coming from 
China. Africa contributed 2.2 percent to global aquaculture production in 
2010, and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) contributed just 0.6 percent (FAO, 
2012) despite its natural aquaculture production potential, estimated at 1.5 
thousand million tonnes annually (Kapetsky, 1995).  
 
World demand for fish and seafood is projected to keep rising, driven by 
population growth, increasing urbanisation (often associated with increased 
consumption of animal protein) and rising incomes. Demand is estimated to 
reach at least an additional 40 million tonnes by 2030 just to maintain current 
per capita consumption levels (FAO, 2006). Aquaculture is perceived to have 
the greatest potential to meet this growing demand. Globally fish provides 4.3 
billion people with approximately 15 percent of their average per capita 
consumption of animal protein. In low-income food-deficit countries, fish 
contributed 24 percent of animal protein intake in 2009, perhaps more if the 
contribution of small-scale and subsistence fisheries and aquaculture was 
fully accounted for (FAO, 2012). The importance of fish to food security and 
nutrition is further seen in the poorest SSA countries where fish can provide 
over 50 percent of animal protein intake (FAO, 2006). Per capita fish 
consumption in SSA is however lower than all other regions and is the only 
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region where it is falling, and projected to keep falling, due to population 
growth and stagnating capture fisheries (FAO, 2006).  
 
Aquaculture’s growth is an example of the ‘high-value revolution’ (World 
Bank, 2007) which is creating a second wave of employment growth after the 
Green Revolution (GR), and includes sectors like horticulture and livestock. 
Employment in fisheries and aquaculture has increased by 3.6 percent 
annually since 1980 which is faster than the growth in world population and 
employment in traditional agriculture. It is also estimated that for each person 
directly employed in fisheries and aquaculture production, a further three jobs 
are created in secondary activities (FAO, 2010).  
  
With developing countries dominating the production of aquaculture products, 
aquaculture has the potential to increase incomes and create employment 
along with meeting the growing demand for fish. Governments and donors 
supporting aquaculture development view it as a means to promote rural 
development, livelihood enhancement, food security and poverty reduction in 
developing countries. However, despite this potential, it is uncertain whether 
aquaculture has made any significant direct impact on poverty alleviation 
(Stevenson and Irz, 2009).  
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Aquaculture promotion for poverty alleviation has had a poor record in many 
developing countries, especially SSA where aquaculture’s potential is yet to 
be realised at any significant scale (Harrison et al., 1994; Brummett et al., 
2008). Brummett et al. (2008) suggest this is due to constraints including: 
lack of seed, feed and technical advice; poor market infrastructure and 
access; and weak policies favouring central planning over private sector 
initiative. Brummett and Williams (2000) suggest uneven growth is partly 
because aquaculture is not indigenous to SSA (it was introduced during the 
colonial period) unlike Asian countries like China, India, Indonesia and the 
Philippines, which have long traditions of aquaculture. Increasing 
globalisation of trade in aquaculture products is also tending to marginalise 
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small-scale producers. Producers face major challenges, especially to export, 
such as increasingly strict food safety standards, traceability, certification and 
other non-tariff requirements favouring medium- to large-scale, capital 
intensive operations. Small-scale aquaculture farmers thus face many 
constraints to integrate into supply chains and benefit fully from the new 
market environment. 
 
Aquaculture’s potential to contribute to the livelihoods of the rural poor in 
SSA has been emphasised by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) that sees aquaculture as a priority for African development. 
NEPAD’s 2005 Fish for All Summit in Abuja, Nigeria produced the Abuja 
Declaration on Sustainable Fisheries and Aquaculture calling for increased 
focus on aquaculture promotion and development1. This was followed up by 
the first Conference of African Ministers of Fisheries and Aquaculture 
organised by NEPAD in 2010, with the theme of ‘African fisheries and 
aquaculture: contributing to agricultural development and economic growth’.  
Donors such as the UK Government’s Department for International 
Development (DfID), international research and development agencies such 
as the WorldFish Center and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of 
the United Nations, and developing country governments are also promoting 
aquaculture as a means for poverty alleviation, food security and stimulating 
rural economic growth.   
 
However, despite the wide range of benefits expected from aquaculture 
promotion, the actual and potential contributions of aquaculture development 
to poor people’s livelihoods in SSA have not been fully assessed (Edwards, 
2000).  There are some empirical examples, mainly from Asia and Latin 
America, of aquaculture’s influence on poverty, however there is little 
documented evidence of direct poverty reducing impacts, and few studies 
investigate causality with reliable counterfactuals. Systematic and 
quantitative evaluation of aquaculture’s impact on national economies, 
                                                 
 
1
 Proceedings of the NEPAD - Fish for All Summit (including the Abuja Declaration) available at: 
http://www.worldfishcenter.org/resource_centre/WF_2899.pdf (accessed 31 July 2013). 
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poverty and food security is poorly documented, especially in developing 
countries.  Thus there is limited empirical evidence assessing the role and 
effectiveness of aquaculture in poverty alleviation (Charles et al., 1997; 
Hishamunda et al., 2009; Stevenson and Irz, 2009), or of the institutions 
needed for aquaculture development to realise its potential in SSA.  
 
Research on the impacts of agricultural technology suggests there will be no 
single way in which aquaculture impacts on poverty alleviation as the 
outcome is dependent on context. Das (2002) argues in the case of the GR, 
technology does not have any inherent pro-poor qualities and the relation 
between technology and poverty is contingent on the context. The inherent 
effects of technology on society are those which are internal to the 
technology itself (e.g. increased yield for GR technology, or increased fish 
production for aquaculture). He suggests technology can only have 
‘technological/physical’ effects (p. 65), therefore its inherent effects, unlike its 
contingent effects, cannot be social. The poverty impact of aquaculture is 
thus contingent on the institutional, political, economic, social and natural 
context in which aquaculture development occurs and hence is an empirical 
question, with the answer differing between contexts (Stevenson and Irz, 
2009). 
 
Aquaculture’s ability to affect poverty also depends on the type of 
aquaculture systems that develop within each context.  For small-scale 
artisanal producers, successful aquaculture development has the potential to 
increase revenues, household food security, and can lower risk and improve 
resilience. Large-scale commercial fish farms have the potential to generate 
food, jobs and revenues in both local and export markets. However, some 
experts argue that a business approach focusing on commercial small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) would produce more benefits for more people, 
through stimulating economic growth and reduced fish prices, than either 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) and government led development 
projects, focused on direct poverty alleviation of small-scale artisanal 
producers, or large-scale commercial operations (Moehl et al., 2005; 
Brummett et al., 2008 and 2011). Beveridge et al. (2010) suggest that 
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evidence from some African countries including Cameroon, Ghana and 
Uganda, shows that fish production starts to have an important effect on food 
security where conditions support the growth of commercially oriented 
aquaculture SMEs. They argue that the SME sector is more likely to have the 
assets needed to invest in larger operations and adopt more productive 
technologies resulting in increased fish production and employment 
generation both on-farm and along the value chain. 
 
However, the potential poverty impact of these different systems has not 
been subject to rigorous analysis. The type of aquaculture system(s) 
promoted in different contexts should be informed by an assessment of the 
poverty impacts arising from each system. Both direct and indirect effects of 
aquaculture development have the potential to impact poverty, but it is 
unclear which are more significant. For example, given that rural households 
face certain minimum resource requirements (e.g. access to land and water), 
to adopt aquaculture, often beyond the reach of the poor, indirect effects of 
SME development such as increased labour demand and fish supply, could 
be potentially more important than direct effects in reducing poverty in some 
contexts.  
 
Estimating the potential livelihood benefits from different aquaculture 
systems, including an assessment of the relative benefits to the poor from 
engaging in aquaculture through employment, or through direct adoption, 
would have strong implications for policy orientation and the focus of future 
research and development investments. Enhanced understanding of where 
the strongest potential for poverty impacts lies (e.g. through livelihood 
enhancement or consumption effects), and exploring market-related 
constraints to stronger pro-poor outcomes for the areas with such potential, is 
needed to inform research on technology and institutional development 
(Gordon and Kassam, 2011). Therefore, to harness the role of aquaculture 
for poverty alleviation in SSA, the pathways, constraints, and conditions 
under which aquaculture can maximise its potential impact on poverty 
alleviation must be explored.  
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1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
This thesis therefore aims to understand: a) the actual and potential impacts  
of aquaculture development on poverty and livelihoods in SSA, and b) the 
institutions required for aquaculture development to maximise its potential 
poverty impact. These issues are explored using aquaculture development in 
Ghana as a case study. The specific research objectives of this thesis are 
outlined below: 
 
Objective 1 
To assess the direct poverty and livelihood impacts (positive and negative) of 
small-scale aquaculture systems on different categories of poor people in 
Ghana. 
 
Objective 2 
To analyse the significance of direct and indirect poverty impact pathways 
from different aquaculture systems and assess implications for pro-poor 
growth in different contexts. 
 
Objective 3 
To identify the institutions needed for different aquaculture systems to have 
the highest potential to promote poverty reduction in different contexts. 
 
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE 
 
Following this introduction to the main issues and research questions 
addressed in this thesis, Chapter 2 starts by reviewing the existing literature 
on the impact of aquaculture on poverty. The review highlights the limited 
nature of this literature, especially relating to SSA. It shows that few studies 
have analysed aquaculture’s direct contribution to poverty, that evidence 
concerning aquaculture’s indirect poverty effects is mixed, and that some of 
aquaculture’s potential impacts have hardly been studied. In view of the 
limited literature and to facilitate the exploration of ways in which to examine 
the full range of potential impacts of aquaculture on poverty, the chapter goes 
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on to look at literature in the related areas of sustainable livelihoods, 
economic growth linkages and institutional development. Exploring these 
different literatures helps to identify appropriate conceptual frameworks and 
methodologies used to address the three research objectives outlined above. 
Considering studies from the agriculture sector also informs the ways in 
which aquaculture’s impact on poverty is investigated in this thesis.  Chapter 
2 concludes by highlighting the gaps in the literature identified by the review 
and expands on the thesis’ research objectives by proposing hypotheses to 
be tested. By addressing these objectives this thesis seeks to fill some of the 
gaps found in the literature and contribute to furthering the current state of 
knowledge on the actual and potential impact of aquaculture on poverty and 
how to maximise this impact.  
 
Chapter 3 briefly outlines the reasons for selecting Ghana as a case study 
and gives some background information on Ghana’s geography, economy, 
income, and fisheries and aquaculture sectors and on the aquaculture 
production systems currently in operation. Chapter 4 describes the data and 
methodology used to test the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2.  
 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the results of the research conducted in Ghana 
and comprise the body of the thesis.  Chapter 5 addresses the first research 
objective by examining the direct impacts of small-scale pond aquaculture on 
poverty in three districts in Ghana. Chapter 6 investigates the second 
research objective by assessing the importance of direct and indirect poverty 
impacts of the three aquaculture systems under analysis (small-scale 
artisanal pond aquaculture, SME and large-scale cage aquaculture). Chapter 
7 builds on these results to address the third research objective by 
undertaking an institutional analysis of the different aquaculture systems and 
associated value chains. 
 
Chapter 8 summarises the key findings from these results. The chapter 
explores ways in which institutional innovation could help to maximise the 
potential poverty impact of aquaculture development in Ghana. The thesis 
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ends by proposing some important areas for further research and some 
concluding remarks. 
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 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 BACKGROUND 
 
2.1.1 The role of aquaculture in rural development 
Three quarters of poor people in developing countries live in rural areas, 
most depending directly or indirectly on agriculture2 for their livelihoods 
(World Bank, 2007). Agricultural development is widely thought to be crucial 
for stimulating growth in other sectors and reducing poverty (World Bank, 
2007). Agriculture’s contribution to growth and poverty alleviation varies 
across countries. For agriculture based economies, which make up the 
majority of SSA countries, agriculture is an important source of growth 
(responsible for 32% of GDP growth on average) due to its large share of 
GDP (29% on average) and high levels of employment generation 
(employing 65% of the labour force on average) (World Bank, 2007). It is 
estimated that GDP growth from agriculture is at least twice as effective in 
reducing poverty as growth from any other sector, making agricultural 
development an important strategy for poverty alleviation in SSA (World 
Bank, 2007).  
 
Agriculture contributes to development as an economic activity, driving local 
and national economic growth and stimulating growth in agriculture related 
industries and the rural nonfarm economy3 (RNFE). Agricultural production is 
important for food security, stabilising and increasing domestic food 
production and providing income for the majority of the rural poor. In addition, 
the rural poor depend on a range of livelihood options including diversification 
of activities in the agricultural sector and off-farm employment, with those in 
resource poor environments having a broader range of livelihood strategies. 
A global study of farming systems by Dixon et al. (2001) identified five 
household strategies to escape poverty: intensification; diversification; 
increased farm size; increased off-farm income; and exit from agriculture. 
                                                 
 
2
 including crops, livestock, agroforestry, and aquaculture. 
3
 The rural nonfarm economy includes all rural economic activity outside agriculture.  
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Diversification, which includes aquaculture, was considered to be a key 
poverty reduction strategy in all farming system categories and the most 
important strategy in SSA for farm poverty reduction. However, the extent to 
which aquaculture will lead to poverty reduction depends on a number of 
factors including: the level of engagement by the poor, the scale of adoption, 
the importance of livelihood and production effects compared to consumption 
effects benefiting poor consumers, and the significance of indirect effects 
such as increased demand for labour from larger scale enterprises and of 
economic growth linkages arising from different aquaculture production 
systems and their associated economic multiplier effects. Therefore, even 
though aquaculture may have the potential to contribute to agriculture and 
farming systems development and to rural development and poverty 
alleviation, the extent to which this potential will be realised is dependent on 
an array of contingent factors.  
  
2.1.2 Definitions 
Aquaculture is the farming of aquatic plants and animals. Different types of 
land and water based aquaculture production systems exist in inland and 
coastal areas varying in intensity and commercial orientation. Land-based 
systems involving ponds can be integrated with agriculture, improving farm 
productivity and profitability. Water-based systems use existing water bodies 
(e.g. lakes, reservoirs or rivers) and enclosures (e.g. cages and pens) and 
can provide the landless a way to enter into aquaculture (Edwards, 1999). 
Aquaculture systems are commonly characterised by the intensity of feed 
use, dividing systems into extensive, semi-intensive or intensive (Edwards, 
1999). Extensive aquaculture relies on natural food such as plankton without 
human intervention. Semi-intensive systems supplement natural food with 
organic or inorganic fertilisers and/or low-cost supplementary feed. Intensive 
systems depend on relatively high-cost feed such as small wild fish or 
formulated pelleted feed (Edwards, 1999). Although classification is based on 
feed, increasing intensification of feed is correlated with higher levels of other 
24 
 
inputs such as seed, labour, capital and management4.  Semi-intensive 
systems have favourable characteristics for poor households as they rely 
largely on natural food which can be increased by using on-farm by-products 
like manure and crop residues, produce is affordable for poor consumers, 
and intensification can be achieved using relatively cheap inorganic fertilisers 
(Edwards and Demaine, 1997). 
Aquaculture systems are also defined by commercial orientation. Lazard et 
al. (1991) (cited by Edwards and Demaine, 1997) divide systems into: 
subsistence (family-level); artisanal (producing for the market on a small-
scale); specialised (where various stages of the production cycle are 
undertaken by different farmers); and industrial. Ridler and Hishamunda 
(2001) define aquaculture as commercial when the goal is to maximise profit, 
undertaken by the private sector without direct financial assistance from 
donor or government sources. Operations aiming to minimise risk and 
maximise family utility are classified as ‘non-commercial’ (or ‘rural 
aquaculture’5) even if output is sold. In practice aquaculture occurs along a 
continuum from subsistence to completely commercial farms.  
2.2 CONCEPTUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AQUACULTURE AND 
POVERTY 
 
Aquaculture’s theoretical potential to impact on poverty has been clearly 
outlined in the literature (e.g. Edwards, 2000 and Stevenson and Irz, 2009). 
Figure 1 identifies the main direct and indirect impact pathways, between 
aquaculture development and poverty alleviation.  The main impacts are 
summarised in Table 1 below and examined in detail in the rest of the 
chapter. 
 
                                                 
 
4
 This classification is relevant to crustaceans and fin fish, not molluscs or aquatic plants. 
5
 ‘Rural aquaculture’ refers to two types of aquaculture (for the ‘poorest of the poor’ and the ‘less 
poor’) and is roughly equivalent to extensive and semi-intensive systems as defined above (Martinez-
Espinosa, 1995).  
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Direct impacts affect the welfare of aquaculture adopting households through 
for example increased regular income and fish consumption. The poverty 
impact of these benefits depends on the socio-economic status of adopting 
households and will only be significant if the poor adopt aquaculture. 
However there are many constraints to adoption for poor households 
including limited access to capital and technical knowledge, and high risks. 
Extensive or semi-intensive systems are more pro-poor than intensive 
systems, as the poor are often unable to purchase the large amounts of 
inputs such as feed and seed used in intensive systems (Irz et al., 2007a). 
 
Table 1: Summary of potential impacts of aquaculture 
Potential 
impacts 
Pathway 
Direct impacts affecting adopters 
Income Increased on-farm income from own enterprise production 
Consumption Enhanced food security and quality from increased household fish 
consumption and/or as a result of higher incomes from sale of fish 
(especially where women are producers and in control of family income) 
Farm 
sustainability 
Increased farm sustainability through Integrated Agriculture Aquaculture 
enabling more effective use of on-farm inputs  
Indirect impacts affecting non adopters 
Consumption Increased availability of fish for poor consumers 
Lower prices of fish for poor consumers (also referred to as cost of living 
linkages by Paz et al., 2006) which could also negatively affect poor 
fishermen 
Employment Increased employment of poor labourers on fish farms (potentially also 
boosting rural wage rates) 
Economic 
growth/multiplier 
Increased employment, wage and income effects in the aquaculture 
value chain through production linkages 
Increased employment, wage and income effects in other sectors 
through consumption linkages increasing the demand for locally 
produced goods and services creating an economic multiplier effect and 
boosting local economic growth 
Environmental Privatisation of previously common access grounds used by the poor, 
degradation of capture fisheries habitats etc. 
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Increased household food security through on-farm consumption of 
nutritionally rich food is an important potential direct benefit (Prein and 
Ahmed, 2000). Approximately 70 percent of Africans are both producers and 
consumers of agricultural products, generating livelihoods from small-scale, 
mixed enterprise farms producing food crops primarily for subsistence and 
secondarily for sale (World Bank, 2000). Brummett et al. (2008) suggest that 
although rarely captured in official statistics, small-scale integrated 
aquaculture systems promoted by governments and development agencies 
since the 1970s have had substantial impact on rural food security.  
Kawarazuka and Béné (2010) have developed a framework to improve 
understanding of the contribution of fisheries and aquaculture to fish 
producing households’ nutritional security. They identify three distinct 
pathways through which this may occur, through: increased fish consumption 
by producing households; increased purchasing power of producing 
households from the sale of fish enabling them to buy other food and improve 
their dietary intake; and the economic enhancement of women producers 
who are more likely to use increased family income to improve household 
food security. For each of these pathways they find the data to be limited and 
often anecdotal and decide there is not enough evidence to conclude that 
there are positive nutritional impacts on fish producing households.  
 
Systems that rely on recycled agricultural by-products and simple technology 
are said to have doubled small-farm fish production, albeit from a low base 
(Brummett and Noble, 1995; Prein et al., 1996; Lazard, 2002). Other potential 
direct benefits include increased farm sustainability through constructing 
ponds which also serve as on-farm reservoirs, and improved farm 
productivity (leading to potentially higher incomes and fish consumption) 
through Integrated Agriculture Aquaculture (IAA) technology, exploiting 
synergies between production systems, enabling more effective use of 
conventional inputs like labour, organic fertiliser and capital, along with 
conserving the environment (Edwards, 2000; Dey et al., 2007).  
 
Indirect poverty impacts affect the welfare of the poor from aquaculture 
adoption by both poor and non-poor farmers. Aquaculture development 
27 
 
increases fish supplies, potentially increasing the availability and lowering the 
price of fish in local and urban markets. This can benefit poor consumers 
including landless farm workers, smallholders, and the urban poor. As fish is 
a more nutrient efficient, and usually cheaper, protein source than livestock, it 
can be an important source of protein for the poor. Cost of living linkages can 
also occur when a significant portion of household incomes is spent on fish. 
Reduced fish prices will then lead to decreased household expenditure 
leaving more income to spend on local goods and services generating 
consumption linkages which can contribute to economic multiplier effects 
(discussed in more detail below). However, the extent of these benefits 
depends on the size of the market where production is sold and the type of 
fish produced. If output is sold locally in small and poorly integrated markets, 
price reductions could be large (benefiting consumers but not necessarily 
producers); however if production is exported, the country’s poor will not 
benefit in terms of food security and cost of living linkages will not arise. 
Further, consumption benefits will only occur if the poor, either locally or 
nationally, consume the species produced by aquaculture. If only high-value 
species are farmed, it is unlikely these potential nutritional benefits will affect 
the poor (Irz et al., 2007a).  
 
Aquaculture development can increase employment of the poor on farms, 
both full-time (e.g. farm managers or caretakers) and seasonal employment 
of unskilled labour (e.g. during harvesting). This could benefit the poor in 
countries with labour surpluses such as in Asia. Labour demand in many 
SSA countries is seasonal, especially in rural areas, and aquaculture 
enterprises can create new jobs, which may or may not be at times of peak 
agricultural labour demand, potentially decreasing seasonality in labour 
demand.  Aquaculture can also potentially increase the marginal productivity 
of labour leading to higher wage rates, further benefiting the poor. However, 
large-scale operations can be capital intensive, not generating much 
unskilled employment. Therefore, the labour intensities of different 
aquaculture systems influence their relative potentials for poverty reduction 
(Irz et al., 2007).  
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Other potential indirect benefits include employment, wage and income 
effects on other sectors, and these could benefit the poor through production, 
consumption and other growth linkages (Haggblade et al., 1991). Production 
linkages include backward linkages from the farm in demanding inputs and 
services for aquaculture production, and forward linkages from the farm in 
demanding processing, storage, and transport of production. Consumption 
linkages arise when increased farm income is spent on other goods and 
services, often in the RNFE. These linkages enable initial increases in 
aquaculture production to stimulate growth in other sectors, producing an 
economic multiplier effect. Employment creation on aquaculture farms, 
related activities and other sectors in the economy could have positive 
impacts for a range of poor people including landless farm workers, net 
labour-selling smallholders and the rural non-agricultural and urban poor. 
Growth linkages are difficult to measure and have not been estimated for the 
aquaculture sector in developing countries. However there is a large 
theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of agricultural growth on the 
RNFE and most empirical studies have estimated large agricultural 
multipliers in SSA (Delgado et al., 1998; Irz et al., 2001, Haggblade et al., 
2007a).  
 
The conceptual relationship between aquaculture development and poverty, 
elaborated above, is illustrated in Figure 1 through impact pathways. A 
distinction is made between the necessary and contingent outcomes of 
aquaculture development on poverty with the latter dependent on the context 
(Stevenson and Irz, 2009). 
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Source: Adapted from Stevenson and Irz (2009:294). 
 
2.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
Few studies have analysed aquaculture’s direct contribution to poverty and 
empirical evidence concerning aquaculture’s indirect poverty effects is mixed. 
Most studies have focused on Asia and some on Latin America, and 
evidence from SSA is limited. There is a general view that aquaculture 
promotion in SSA has largely been unsuccessful (Harrison et al., 1994; 
Edwards and Demaine, 1997; Brummett et al., 2008), while in Asia, although 
small-scale commercial aquaculture has experienced significant growth, 
generally households with better resource bases have benefited rather than 
the poor (Halwart et al., 2002).  
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2.3.1 Income effects 
Aquaculture can be a good income source for households in rural areas, 
although it is not usually the main source for most small farmers. In 
Bangladesh, Bouis (2000) found that aquaculture contributed 5 to 10 percent 
of household income.  Also in Bangladesh, Jahan and Pemsl (2011) 
estimated the total income of IAA project households receiving training and 
extension support increased annually by approximately 8 percent over the 3 
year project period compared to just less than 1 percent for non project 
households who did not receive support. This difference was due to 
increased farm and fish income. It was also found that at the end of the 
project aquaculture contributed just over 11 percent to total income for 
project farmers compared to just less than 8 percent for control farmers. In 
one of the few case studies from SSA which attempts to estimate a 
counterfactual, Dey et al. (2007) found that IAA adopting households had 1.5 
times the income of non-adopters (US$254 and US$174 respectively), due 
mainly to differences in farm income and larger farm size of IAA farmers. IAA 
farmers’ average farm income was US$185 (80% of total income), 1.8 times 
as much as non-IAA farmers’ average of US$115 (66% of total income). 10 
percent of IAA farmers’ income was from aquaculture. Intensification of 
aquaculture technology can also generate higher incomes, for example 
Ahmed and Lorica (2002) report polyculture technology using more intensive 
feed and other inputs, popular in some Asian countries, provides a larger 
share of household income compared to traditional semi-intensive 
operations.  Evidence from a 5 year WorldFish Center aquaculture project in 
Cameroon showed that average net profits of fish farms in peri-urban areas 
rose from US$150 to US$1500 over 5 years whereas those is rural areas 
rose from US$34 to US$213. One of the main reasons put forward by 
Brummett et al. (2011) for this difference was the positive impact of market 
access on the scale and intensity of fish production in peri-urban areas 
compared to rural areas. Combining aquaculture with other activities such as 
rice culture has also been found to increase incomes. The Adivasi Fisheries 
Project in Bangladesh helped to almost double profits within a year when fish 
and rice farming were integrated (WorldFish Center, 2009). 
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2.3.2 Employment effects 
Aquaculture can reduce poverty through creating low skilled jobs that are 
accessible to the poor and can increase rural wage rates (Stevenson and Irz, 
2009). However, compared to crop agriculture, labour use in aquaculture 
seems low. Ahmed and Lorica (2002) indicate most studies show 
aquaculture using very little labour, most of which is family labour. Ahmed et 
al. (1993) (cited in Ahmed and Lorica, 2002) found less than 1 percent of 
total hired labour employed by pond operators/owners in Bangladesh was 
used for aquaculture. Brummett et al. (2008) also report large-scale 
aquaculture production systems in SSA are not highly labour intensive 
requiring between 0.05 and 0.1 person-years per tonne of fish produced. 
However other studies suggest aquaculture requires higher amounts of 
labour. Ahmed and Lorica (2002) report that hired labour can be common for 
smallholder aquaculture; for example, in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, hired 
labour cost accounted for nearly 37 percent of labour costs. Shrimp farms in 
Brazil are estimated to generate higher labour demand than agriculture 
(Costa and Sampaio, 2004) while shrimp mariculture in Honduras is 
estimated to generate 100-150 person days per hectare per year (Stanley, 
2003).  Stevenson (2006) cited by Stevenson and Irz, 2009 shows labour 
intensity of aquaculture production varies substantially across farm types in 
the Philippines, estimating mean demand for hired labour on low-input 
systems at 211.5 person days per hectare per year, four times the estimate 
for larger farms. In a related study, Irz et al. (2007) found income from 
aquaculture activities (mainly from employment on aquaculture farms) in the 
Philippines benefited the poor disproportionately and reduced inequality. 
Hishamunda and Ridler (2006) suggest employment generation varies with 
the intensity of production technology, estimating extensive aquaculture in 
SSA has the same labour-land ratio as rice farming while intensive 
aquaculture uses three times more labour per hectare. There is also some 
evidence suggesting labour and land productivity is higher for aquaculture 
resulting in higher wage rates than agriculture. For example in Malawi, 
productivity of family labour in IAA activities was found to be higher than in 
off-farm activities (Dey et al., 2007). In Mexico, Singh (1999) (cited in 
Stevenson and Irz, 2009) estimated that the lowest grade of shrimp farm 
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employee earned 1.22 times the average annual income in 1996. Direct 
employment generation from aquaculture therefore seems to vary with 
technology and farm size and in some cases labour use and wage rates are 
higher than those generated by alternative activities and will likely vary by 
context. The evidence is mixed and so far, aquaculture’s impact on wages 
and labour markets in SSA has not been studied in depth. 
  
Aquaculture generates indirect employment through backward linkages (e.g. 
to hatcheries and feed suppliers) and forward linkages (e.g. to harvesting, 
post-harvest handling, processing and marketing activities) which could 
generate important employment opportunities for the poor depending on the 
degree to which aquaculture is integrated into the local economy. Empirical 
evidence is again limited and mixed. Costa and Sampaio (2004) estimated 
indirect employment generation from shrimp farming in Brazil at 1.86 jobs per 
hectare, similar to direct employment generation. However Stanley (2003) 
estimated 0.25 full-time equivalent jobs per hectare generated indirectly from 
shrimp production in Honduras. Stevenson (2006) also estimated low off-
farm employment generation by aquaculture production in the Philippines, 
with inputs accounting for 11 percent of total labour demand (260 person 
days per hectare per year) and processing accounting for 10 percent.  
 
A related aspect of aquaculture’s impact on poverty through employment 
creation concerns the role of women. While poverty affects households as a 
whole, due to the gender division of labour and their responsibilities for 
household welfare, women often bear a disproportionate burden. Poverty is 
particularly acute for women living in rural households who represent up to 
70 percent of the rural poor (IFAD, 1998) especially where they are 
household heads. Women often carry most of the responsibility for household 
food security.  Women play an important role in processing and marketing of 
agricultural goods. The extent of women’s participation in aquaculture 
production and value chains has been estimated to be relatively high. 
According to Weeratunge and Snyder’s 2009 review of the literature on 
gender and fisheries/aquaculture, women’s participation in aquaculture is 
higher than in the fisheries sector. This is especially true in Southeast Asia, 
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where women’s engagement in the aquaculture sector ranges from 42-80 
percent in Indonesia and Vietnam, and in the Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia, 
women’s participation in fish culture is 50 percent and as high as 85 percent 
in buying and selling (Weeratunge and Snyder, 2009:5). However they 
suggest there is room for increasing the engagement of women through 
better extension services, innovation policies and institutional practices 
directed at women especially in South Asia and Africa where promotion of 
aquaculture as a development strategy for women has been partially based 
on the perception that it is an extension of women’s domestic activities to be 
coordinated with housework and child care (Weeratunge and Snyder, 
2009:5). However it may not always be appropriate or beneficial for women 
to increase their engagement in new activities such as aquaculture as 
women already have heavier time burdens than men due to their 
simultaneous productive, reproductive and community roles. Women’s 
multiple roles can limit the benefits of development interventions unless 
specifically targeted to them and due consideration is given to their specific 
situations, roles and responsibilities and the context in which they operate.   
 
2.3.3 Consumption effects 
Production of low-value fish within extensive or semi-intensive systems has 
supplied large quantities of affordable fish for home consumption and 
domestic markets (Prein and Ahmed, 2000). Much of the literature reports an 
increase in household consumption of fish for those who invest in pond-
based aquaculture or in IAA systems (Prein and Ahmed, 2000). Evidence 
from Asia suggests aquaculture can significantly affect direct fish 
consumption. Dey et al. (2000) found in countries where aquaculture 
constituted a large proportion of national fish production and smallholder 
production dominated (e.g. China, Vietnam and Bangladesh), per capita fish 
consumption was significantly higher for fish-producing households than non-
producing households and the national average. In India, Kumar and Dey 
(2006) cited in Kawarazuka and Béné (2010) found the energy intake of 
households that own fish ponds to be nearly 11 percent higher than that of 
households with wage earners but no ponds, and that the undernourished 
population was 10 percent lower among fish pond owners than in the 
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comparison group. Dey et al. (2007) found that following IAA introduction in 
Malawi, IAA households consumed fresh fish and other animal protein more 
frequently than non IAA households. However no significant difference was 
found in the nutritional status of children under five, although this is a more 
long-term impact. Most studies assume increased production and 
accessibility of fish to the poor will lead to greater consumption, with resultant 
benefits to nutrition and livelihoods. Direct measurements of the nutritional 
impact of aquaculture are rarely conducted, although a recent study in 
Zomba, Malawi (Aiga et al., 2009) found that the prevalence of malnutrition 
among children was lower in fish farming households compared to non-fish 
farming households. The authors suggest that fish farming may have 
indirectly contributed to this result by increasing household purchasing power 
and enabling increased consumption of fats and oils though also cautioning 
that the causes of malnutrition are likely to be more complex. 
 
Not all studies show that aquaculture is associated with increased household 
consumption and food security. Ahmed et al. (1993) suggest that due to the 
low productivity and small fish ponds in some fish eating countries, total on-
farm production may not be enough to meet household consumption 
requirements. They highlight fish farming households in Bangladesh that still 
purchased 68-78 percent of their per capita fish requirement. Other studies 
show that fish farming households do not necessarily show any increase in 
their fish consumption for example, Roos et al. (2003) found no difference in 
total fish consumption between households engaged in domestic aquaculture 
production and non fish producing households in Kishoreganji district, 
Bangladesh from 1997 to 1998. Fish bought in the local markets and wild 
captured fish was found to represent over 90 percent of the total fish 
consumed by both groups. Kawarazuka and Béné (2010) suggest that one 
reason aquaculture may not increase household fish consumption is that 
farmed fish are not usually the same species as wild caught fish and are 
often seen as a cash crop rather than a food crop, produced to supply higher 
value markets. Income from sale of farmed fish is also not necessarily used 
to buy smaller, cheaper fish for home consumption. 
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In terms of indirect consumption effects on poor consumers, in theory 
aquaculture development could increase the consumption of protein by poor 
consumers due to decreases in the price of fish and other substitute protein 
sources like beans and wild-caught fish. Cost of living linkages will also arise 
if adoption of fish farming increases fish supply in the local market so prices 
fall, real incomes rise and are spent on local goods and services.  Fish prices 
and household incomes are important determinants of fish consumption and 
fish tend to have high income elasticities of demand (i.e. fish consumption 
rises rapidly with income), and high price elasticities of demand (i.e. fish 
consumption rises as price decreases). Dey (2000a) showed price-elastic 
demands for species such as carp and tilapia in India, Bangladesh, Thailand 
and Philippines. Evidence suggests most high-value products like shrimp 
have higher price elasticities of demand and low-value products have lower 
price elasticities (Ahmed and Lorica, 2002:132). The effect of price 
decreases on consumers differs between countries, areas, income groups 
and types of product. Dey (2000b) disaggregated fish demand by species 
and income groups for urban and rural areas in Bangladesh finding that price 
and income elasticities of demand varied across species and income groups 
between urban and rural areas but that overall demand for fish was price 
elastic. Garcia et al. (2005) found price elasticity of demand for tilapia and 
milk-fish in the Philippines was high for lower income groups, suggesting a 
price reduction would increase consumption by the poor. Studies have also 
estimated price and income elasticities of fish, rice (as a complementary 
good) and meat (as a substitute good) in Asian countries showing higher 
price and income elasticities of demand for fish, suggesting that as 
disposable income and market supply of fish increases, fish demand will 
increase at a higher rate than demand for staple goods and meat (Ahmed 
and Lorica, 2002:132). Dey (2000a) also estimated that adopting improved 
tilapia would reduce tilapia prices by between 5 and 16 percent in 
Bangladesh, Philippines, Thailand, China and Vietnam leading to increased 
fish consumption. Even if demand for fish is price inelastic and a price 
reduction does not necessarily increase demand, there would still be a 
positive effect on consumers in terms of increased consumer surplus and 
real income.  
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Despite these potential positive effects on poor consumers, there is also the 
possibility that lower fish prices could reduce income for poor fishermen. In 
countries where capture fisheries is an important livelihood for poor people, 
and where the majority of consumers are either concentrated in urban areas 
or are not poor, a price reduction of fish and fisheries products due to 
aquaculture development may have negative impacts on the poor. As noted 
by Stevenson and Irz (2009) however, this may not happen if wild and 
farmed fish are sold in separate markets. For example, Garcia et al. (2005) 
found cross-price elasticities of demand for farmed species and wild-caught 
fish in the Philippines to be very low implying lower prices for farmed fish 
would not lead to a large decrease in the price of wild-caught fish, limiting the 
impact on poor fishermen. 
 
Despite the results of these studies showing that a decrease in fish price 
would increase demand for fish, there is little evidence in the literature to 
show that aquaculture development does actually reduce fish prices and so 
benefit poor consumers.  As discussed by Kawarazuka and Béné (2010), the 
extremely limited literature on this shows that reality is more complex than 
the theory suggests. They conclude that many factors interact with market 
dynamics to either support or weaken the effect of increased farmed fish 
supply on the market price so the impact on poor consumers is unclear. The 
overall effect is complicated by the economic interactions between 
aquaculture and wild fisheries at the local level which have not been studied 
in the literature (and are beyond the scope of this thesis).  
 
2.3.4 Multiplier effects 
Aquaculture can potentially stimulate growth in other sectors via economic 
growth linkages producing an economic multiplier effect. When aquacultural 
incomes are spent on nontradable goods and services (those produced and 
consumed locally and not imported or exported to or from the area) 
consumption linkages stimulate further demand for local industry and 
services. Demand for local services, housing, durables and high-value 
agricultural products such as horticulture and livestock rise faster than 
demand for food grains when incomes rise, stimulating the RNFE. 
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Consumption linkages have been found to be the most important types of 
growth linkages, especially in SSA. However the marginal budget share 
(MBS) for non-food items (an important determinant of consumption linkages 
to the RNFE) in SSA is lower than in Asia with studies showing African 
consumers spending approximately half the percentage of Asian consumers 
of extra income on locally produced non-food items. African consumers 
spend more of their average and marginal income on rurally produced foods 
while Asian consumers have better access to rural towns due to better 
transport networks6 (Haggblade et al., 1989). 
 
Production linkages consist of backward and forward linkages. A sector’s 
backward linkage is its relationship with the rest of the economy through 
direct and indirect purchases from other sectors. The type and size of 
backward linkages depend on factors such as agricultural technology, size of 
land holding, type of commodity and whether production is rain fed or 
irrigated (Haggblade et al., 1989). In SSA, backward linkages are weaker 
than in Asia due to lower levels of mechanical input use and construction and 
maintenance associated with Asian irrigated agriculture (Haggblade et al., 
1989). In aquaculture in SSA, feed has been estimated to represent 60-65 
percent of variable costs and 45-63 percent of total costs (Hishamunda and 
Manning, 2002). As aquaculture develops, feed and seed, the two major 
inputs that often depend on imports, are increasingly supplied by local 
producers, indicating the growing importance of backward linkages from 
aquaculture (Hishamunda et al., 2009). A sector’s forward linkages represent 
its relationship with the rest of the economy through its direct and indirect 
sales to other sectors. Food processing and distribution of agricultural 
products seem to generate the largest forward linkages in rural economies 
(Haggblade et al., 1989). The availability of local resources and excess 
capacity (e.g. labour and capital) and a favourable investment climate 
facilitate a supply response from other sectors, critical for realising such links 
(World Bank, 2007).  
                                                 
 
6
 Haggblade et al. (1989) have cautioned that African linkages may be underestimated due to the 
high share of non marketed goods and services in total consumption which are thus not measured. 
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Factor market linkages include labour and capital flows. Seasonality of 
agricultural labour demand means labour availability in the RNFE increases 
when agricultural labour demand decreases and vice versa resulting in 
seasonal labour flows between the two sectors. Haggblade et al. (1989) 
estimate 20-40 percent of the rural labour force in SSA work in both farm and 
nonfarm activities. Increasing labour productivity can also lead to rising rural 
wage rates spreading benefits to labouring households in other sectors. 
Capital or investment linkages occur when increased agricultural income is 
saved and used to finance nonfarm investment, reducing vulnerability and 
increasing productivity of local activities and potential elasticity of supply 
responses crucial to consumption linkages. Evidence from Kenya and Sierra 
Leone suggests agricultural surpluses account for 15-40 percent of nonfarm 
investment funds (Haggblade et al., 1989) 
 
Agricultural multiplier effects differ depending on a country’s economic 
structure. Small economies with large tradable sectors (tradables being 
goods and services that are imported or exported to or from the area) have 
smaller multipliers than large economies with a high share of nontradable 
agriculture and services (Haggblade et al., 1989). Empirical evidence 
confirms these multipliers from agriculture, although results are mixed. No 
studies have estimated multipliers from aquaculture. Estimating agricultural 
multipliers is difficult as time-series evidence from countries with fast-growing 
agriculture cannot isolate the impact of agriculture from the many other 
changes occurring. Most attempts at quantifying multipliers rely on models 
based on strong behavioural assumptions (Haggblade et al., 1989).  
 
Delgado et al. (1998) estimated average agricultural multipliers in SSA to be 
over 2.07 (i.e. $1.00 of initial growth in rural agricultural incomes leads to an 
additional $1.00 or more of income from production in rural nontradables) 
implying the overall benefit of boosting rural incomes (e.g. from additional 
                                                 
 
7
 The study found adding US$1.00 of new farm income could increase total income in the local 
economy beyond the initial US$1.00 by an additional US$1.88 in Burkina Faso, US$1.48 in Zambia, 
US$1.24 to US$1.48 in two locations in Senegal, and US$0.96 in Niger. 
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exports) is twice as high as the immediate return from the activity promoted 
in the first place. The study used a fixed-price multiplier model which 
assumed a perfectly elastic supply of nontradable goods and services (due to 
underemployed rural resources), meaning increased demand from higher 
agricultural incomes would not increase prices and reduce the full multiplier 
effect. The assumption that the supply of nontradable goods and services is 
perfectly elastic is a stong assumption however, thus estimates from fixed-
price multiplier models are upper limits and can potentially overestimate 
multipliers by up to 30 percent.  
 
In a review of multipliers in developing countries, Haggblade et al. (2007a) 
suggest agricultural multipliers in SSA range from 1.3 to 1.5, accounting for 
the wide range of multiplier estimates from different countries using different 
methods. They note the majority of empirical studies estimate consumption 
spending accounts for approximately 80 percent of agricultural demand 
linkages while backward and forward production linkages account for the 
remainder. Hishamunda and Ridler (2006) suggest the total direct and 
indirect impact of aquaculture in SSA is likely to approximate that of 
horticulture, noting the small size of the horticulture and aquaculture sectors 
prevent them from eliminating poverty in the continent. Diao et al. (2003) 
estimated multiplier effects of productivity growth in a number of agricultural 
and non agricultural sectors in SSA using a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model and found that horticulture had the smallest multiplier effect of 
all the sectors. However, drawing on McCulloch and Ota’s 2002 assessment 
of the poverty impact of export horticulture in Kenya, Diao et al. (2003) argue 
that despite its low multiplier effect on national income, horticulture still 
impacts poverty by generating employment on the major export farms and 
enabling small-scale horticulture farmers to access credit and extension 
services. McCulloch and Ota (2002) found households involved in export 
horticulture were much better off than non-horticultural smallholders in similar 
circumstances thus while at the national level the impact of horticulture is 
likely to be small, the impact on poverty and food security at the household 
level can still be significant in particular communities due to local multiplier 
effects. By highlighting the role of increased access to credit and extension 
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services in benefiting small-holder horticulture farmers, Diao et al. (2003) 
show that linkages other than consumption and production linkages, namely 
institutional and service linkages, are also important in generating multiplier 
effects but are not included in economic models. The role of service and 
institutional linkages is examined further below. 
 
Hishamunda and Ridler (2006) note the importance of externalities, i.e. 
effects that can be attributed to a sector, but are not part of the balance sheet 
of farms. They illustrate this with a stylised example of an aquaculture sector 
with a dualistic structure comprising a few advanced commercial operations 
and many artisanal farms, similar to the aquaculture sector in many SSA 
countries. The advanced farms may produce positive externalities, 
stimulating a ‘vent for surplus’ and a movement along the learning curve for 
the artisanal farmers (as with horticulture). The result is a dynamic 
cumulative impact on the sector that spreads throughout the economy. 
Shops opening near fish farms to sell produce to workers, or transferable 
skills from training of workers on farms are positive externalities. Alternatively 
advanced farms could be ‘enclaves’ with few external benefits and even 
some negative externalities such as environmental degradation. These 
externalities, shown in Table 2 below, are part of aquaculture’s total impact. 
 
Overall, growth linkages are likely to be most beneficial for the poor when 
direct effects of increased production are equitably distributed, as poor 
consumers tend to demand more local and labour-intensive goods than 
richer consumers. Growth linkages are also stronger when agricultural 
income is a high proportion of household income, initial asset distribution is 
relatively equitable, and economic capacity is underutilised (Hazell and 
Haggblade, 1993). 
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Table 2: Linkages and externalities arising from aquaculture 
Linkages Large positive externalities, 
 ‘vent for surplus’ 
Few positive externalities, 
‘enclave’ 
Production:   
Direct High value added (local content) Low value added 
Backward Local/national inputs (feed etc.) Imported inputs 
Forward Processing Exported unprocessed goods 
Consumption High spending, particularly on 
nontradable goods 
(Expatriate) workers spend on 
imported goods 
High proportion of unskilled labour High capital labour ratio 
Investment Ownership is local and reinvestment 
occurs 
Foreign ownership and profits 
are repatriated 
Human 
capital 
Training is available/encouraged Labour is imported 
Skills transferable to other sectors Highly specialised skills required 
Secondary Infrastructure (roads, schools, health 
clinics) built either by the companies or 
by the state 
No infrastructure built 
Social disruption 
Environmental degradation 
Source: Hishamunda and Ridler (2006:408). 
 
While Table 2 outlines a wide range of growth linkages arising from 
aquaculture, and does note secondary linkages, it does not include all 
service and institutional linkages which were shown by Diao et al. (2003) to 
be important in the effect of horticulture sector growth on overall economic 
growth. Service and institutional linkages are potentially very important (Paz, 
et al., 2006). Increasing trade flows may lead to improvements in local 
services particularly communications (e.g. telecommunications and transport 
services), increased investment in infrastructure such as roads, and reduced 
unit costs for service provision due to increased demand. These 
improvements may also increase the amount of tradables in the local 
economy, reducing local beneficial effects and increasing leakages. There is 
some evidence of beneficial service linkages from aquaculture, for example 
the Aqualma project in Madagascar contributed US$1.6 million in roads, 
utilities, communications, housing and amenities to the local economy, and 
Kafue Fish Farms in Zambia contributed to local road construction 
(Hishamunda et al., 2009).   
 
Institutional linkages arise when increased agricultural production changes 
institutions, for example rules governing land ownership, water rights, or the 
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relationship between producers and buyers. These changes can be 
beneficial or damaging to different groups and potentially affect the growth of 
different sectors and livelihoods of the poor. The effects of both service and 
institutional linkages are overlooked in conventional economic input-output 
growth linkage studies.  
 
2.3.5 Linkages and pro-poor economic growth 
Figure 2 illustrates the role of linkages and leakages in a rural economy.  
 
Figure 2: Linkages and leakages in a local economy 
 
   Source: Adapted from Dorward et al. (2003:322)  
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For rural economic growth to occur, increased production of tradable 
commodities and increased productivity of nontradable goods with high 
average budget shares (ABS) is important. As tradable commodity prices are 
not established locally, increased supply does not reduce prices and 
increases producers’ revenue. As nontradable commodity prices are 
determined locally, increased supply (when demand is constant) reduces 
prices, which will not necessarily increase producers’ incomes. However if 
nontradable goods are widely consumed with high ABS (e.g. staple foods in 
poor areas) reduced prices will increase consumers’ real incomes. Figure 2 
shows how increases in real incomes of producers and consumers lead to 
increased demand for local nontradables via consumption, production and 
investment linkages, generating local employment opportunities, raising 
incomes further and contributing to a ‘virtuous circle’, multiplying the benefits 
of the original income gains (Dorward et al., 2003). Increased trade flows 
may also lead to service and institutional linkages which can further support 
this virtuous circle. 
 
The local multiplier effect will be limited by ‘leakages’. If extra income is spent 
on tradables the stimulus to local demand decreases. If local supply of 
nontradables cannot respond to increased demand due to lack of labour or 
capital, or poor market development and high transaction costs, prices will 
rise, off-setting consumers’ increased incomes. Employment and wage gains 
will also be reduced if production systems are capital or import intensive or 
benefit only a limited number of local people (Dorward et al., 2003). 
Leakages may also arise if returns to local savings and investment are low, 
due to lack of secure investment opportunities or if effective financial markets 
link the local economy with other economies.  
 
Understanding linkages and leakages helps understand markets and 
activities that will have wider indirect positive impacts on the livelihoods and 
opportunities of the poor. Dorward et al. (2003) argue that in many poorer 
areas, increasing productivity of farm activities has greater potential for 
stimulating poverty-reducing growth, whereas increased productivity of 
nonfarm activities and nontradable agricultural commodities with high MBS 
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will support secondary, consumption linkage-dependent poverty-reducing 
growth, particularly if the activities have low barriers to entry and high labour 
demands. Delgado et al. (1998) also note that improved production response 
of nontradables is important to maximise benefits from consumption linkages. 
This suggests the importance of considering changes in the context of a 
wider livelihoods perspective, which is explored in Section 2.5 below. 
 
2.3.6 Environmental effects 
Potential negative impacts of aquaculture include detrimental environmental 
and ecological effects (see Hall et al., 2011 for a review and analysis of 
environmental impacts of different aquaculture systems). These effects can 
impact on capture fisheries, affecting poor artisanal fishermen due to: habitat 
modification e.g. mangrove loss; use of wild seed to stock aquaculture 
ponds; food web interactions e.g. overexploitation of small pelagics for 
fishmeal; introduction of non-indigenous organisms leading to hybridisation of 
farmed stocks with wild, causing genetic pollution through loss of adaptive 
traits; and effluent discharge which can cause problems in coastal areas 
(Naylor et al., 2000). Linking these potential ecological impacts to the 
livelihoods of poor fishermen has, however, not been established 
convincingly in the literature.  
 
2.3.7 Direct and indirect effects 
The previous sections have shown that there is a wide range of direct and 
indirect ways through which aquaculture can impact on poverty. However, 
the relative importance of these impact pathways and the type of growth 
strategy which will maximise indirect effects via growth linkages has not been 
explored in the literature on aquaculture development. In agriculture, there 
has been a debate amongst development economists about the relative 
importance of the direct and indirect effects of changes in technology on 
reducing poverty with implications for the target groups of research and 
policies. For example Alston et al. (1995) argue technology’s main benefit is 
increasing food supply and lowering prices. Thus they suggest research 
should focus on maximising output, most likely to be achieved by focusing on 
larger farmers in more productive areas, leaving the issue of poverty 
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reduction of smallholders to other interventions. Others like Fan and Hazell 
(2002) argue that direct effects are the most important for poverty alleviation 
and attention should be focused on resource poor farmers in marginal areas 
where research has been minimal. 
  
Empirical evidence suggests the strength of agricultural growth linkages 
depends on a range of conditioning factors. Due to the strength of 
consumption linkages, consumption preferences of the farmers receiving the 
initial income boost and their propensity to consume local goods as opposed 
to imports, are extremely important to the spatial distribution of indirect 
income gains (Haggblade et al., 2007a:169). Many studies have tried to 
identify the farmer groups that offer the strongest local consumption linkages. 
Mellor and Lele (1972) looked at MBS by rural expenditure deciles in India 
and found higher-income rural people and the dominant cultivator class 
generated the largest consumption linkages. Hazell and Roell (1983) 
analysed MBS by farm size in Malaysia and Nigeria and found larger farmers 
(or according to them medium-sized farmers by most standards) generated 
the largest consumption linkages.  
 
In a review of the linkage literature, Tomich et al. (1995) suggest small 
farmers generate the strongest consumption linkages. Many others have also 
supported a small-farm focus in agriculture-led growth, which Mellor and 
Johnston (1984) referred to as a ‘unimodal’ growth strategy. However the 
term unimodal seems to cover a wide range of farm sizes and types of 
consumers, leading to confusion. Haggblade et al. (2007a:169) suggest this 
is partly due to differing farm sizes in different parts of the world and because 
consumption data is often collected by expenditure class rather than farm 
size, and these classes do not necessarily correspond.  They suggest that 
ultimately farmers who consume locally produced goods and services and 
send their children to school locally produce the largest rural consumption 
linkages. Thus the targeting of different categories of farmers will have 
important implications for the size and nature of nonfarm spinoffs arising from 
agricultural (and aquaculture) growth (Haggblade et al., 2007a). 
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Moehl et al. (2006) suggest that to maximise aquaculture’s impact on poverty 
in SSA, focus should be placed on SMEs. They argue SMEs are the most 
effective economic growth engines with the highest potential to maximise 
poverty impacts of aquaculture development, implying indirect effects are 
more important than direct effects. Brummett et al. (2008) also support this 
argument noting that although small-scale semi-intensive aquaculture 
systems can create important direct benefits for poor producers such as 
increased household food security, artisanal farmers create little or no 
economic growth as they generate minimal cash revenues and little liquid 
capital for reinvestment and expansion, unlike SMEs. They also suggest 
large-scale systems have relatively less economic impact and tend to 
concentrate wealth more than would a larger number of smaller-scale 
investments. Thus they argue for a stronger focus on the growth of a SME 
aquaculture sector that can make the most of the secondary economic 
opportunities created through the aquaculture value chain and maximise the 
impact of growth linkages and employment opportunities on the poor. These 
views represent an emerging paradigm in aquaculture development of 
shifting support from small-scale artisanal farming to larger more commercial 
SMEs, explored below. 
  
2.4 THE EMERGING PARADIGM IN AQUACULTURE DEVELOPMENT 
 
A number of authors (Moehl et al., 2006; Brummett et al., 2008; Little et al., 
2012) have highlighted the failure of aid over the past few decades to 
develop the aquaculture sector in SSA. Moehl et al. (2006) present a detailed 
summary of donor support of aquaculture in SSA from the 1980s onwards. 
They indicate that much of this support was focused on family fishponds and 
in some cases larger commercial scale farms. From 1980 to the mid 1990s 
aid was directed to institutional support and capacity building, subsidising 
existing national government aquaculture activities, building infrastructure 
such as hatcheries and government stations, and supporting the Training and 
Visit system (a popular model for extension at the time but now widely 
regarded as ineffective, inefficient and unsustainable (Anderson and Feder, 
2004)). However by the end of the 1980s many of the larger farms had folded 
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while small-scale production continued, albeit heavily subsidised. Donors 
became disappointed by the apparent failure of small-scale aquaculture to 
meet often unrealistic expectations of increased food security and economic 
growth and by the mid 1990s donor support was at its lowest (Moehl et al., 
2006).  
 
Brummett et al. (2008) indicate that aquaculture support to SSA was poorly 
managed for example, much of the aid was invested in infrastructure which 
failed to perform thus did not create positive or sustainable outcomes. 
Beveridge et al. (2010) suggest that the relative failure of African aquaculture 
compared to Asia, was due to factors such as the different market conditions 
between the two and also the focus on smallholder aquaculture in SSA 
driven by external support. Like Brummett et al. (2008) they note that small-
scale aquaculture may have had some positive community level impacts, but 
did not lead to growth in national fish production. Belton and Little (2011:476) 
contend that there were three main conditions that contributed to the growth 
of commercial aquaculture in South East Asia: high demand for aquaculture 
products; readily available factors of production to enable supply to meet the 
demand: and the development of infrastructure, networks and governance 
needed for export, to deliver products to market. They argue that these three 
conditions are in fact related to the status of general economic development 
and the policies that have the greatest effect on aquaculture are those which 
are not specific to the sector but are rather geared towards general 
development in the areas of trade and investment. Thus it could be 
suggested that the relative failure of the aquaculture sector to develop in SSA 
is not due simply to the misdirecting of aid to the wrong type of farmer, but 
due to a range of other factors, not all specific to the sector, such as 
unfavourable market, infrastructure and governance conditions along with 
mismanaged aid. It could also be hypothesised that demand for fish is 
unlikely to pick up until labour productivity in staple food production and 
hence real incomes rise and stimulate demand for fish. 
 
By the end of the 1990s private sector investment in aquaculture in some 
SSA countries had again been established and, driven by increasing urban 
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demand for aquatic products, has been growing ever since (Moehl et al., 
2006). However the focus on small-scale farmers of past decades and the 
underlying assumption that smallholder aquaculture development has more 
potential to reduce poverty than the indirect poverty impacts generated by 
larger commercial farms through employment and economic growth is being 
challenged in the light of past experience. There is a drive to move beyond 
support to small-scale artisanal farming to more commercial forms of 
aquaculture. Moehl et al. (2006) argue for a shift from ‘non commercial’ to 
‘commercial’ aquaculture, defining ‘non commercial’ aquaculture as ‘farm 
ponds’ i.e. farmers with ponds. These farmers view aquaculture as one 
component of a diversified farming system which serves to reduce risk, 
improve farm sustainability and act as a ‘bank’ or store of wealth like 
livestock, and do not run their aquaculture operations as a business. 
‘Commercial’ farmers are those who are primarily fish farmers of any scale 
but who manage their fish farm as a business with profit being the primary 
goal.  As noted above, Brummett et al. (2008) argue that due to the limited 
potential for economic growth from dispersed small-scale rural farmers, 
support should focus on developing the SME sector and associated value 
chains if aquaculture’s potential in SSA is to be realised. Little et al. (2012) 
highlight the emerging consensus supporting a shift away from the ‘small-
farm first’ paradigm based on research from the past decade which supports 
the hypothesis that commercially oriented ‘quasi capitalist’ aquaculture has 
more potential to impact on poverty through employment generation in the 
value chain compared to the potential benefits from small-scale artisanal or 
‘non commercial’ ‘quasi peasant’ aquaculture (Belton et al., 2012). They note 
that the poor mostly do not benefit directly from rural aquaculture as 
generally, they are not producers, rather they benefit indirectly through 
employment on-farm and along the value chain. Beveridge et al. (2010) also 
agree that more commercial SMEs are better able to impact on food security 
and generate employment throughout the value chain especially where there 
is strong and accessible market demand. They do however still see a role for 
small-scale aquaculture which they suggest may not impact on national fish 
production, but should be supported where it provides a viable crop 
alternative for improving livelihoods. 
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Despite this emerging consensus, aquaculture SMEs do not appear to have 
received much attention from African governments or international donors as 
they are not perceived to represent the poor (Brummett et al., 2008). This 
could also partly be because a strong case, supported by empirical evidence 
and rigorous assessment of the relative importance of direct and indirect 
poverty impact pathways of different types of aquaculture development in 
SSA, has yet to be made.  As noted above, empirical evidence on the direct 
impact of aquaculture on poverty in SSA is limited and the actual and 
potential contributions of aquaculture to poor people’s livelihoods in SSA 
have not been fully assessed. There is inadequate documented evidence of 
direct poverty reducing impacts of aquaculture, especially studies with 
rigorous counterfactuals which can overcome the attribution problem and 
establish causality, let alone of the indirect effects and the strength of 
multiplier effects of SME development. Overall the existing empirical 
evidence is mixed, indicating the contribution of aquaculture to poverty 
alleviation and economic growth is highly context specific.  
 
The range of contextual factors on which the relative importance of the 
various ‘contingent’ direct and indirect effects of aquaculture on poverty is 
likely to depend, include the distribution of poverty between rural and urban 
areas, market structure, agrarian structure, infrastructural and institutional 
development, geographic concentration of the poor, economic policies, and 
the extent to which aquaculture products are important in incomes of poor 
producers or expenditures of poor consumers (Byerlee, 2000).  The extent to 
which aquaculture growth will stimulate growth in other sectors depends on a 
variety of structural features of the rural economy. Haggblade et al., 
(2007a:171) suggest the following ‘conditioners’ that strengthen linkages: 
- entrepreneurial and technical skills to enable a supply response from 
the RNFE 
- good rural infrastructure to facilitate communication, transport and 
credit flows and improve the responsiveness of the RNFE to increases 
in demand  
- increasing population density favouring local production enabling 
minimum efficient scales of production to be reached more easily, 
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reducing transport costs and improving supply response from the 
RNFE 
- a policy environment that supports RNFE enterprise growth 
- a high marginal propensity to purchase non foods (this increases with 
average per capita income levels). 
 
Conceptualising and measuring direct and indirect impacts of aquaculture 
development on poverty and pro-poor economic growth, and assessing how 
these impacts could be maximised, is necessary if aquaculture is to 
effectively reduce poverty. Detailed analysis is required to understand how 
the nature of the aquaculture system adopted, the structure of poverty, and 
the economic and institutional context, influence aquaculture’s impact on 
different groups (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2002).  
 
The preceding review of the literature on aquaculture’s impact on poverty has 
highlighted its limited nature, especially in the literature relating to SSA. Few 
studies have conducted detailed analyses of aquaculture’s direct contribution 
to poverty and the evidence concerning aquaculture’s indirect poverty effects 
is limited and inconclusive. Some of aquaculture’s important potential 
impacts, such as the economic multiplier effects arising from different types 
of aquaculture development, have barely been studied. In order to further 
explore ways in which to examine the full range of potential impacts of 
aquaculture on poverty, the following sections of this chapter investigate 
some aspects of the broader literature on rural development and poverty, 
specifically relating to livelihood enhancement and institutional development. 
These distinct but related sets of literature help to inform the ways in which 
aquaculture’s impact on poverty is conceptualised and investigated in this 
thesis. Consideration of findings from both the aquaculture and agriculture 
sectors also assists in the development of hypotheses on what the poverty 
impacts of aquaculture might be (presented in Section 2.7.2). 
  
 
 
 
51 
 
2.5 A LIVELIHOODS PERSPECTIVE 
 
Livelihoods perspectives represent an important way in which to examine 
complex rural development questions, such as those related to aquaculture’s 
actual and potential impact on poverty and the institutions required for pro-
poor aquaculture development. Amongst other things livelihoods 
perspectives allow a holistic understanding of poverty to be used, 
incorporating more than the conventional income and consumption based 
approaches found in much of the aquaculture and poverty literature.  
Perceptions about poverty have changed over the past decades to more 
multidimensional understandings, focusing on aspects of poverty that are 
important to poor people themselves. Apart from low income, poverty can 
include food insecurity, social inferiority and exclusion, lack of assets and 
vulnerability (La Rovere and Dixon, 2007).  Well-being is an important 
concept for understanding poverty and refers to quality of life which includes 
the full spectrum of human experience: social, mental, spiritual and material. 
Each individual may define well-being differently and Chambers (1997) 
argues that well-being for all is the objective of development.  Two basic 
components of well-being are secure livelihoods to meet basic needs, and 
realising and expanding one’s capabilities to achieve fulfilment (Sen, 1981, 
1993; Chambers, 1997; Kerr and Kolavalli, 1999). Findings of the World 
Bank’s participatory poverty assessments in different countries indicate that 
poor people consider poverty as ill-being, in terms of factors such as 
vulnerability, physical and social isolation, lack of security, lack of self-
respect, powerlessness and lack of dignity (Kerr and Kolavalli, 1999; 
Narayan et al., 2000; World Bank, 2002). Vulnerability, which is related to 
risk, is an important concept in understanding poverty. People are vulnerable 
to poverty when they face risks at different levels. At the household level this 
could be illness, at the community or wider level risk could be related to 
weather, and at the national level risks could be related to policy changes 
affecting costs of inputs or outputs. Concepts such as vulnerability, social 
exclusion and empowerment are all part of this multidimensional view of 
poverty and should be kept in mind when assessing impacts of policies, 
technology change and development interventions on poverty alleviation.   
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This broader understanding of poverty has contributed to the emergence of 
‘livelihoods’ as a way of conceptualising the multiple economic activities poor 
people undertake, defined as ‘the capabilities, assets (both material and 
social resources), and activities required for a means of living’ (DfID, 1999). A 
livelihood is sustainable when ‘it can cope with and recover from stresses 
and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and 
in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base’  (DfID, 1999) 
(this definition is based on a paper by Chambers and Conway in 1992).  The 
Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) (Carney, 1998) has been widely 
used for over a decade to analyse the causes of poverty, peoples’ access to 
resources and their diverse livelihoods activities, strategies and outcomes.  
 
There are a number of sustainable livelihoods frameworks that take an 
asset/vulnerability approach to the analysis of poor people’s livelihoods. The 
DfID SLF identifies five types of assets or capitals (human, social, natural, 
physical and financial capital) which are influenced by a particular 
vulnerability context, including trends, shocks and seasonality. The 
framework also includes a set of policies, institutions and processes that 
influence and are influenced by people’s livelihood strategies. Based on the 
interactions between these elements, the framework defines a set of 
livelihood outcomes or poverty indicators which go beyond simple income 
and consumption measures as noted above (Kanji et al., 2005). 
 
Scoones (2009) has noted that livelihoods perspectives are less prominent 
now than a decade ago. He suggests that failure of these perspectives to 
engage with more macro processes of economic globalisation, politics and 
governance debates, environmental sustainability and climate change, and 
fundamental transformatory shifts in rural economies and wider agrarian 
change has resulted in a refocusing of research and policy from more 
contextual livelihood perspectives, often back to macroeconomic analyses. In 
order to address these failures and be responsive to new contexts, Scoones 
(2009) sees the need for livelihoods perspectives to focus more explicitly on 
concerns of knowledge, politics, scale and dynamics. Dorward et al. (2003) 
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also highlight an important weakness in the original SLF arguing that it lacks 
emphasis on markets and their role in livelihood development. Considering 
the importance of markets to livelihoods, their frequent failure to serve poor 
people’s interests, and the dependence of livelihood development on 
demand for livelihood outputs, this gap could lead to failure to identify and act 
on livelihood opportunities and constraints arising from critical market 
processes that are important for pro-poor market development. Their 
approach is informed by the linkages between processes of livelihood 
change and market access, and wider processes of growth whereby 
production, consumption and other linkages allow increased production or 
market opportunity to feed back into increased demand for labour and locally 
produced goods and services producing a multiplier effect (as discussed in 
Sections 2.3.4 and 2.3.5 above). These linkages are overlooked by the 
traditional SLF.  
 
Their modified SLF approach is also influenced by New Institutional 
Economic (NIE) theory which: highlights the role of institutional development 
in livelihood enhancement and economic growth, viewing markets as one 
type of institution for economic coordination and exchange; enables analysis 
of the institutional causes and effects of vulnerability; emphasises 
development of institutional arrangements; and provides a framework for 
investigating the institutional requirements and context of technological 
change. The modified SLF of Dorward et al. (2003), shown in Figure 3, 
therefore enables a clearer understanding of the markets and activities that 
will have wider positive impacts on poor people’s livelihoods and 
opportunities.  
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Figure 3: Modified Sustainable Livelihoods Framework 
 
Source: Dorward et al. (2003:327) 
 
As mentioned above, within the SLF people operate within a context of 
vulnerability to sudden shocks in the physical environment (drought, flood, or 
typhoons), or longer term trends in the economic environment or resources, 
which can reduce household assets.  
 
The five assets which form the basis of people’s livelihoods are: 
- Natural capital  e.g. land, water, forests, marine resources, air quality, 
erosion protection, and biodiversity 
- Physical capital e.g. transportation, roads, buildings, shelter, water 
supply and sanitation, energy, technology, and communication 
- Financial capital e.g. as savings (cash and liquid assets), credit 
(formal and informal), and inflows (state transfers and remittances) 
- Human capital e.g. as education, skills, knowledge, health, nutrition, 
and labour power  
- Social capital which includes any networks that increase trust, ability 
to work together, access to opportunities, reciprocity; informal safety 
nets; and membership in organisations. 
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The effects of policies and institutions on institutional interactions between 
assets, activities, outputs and outcomes are emphasised along with 
interactions between access, markets, power, rights and services. Policies 
and institutions may affect access to any livelihood component (e.g. access 
to demand, different assets, benefits from livelihoods and technologies). This 
framework can also analyse effects of power, processes and incentives for 
institutional and technical change; and reasons for, and effects of, current 
institutional arrangements. Livelihood assets interact with the vulnerability 
context and policies and institutions, which also interact with each other, 
affecting all livelihood components.  
 
Livelihood strategies develop in response to people’s asset situation, the 
vulnerability context, and prevailing policies and institutions. Strategies 
consist of activities which utilise inputs (including assets) to produce outputs, 
e.g. migration, off-farm or urban employment, crop diversification or 
intensification, often combining farm and nonfarm activities. Technology’s 
role in changing input: output (or asset: output) relations is important. 
Demand for livelihood outputs is critical for livelihood development and the 
extent and nature of this demand is central to determining immediate and 
longer term impacts and sustainability of livelihood activities. Demand must 
be effective and can be: mediated through markets or other institutional 
mechanisms; embedded in the local or wider economy resulting in different 
linkage characteristics; and affected by livelihood outcomes.  
 
Livelihood outcomes are the types of poverty impacts that are of interest in 
this thesis, both traditional indicators such as income and food security, and 
broader outcomes such as strengthened asset base and reduced 
vulnerability which all feed back into the vulnerability status and future asset 
base.  Changes in other factors affecting livelihoods such as institutional 
structures or processes, the resilience or vulnerability of households and 
livelihood strategies are also important using a livelihoods framework to 
assess aquaculture’s impact on poverty. 
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The modified SLF framework of Dorward et al. (2003), with its emphasis on 
markets and institutions, facilitates the linking of micro and macro processes 
more explicitly than the original SLF and so address some of the concerns of 
Scoones (2009) mentioned above. Scoones argues that one of the 
shortcomings of livelihoods approaches has been the failure to address 
wider, global processes such as globalisation and their effect on livelihoods 
at the local level. However with an emphasis on markets, economic linkages 
and broader processes of growth, the modified SLF goes some way to 
addressing this concern. The modified SLF’s focus on markets as one type of 
institution, and the importance placed on other institutional arrangements 
between actors and the institutional and policy environment at district, 
national and sometimes even international levels, also speaks to this concern 
of scale. Another shortcoming that Scoones identifies is the lack of attention 
placed on power and politics.  The modified SLF places the role of institutions 
more centrally than the original SLF. Peoples’ access to assets is mediated 
by institutions and social relations, which are in turn mediated by power 
relations. The importance placed on institutional and governance 
arrangements in the modified SLF thus also highlights the key relationships 
between livelihoods, power and politics.   
 
Finally, including effective demand (from the local or wider economy) and 
markets within the modified SLF reflects the importance of linkages between 
processes of livelihood change, market access, and wider growth processes.  
Analysing linkages gives important insights into the indirect impacts of growth 
in one sector on different elements of the rural economy and local economic 
growth. To understand aquaculture’s indirect effects on pro-poor economic 
growth the nature and importance of linkages arising from different types of 
aquaculture development must be understood. As already noted, there is 
limited literature on aquaculture linkages, but the large theoretical and 
empirical literature assessing farm nonfarm/RNFE linkages within developing 
country rural economies (reviews include: Delgado et al., 1998; Haggblade et 
al., 2007a and 2007b) introduced above in Section 2.3.4, can be used to 
conceptualise the range of linkages arising from aquaculture and their 
potential importance for pro-poor economic growth.  
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2.6 THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
The SLF highlights the role of institutions in mediating people’s access to the 
assets they depend on for their livelihoods. Edwards (2000) has suggested 
that it is socio-economic and institutional, rather than technological factors 
that are constraining aquaculture’s contribution to rural development. Little 
research has been done on the role of institutions in aquaculture 
development, although over the last two decades institutions have been 
increasingly recognised as important in influencing economic behaviour and 
processes of economic growth (Nabli and Nugent, 1989; Poulton et al., 1998; 
North, 1990; World Bank, 2002; Dorward et al., 2005a). 
  
2.6.1 Institutions, New Institutional Economics and transaction costs 
Institutions, defined as the ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990), influence the 
incentives and actions affecting people’s behaviour (e.g. land tenure 
arrangements, procedures for approval and release of new seed varieties or 
laws). Institutions are not ‘organisations’ which are the ‘players in the game’. 
Institutions are formal or informal and are described at two levels (Davis and 
North, 1971:6-7): 
 
 The institutional environment is the set of fundamental political, social 
and legal ground rules that establishes the basis for production, 
exchange and distribution.  Rules governing elections, property rights, 
and the right of contract are examples of the type of ground rules that 
make up the economic environment 
and: 
 An institutional arrangement is an arrangement between economic 
units that governs the ways in which these units can cooperate and/or 
compete. 
 
The institutional environment describes the set of institutions within which 
particular groups operate, determining the way markets exchange and 
institutions develop. Institutional arrangements describe the actual 
mechanisms for exchange and coordination in an economy e.g. markets. 
Exchange can be conducted through non-market channels involving formal 
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or informal contracts, agreements or understandings. Coordination can also 
be formally or informally established through market mechanisms, within 
firms, or through state or collective actions.  
 
Institutions reduce uncertainty inherent in human interaction and help 
overcome market failures caused by high transaction costs and risks8 
(Dorward et al., 1998b). These are influenced by imperfect information and 
opportunistic behaviour of trading partners. Williamson (1991) suggests 
transaction costs depend on the degree of asset specificity9, uncertainty10 
and transaction frequency11.  If transaction costs are prohibitively high, 
producers and traders will not engage in markets (de Janvry et al., 1991) 
leading to low levels of economic activity, constraining economic 
development, potentially resulting in a ‘low equilibrium trap’ (Dorward et al., 
2003). The key importance of institutions in economic development therefore 
lies in their transaction cost minimising role (Dorward et al., 2000). 
 
Standard neo-classical economics starts from assumptions about perfectly 
competitive markets and focuses on minimising transformation costs for 
market players to gain competitive advantage, placing no importance on 
transaction costs or institutions.  In reality, markets are not perfect, especially 
in poor rural areas of developing countries where transaction risks are high, 
information is costly, and the institutional environment is weak. Where 
transaction costs are high and one or more parties are risk averse, market 
arrangements may not be viable and non-market arrangements may be more 
                                                 
 
8
 The costs incurred by trading partners associated with the exchange of goods and services and 
exchange risks are comprised of: ex ante costs of arranging a contract  (acquiring information, 
establishing relations, agreeing  contract); costs of transferring ownership of transacted goods (legal 
costs, communication costs); and ex post costs of contract monitoring, adjusting and  enforcement. If 
transaction costs and risks plus transformation (production) costs and risks exceed returns, there will 
be no transaction and a missing market. 
9
 The more specific the asset, the higher the cost of transferring it to the next best use. Thus with a 
more specific asset there will be a higher cost involved in minimising the risk of transaction failure as 
the asset owner will spend more to ensure the transaction is successful. 
10
 Which influences the costs of searching for information, screening, negotiating, bargaining and 
monitoring contracts 
11
 For a transaction of a given size, a one off transaction will have higher transaction costs than a 
transaction that will be repeated. Thus increased transaction frequency spreads the fixed costs of a 
relationship between trading partners over more transactions. 
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efficient than market failure. This is overlooked in standard neo-classical 
analysis, NIE thus offers a more comprehensive framework in which to 
explore market development, economic growth and poverty alleviation in 
developing countries.  
 
2.6.2 Coordination  
Dorward et al. (2005a) argue that focusing only on developing competitive 
markets is inefficient in promoting growth and unlikely to achieve pro-poor 
growth as markets are just one type of institution. They suggest other 
institutions may be more effective at fulfilling market functions in economies 
with weak institutional environments (such as Ghana) where some markets 
may not perform at all. Dorward et al. (2005b) suggest coordination is a 
central challenge facing smallholder agricultural development and is vital to 
achieve rapid pro-poor growth. Poulton and Lyne (2009) explore vertical, 
horizontal and complementary coordination for market development. 
 
2.6.3 Commodity techno-economic characteristics 
Coordination incentives vary between innovations and crops. Jaffee and 
Morton (1995) argue that the organisation and performance of private sector 
marketing and processing and the institutional arrangements developed by 
transacting parties are influenced by ‘distinctive techno-economic 
characteristics of the individual commodities’. These characteristics affect 
transaction costs (and hence demand for institutions) by influencing asset 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency of transaction in production and 
marketing. Institutional requirements, the need for coordination mechanisms 
and the relevance of non-market institutional arrangements increase with 
demanding techno-economic characteristics. Dorward (2001) separates 
these characteristics into transaction characteristics (e.g. volume and 
frequency, uncertainty and bounded rationality, asset specificity, and scope 
for opportunism) and commodity characteristics (e.g. price and volume 
(production) uncertainty, perishability, processing and storage requirements, 
quality, seasonality, economies of scale, the supply chain and the 
commodity’s place in it and government interventions). 
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Jaffee and Morton (1995) applied a transaction cost analysis to marketing of 
high-value crops in SSA, hypothesising that the range of feasible institutional 
arrangements for commodities posing inherent problems for quality control 
and vertical coordination and associated with economies of scale in 
production and/or processing would be limited to vertically integrated or 
contract–based systems. For commodities with less demanding 
characteristics, decentralised, small-scale trading and processing operations 
could well be the institutional norm. This approach has been used in several 
studies on agricultural marketing, e.g. on potato in Egypt (Loader, 1996), 
cashew in southern Tanzania (Poulton, 1998a), cotton in northern Ghana 
(Poulton, 1998b) and cotton and wheat in Pakistan (Stockbridge et al., 1998). 
 
2.6.4 Technology and institutions 
This discussion has important implications for promoting new technologies 
and commodities in poor rural areas. High transaction costs may make some 
opportunities like aquaculture non-viable. The environment and commodity 
and players’ characteristics affect preferences for and negotiations over 
institutional arrangements which affect the incentives for different players to 
take up new technologies or commodities (Dorward et al., 2000).   
 
Dorward et al., (2000) explore the effects of institutional development and 
‘linkage intensity’ of technology on uptake. Technologies with low ‘linkage 
intensity’ do not need many resources brought into the farm or sophisticated 
market chains to reach consumers (e.g. subsistence crops - point A in Figure 
4). Technologies with high ‘linkage intensity’ need resources brought into 
farms and market chains to reach consumers (e.g. high input cotton 
production - point B in Figure 4).  Where institutions are developed, a wide 
range of technologies and activities may be possible and inputs and outputs 
will be traded in competitive markets. Where institutions are less developed 
(and players face greater risks) markets may not be effective, and vertical 
linkages may be needed to reduce transaction costs. Alternatively, 
transaction costs may be too great, leading to market failure. Therefore, 
technologies and production systems must ‘fit’ the institutional environment of 
farmers.  
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Figure 4: Technological linkage intensity, markets and institutional fit 
 
Source: Dorward et al. (2000:102). 
 
Limited institutional development in countries such as Ghana, especially in 
rural areas, is likely to constrain development of commodity systems like 
aquaculture.  Aquaculture products have institutionally demanding techno-
economic characteristics (e.g. perishability, quality requirements, use of 
multiple inputs, need for cold chain, sale and transport of live fish etc.), 
especially if products are exported. Institutional innovation is needed to 
enable aquaculture to ‘fit’ (shown by the arrow above point C in Figure 4) the 
institutional context and provide incentives for aquaculture uptake. 
Institutional innovation must be efficient, equitable, sustainable, and 
compatible with existing institutions. Assessing the role of institutional 
innovations in developing aquaculture systems is thus central to maximising 
aquaculture’s potential effects on poverty in Ghana.   
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2.7 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
2.7.1 Gaps in the literature 
The problem statement outlined in Chapter 1 proposed that aquaculture has 
a significant role to play in rural development and poverty alleviation. The 
review of the literature related to aquaculture’s impact on poverty above 
found that the empirical evidence of aquaculture’s impact on poverty is 
limited, especially in SSA, and highlighted a number of gaps in the literature. 
It showed that even though there are some examples of aquaculture’s 
influence on poverty, mainly from Asia and Latin America, there is little 
documented evidence of direct poverty reducing impacts, and few studies 
investigate causality with reliable counterfactuals. These studies also tend to 
look at narrow indicators of poverty such as income rather than taking a more 
holistic approach to poverty and livelihoods. Furthermore, evidence from Asia 
suggests that it is the better resourced farmers who are able to adopt 
aquaculture and from the few studies from SSA it does not seem clear 
whether poor farmers are also able to adopt and sustain aquaculture without 
outside assistance.  
 
The literature review further revealed limited and mixed evidence on indirect 
employment effects, either through direct employment on SME and large-
scale farms or through employment along the value chain. Again, studies 
have focused mainly on Asia and South America, not on SSA. Evidence on 
direct and indirect consumption effects was also found to be limited and 
inconclusive. While most studies found that household fish consumption 
increased in fish producing households compared to non fish producing 
households, other studies found this not to be the case. Kawarazuka and 
Béné (2010) suggest quite plausibly that aquaculture’s impact on household 
fish consumption will depend on the type of fish that is produced compared to 
the locally consumed wild caught fish and the role the farmed fish plays, 
either as a cash crop or a food crop. The literature on indirect effects of 
aquaculture on poor consumers is also scarce. While quite a few theoretical 
studies show price elastic demands for fish, there is little evidence to show 
that aquaculture development reduces fish prices in reality due to the 
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complex economic relationship between aquaculture and wild fisheries at the 
local level, and this has not been studied.  
 
The literature review also discovered that there has been no study at all of a 
potentially significant type of indirect impact related to growth linkages arising 
from aquaculture and the potential economic multiplier effect. There is a large 
theoretical and empirical literature on agriculture growth linkages, reviewed 
above, confirming these multipliers from agriculture, but no studies have 
estimated multipliers from aquaculture.  Despite the fact that multiplier effects 
arising from aquaculture development have not been estimated, promotion of 
aquaculture SMEs over small-scale artisanal farmers is increasingly being 
supported by some, based on an untested assumption that local economic 
growth effect will be stronger from the development of aquaculture SMEs 
rather than from small-scale artisanal fish farming. 
  
Finally, the literature review found that even though it has been suggested 
that institutional rather than technological factors are constraining 
aquaculture’s contribution to rural development, and even though the SLF, a 
dominant approach in rural development for at least a decade, highlights the 
important role of institutions in people’s livelihood strategies and outcomes, 
little research has been done on the role of institutions in aquaculture 
development. 
 
2.7.2 Research objectives 
This thesis aims to understand the actual and potential impacts of different 
types of aquaculture development on poverty and livelihoods in SSA and the 
institutions required for these types of aquaculture development to maximise 
their potential poverty impact, using aquaculture development in Ghana as a 
case study. This overall objective has developed from the observation that 
various actors in the development sector are promoting aquaculture as a 
means for poverty alleviation in SSA even though there is currently a 
shortage of evidence of aquaculture’s impact on poverty in SSA and even 
less on which type of aquaculture development would have the strongest 
potential to impact on poverty. A review of the literature has confirmed the 
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lack of empirical evidence of aquaculture’s impact on poverty in SSA and has 
revealed major gaps.  
 
This section elaborates on the three main research objectives of this thesis. 
These objectives seek to: i) fill some of the gaps identified in the literature as 
highlighted in Section 2.7.1; and ii) contribute to the debate surrounding the 
emerging paradigm of broadening support towards more commercial 
aquaculture, as discussed in Section 2.4 above. Each research objective has 
alongside it a hypothesis that is tested by this thesis. These hypotheses have 
been informed by the literature on both aquaculture and agriculture, as 
reviewed above. 
 
Objective 1 
To assess the direct poverty and livelihood impacts (positive and negative) of 
small-scale aquaculture systems on different categories of poor people in 
Ghana. 
 
Hypothesis 1  
Small-scale aquaculture has positive direct impacts on poverty and 
livelihoods of poor households in Ashanti Region, Ghana. The magnitude of 
these impacts depends on the livelihood characteristics and production 
systems of small-scale farmers, and the institutional and infrastructure 
context. 
 
Hypothesis testing 
The hypothesis is tested using the SLF. Poor fish farming households are 
first identified to see whether the poor have been able to adopt aquaculture 
and thus have the potential to benefit directly from aquaculture. The 
livelihood characteristics, capital assets, activities and livelihood strategies of 
poor and non-poor, small-scale fish farmers and a comparison group of non-
fish farmers are then investigated and compared. Fish farming as a livelihood 
activity is explored along with the perceived benefits for adopting households 
and the community. The difference in livelihood outcomes such as income 
and food security between fish farming and non-fish farming households is 
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then compared to identify any significant differences between fish farming 
and non-fish farming households which could indicate that fish farming 
households are better off than non-fish farming households. However these 
comparisons do not account for possible differences in household 
characteristics, other than participation in fish farming, which may cause 
differences in poverty status and livelihood outcome indicators between fish 
farming and non-fish farming households. Thus an Income Determination 
Model is used to control for differences in observable characteristics between 
households and assess the factors that contribute to differences in income 
between fish farming and non-fish farming households.  
 
Objective 2 
To assess the importance of direct and indirect poverty impact pathways 
from different aquaculture systems and examine implications for pro-poor 
growth in different contexts. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Indirect poverty impact pathways (such as employment, consumption and 
multiplier effects) from increased aquaculture SME activity have more 
potential to impact on poverty than indirect pathways from large-scale 
commercial operations and direct and indirect pathways from small-scale 
aquaculture. 
 
Hypothesis testing 
To test this hypothesis, the thesis investigates the nature and importance of 
the various growth linkages (production, consumption, investment, 
infrastructure, institutional etc.) arising from the different aquaculture systems 
under analysis. The economic multiplier effects arising from these 
aquaculture systems are estimated in order to compare the potential 
economic growth generated by development of each system. Labour 
opportunities created by different systems are also estimated, along with 
employment created along the different value chains related to these 
systems. The strength of each of the direct and indirect impact pathways and 
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linkages, and their likely impact on poverty, are then compared between 
systems. 
 
Objective 3 
To identify the institutions needed for different aquaculture systems to have 
the highest potential to promote poverty reduction in different contexts. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
Due to the institutionally demanding techno-economic characteristics of 
aquaculture products, complementary technical and institutional development 
is necessary for aquaculture to develop and impact poverty. 
 
Hypothesis testing 
The institutional framework developed by Dorward and Omamo (2009) is 
used to test this hypothesis. Some important aspects of the institutional 
environment in which aquaculture development in Ghana is taking place are 
first reviewed. The ‘techno-economic’ characteristics of aquaculture 
commodities are assessed, and the implications of these characteristics for 
the expected institutional arrangements in the different aquaculture systems 
are then considered. The key actors and institutional arrangements observed 
in each aquaculture system are analysed. In this analysis, actors’ 
characteristics and economic behaviour, and the role, form and functions of 
institutional arrangements in reducing transaction costs and risks are 
highlighted. Based on this analysis, the thesis identifies key constraints to 
development of the different systems and identifies actors and institutions 
that may be missing. Based on the overall findings of these three research 
objectives and their associated hypothesis testing, the types of institutions 
needed for different aquaculture systems to have the highest potential to 
promote poverty reduction are explored. 
 
2.7.3 Significance of research 
As already noted, these research objectives and their associated hypothesis 
testing, seek to address some of the important gaps in the literature, in the 
context of the emerging paradigm shift in aquaculture development. The 
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review of the literature confirmed that despite the recognised potential of 
aquaculture to achieve poverty alleviation in developing countries, the actual 
and potential contributions of aquaculture development to the livelihoods of 
the poor in SSA have not been fully assessed. The poverty impact and 
potential for pro-poor growth of different aquaculture systems has not been 
rigorously explored, making this thesis particularly significant in contributing 
to the currently limited evidence on this. Furthermore, even though there 
have been some studies applying a NIE theoretical framework to commodity 
systems (e.g. Jaffee and Morton, 1995), the NIE literature is still lacking 
empirical data on the institutions needed for commodity development in SSA, 
and an institutional framework has not been used to analyse aquaculture 
development before. Finally, it should be noted that while this thesis does not 
address the issue of whether or not aquaculture offers the best poverty- 
reducing pathway, given other ways that public and private funds could be 
invested, it provides more specific information on the poverty impacts of 
aquaculture in SSA than has hitherto been available.  
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 CHAPTER 3: GHANA CASE STUDY 
 
The research objectives and hypotheses addressed by this thesis are 
explored using a case study approach in Ghana. Ghana’s aquaculture sector 
is growing rapidly, albeit from a low base, encompassing a range of different 
production systems (extensive aquaculture in the north, semi-intensive pond 
aquaculture in the central and southern belts and intensive SME and large-
scale commercial cage aquaculture in Lake Volta). Significant urban markets 
exist for aquaculture products, a factor driving much of the private sector led 
aquaculture development in SSA. Fish also plays an important role in 
Ghana’s economy due to its significant capture fisheries sector and the high 
share of protein from fish in local consumption. These conditions make 
Ghana an especially interesting and relevant case study, with the potential to 
yield lessons applicable to other countries in SSA.  
 
This chapter outlines some background information on Ghana, the economy, 
the agriculture sector, household expenditure and income, poverty rates and 
trends, the fisheries and aquaculture sectors and evidence of aquaculture’s 
impact on poverty in Ghana. This information provides a useful context for 
the findings of the thesis presented in Chapters 5 to 7.  
 
3.1 GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT 
 
Ghana is located just north of the equator in West Africa and has a total land 
area of 238,539 km2 and a 536 km coastline. Ghana’s population was 24.97 
million in 2011 (World Bank, 2013a), 48.5 percent of which is rural12. The 
country is comprised of 10 administrative regions shown in Figure 5 below: 
Greater Accra (where the capital Accra is located), Volta, Central and 
Western Regions in the south, Ashanti, Eastern and Brong-Ahafo Regions in 
the middle belt and Northern, Upper East and Upper West Regions in the 
north. The regions are further divided into 138 individual metropolitan, 
municipal and district assemblies. The Ghana Living Standards Survey 
                                                 
 
12
 http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/ghana/rural-population (accessed 22 May 2013). 
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(GLSS) divides rural areas into three ecological zones: savannah (northern 
belt), forest (central belt) and coastal (southern belt) with the savannah zone 
being the poorest and forest zone being the least poor (GSS, 2008). 
 
Figure 5: Map of Ghana 
 
3.2 THE ECONOMY 
 
Ghana’s economy is predominantly based on natural resources and 
agriculture, oriented around primary commodity production and export, 
particularly cocoa, timber and gold (Asmah, 2008). Ghana’s GDP was 
estimated at US$39.2 billion in 2011 (World Bank, 2013a). The agriculture 
sector (crops, livestock, fisheries and forestry) contributed approximately 26 
percent of GDP in 2011 (World Bank, 2013a) and is the largest industrial 
sector employing 41.6 percent of the economically active population aged 15 
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years and older (GSS, 2012). Since the mid 1980s, Ghana’s economy has 
been growing steadily (though GDP growth almost doubled from 8% percent 
in 2010 to 14.4% in 2011) with GDP per capita estimated at US$1,570 in 
2011 (World Bank, 2013a) making Ghana a low-middle income country with 
the highest per capita income in West Africa (Kolavalli et al., 2011). 
 
3.3 AGRICULTURE SECTOR 
 
The fifth and most recent GLSS, undertaken between September 2005 and 
2006 (GLSS5), indicated that 60.5 percent of households own or operate a 
farm or keep livestock, 85 percent of them in rural areas (GSS, 2008). The 
savannah zone has the highest percentage of households in agricultural 
activities (92%) followed by the forest zone (86%) and coastal zone (73%). 
Livestock are concentrated primarily in the savannah zone, followed by the 
forest zone (GSS, 2008). Food crop production is mainly at subsistence level, 
with a small but growing proportion of commercial enterprises. Crops vary 
considerably by region but the most common crops grown include maize, 
cassava, yam, plantain, pepper, sorghum/millet/guinea corn, cocoa, 
groundnut/peanut, beans/peas and rice. Maize is the only staple grain which 
is grown extensively in all three ecological zones. The two most important 
crops, in terms of sales, are maize and cocoa (GSS, 2008). 
 
Agriculture has dominated the Ghanaian economy until recently when the 
service sector has taken over. Crops other than cocoa make up nearly two 
thirds of agriculture GDP, cocoa accounts for 13 percent and export crops 
(including cocoa) account for 22 percent. The agriculture sector has grown 
over 5 percent annually for the past decade, driven by the expansion of 
agricultural land area (60% of which has been for cocoa) rather than 
productivity growth (Kolavalli et al., 2011). Ghana’s agriculture is smallholder 
dominated with the average land holding size of rural households at 4.3 
hectares (GSS, 2008), characterised by low levels of inputs and high reliance 
on rain-fed agriculture. The lack of productivity growth over the years has 
been attributed to lack of support for innovation in small-scale agriculture, 
along with poor transport and distribution channels (Kolavalli et al., 2011).  
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3.4 HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE 
 
Food expenditure accounts for 40.4 percent of household expenditure, while 
the imputed value of own-produced food consumed by households 
represents a further 10.5 percent.  Total food expenditure (actual and 
imputed) accounts for approximately half the expenditure of households in 
the highest wealth quintile and approximately 60 percent of expenditure in 
the lowest quintile.  In rural areas, total food expenditure accounts for 55.4, 
61.8 and 73.8 percent of total expenditure in forest, coastal and savannah 
zones respectively. Overall the most important foods in terms of food budget 
shares (based on both cash expenditure and home production) are bread 
and cereals (20%), fish and seafood (16%) and vegetables (14%) (GSS, 
2008:127), showing the significant role that fish plays in average household 
food consumption. 
 
3.5 HOUSEHOLD INCOME  
 
Average annual household income was estimated by the GLSS5 as 
US$1,327 and average per capita income as US$43313. In the rural localities, 
rural coastal had the highest average annual per capita income (GH¢368) 
while rural savannah had the lowest (GH¢232) (GSS, 2008). Overall, the 
main sources of household income are agriculture (35%), wage employment 
(29%) and self-employment (25%). Households in the lowest four quintiles 
earn their primary source of income from agricultural activities and the 
majority of income of rural households is from agriculture (57.7%).  28.5 
percent of the population were under the poverty line in 2005/2006 (GSS, 
2008) and rural household heads constituted the largest proportion (87.1%) 
of household heads in the poorest quintile in 2000 (GSS, 2002). 
 
3.6 POVERTY TRENDS 
 
Ghana’s poverty rate has declined substantially over the past two decades 
from 51.7 percent in 1991/92 and 39.5 percent in 1998/99 to 28.5 percent in 
                                                 
 
13
 Average June 2006 exchange rate of GH¢0.92 to US$1 (GSS, 2008:viii). 
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2005/06 (GSS, 2007). Poverty has reduced more in rural areas, both in 
absolute and relative terms. Rural poverty decreased from 63.6 percent in 
1991/92 to 39.2 percent in 2005/06, a decline of 24.4 percentage points. 
However, regional inequality considerably increased and the poverty rate 
remained as high as 62.7 percent in the north in 2005/06, while it reached 20 
percent in the rest of Ghana (Diao, 2010). This poverty reduction is attributed 
to improvements in economic growth over the past decade, driven in part by 
high prices for cocoa and gold. Economic growth has been accompanied by 
policies on poverty reduction including a school feeding programme and the 
Livelihoods Empowerment against Poverty Program, intended to help reduce 
the levels of food insecurity, malnutrition and poverty14.  
 
While the poverty headcount ratio has not been estimated since 2006, with 
this sustained growth, the reduction in poverty is expected to be maintained. 
However, there may not have been a continued decline in poverty from 2006 
due to the recent global economic crisis and the rise of food and fuel prices. 
Food prices have been rising in Ghana since 2007. For example, maize retail 
prices increased by 83 percent in real terms in 2008 between March (the 
beginning of the lean season) to July/August (the peak of the lean season). 
This was five times higher than maize prices for the same period in 2007 and 
10 times higher than the five year average. With markets being the main 
source of food for 80 percent of households, the majority of the population is 
vulnerable to such market upheavals (Biederlack and Rivers, 2009). Overall 
inflation increased from an annual average of 10.7 percent in 2007 to 16.5 
percent in 2008 and reached a peak of 19.3 percent in 2009 but was down to 
8.7 percent in 2011 (World Bank, 2013a). It is in this dynamic context that 
aquaculture is developing in Ghana and shows the difficulty of disentangling 
the effect of fish farming on poverty when many other variables are also 
changing.   
  
                                                 
 
14
 http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/transfer/countries/ghana (accessed 22 May 2013). 
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3.7 FISHERIES SECTOR 
 
The fisheries sector, which includes aquaculture, accounted for nearly 7 
percent of Ghana’s agricultural GDP and 1.7 percent of her national GDP in 
2011 (GSS, 2012). It has been estimated that fisheries contributes directly 
and indirectly to the livelihoods of over 2.2 million people (Seini et al., 2004), 
just under 10 percent of the population. 
 
3.7.1 Fish consumption and demand 
Fish is important in Ghanaian diets and is estimated to represent 
approximately 60 percent of average animal protein intake (FAO, 2006:41). 
Average per-capita fish consumption is 29.7kg (FAO, 2004), one of the 
highest in the SSA. The GLSS5 estimated the food budget shares (both cash 
expenditure and home produced) of fish and seafood was 20.8 percent for 
the rural forest zone (where the study area for analysis of small-scale 
artisanal pond aquaculture for this thesis is located, see Chapter 4) and 22.6 
percent in rural coastal zone (where the study area for analysis of cage 
aquaculture for this thesis is located, see Chapter 4). These shares are 
higher than the shares for bread and cereals (16.4% and 19.5% for rural 
forest and rural coastal zones respectively) and for meat (6.3% and 4.2%) 
(GSS, 2008:128).  
 
3.7.2 Domestic production 
Domestic fish supply in Ghana comes from marine fisheries, lagoon fisheries, 
Lake Volta, other inland fisheries, aquaculture, and imports. Fisheries 
production, mainly from capture fisheries has been following a decreasing 
trend over the past decade (FAO, 2004-2013). However, overall fish 
production was reported to have increased by over 8 percent between 2009 
and 2011, from just under 410,000 tonnes to approximately 440,000 
tonnes15. Aquaculture production increased from 950 tonnes in 2004 to 5,594 
tonnes in 2008 and between 2009 to 2011 it increased by over 165 percent 
                                                 
 
15
 http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/news/features/18811-fish-production-up-by-82 (accessed 15 
May 2013). 
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from 7,154 to 19,092 tonnes (FAO, 2004-13) (due mainly to increased 
production from large-scale cage farms), representing over 4 percent of 
overall fish production in 2011. The overall domestic fish requirement was 
approximately 992,000 tonnes in 2011 leaving a shortfall of 552,000 
tonnes16. This shortfall is currently being met by importing fish valued at over 
US$200 million annually, highlighting the potentially important role of 
aquaculture in meeting domestic fish requirements. 
  
3.8 AQUACULTURE SECTOR  
 
Fish farming in Ghana began in 1953 when the Department of Fisheries 
(DoF) built ponds to produce fingerlings for culture based reservoir fishery 
development in northern Ghana. After independence in 1957 the government 
allocated 5 percent of state owned irrigation facilities to aquaculture. 
However fish farming did not develop much during this time (FAO, 2006-
2013). Between 1982 and 1984, the government supported the 
establishment of several fish farms by facilitating the provision of commercial 
loans for pond construction. However many new fish farmers failed as they 
were given little technical assistance in aquaculture production or marketing 
(Prein and Ofori, 1996; Quagrainie et al., 2009). The government did not 
provide much support to the sector again until early 2000 with a number of 
policy changes with the objective of developing the aquaculture sector. In 
2005 a Ministry of Fisheries was created17, free extension services to fish 
farmers were provided by fisheries extension staff, fingerlings were produced 
at government hatcheries and Fish Farmer Associations (FFAs) were 
established (Quagranie et al., 2009). 
 
The Fisheries Commission (FC) of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
(MoFA), has recently produced a draft Ghana National Aquaculture 
                                                 
 
16
 http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/news/features/18811-fish-production-up-by-82 (accessed 15 
May 2013). 
17
 However in 2009 the Ministry of Fisheries was reconstituted as the Fisheries Commission (FC) and 
brought back under the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. The FC advises the Minister responsible for 
fisheries. 
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Development Plan (GNADP), with support from FAO, which aims to increase 
production of commercially farmed fish from 10,200 tonnes in 2010 to 
100,000 tonnes in 2016, boosting the market share of farmed fish to 30 
percent (MoFA/FC, 2012). The strategy is based on supporting the 
development of commercial aquaculture through the development of high 
priority aquaculture zones. The GNADP also emphasises the need for 
support mechanisms and services for aquaculture businesses to be private 
sector led with government playing facilitation and monitoring roles. Although 
the GNADP’s vision statement includes food and nutritional security, 
employment generation, increased incomes, economic growth and poverty 
reduction, the primary focus of the plan is increasing fish production through 
commercial aquaculture development to reduce the national fish deficit. 
There is a mention of the importance of the small-scale sub-sector for 
achieving national socio-economic goals of employment generation and 
poverty reduction (MoFA/FC, 2012:2) though it is unclear whether this refers 
to the ‘commercial’ or ‘non commercial’ small-scale sub-sector. However the 
GNADP does not appear to make provisions for supporting rural artisanal 
pond aquaculture farmers who dominate the aquaculture sector in Ghana 
and who are unlikely to fall into the ‘commercial’ category or relocate to high 
priority aquaculture zones where support is focused. 
 
Ghana’s aquaculture sector has also been supported by international 
organisations over the years. From 1996 to 2002, The World Bank funded 
the Fisheries Sector Capacity Building Project aimed at strengthening the 
DoF’s capacity and supporting improved aquaculture extension services and 
higher quality fingerlings18.  In 2002 FAO funded a project to strengthen the 
organisational capacity of FFAs, and supported the development of the 
National Fisheries and Aquaculture Policy in 2006. In 1999 WRI collaborated 
with the WorldFish Centre to undertake a project to develop improved tilapia 
strains for aquaculture. The project developed the ‘Akosombo’ strain of Nile 
Tilapia which is reported to grow approximately 30 percent faster than those 
                                                 
 
18
 http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P000962/fisheries-subsector-capacity-building-
project?lang=en (accessed 22 May 2013) 
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in the wild. From 2008 to 2010, FAO in collaboration with the WorldFish 
Center and the governments of six countries sharing the Volta basin 
implemented a project19 to further develop and disseminate the ‘Akosombo’ 
strain20. The Aquaculture and Fisheries Collaborative Research Support 
Program (known as AquaFish CRSP), funded by USAID, has also been 
supporting aquaculture through research and training of fish farmers 
(Quagrainie et al., 2009).  
 
In July 2011 the World Bank approved an investment of US$53.8 million (a 
grant of US$3.5 million from the Global Environmental Facility and a loan of 
US$50.3 million from the International Development Association) to 
implement the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program, a 5 year fisheries 
and aquaculture project in Ghana (World Bank, 2011). US$8 million is 
earmarked for aquaculture development as follows: developing aquaculture 
policy and legal framework; improving genetic quality of tilapia fingerlings and 
broodstock; catalysing aquaculture development for medium and large-scale 
enterprises; marketing and technical studies; and small-scale aquaculture 
development (to which US$5 million is dedicated, focused on encouraging 
development of new commercial small-scale enterprises rather than rural 
artisanal fish farmers) (World Bank, 2011). 
 
These activities indicate an increasing level of interest in aquaculture 
development in Ghana and have contributed to the development of the 
aquaculture sector in recent years. Asmah (2008) found that nearly 64 
percent of pond farms surveyed were established after 1995 and estimated a 
16 percent annual growth rate in the number of fish farms established since 
2000, showing how pond aquaculture has been developing, although from a 
small base. The development of the sector is also reflected in the recent 
rapid increase in aquaculture production mentioned above.  
 
                                                 
 
19
 Funded by the Agencia Espanola de Cooperacion Internacional. 
20
 http://ongoing-research.cgiar.org/factsheets/aquaculture-investments-for-poverty-reduction-in-
the-volta-basin-creating-opportunities-for-low-income-african-fish-farmers-through-improved-
management-of-tilapia-genetic-resources/ (accessed 22 May 2013). 
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3.8.1 Production systems 
Aquaculture is practiced in all ten regions of Ghana, most prominently in the 
southern and central sections. The main fish species cultivated are Nile 
Tilapia (Oreochromis niloticus) and African Catfish (Clarias gariepinus) 
(Kaunda et al., 2010). Pond aquaculture is the dominant production system in 
the southern and central belts, accounting for over 98 percent of farms there 
(Asmah, 2008). In the last 5 years the dominant culture system for tilapia 
production has changed and the vast majority of cultured tilapia is now being 
produced in cages. Cages (and pens), introduced after 2003, account for less 
than 2 percent of farms by number but much more by production. The cage 
farms are mainly located in Asuogyaman and South Dayi Districts of the 
Eastern and Volta regions respectively with the majority in Lake Volta 
(Asmah, 2008).  Fish farming in the north is largely extensive and conducted 
in reservoirs and ‘dugouts’ (earthen dams) due to the relatively poor rainfall 
distribution pattern.   
 
Kaunda et al. (2010) estimated that in 2010 there were two large-scale 
commercial cage farms (Tropo and West African Fish Ltd (WAF)), 5-10 
medium-scale cage farms, 100 small-scale cage farms and 10 larger pond 
farms. The GNADP states there are 2,869 small-scale farms (including both 
artisanal pond farms and reservoirs) (MoFA/FC, 2012). Kaunda et al. (2010) 
categorise the main systems which are expected to meet the increasing fish 
demand in Ghana as follows: i) fully commercial internationally/regionally 
targeted operations including development of large-scale cage culture tilapia 
farms producing 1,000 to 10,000 tonnes per annum per farm; (ii) local 
commercial small to medium size operations producing tilapia, catfish, and/or 
polyculture with an output between 50 to 500 tonnes per annum per farm; 
and iii) small-scale aquaculture activities (small-scale pond or cage culture 
across a range of species with an output of 1 to 20 tonnes per annum per 
farm). While this broadly categorises the commercial aquaculture sector it 
does not include the majority of artisanal pond aquaculture farmers producing 
less than 1 tonne per annum per farm.  
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In order to address the objectives and test the hypotheses presented in 
Chapter 2, this thesis focuses on analysing the three most important 
aquaculture systems in Ghana categorised as follows: i) the small-scale 
artisanal rural pond aquaculture sector producing less than 1 tonne per 
annum per farm; ii) the commercial SME cage aquaculture sector producing 
1 to 500 tonnes per annum per farm in Lake Volta (with small-scale cage 
farms producing 1 to 50 tonnes per annum farm and medium-scale 
commercial cage farms producing 50 to 500 tonnes per annum farm); and iii) 
the large-scale commercial cage aquaculture sector consisting of 2 farms 
producing over 500 tonnes per annum farm in Lake Volta, estimated by the 
FC to contribute more than half of the total aquaculture production in Ghana 
(i.e. more than half of the 19,092 tonnes produced in 2011). The particular 
study areas chosen to explore these systems and the methodology used for 
data collection and analysis are described in Chapter 4.    
 
3.8.2 Evidence of aquaculture’s poverty impact in Ghana 
There has been limited research on aquaculture’s role in poverty alleviation 
in Ghana. Kaliba et al. (2007b) used a CGE model to estimate the effects of 
aquaculture expansion in three SSA countries including Ghana. Their results 
suggest a 10 percent increase in aquaculture production would increase 
income for all household groups by 2 percent and reduce the poverty gap. 
However it is unclear how realistic these estimates are. By using a static 
CGE model the process of adjustment to the new equilibrium was not shown. 
The model uses a set of restrictive equilibrating conditions (e.g. no excess 
demand and full employment of resources (except labour)) which is 
unrealistic especially for a developing country like Ghana. The limited 
number of household groups (e.g. treating agricultural producers as a 
homogenous group) may also hide negative income and poverty impacts 
within groups.  
 
Ruddle and Prein (1997) (cited in Prein and Ahmed (2000)) studied the 
potential nutritional impact of IAA and concluded that large economic and 
nutritional benefits were possible for farmers in inland regions if they had 
favourable water availability and soil quality for pond construction and 
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operation. Lightfoot et al. (1996) compared IAA and non-IAA smallholders 
before and after integration. Preliminary results showed potential for 
transforming existing, traditional farming systems to become more 
sustainable. However, the small sample meant that results were only 
illustrative.  
 
3.9 CONCLUSION 
 
The background information summarised in this chapter has highlighted the 
important role of fisheries in Ghana’s economy and of fish in national diets 
and household expenditure. It has given an overview of the rapidly growing 
aquaculture sector and its range of production systems, showing the potential 
for aquaculture development in Ghana. The chapter also suggested that the 
current limited empirical evidence is inadequate to provide in depth 
understanding of aquaculture’s role in and impact on poverty and livelihoods 
in Ghana. These are some of the conditions which make the aquaculture 
sector in Ghana a particularly interesting and appropriate case study through 
which to explore the objectives and hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2. 
 
The following chapters present the methodology (Chapter 4) and findings 
(Chapter 5 to 7) of this thesis, which focus on assessing the actual and 
potential impacts of the three main aquaculture systems (small-scale rural 
artisanal pond aquaculture, SME and large-scale commercial cage culture) 
on poverty and livelihoods in Ghana and the institutions needed to maximise 
their potential for poverty reduction.  
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 CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODS 
 
This chapter describes the overall research strategy, study sites, data 
sources and methodology used to address the thesis’ three research 
objectives and test their related hypotheses, outlined in Chapter 2. Where 
appropriate, additional details of the data and methods used are given in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7, where the results for hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 
respectively, are presented. This chapter starts by outlining the overall 
research strategy used for data collection, followed by a description of the 
two main study sites where primary data were collected. The chapter then 
discusses the data and methods used to test each hypothesis in turn. 
  
4.1 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
 
A mixed method approach using quantitative and qualitative research 
methods is used. There is a growing acceptance of the integration of 
quantitative and qualitative methods and over the last decade, there has 
been a marked increase in the combined use of qualitative and quantitative 
(Q-Squared) methods in poverty analysis (e.g. Hulme and Toye, 2006; 
Kanbur and Shaffer, 2007; Q-Squared Working Paper Series21).The benefits 
of mixed method research include (Bryman, 2012): 
 Triangulation: methods are combined to cross-check information to 
increase the validity of findings and help offset the weaknesses of 
each method.   
 Completeness: gaps left by one method can be filled by another. 
 Instrument development: qualitative research is used to develop 
survey questionnaires to ensure appropriate wording of questions and 
choices of closed answers. 
 Explanation: qualitative methods are used to help interpret findings 
from quantitative research 
                                                 
 
21
 http://www.trentu.ca/ids/qsquared.php  (accessed 24 April 2013). 
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 Process: qualitative methods are used to explore trends and 
processes.  
 
4.2 STUDY SITES 
 
Research was conducted in two regions: Ashanti Region, where more small-
scale pond aquaculture farmers are located compared to other regions 
(though uptake of fish farming is still very low); and Eastern Region around 
Lake Volta where the majority of commercial cage fish farms are situated22. 
The two study regions are shown in Figure 6 below. 
  
 
Figure 6: Study regions 
 
                                                 
 
22
 The Regional FC Office in Kumasi (the regional capital), and the Water Research Institute’s (WRI) 
field station in Akosombo (the Aquaculture Research and Development Centre) were used as bases 
for data collection in Ashanti and Eastern Regions respectively. WRI is one of the 13 public research 
institutes of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research in Ghana. 
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In Ashanti Region, data were collected in: Amansie West, Amansie Central 
and Adansi North districts, all in the forest zone (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7: Study districts in Ashanti Region 
 
 
In Eastern Region, data were collected in Asuogyaman and Lower Manya 
Krobo districts (Figure 8). These districts were chosen as they had the 
highest density of fish farmers in their respective regions. 
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Figure 8: Study districts in Eastern Region 
 
Notes: In 2008 Manya Krobo District was split to form Lower  
and Upper Manya Krobo Districts. Pre 2008 district  
boundaries are shown here 
 
Key characteristics of the study districts are outlined below23.  
 
4.2.1 Study districts in Ashanti Region 
Amansie West 
Amansie West is one of the largest districts in Ashanti, covering 1,364 km2.  
The district capital is Manso Nkwanta, located 65km from the regional capital 
Kumasi. The population was estimated at 144,104 in 2010 (over 95% of 
which is rural). Population density is approximately 106 persons/km2 and 
there are over three hundred towns, villages and hamlets. The district has 
potentially rich gold deposits and large areas have been leased to companies 
with licenses for prospecting. Agriculture employs 70 percent of the 
population and is the main source of household income (73%). Agriculture is 
                                                 
 
23
 Unless otherwise stated, the background information on study districts is taken from Ghana’s 
MoFA website:  http://mofa.gov.gh/site/ (accessed 22 May 2013). 
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mainly small-scale and average farm size is 5ha. Staple crops include 
cassava, cocoyam, plantain, yam and maize and cocoa is the main cash 
crop. Many of the communities in Amansie West (especially in the hinterland 
where some fish farming is practised) are quite remote due to the poor road 
infrastructure and high transportation costs. 
  
Amansie Central 
Amansie Central has an area of 710km2. Jacobu is the district capital, 
located 35km from Kumasi. The population was estimated at 110,026 in 2010 
(90.4% of which is rural). The population density is 155 persons/km2 and 
there are about 220 communities or settlements. Both large- and small-scale 
gold mining activities are present in the district, including illegal mining 
operations such as “galamsey” which many youth are engaged in. Agriculture 
employs 80 percent of the population. Cocoa, oil palm and citrus are the 
main cash crops and cassava and maize are the main food crops. Average 
farm size is less than 1ha resulting in low production and income per farmer. 
Out migration is a problem especially with the youth who do not want to 
engage in agriculture. Fish farming is concentrated in areas around 
Tweapease and Kankanfrase.  
 
Adansi North 
Adansi North has an area of 1,140km2 and the district capital, Fomena, is 
located 59km from Kumasi. The district population was estimated at 123,120 
in 2010 (68.8% of which is rural). Population density is 108 persons/km2 and 
there are 94 communities, most within 28km from Fomena. Infrastructure 
development is very low. Agriculture employs about 77 percent of the labour 
force and the average farm size is 1ha. Major food crops grown are maize, 
plantain, cassava, cocoyam, yam and rice. The main cash crops are cocoa 
and oil palm.    
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4.2.2 Study districts in Eastern Region 
Asuogyaman 
Asuogyaman has an area of 1,507km2. The district capital is Atimpoku, 82km 
from Accra. The population was estimated at 87,734 in 201024 (35% of which 
is rural, the only study district with a majority urban population). Agriculture is 
predominantly small-scale and average farm size is 1ha with about 90 
percent of farm holdings less than 1.2 ha. The major crops are maize, 
cassava, vegetables and yam. Cocoa and oil palm are the major cash crops 
grown on small plantations. There are some large farms and plantations for 
mango and banana. Fishing in Lake Volta is an important part of the 
agricultural sector and is practised in several communities along the Lake. 
 
Lower Manya Krobo 
There is limited demographic and socio-economic information available on 
Lower Manya Krobo as it was formed in 2008 (along with Upper Manya 
Krobo) out of Manya Krobo District. Lower Manya Krobo is 1,476km2. The 
district capital is Odumase, located approximately 70km from Accra. The 
major economic activity is agriculture employing nearly 70 percent of the 
population. Maize is cultivated throughout the district while cassava, plantain 
and rice are grown in certain areas. About 15 percent of the working 
population farm livestock.  Average farm size is estimated at approximately 
1.4 ha25. Fishing is carried out along Lake Volta and rivers in Kpong, Akuse 
and around Obelemanya. Many SME cage farms are clustered around 
Akuse.  
 
4.3 DATA AND METHODS 
 
The data and methodology used to test the three research hypotheses are 
described in this section. Overall, country level data were gathered from 
secondary sources including case studies, published articles, books, 
government surveys and statistics, and grey literature. Primary data were 
                                                 
 
24
 Author’s own calculation based on the 2000 population census estimate of 74,124 and a growth 
rate of 1.7 percent. 
25
 http://lowermanya.ghanadistricts.gov.gh/?arrow=atd&_=74&sa=2189 (accessed 22 May 2013). 
86 
 
collected from the field between September 2010 and July 2011. A number of 
questionnaire surveys were undertaken (described in detail below), 
complemented by Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) techniques such as semi-
structured interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), key informant 
interviews and direct observation (Chambers, 1981). Data collected to test 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 is broadly analysed within the conceptual framework of 
the modified SLF of Dorward et al. (2003) (presented in Chapter 2). Data 
collected to test Hypothesis 3 is analysed within the broad framework of NIE 
(presented in Chapter 2) using the institutional framework of Dorward and 
Omamo (2009) (outlined in Chapter 7). 
 
4.3.1 Data and methods to test Hypothesis 1 
This section starts by reviewing Objective 1 and Hypothesis 1. It then briefly 
discusses some challenges with impact assessment which have implications 
for the methodology used. The section then goes on to describe the methods 
used for quantitative and qualitative data collection, along with the use of 
some participatory methods, and data analysis.  
 
Objective 1 and Hypothesis 1 
Objective 1:  To assess the direct poverty and livelihood impacts (positive 
and negative) of small-scale aquaculture systems on different categories of 
poor people in Ghana. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Small-scale aquaculture has positive direct impacts on 
poverty and livelihoods of poor households in Ashanti Region, Ghana. The 
magnitude of these impacts depends on the household and livelihood 
characteristics and production systems of small-scale pond aquaculture 
farmers in Ashanti Region, and the institutional and infrastructure context. 
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Challenges of impact assessment 
To test Hypothesis 1, an ex-post impact assessment of aquaculture on the 
livelihoods and poverty status of poor households is required. To measure 
this impact, the difference between i) impact indicators after adoption of 
aquaculture; and ii) what these outcomes would have been without 
aquaculture adoption (the counterfactual scenario), is needed to disentangle 
the effects of aquaculture from other intervening factors (Baker, 2000) and 
thus attribute any difference to aquaculture. However it is impossible to 
measure the impact indicators for adopting households had they not adopted, 
and in social science research it is extremely difficult to isolate a true ‘control’ 
group for comparison with a ‘treatment’ group. Thus ‘experimental controls’ 
are nearly impossible and ‘quasi-experimental controls’ such as the ‘double 
difference’ approach are often used. Constructing a realistic counterfactual 
requires both ‘before’ and ‘after’, and ‘with’ and ‘without’ scenarios to be 
generated for a ‘difference in difference’ approach (Baker, 2000).  However 
as no baseline data exist on impact indicators and poverty levels of the small-
scale artisanal fish farming households under analysis before they started 
fish farming, and on a comparison group of non-fish farmers at the same 
time, a true impact assessment using a ‘double difference’ approach and 
constructing a realistic counterfactual to test Hypothesis 1 is very difficult.  
 
In order to overcome this, the following two groups were surveyed: i) a group 
of small-scale artisanal pond aquaculture farmers; and ii) a comparison group 
(or counterfactual) of non-fish farmers, constructed using an informal 
matching method, described in detail below. The limitation of this approach is 
that the difference in impact indicators between fish farmers and non-fish 
farmers can only be used to measure impact if it is assumed that both groups 
were on average at the same poverty level before fish farming was adopted, 
which may not be the case.  However as each comparison non-fish farmer 
was chosen according to certain criteria to match them on the characteristics 
of their ‘paired’ fish farmer, it could be assumed that the adoption of fish 
farming, while not randomly adopted in the wider population as farmers ‘self 
select’ into adopting and non adopting groups, is randomly adopted within a 
core group of households with certain similar characteristics (Mendola, 
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2007). Thus matching non-fish farmers with fish farmers informally controls 
for a combination of observable variables. This enables the impact of fish 
farming on poverty to be measured by the difference in poverty impact 
indicators between these two groups (or as the coefficient of the binary 
variable in a linear Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to determine 
income) (Mendola, 2007). However these issues may potentially lead to 
selection bias and this was therefore tested for in the analysis presented in 
Chapter 5.  
 
Quantitative data collection 
A household survey was undertaken in early 2011 in the three study districts 
in Ashanti Region. A sampling frame of 90 small-scale semi-intensive 
artisanal pond aquaculture farmers who had stocked fingerlings in or 
harvested fish from their ponds in the past two years, was constructed with 
the assistance of Regional FC staff in Kumasi and district level agricultural 
extension agents. The comparison group of non-fish farmers was constructed 
from the same villages as the selected fish farmers, using informal matching 
criteria, to represent the counterfactual scenario as described above. The 
criteria to select the comparison non-fish farmers were as follows: the 
comparison farmer had to be i) the nearest neighbour of the surveyed fish 
farmer; ii) within 5 years of age of the fish farmer; and iii) a crop farmer (and 
not a fish farmer) as all fish farmers interviewed were also crop farmers. 
These criteria were chosen as it was thought that farming households located 
close to each other with similarly aged household heads were likely to have 
similar household characteristics to their matched fish farmers. 
 
As many as possible of the 90 fish farmers in the sampling frame (and their 
corresponding 90 non-fish farmers) were surveyed over the course of six 
weeks, from January to February 2011. In total 158 farmers (79 fish farmers 
and 79 non-fish farmers) were surveyed in the villages shown in Figure 9 
below. 
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Figure 9: Villages surveyed in three districts in Ashanti Region 
 
 
The survey questionnaire collected information on the respondent’s 
household, the main unit of analysis, and was divided into 7 main sections as 
follows: i) Human Capital (household characteristics and occupations); ii) 
Natural Capital (access to land and ponds); iii) Social Capital (information 
and training on fish farming, access to extension services and association 
membership); iv) Financial Capital (access to credit); v) Physical Capital 
(ownership of household assets, access to infrastructure and facilities); vi) 
Livelihood strategies: aquaculture (goals, production practices), crops and 
livestock (crop production, livestock holdings); vii) Livelihood outcomes 
(key impact indicators): income (sources and level of household income for 
2010), food security (dietary diversity and food adequacy), vulnerability 
(crises and coping strategies); impacts of fish farming on households and 
communities. Comparison non-fish farmers were administered the same 
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questionnaire as fish farmers without the questions relating specifically to fish 
farming. The full questionnaire is presented in Appendix 126. 
 
On completion, each questionnaire was checked for mistakes and 
inconsistencies and, if necessary, corrected by asking the respondent for 
clarification (either in person or by phone), to minimise error.  The data were 
then entered into a data base in Statistical Package for Social Scientists 
(SPSS) Version 16 and cleaned. All outliers and missing data were checked 
against the questionnaires and corrected. A number of cases were removed 
based on the presence of outliers (in household size, income level or size of 
land ownership) leaving a final clean data set containing 143 farmers (69 fish 
farmers and 74 non-fish farmers) as shown in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Number and percentage of surveyed households by district 
and fish farming status 
District Fish farmer 
households 
Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total 
households 
N            % N            % N            % 
Amansie West 19 28 20 27 39 27 
Amansie Central 20 29 19 26 39 27 
Adansi North* 30 44 35 47 65 46 
Total households (Nos.) 69 74 143 
Notes: * Including 2 fish farmer and 2 non-fish farmer households from Obuasi Municipality 
 
Qualitative data 
Qualitative data were collected to supplement the household survey. FGDs 
and semi-structured interviews were conducted with fish farmers and FC 
extension officers and staff before the household survey to refine the 
questionnaire and ensure questions and impact indicators were relevant and 
meaningful and the choice of closed answers were comprehensive and 
                                                 
 
26 Responses were pre-coded and all questions were translated into Twi (and back again to English to 
ensure accurate translation). The questionnaire was tested on ten fish farmers in non survey districts 
prior to administering the survey and the questionnaire was revised accordingly. Six enumerators (a 
mixture of staff and National Service volunteers based at the Regional FC office in Kumasi) were 
trained in interview techniques and on administering the survey questionnaire.  
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appropriate for the context.  Qualitative research was also undertaken after 
the survey was completed to help triangulate and interpret survey findings 
and gain a deeper understanding of the impact of aquaculture on poverty. 
 
Participatory data collection 
Participatory wealth rankings (Grandin, 1988) were undertaken in three 
communities to understand local perspectives on poverty and wealth, and to 
determine if fish farming was being adopted by those the community 
considered poor or only by the better off. Each wealth ranking group 
consisted of 8 to 12 community members of mixed ages and genders and 
included a community leader. The groups were asked to list all the 
households in their communities and then separate the households into 
different groups based on their wealth and/or poverty status, however they 
defined it. The characteristics of each group of households were then 
discussed to understand local conceptions of poverty and develop 
meaningful impact indicators to include in the household survey.  Seasonal 
calendars were also developed in two communities using FGDs with 
community members (with groups made up of fish farmers, non-fish farmers, 
men and women) to understand: seasonal variations in activities, food 
consumption, labour etc.; local production systems; and how aquaculture fits 
into the general productive system.  
 
Fish farm budgets were estimated with four groups of fish farmers using the 
method of participatory budgeting (Dorward et al., 1998a).  Participatory 
budgets (PBs) are used to help farmers measure and analyse inputs and 
outputs, including non-cash resources27. The method is based on a 
traditional African board game (oware in Ghana) and uses local materials 
(stones, beans, or anything that can be used as counters in a grid) to develop 
a budget and does not require farmers to be numerate. The method can be 
                                                 
 
27
 This method was chosen as most fish farmers do not keep good records so it would have been 
difficult and time consuming to record budget data with each farmer individually during the 
household survey. It was also thought that the process of developing a PB with farmers would be a 
learning experience both for farmers and for the FC extension staff who were trained in the method 
and facilitated the groups, enabling them to use the tool with other farmers in the future.  
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used either with individual farmers, with a group of farmers where one is 
used as a case-study, or an average budget can be developed for a given 
size of enterprise, if all the farmers in the group have similar production 
practices (Dorward et al., 1998a). The limitation of this approach for the 
present analysis is the possibility of non representative farmers being 
selected as case studies.  
 
Data analysis 
The household survey data were analysed using SPSS Version 16 and 
SAS/STAT software Version 9.3 was used for specific statistical tests. The 
descriptive analysis compares differences in livelihood characteristics and 
strategies, and livelihood outcomes (or impact indicators) between the fish 
farming and non-fish farming households surveyed. Chi square tests for 
independence are used to test the significance of differences and 
associations between categorical variables and independent samples t-tests 
are used to test the significance of differences between the means of 
continuous variables.  
 
Identification of poor households is necessary to test the hypothesis that fish 
farming has positive direct impacts on the livelihoods of poor households. As 
noted in Chapter 2, poverty is a multi-dimensional concept and definitions of 
‘the poor’ vary according to who is doing the defining. However, for simplicity, 
‘poor’ and ‘non-poor’ households are identified in Chapter 5 by estimating per 
capita household income and placing households above and below a poverty 
line, enabling the characteristics of ‘poor’ and ‘non-poor’, fish farming and 
non-fish farming households to be compared. The results presented in 
Chapter 5 show that broader poverty measures such as access to assets, 
household wealth and food security, are positively associated with income 
measures.  
 
Composite indexes 
A number of indexes related to key poverty impact indicators of household 
wealth and food security are used in Chapter 5 to enable easier comparison 
of multiple variables between groups, described below.  
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Durable goods index 
A durable goods index is constructed by assigning weights (to represent 
value) to each of the durable goods owned by each household and summing 
over all assets.  The methodology and weights used to construct the durable 
goods index (and household asset index below) are adapted from BMGF 
(2010) which draws on the current literature on asset based approaches to 
measuring poverty impact. The weights are constructed as follows: radio = 2; 
TV = 4; electric fan = 2; refrigerator = 5; phone = 3; bicycle = 6; boat = 10; 
motorcycle = 48; vehicle = 160; water pump = 1228. The weight is halved if 
the asset was owned but not functioning, and weighted values on all items 
then summed to produce a durable goods index score. 
 
Household asset index 
The household asset index represents household wealth. It is composed of 
the durable goods index, household livestock holdings in Tropical Livestock 
Units (TLUs)29, and additional variables related to household facilities 
(ownership of iron roof, latrine and flush toilet). Just as with the durable 
goods index, weights are assigned (to represent value) to each of the assets, 
facilities and number of each livestock (in TLUs) owned by each household 
and summed over all assets. The durable goods index weights are given 
above, the remaining weights used are as follows: iron roof = 6; latrine = 4; 
flush toilet = 8; draught animals = 10; cattle = 10; sheep = 3; goats = 3; pigs = 
2; poultry = 1; rabbits = 1; and grasscutter = 1. 
 
Food Consumption Score and Simple Food Count  
Food security is a core dimension of poverty and vulnerability. The most 
common definition defines food security as “access by all people at all times 
                                                 
 
28
 Flush toilet and latrine are excluded from the durable goods index but are included, along with 
livestock and corrugated iron roof, in a more comprehensive household asset index used as a proxy 
indicator for wealth described below. 
29
 The concept of TLU provides a common unit to quantify different livestock types in a standardised 
way enabling comparison of total livestock holdings between groups. The TLU conversion factors 
used follow Jahnke (1982) as follows: draught animals (0.80); cattle (0.70); sheep (0.10); goats (0.10); 
pigs (0.20); and chickens (0.01). Jahnke (1982) does not estimate conversion factors for rabbits and 
grasscutters so are assumed here to be equal to chickens (0.01).   
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to sufficient food for an active and healthy life” (World Bank, 1986).  Food 
security can be broken down into four components – availability, access, 
utilisation and vulnerability – each capturing different, but overlapping, 
dimensions. No single indicator can capture all of these dimensions (Migotto 
et al., 2006).   
 
The most common food consumption indicator used by the World Food 
Programme (WFP) in their Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability 
Analyses, is the Food Consumption Score (FCS). The FCS is a proxy 
indicator representing the dietary diversity and energy, and macro and micro 
(content) value of the food people eat. It is based on dietary diversity (the 
number of food groups consumed by a household over a reference period), 
food frequency (the number of days in a week a particular food group is 
consumed), and the relative nutritional importance of different food groups30 
(WFP, 2009). The FCS used by the WFP is adapted31 and constructed here 
using the survey data to compare food security between groups.  
 
To construct the FCS, food items are grouped according to the food groups 
in Table 4 below. The consumption frequencies of all the food items surveyed 
in each food group are summed (with a maximum consumption frequency of 
7 days per week). Each food group is assigned a weight (see Table 4, weight 
A), reflecting its nutrient density. 
 
  
                                                 
 
30
 The FCS has been found to have positive and statistically significant associations with per capita 
calorie consumption, increasing its validity as a measure of food security per capita (Wiesmann et al., 
2009). 
31
 In the full FCS used by the WFP a wider variety of food groups is used including staples (cereals, 
tubers and root crops), pulses, sugar and oil. Data on these food groups were not collected due 
partly to time constraints and partly due to the importance placed on understanding the impact of 
fish farming on the consumption of fish and protein. However it can be assumed that the households 
surveyed are food secure in terms of staples and pulses otherwise it is unlikely they would be able to 
consume fish and meat so regularly (see Chapter 5 for more details). 
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Table 4: A completed Food Consumption Score table 
Food group Weight (A) Days eaten in average 
week in dry/rainy season 
(B) 
Score A x B 
Meat and fish (including eggs) 4 7 28 
Milk 4 1 4 
Vegetables 1 7 7 
Composite score  39 
 
For each household, the FCS is calculated by multiplying each food group 
frequency by each food group weight, then summing these scores into one 
composite score.  Along with the FCS, a Simple Food Count (SFC) index is 
also constructed for both dry and rainy seasons. This uses the same 
methodology as for FCS but does not combine food items into groups, giving 
more variability in the scores.  
 
Income Determination Model 
The descriptive analysis described above may not account for all possible 
differences in household characteristics, other than participation in fish 
farming, which could cause differences in impact indicators such as income 
between fish and non-fish farming households.  Therefore, a household 
Income Determination Model (IDM) is used to control for differences in 
observable characteristics between households and to assess the factors 
that contribute to differences in income between fish farming and non-fish 
farming households. The multiple log-linear regression model is estimated 
using OLS (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2.11 for details).  
 
4.3.2 Data and methods to test Hypothesis 2 
This section reviews Objective 2 and Hypothesis 2, and then describes the 
main data and methods used to test Hypothesis 2.  
 
Objective 2 and Hypothesis 2 
Objective 2: To assess the importance of direct and indirect poverty impact 
pathways from different aquaculture systems and examine implications for 
pro-poor growth in different contexts. 
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Hypothesis 2: Indirect poverty impact pathways (such as employment, 
consumption and multiplier effects) from increased aquaculture SME activity 
have more potential to impact on poverty than indirect pathways from large-
scale commercial operations and direct and indirect pathways from small-
scale pond aquaculture.  
 
To test Hypothesis 2 and explore the linkages arising from different 
aquaculture systems, a number of data sources and methodologies are 
utilised as follows: i) the household survey of small-scale fish farmers in 
Ashanti Region described in Section 4.3.1 above: ii) an enterprise survey of 
SME and large-scale cage farms in Lake Volta in the two study districts in 
Eastern Region; and iii) FGDs conducted in seven communities on Lake 
Volta where cage aquaculture is present. The communities in which the 
surveyed cage farms are located are shown in Figure 10.  
 
Economic multiplier effects are calculated using a semi input-output multiplier 
model using data from the small-scale fish farming PBs described in Section 
4.3.1, budget data from the cage farm survey, and expenditure data from the 
GLSS5. Employment generated by different systems along with wage rates is 
calculated using data from the household survey and the cage farm 
enterprise survey. These data sources and methodologies are described in 
turn below (aside from the household survey and PBs). All survey data is 
analysed using SPSS Version 16. 
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Figure 10: Location of cage farms surveyed in the two study districts 
 
 
Cage farm enterprise survey and community FGDs 
A cage farm enterprise survey was undertaken in early 2011 in the two study 
districts in Eastern Region. A sampling frame of 54 functional SME and large-
scale cage farms was constructed with the help of the District FC and Water 
Research Institute (WRI) staff in Akosombo. A large number of cage farms 
on record at the District FC Office were no longer functional. As many as 
possible of the functional cage farms were visited. In total 14 small-scale, 5 
medium-scale and 2 large-scale commercial cage farms were surveyed 
(shown in Figure 10) and owners and/or caretakers were interviewed. The 
survey collected information for 2010 on: i) farmers’ socioeconomic 
characteristics; ii) production systems and practices including number and 
size of cages and levels of inputs; iii) fish production and revenue; iv) farm 
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employment and wages; v) marketing channels; vi) costs and revenues; and 
vii) linkages with and impacts on surrounding communities. The full 
questionnaire is presented in Appendix 2.  
 
FGDs were conducted with 7 communities on Lake Volta where cage 
aquaculture is present. The communities were chosen to represent the range 
of small, medium and large-scale farms (and one community, where a private 
hatchery, previously a commercial cage farm, is located was also chosen) to 
understand the linkages arising from different systems. The FGDs were 
undertaken with groups of 8-12 community members of mixed ages and 
genders, and gathered information on: i) community characteristics and 
distribution of poverty; ii) main livelihood activities of community members, iii) 
employment linkages from cage farms (including data on groups benefiting 
from seasonal and regular employment, trading and processing due to cage 
aquaculture); iii) cost of living linkages, and price and food security impacts 
on consumption of fish by poor households; iv) consumption linkages; and v) 
institutional, service and infrastructure linkages from cage farms. Short FGDs 
were also conducted with fishermen in these 7 communities to understand 
the positive and negative impacts of cage aquaculture on fishermen’s 
livelihoods (if any) such as changes in access rights to fishing grounds. 
 
Multiplier estimation  
A fixed-price semi input-output multiplier model is used to estimate the 
economic multiplier effects arising from development of small-scale pond 
aquaculture in Ashanti Region and commercial SME cage aquaculture in 
Lake Volta, Eastern Region. The model used here, like most economic 
multiplier models in the literature, only considers the effects of backward and 
forward production linkages and consumption linkages on economic growth. 
Investment, cost of living, environmental, service and institutional linkages 
(described in Chapter 2) are excluded from the calculations. However results 
from Chapter 6 indicate that production and consumption linkages are the 
strongest of all the possible linkages from aquaculture. 
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Many of the models used in linkage studies are variants of the original semi 
input-output model developed by Bell and Hazell (1980), for example Bell, 
Hazell and Slade (1982), Haggblade and Hazell (1989) which used a three 
sector variant and Delgado et al. (1998) which used a four sector variant. The 
model describes an economy in which gross output consists of tradable 
output T, assumed to be fixed at T, as tradable goods are assumed to be 
supply constrained, plus nontradable outputs, N, the supply of which is 
assumed to be highly elastic.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.4, nontradable goods are those that 
are produced and consumed locally, having either no outside markets or 
external sources of demand. Furthermore, nontradable goods must not have 
close tradable substitutes that are available locally, so the domestic price of 
the non traded good is not likely to be highly correlated with the domestic 
price of any tradable good that could play the same role in the consumption 
basket (Delgado et al., 1998:1). Nontradables are demand constrained so 
any increased demand through income growth must be met by new 
production leading to additional growth in the local economy. This thesis uses 
both the regional and the national definition of trading space to calculate 
regional (local) and national multiplier effects. Thus the classification of a 
commodity as tradable or nontradable depends on whether the commodity is 
imported or exported from the trading space (in this case Ashanti 
Region/Eastern Region or Ghana) or has any locally available substitutes 
whose prices are correlated with it. While farmed fish produced by small-
scale pond farmers in Ashanti Region are generally not traded outside the 
region let alone the country, and while tilapia from SME cage farms are 
traded outside Eastern Region but are not exported, aquaculture products 
are still treated here as tradables as they have locally available tradable 
substitutes (fish from marine and inland capture fisheries in Ghana and 
imported fish) whose prices are correlated. 
 
The model measures the impact on a region’s income of an exogenous 
shock to a sector, via technological change or outside investment, enabling 
the region to increase its output of tradables and causing the output of 
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nontradables to increase.  Assuming the level of intermediate inputs used per 
unit of tradable output does not change due to the initial increase in tradable 
output (Haggblade et al., 1991), Bell and Hazell’s (1980) multiplier (M) can be 
written (Delgado et al., 1998:10): 
     
  
          
  
  
 
                
 
           
where:  
   ,      =  the share of nontradable intermediate inputs in nontradable and 
tradable output respectively (between 0 and 1), 
   ,       =  the share of tradable intermediate inputs in nontradable and 
tradable output respectively (between 0 and 1), 
      =  a constant with a value equal to 1 -     -    , the share of value  
added in gross output of the nontradables sector, 
       =  same as    but for tradables, with value equal to 1 -     -     
       =  marginal propensity to consume nontradables (or MBS of  
nontradables) 
s   =  leakage, a constant proportion of total income (savings and tax  
rate)32. 
 
The MBS for nontradables as a group is the most important determinant of 
the magnitude of estimated growth multipliers (Delgado et al., 1998). The 
actual multiplier is a numerical solution to a regional level model of supply 
and demand which incorporates household demands and intermediate 
demands between sectors (Delgado et al., 1998). This model is used to 
estimate the regional and national economic multiplier effects (i.e. the effect 
on regional and national income) of a one dollar increase in income from: 
 
i) small-scale pond aquaculture in Ashanti Region and 
ii) SME commercial cage aquaculture in Eastern Region, Ghana.  
                                                 
 
32
 The multiplier and parameter definitions are taken directly from Delgado et al. (1998:10). 
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Parameter estimation and data  
The model parameters are estimated using a mixture of primary and 
secondary data. The share of nontradable intermediate inputs in nontradable 
output (   ) is estimated from the results of a previous study of agricultural 
multipliers in Ghana by Al-Hassan and Jatoe (2007). The share of 
nontradable intermediate inputs in tradable (i.e. aquaculture) output (   ) are 
estimated from primary budget data collected through PBs of small-scale 
pond farmers, and survey data of SME cage farmers supplemented by data 
from key informant interviews. The ratio of value added in gross output of the 
nontradables sector (  ) is also estimated from the results of Al-Hassan and 
Jatoe (2007), and the ratio of value added in gross output of the tradable 
aquaculture sector (  ) is estimated from the primary budget data described 
above. The savings rate (s) is estimated from Ghana National Accounts data 
for 2010.  
 
The MBS of nontradables ( n) is calculated by empirically estimating 
expenditure functions for nontradable goods using expenditure data from the 
GLSS5.  Goods were classified into nationally tradable and nontradable 
categories according to the definition given above. As there was only one 
pond farmer and no cage farmers captured by the GLSS5, the expenditure of 
cocoa farmers in Ashanti Region is used as a proxy for expenditure of small-
scale pond farmers in Ashanti and the expenditure of professionals from 
Greater Accra who also had agricultural income is used as a proxy for SME 
cage farm owners. These proxies were chosen as the majority of small-scale 
pond farmers surveyed in Ashanti Region were also cocoa farmers and the 
majority of small-scale cage farm owners surveyed were professionals living 
in Accra. 
 
An Engel curve relates the household budget shares allocated to each good 
to total household expenditure. A number of functional forms of the Engel 
curve have been developed in the economics literature (Deaton and 
Muellbauer, 1980). A popular form is the Working-Leser model (Working, 
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1943, Leser, 1963) where the budget share of each good is a linear function 
of the logarithm of total household expenditure which can be expressed as: 
 
                                                                                            (1) 
 
where     is the budget share of good j in household i (so if j is the group of 
nontradable goods,     represents the ratio of expenditure on nontradable 
goods to total household expenditure),    is total household expenditure,    
and    are parameters to be estimated and     is an error term. An 
expression to estimate the MBS of nontradable goods can be derived from 
this equation (shown in Appendix 3).  
 
A variant of the Working-Leser model is used to estimate the MBS of 
nontradable goods in this thesis, using total expenditures as a proxy for 
income. MBS thus represents marginal propensities to consume. The basic 
Working-Leser model has been expanded to include other variables such as 
socio-economic and demographic household characteristics assumed to 
affect the budget shares allocated to different types of goods (see Deaton, 
1997). Household characteristics are therefore included in the model used 
here which takes the following form:  
 
                                                                ,             (2) 
 
where     is the budget share of category j of goods (in this case the share of 
nontradable goods) in household i,    is total expenditure of household i,     is 
a vector of household characteristics (household size, sex of household head 
and age of household head),    and    are parameters to be estimated,    is 
an unknown parameter vector to be estimated and relates to household 
characteristics contained in the     vector, and     is an error term. The 
estimation technique used is the OLS procedure. The MBS values for 
nontradables were estimated with the assistance of an econometrician from 
the University of Ghana, Legon. 
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Estimation of employment generation and wages 
The level of employment generated by small-scale pond aquaculture is 
compared to the employment generated by crop farming and also by SME 
and large-scale commercial cage aquaculture using data collected from the 
household survey and from data collected from the cage farm enterprise 
survey.  Employment is measured in full-time equivalent (FTE) jobs based on 
the number of days usually worked in the farming sector so one FTE job is 
estimated to represent one full time job for someone working 8 hours a day, 
300 days a year. Wage rates between labourers on small-scale pond farms 
and SME cage farms are also estimated and compared to average wage 
rates in the agricultural sector.  
 
Labourer characteristics 
Some demographic characteristics of labourers on SME and large-scale 
commercial farms are explored using data collected from a survey of 
labourers. 86 employees on 3 small-scale farms, 5 medium-scale farms, 2 
large-scale farms and the largest hatchery (Crystal Lake) were selected at 
random to be interviewed. The questionnaire is presented in Appendix 4.    
 
4.3.3 Data and methods to test Hypothesis 3 
This section reviews Objective 3 and Hypothesis 3, and then describes the 
main data sources, methods for data collection and analysis used to test 
Hypothesis 3. 
 
Objective 3 and Hypothesis 3 
Objective 3: To identify the institutions needed for different aquaculture 
systems to have the highest potential to promote poverty reduction in 
different contexts. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Due to the institutionally demanding techno-economic 
characteristics of aquaculture products, complementary technical and 
institutional development is necessary for aquaculture to develop and impact 
poverty. 
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To test Hypothesis 3, the institutional framework of Dorward and Omamo 
(2009) (outlined in more detail in Chapter 7) is applied to both pond and cage 
aquaculture sub-sectors. Data collected to test Hypothesis 1 and 2 
(described above) along with additional primary data, are utilised to analyse 
the following components of the conceptual framework within the pond and 
cage aquaculture sectors (referred to as ‘action domains’): i) activities and 
their attributes (including the techno-economic characteristics of farmed fish 
commodities); ii) actors and their attributes; iii) institutions and their attributes; 
and iv) outcomes. Secondary data are used to supplement the primary data 
to understand the operational environment (physical, socioeconomic and 
policy and governance environment) in which the aquaculture systems 
operate. Analysis of each of these components makes use of data from a 
range of sources to enable more comprehensive analysis (described further 
below). 
  
Data used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 were utilised, specifically data from the 
household survey and the cage farm enterprise survey. These data were 
supplemented with data gathered from 42 farmed fish traders, key informant 
interviews with other stakeholders in the aquaculture value chains including 
feed and seed suppliers and FC extension staff as well as direct observation. 
Information gathered from these sources is used to understand the techno-
economic characteristics of farmed fish in the three systems as well as 
analyse the activities and attributes of actors and the types of institutional 
arrangements linking them. Secondary data is also utilised to understand the 
wider institutional environment. The sources of primary data used are 
described below. 
 
Household survey 
Data collected by the household survey of small-scale artisanal fish farmers 
on: farmers socio-economic characteristics; production practices; marketing 
channels for farmed fish; institutional arrangements between producers and 
buyers; and problems of farmers related to fish farming production and 
marketing, are used to analyse the components of the conceptual framework 
for the pond aquaculture ‘action domain’.  
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Cage farm enterprise survey 
Similarly, data collected by the cage farm enterprise survey on: the socio-
economic characteristics of cage farm owners; production practices; 
marketing channels for cage farmed fish; institutional arrangements between 
producers and both buyers and input suppliers; and problems of farmers 
related to production and marketing, are used to analyse the components of 
the conceptual framework for the cage aquaculture ‘action domain’.  
 
Trader interviews 
Data from the two surveys described above were supplemented with 
information gathered from semi-structured interviews with 3 pond farmed fish 
traders and 8 wild caught tilapia traders in Kumasi (Ashanti Region), and 31 
cage farmed fish traders (3 of whom were also fish wholesalers) in Eastern 
Region. All traders were interviewed individually while they were buying fish 
(from small-scale pond farms, SME cage farms and/or large-scale 
commercial cage farm retail/marketing outlets). One FGD with 6 members of 
a farmed fish trader group was also undertaken. Information was gathered 
from traders on: i) socio-economic characteristics of traders; ii) trading 
activities; iii) the marketing chain including sources of fish, retailing outlets, 
sources of credit, transport and other services; iv) institutional arrangements 
linking traders with other value chain actors as well as with other traders and 
wholesalers; iv) fish grading and pricing; v) profitability of fish trading; vi) 
problems related to sourcing fish and fish marketing, especially sources and 
levels of risk faced by traders. 
 
Key informant interviews 
The above data were supplemented with information gathered from key 
informant interviews with other key actors in the pond and cage aquaculture 
sectors including: feed and fingerling suppliers, credit providers, staff from 
the FC in Accra, Kumasi and Akosombo, and staff from WRI in Accra and 
Akosombo. 
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Direct observation 
Fish harvests (for both pond and cage farms) were attended where traders, 
farmers and processors and their interactions could be observed. Direct 
observation of Regional FC staff and their activities in Kumasi and staff at 
WRI in Akosombo (which is also a government hatchery) was also used to 
verify and supplement the data collected from the sources outlined above. 
 
Iterative process of data collection and analysis  
Overall data collection for the institutional analysis required to test 
Hypothesis 3 was an iterative process. The institutional picture and the 
dynamics and relationships between actors and institutions were built up 
gradually over the course of the fieldwork.  
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 CHAPTER 5: DIRECT IMPACTS OF SMALL-SCALE 
AQUACULTURE ON POVERTY  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter focuses on assessing the direct impacts of small-scale pond 
aquaculture on poverty and livelihoods of households in three districts in 
Ashanti Region using a Sustainable Livelihoods approach. The research 
question and hypothesis addressed in this chapter are as follows: 
 
Objective 
To assess the direct poverty and livelihood impacts (positive and negative) of 
small-scale aquaculture systems on different categories of poor people in 
Ghana. 
 
Hypothesis  
Small-scale aquaculture has positive direct impacts on poverty and 
livelihoods of poor households in Ashanti Region, Ghana. The magnitude of 
these impacts depends on the livelihood characteristics and production 
systems of small-scale farmers, and the institutional and infrastructure 
context. 
 
To test this hypothesis, poor fish farming households are first identified to see 
whether poor households are able to adopt fish farming and thus potentially 
benefit directly from aquaculture. The chapter then investigates and 
compares the livelihood characteristics, capital assets, activities and 
livelihood strategies of poor and non-poor small-scale fish farmers and a 
comparison group of non-fish farmers (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1). Fish 
farming as a livelihood activity is then explored along with the perceived 
benefits for adopting households and the community. The differences in 
livelihood outcomes such as income, household assets and food security 
between fish farming and non-fish farming households are then compared in 
order to identify any significant group differences which could indicate that 
fish farming households are better off than non-fish farming households. 
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These comparisons, however, do not account for other possible differences 
in household characteristics which may cause differences in livelihood 
outcomes between fish farming and non-fish farming households. Thus an 
Income Determination Model is used to control for differences in observable 
characteristics between households and to assess the factors that contribute 
to differences in income between fish farming and non-fish farming 
households.  The results presented in this chapter are based on non 
representative samples of fish and non-fish farming households and no 
compensatory weights were applied: they thus represent sample results not 
population estimates. 
 
The descriptive statistics exploring group differences between fish farming 
and non-fish farming households have to be presented in some detail to test 
the hypothesis.  However, readers who wish to avoid this can skip straight to 
Section 5.2.11 and rely on that and the summary of findings in Section 5.3 to 
glean the major conclusions made from the detailed examination of the 
descriptive statistics in Sections 5.2.1 to 5.2.10.  
 
 
5.2 RESULTS 
 
5.2.1 Defining the poor 
To test the hypothesis that fish farming has positive direct impacts on the 
livelihoods of poor households, identification of poor households is 
necessary. This is done below by analysing community wealth ranking 
exercise results (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1), estimating headcount poverty 
rates of the fish and non-fish farming households surveyed, and analysing 
respondents’ own subjective perception of their household poverty level.  
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Wealth ranking 
Wealth ranking exercises were conducted in three communities to 
understand communities’ own perception of poverty and find out which 
wealth categories fish farmers are in. The results are summarised in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Wealth ranking results: households in three wealth categories 
Households from three villages 
More 
wealthy 
Medium 
wealth 
Less 
wealthy  Total  
Total households (Nos.) 37 107 113 257 
% of households in each category 14 42 44 100 
Total fish farming households 8 8 7 23 
% of fish farming households in each 
wealth category 22 7 6 9 
%  within fish farmers 35 35 30 100 
 
Of all 257 households, 44 percent were classified as less wealthy and 56 
percent as medium or more wealthy. A much higher percentage of more 
wealthy households is involved in aquaculture compared to the less well off 
groups. Overall the results suggest that while less wealthy (or poor) 
households are able to adopt fish farming, fish farmers are more likely to be 
wealthier. 
 
Table 6 below shows some of the main characteristics of households in these 
wealth categories, identified by the communities. Many of the household and 
livelihood characteristics that are compared between fish farmers and non-
fish farmers, presented in the following sections of this chapter, are those 
which communities themselves point to as indicators of poverty.  
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Table 6: Wealth ranking results: characteristics of households in three 
wealth categories. 
Category 1 (More wealthy) 2 (Medium wealth) 3 (Less wealthy) 
Land 
ownership 
25 ha and above 
Some rent out land for 
sharecropping 
1-2 ha on average Some own small sized land 
holdings, others do not own 
any land 
Crop systems Mainly cash crops (e.g. 
cocoa, citrus, pepper, 
vegetables, oil palm, 
coconut) 
 
Mixture of cash crops (e.g. 
cocoa, oil palm) and 
staples (e.g. plantain, 
cassava). 
Those with land produce 
mainly staples (cassava, 
plantain) for subsistence. 
Others produce cocoa 
through sharecropping. 
Livestock 
ownership 
Own livestock Own livestock Only some own livestock 
Ability to 
invest in fish 
farming 
Have the funds to do fish 
farming – e.g. income 
from cocoa is used to dig 
ponds and hire labourers 
Are able to invest in fish 
farming 
Less able to do fish farming. 
Those that do have small 
ponds 
Occupation Farming of cash crops 
Business owners 
Salaried employment e.g. 
teacher, banker 
Two incomes e.g. 
spouses do trading or 
own business 
Farming of cash crops 
Business owners 
Employed in nonfarm 
sector as artisans 
Traders 
 
Subsistence farming 
Petty trading 
Casual farm labour  
(GH¢ 3.5/day) 
Unemployed 
Illegal mining 
House Own one or more 
houses. 
Walls made from cement 
blocks, iron roofs 
Own their own houses 
Walls made of bricks or 
cement blocks, iron roofs 
Some own their own 
houses 
Walls made from mud, 
some have iron roofs, 
others have bamboo/ thatch 
roofs 
Assets Many own vehicles -  car, 
motorbike 
Own assets such as 
pumping machine, 
processing machines 
Some own motorbikes 
 
No household assets 
No vehicle 
Food security 3 good meals a day 3 good meals a day Less than 3 good meals a 
day 
Labour Able to hire labour Able to hire labour Unable to hire labour 
Savings Able to save Able to save Unable to save 
Children’s 
education 
Some able to send their 
children to private 
schools and on to 
secondary schools or 
training college 
Government basic schools, 
secondary education 
Government basic schools, 
no secondary education 
Other Strength to work, not lazy 
 
 
Not migrants 
Strength to work, not lazy 
 
 
Not migrants 
Not enough strength to 
work, always complaining, 
old age, invalids, lazy, 
drunk, 
Migrants 
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Headcount poverty rate 
Surveyed households are classified here as ‘poor’ if their per capita income is 
below the poverty line33 and ‘non-poor’34 if their per capita income is above 
the poverty line. Income data were collected in the household survey. 
However, farming, livestock and household enterprise costs were not 
collected due to lack of resources. Thus, the estimates are of gross (as 
opposed to net) income. Table 7 shows the percentage of poor and non-poor 
surveyed fish and non-fish farming households35.  
 
Table 7: Poor and non-poor surveyed households by fish farming 
status 
Poverty status Fish farmer 
households 
Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
% % % 
Poor households 44 57 50 
Non-poor households 57 43 50 
Total households (Nos.) 69 74 143 
 
50 percent of surveyed households are classified as poor (similar to the 44% 
less wealthy households from the wealth ranking results above)36. The 
                                                 
 
33
 The international poverty line of US$1.25 a day at 2005 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) set by the 
World Bank was used. Inflating this using the 2010 PPP exchange rate for Ghana (0.856) gives a 
poverty line of GH¢ 390.55. A US$2 per day poverty line for Ghana is GH¢ 624.88 at 2010 PPP. 
34
 To avoid repetition, the terms ‘poor’ and ‘non-poor’ are used throughout the thesis to refer to 
sampled households with per capita income below and above the poverty line respectively unless 
otherwise stated.  
35
 Table 1 in Appendix 5 shows the distribution of respondents in each district by fish farming and 
poverty status. 
36
 The World Bank estimated the population under the US$1.25 international poverty line to be 30 
percent in Ghana in 2006 (World Bank, 2013a). The GLSS5 of 2005/6 estimated 14.6 percent of the 
forest zone was below their lower poverty line of GH¢288.47. The GLSS5 poverty line is based on 
consumption expenditure needed to meet minimum nutritional requirements and is similar to the 
poverty line used here when adjusted to 2010 prices i.e. when it is increased by 37.7 percent (the 
increase in Consumer Price Index for food in Ashanti Region between 2006 and 2010) the GLSS5 
poverty line is GH¢396.58. The difference in poverty rates between the GLSS5 and this survey may 
be due to a number of reasons including their use of expenditure (which was 52 percent higher than 
income) to measure poverty rather than income. When the income figures from the current survey 
are increased by 52 percent the poverty rate is 30.8 percent. Also while poverty is reported to have 
decreased substantially in Ghana from 1991/2 to 2005/6 (GSS, 2007), Osei (2011) argues that 
poverty has increased in Ghana since 2005 due to rising food prices and the global financial crisis and 
using a micro-simulation model for Ghana estimated 32.9 percent of households were under the 
poverty line in Ashanti in 2010 (Osei, 2011:11). Ultimately it is not surprising there are differences 
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percentage of poor fish farmer households is lower than poor non-fish farmer 
households (p = .11)37 (see Appendix 6 for all Chi square test results).   
 
Poverty self assessment  
Respondents were also asked about their own subjective perception of their 
poverty level. Table 8 shows that overall 42 percent categorised their 
households as very poor or poor (similar to the 50 percent headcount poverty 
rate above). An association was found between poverty status and 
household’s own perception of poverty (p = .1) suggesting that subjective 
and objective indicators of poverty are related. 
 
Table 8: Household’s own perception of poverty by fish farming and 
income poverty status 
  Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
% % % % % % % % % 
Very poor/ 
poor 37 31 33 57 41 50 49 35 42 
Not so 
poor/well off 63 69 67 43 59 50 51 65 58 
Total 
households 
(Nos.) 30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
 
There is a significant association between fish farming status and 
households’ own perception of poverty (p = .04) indicating non-fish farmers 
are more likely to assess themselves as being either very poor or poor than 
fish farmers38.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                          
 
between this survey which covers 143 households compared to the nationally representative GLSS5 
covering 8,687 households and 37,128 household members.  
37
 The percentage of the surveyed population (not households) under the poverty line is 55 percent, 
47 percent for the population in fish farming households and 63 percent for those in non-fish 
farming households (p < .001), see Table 2, Appendix 5. 
38
 85 percent of all respondents also said that the poor practise fish farming. 
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5.2.2 Human capital  
Household and demographic characteristics 
Human capital includes the skills, knowledge, ability to labour and good 
health that enable people to pursue different livelihood strategies and 
achieve their livelihood objectives. (DfID, 1999). Data on household size and 
composition, education and occupation is presented for fish farmers and non-
fish farmers in the following tables.  
 
Table 9 shows that there are few major differences in demographic 
characteristics between fish farming and non-fish farming households (see 
Table 4, Appendix 5 for more data on demographic characteristics).  
 
Table 9: Household and demographic characteristics of sample 
households by fish farming and poverty status 
 Fish farmer 
households 
Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
Female headed 
households (%)  
10 0 4 0 9 4 4 4 4 
Married 
household heads 
(%) 
93 97 96 98 88 93 96 93 94 
Average age of 
household head 
51.0 
(1.95) 
46.9 
(1.90) 
48.7 
(1.38) 
50.8 
(1.61) 
47.1 
(1.91) 
49.2 
(1.24) 
50.9 
(1.23) 
47.0 
(1.34) 
48.9 
(0.92) 
Average 
household size 
9.3 
(0.68) 
8.1 
(0.58) 
8.6 
(0.45)  
9.3 
(0.47) 
7.3 
(0.48) 
8.4 
(0.36) 
9.3 
(0.39) 
7.7 
(0.39) 
8.5 
(0.28) 
Total households 
(Nos.) 
30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
Notes:  % refers to column percentage i.e. percentage of total households surveyed 
Standard errors (SE) in parentheses 
 
The majority of all households are headed by males, nearly all of whom are 
married. While the average size of fish and non-fish farming households are 
very similar39, overall poor households have more household members than 
                                                 
 
39
 The average household size of total surveyed households (8.5) is much higher than that reported 
by the GLSS5 which measured household size as the number of equivalent adults using a scale based 
on age, gender and specified calories requirements. Using this method, the GLSS5 estimated average 
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non-poor households (p = .005) (see Appendix 7 for all independent samples 
t-test results), a reflection of the way in which the ‘poor’ and ‘non-poor’ 
groups were constructed using per capita income which is likely to be lower 
when household size is larger. The average age of fish and non-fish farming 
household heads is very similar due to the age criteria used to match 
respondents described in Chapter 4. The average age of household heads is 
higher for poor than non-poor households (p = .03), related to older 
household heads having larger household sizes thus lowering their per capita 
income levels.  
 
Education of household heads  
Table 10 shows very little difference in the mean number of years of 
education of household heads between fish farming and non-fish farming 
households and between poor and non-poor households. 
 
Table 10: Mean number of years of education of household head by fish 
farming and poverty status 
 Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
 Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
Mean years 
of 
education  
 8.5  9.9 9.3  9.2 9.2  9.2  8.9 9.6  9.2  
 (0.71)  (0.54)  (0.44)  (0.62)  (0.49)  (0.40)  (0.47)  (0.37)  (0.30) 
Total 
households 
(Nos.) 
29 38 67 41 32 73 70 70 140 
Notes:  S.E. in parentheses 
 
On average household heads from poor fish farming household have fewer 
years of education than those from non-poor fish farming households 
(p=.12)40.  
                                                                                                                                          
 
household size in the forest zone to be 3.8 and overall rural household size to be 4.4 equivalent 
adults. 
40
 Dey et al.’s (2007) impact assessment of IAA in Malawi used a Logit model to estimate the 
determinants of IAA adoption. The model showed that higher education was not associated with 
higher adoption, which is similar to the finding here of no difference in education levels between fish 
farmers and non-fish farmers. However the Malawi study found that as education increased so did 
the level of integration of IAA practices.  
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Occupation of household heads and spouses 
Respondents were asked about their primary occupations (as defined by 
them) during the rainy season (late April to October) and the dry season 
(November to April). Fish farming and non-fish farming household heads are 
mainly engaged in agricultural activities and have similar occupations (see 
Tables 6 and 7, Appendix 5). The primary occupation of the majority of 
household heads (64%) is cocoa farming in the rainy season (reducing to 
20% in the dry season) while 50 percent of household heads farm other 
crops (e.g. cassava and plantain) as their primary occupation in the dry 
season. Just over 10 percent of fish farming household heads reported fish 
farming to be a primary occupation in both seasons indicating that fish 
farming is a secondary or tertiary activity for most fish farmers, after their 
crop farming activities.  The household heads for whom fish farming is a 
primary occupation are evenly distributed between poor and non-poor 
households in the dry season (approximately 10% in each category). This 
percentage increases for poor household heads in the rainy season (17%) 
which is higher than non-poor household heads (8%), though this difference 
is not significant at the 10% level41. Thus fish farming is not a primary 
occupation for the majority of both poor and non-poor households.  
 
The primary occupation of spouses by season is shown in Tables 8 and 9 in 
Appendix 5. For the majority of households, household heads and spouses 
share the primary occupations of farming cocoa and other crops.  Some 
spouses also have their own businesses (such as trading in food stuffs) as a 
primary occupation (17% in the dry season and 5% in the rainy season) with 
little difference between poor and non-poor households. Less than 5 percent 
of spouses are involved in fish farming as a primary occupation indicating it is 
a primarily male activity.  
  
  
                                                 
 
41
 The significance was tested using Fisher’s exact test. 
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5.2.3 Natural capital  
Natural capital refers to the natural resource stocks from which resource 
flows and services useful for livelihoods are derived, and is very important to 
those who draw all or part of their livelihoods from resource-based activities 
such as farming, fishing, forestry etc. (DfID, 1999). This section focuses on 
the access of farmers to land, which is one of the most important resources 
from which rural households in this survey derive their livelihoods and, along 
with access to water, is required for fish farming.  
 
Land ownership  
Land ownership in Ghana is either by stools42, clans, families, individuals or 
the state. Table 11 shows that all the households surveyed have access to 
land either through owning, leasing or renting from others or through 
sharecropping.  
 
Table 11: Household land ownership by fish farming and poverty status 
 Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
 Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
% % % % % % % % % 
Households 
owning land 
97 95 96 79 91 84 86 93 90 
Households 
leasing land  
10 0 4 2 3 3 6 1 4 
Households 
renting land  
3 8 6 5 16 10 4 11 8 
Households 
sharecropping 
land 
20 18 19 31 22 27 26 20 23 
Total 
households 
(Nos.) 
30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
 
The proportion of fish farming households who own land is significantly 
higher than non-fish farming households (p =.02) supporting findings from 
                                                 
 
42
 A Stool represents the traditional office for chiefs in southern Ghana. Stool lands are lands which 
are entrusted in the appropriate Stool on behalf of and in trust for the subjects of the Stool (source: 
http://ghanadistricts.com/home/?_=42&sa=3638&ssa=1418 (accessed 23 May 2013))  
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key informant interviews that households with secure access to land are 
more likely to invest in fish farming43.  
 
Table 12 shows the average and median hectares of land owned and total 
farm size (the amount of land owned, leased, rented and sharecropped44) by 
all households surveyed. 
 
Table 12: Average land size by fish farming and poverty status 
 Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer households Total households 
 Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
Size of land 
owned (ha)  
6.0 
 (1.38) 
Median 
3.5 
8.2 
 (1.28) 
Median 
5.1 
7.2 
 (0.94) 
Median 
4.1 
4.4 
(0.75) 
Median 
3.7 
7.2 
(1.35) 
Median 
4.9 
5.7 
(0.73) 
Median 
4.1 
5.1 
(0.72) 
Median 
3.5 
7.8 
(0.93) 
Median 
4.9 
6.4 
(0.59) 
Median 
4.1 
Total farm 
size  
(ha) (1) 
7.6 
(1.52) 
Median 
4.5 
9.4 
(1.44) 
Median 
5.9 
8.6 
 (1.05) 
Median 
5.3 
6.3 
(1.06) 
Median 
4.1 
9.2 
(1.62) 
Median 
6.9 
7.6 
(0.93) 
Median 
4.9 
6.8 
(0.88) 
Median 
4.1 
9.3 
(1.07) 
Median 
6.1 
8.0 
(0.70) 
Median 
4.9 
Total 
households 
(Nos.) 
30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
Notes:  SE in parentheses 
(1) Total farm size is the sum of land owned, leased, rented and sharecropped but is not 
necessarily the amount of land under production 
 
Medians are included as size of land owned is skewed towards smaller land 
sizes.  On average fish farming households own more land than non-fish 
farming households (p = .18) and poor households own significantly less land 
than non-poor households (p = .025). Poor households have a lower average 
total farm size than non-poor households (p = .078) and a lower median farm 
size. There is no significant difference at the 10 percent level between 
                                                 
 
43
 The percentage of respondents owning land seems rather high judging by the nature of the land 
tenure system in Ghana. For comparison Wiredu et al. (2011) reported the findings of a survey of 
366 cocoa farmers in Ashanti Region in 2005 where approximately 74 percent of farmers owned 
land. Asmah (2008) found 67 percent of fish farmers surveyed owned land with legal title and 30.5 
percent leased land from chiefs, individuals or the state. It could be possible that ownership and 
lease definitions between these surveys are not the same, for example the current survey did not 
specify ownership to mean households who have a legal title.  
44
 See Table 10 in Appendix 5 for disaggregated values. 
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average total farm size of fish farmers and non-fish farmers and between 
poor and non-poor fish farming households45.  
 
5.2.4 Physical capital 
Physical capital consists of the producer goods and basic infrastructure 
needed to support livelihoods (DfID, 1999). This section focuses on physical 
capital such as housing, ownership of household assets and access to 
infrastructure of the surveyed population. The majority of those surveyed own 
their own houses with no significant difference in home ownership between 
fish farming and non-fish farming households (p = .31) (see Table 11 in 
Appendix 5 for data on housing conditions such as roof and wall materials).  
 
Table 13 shows the ownership of household assets of the households 
surveyed. Ownership of some assets (such as radio, boat, bicycle, 
motorcycle, flush toilet and latrine) appears to be similar across different 
household groups. However, ownership of other assets shows some 
significant differences between groups. For example, a higher percentage of 
fish farming households own a refrigerator compared to non-fish farming 
households (p = .06) and this is also the case for non-poor compared to poor 
households (p = .02). A higher percentage of fish farming compared to non-
fish farming households own a telephone and/or mobile phone (p = .1) and a 
significantly higher percentage of non-poor compared to poor households 
own a telephone and/or mobile phone (p = .002). Significant differences are 
also found in vehicle and water pump ownership between fish and non-fish 
farmer households (p = .05 and p = .06 respectively). These differences may 
indicate that fish farming households are better off than non-fish farming 
households but could also indicate that fish farming households may have 
more need for assets such as water pumps to drain their ponds, and 
refrigerators to store their fish. 
                                                 
 
45
 While both the average and median amounts of total farm size seems rather high compared to 
average district farm sizes reported by the MOFA presented in Chapter 4, other households surveys 
conducted in Ashanti Region have estimated similar sized average land holdings. For example a 
2002-2004 survey of 441 cocoa farmers in Ashanti, Western and Brong Ahafo regions estimated the 
mean area under cocoa per farmer to be 7.49ha (Vigneri, 2008:35).  
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Table 13: Ownership of household assets by fish farming and poverty 
status 
  Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
% % % % % % % % % 
Radio 90 87 88 95 94 95 93 90 92 
Television 50 69 61 50 59 54 50 65 57 
Electric fan 37 64 52 29 47 37 32 56 44 
Refrigerator 27 51 41 21 31 26 24 42 33 
Telephone/mobile 
phone 70 97 86 69 81 74 69 90 80 
Bicycle 17 36 28 24 25 24 21 31 26 
Boat 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 
Motorcycle 3 13 9 5 6 5 4 10 7 
Vehicle 7 18 13 5 3 4 6 11 8 
Water pump 10 15 13 2 0 1 6 9 7 
Flush toilet 7 5 6 2 9 5 4 7 6 
Latrine 57 74 67 62 63 62 60 69 64 
Total households 
(Nos.) 30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
 
A durable goods index was constructed, using the methodology described in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1 to allow easier comparison between groups, 
presented in Table 14 below. 
 
Table 14: Durable goods index by fish farming and poverty status 
 Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
 Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
Durable 
goods 
index 
22.2 
(9.52) 
48.0 
(9.87) 
36.8 
(7.07) 
18.9 
(5.82) 
18.7 
(5.64) 
18.8 
(4.08) 
20.3 
(5.18) 
34.8 
(6.20) 
27.5 
(4.07) 
Total 
households 
(Nos.) 
30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
Notes:  SE in parentheses 
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Table 14 shows large differences in the average durable goods index 
between groups surveyed. Fish farming households have a higher durable 
goods index score than non-fish farming households (p = .03). Poor 
households have a lower score than non-poor households (p = .08) and this 
difference is reflected between poor and non-poor fish farming households (p 
= .07). Poor and non-poor non-fish farming households have almost identical 
scores and non-poor fish farming households have a significantly higher 
score than non-poor non-fish farming households (p = .01). 
 
Access to infrastructure, transport and communication facilities 
Figure 11 shows the average probability46 of different groups of households 
facing difficulties accessing infrastructure and facilities (roads, transportation, 
communication facilities, input and output markets) during the dry and rainy 
seasons. Figure 11 shows that overall access to roads and transportation is 
more difficult in the rainy season than the dry season. It also shows that 
difficulty of accessing communication facilities is similar in both seasons, and 
approximately 30 percent indicated access is not difficult. The probability of 
facing difficulties in accessing input markets is higher than in accessing 
output markets, with little variation between seasons. Overall fish farming and 
non-fish farming households face similar levels of difficulty accessing 
infrastructure, facilities and markets in both seasons. 
 
                                                 
 
46
 Probabilities were calculated by asking respondents how difficult it was to access different types of 
infrastructure and facilities by season on a five step scale from very difficult to very easy. To simplify 
analysis answers were converted into probabilities. A response of very difficult was interpreted to 
mean 80 percent probability of facing difficulties, a response of difficult was interpreted to mean 60 
percent probability of facing difficulties, neither easy nor difficult was interpreted to mean 40 
percent probability of facing difficulties, easy was interpreted to mean 20 percent probability of 
facing difficulties and very easy was interpreted to mean 0 percent probability of facing difficulties. 
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Figure 11: Average probability (%) of facing difficulties in accessing 
infrastructure by season and household type   
 
 
        Notes: RS = rainy season, DS = dry season. 
 
Figure 12 shows the average probability of facing difficulties accessing 
infrastructure and facilities in dry and rainy seasons by district. Households in 
Amansie West face much higher difficulties accessing all facilities and output 
markets in both seasons compared to the other two districts. This reflects the 
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fact that Amansie West is the more remote district out of the three with the 
worst road network and villages that are more dispersed. All districts have 
similar difficulties accessing input markets which on average seems to be 
difficult in both seasons. 
 
Figure 12: Average probability (%) of facing difficulties accessing 
infrastructure/facilities by season and district 
 
Notes: RS = rainy season, DS = dry season. 
 
5.2.5 Financial Capital 
This section looks at households’ access to stocks and liquid assets in the 
form of livestock and credit.  
 
Livestock ownership 
Livestock are the main form of savings for many poor households, and as a 
liquid asset can be easily sold to generate income during times of need47. 
Figure 13 shows the percentage of different household groups that own 
livestock (see Table 12, Appendix 5 for more details).  
                                                 
 
47
 Livestock is also a form of natural capital and can be a form of social capital (e.g. by increasing 
wealth and prestige, and strengthening networks as livestock are often given as gifts). 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
P
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
 (
%
)
Infrastructure/facilities
Amansie West Amansie Central Adansi North
123 
 
 
Figure 13: Percentage of households owning livestock 
 
 
Overall the most popular types of livestock owned are chickens, goats and 
sheep.  90 percent of poor households own some type of livestock compared 
to 73 percent of non-poor households (due mainly to a higher percentage of 
poor households owning chickens and goats) (p = .008). There is no 
significant difference (at the 10% level) between the percentage of fish and 
non-fish farming households owning livestock.  Analysis of livestock holdings 
using TLUs across different households groups, shows that the small 
numbers of larger animals kept by non-poor households roughly 
compensates for the larger number of small animals kept by poorer 
households so that overall portfolios measured in TLUs are roughly similar 
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with no significant difference between fish and non-fish farming households 
(at the 10% level) (see Table 13, Appendix 5 for more details). 
 
Access to credit 
Only 8 percent of surveyed households had accessed credit (one or more 
times) in the past five years with little difference between groups. Credit was 
obtained 14 times by 11 households in the past 5 years. Just over half the 
times credit was obtained from rural banks, nearly 20 percent of the times 
from friends or relatives and the remainder from a mixture of private and 
public sources (see Table 14, Appendix 5). 
 
5.2.6 Social Capital 
The term ‘social capital’ is much debated. Putnam (1993:36) defined it as the 
‘features of social organization, such as networks, norms and trust, that 
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit’. This section looks 
at the level of membership in livelihood associations of the surveyed 
households as an indicator of social capital.  
 
Association membership 
Table 15 shows the percentage of surveyed household heads who are 
members of livelihood associations. 
 
Table 15: Membership of household heads of livelihood associations by 
fish farming and poverty status 
  Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
% % % % % % % % % 
Association 
membership 53 49 51 17 16 16 32 34 33 
Total 
households 
(Nos.) 30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
 
A much higher percentage of fish farming than non-fish farming household 
heads are members of an association (p = .01). This reflects membership of 
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two district level FFAs in the survey area, one in Amansie Central and one in 
Adansi North, established in 2007 by the then Ministry of Fisheries48. 14 
percent of fish farmers are also members of other livelihood associations 
related to cocoa, citrus and other crops. Overall this suggests that fish 
farming households have higher levels of social capital than non-fish farming 
households. The poor can be at risk of being excluded from Farmer 
Organisations (Rondot and Collion, 2000; Stockbridge et al., 2003) however 
association membership is evenly distributed between poor and non-poor 
households here.  
 
5.2.7 The vulnerability context  
People’s livelihoods and asset availability are fundamentally affected by the 
vulnerability context. This context is influenced by shocks (e.g. natural 
shocks such as floods and droughts, economic shocks such as large price 
changes), seasonality (e.g. of production, food security, employment) and 
trends (e.g. population and economic trends) which directly affect people’s 
asset status and opportunities for livelihood strategies to improve livelihood 
outcomes (DfID, 1999).  
 
Shocks 
Figure 14 shows the percentage of households who faced one or more crises 
in 2010 and the types of crises they faced.  
 
  
                                                 
 
48
 The sample may be slightly biased towards those in FFAs as it was through the government 
extension staff and the FFAs that the fish farmers in two of the three districts surveyed were found 
(even though non members were also found and interviewed). 
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Figure 14: Percentage of households facing different types of crises in 
2010 
 
 
Overall 83 percent of households faced one or more crisis in 2010. There is 
no significant difference (at the 10% level) between the percentage of poor 
and non-poor households, and fish farming and non-fish farming households, 
who faced a crisis. Overall, drought was the most common crisis, affecting 
nearly 60 percent of all surveyed households. Drought affected a much lower 
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percentage of fish farming households (48%) compared to non-fish farming 
households (71%) (p = .06). Weather related shocks, such as drought and 
floods, would be expected to be equally distributed across household groups. 
For example the percentage of surveyed households that experienced floods 
in 2010 is very similar across groups. Other studies have shown that 
households with ponds are able to cope better during drought periods. For 
example Brummett and Jamu (2011) note that in Malawi, farm level impacts 
of IAA include a 40 percent increase in farming system resilience defined by 
the ability to maintain positive cash flows through drought years as IAA 
farmers use pond water to irrigate their crops etc. (Dey et al., 2010). However 
here it is more likely that surveyed fish farmers have land situated in valleys 
suitable for fish farming and thus already have land with easy access to 
water sources (enabling them to farm fish in the first place) and so are less 
prone to be affected by drought. Illness in the family was experienced by 48 
percent of all households, and 38 percent of all households experienced 
financial loss from their livelihoods. A higher percentage of non-fish farmer 
households (45%) compared to fish farmer households (30%) experienced 
financial loss (p = .01). Similarly, a higher percentage of poor households 
(44%) compared to non-poor households (31%) experienced financial loss (p 
= .08).  
 
Figure 15 illustrates the range of coping strategies used by the 83 percent 
(119 households) that experienced one or more crises in 2010. The most 
common coping strategy was use of family savings (used by 62% of 
households) while the second most common strategy was loans from friends 
and relatives (used by 22% of households) with little notable difference 
between groups for either of these strategies.  
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Figure 15: Percentage of households facing crises in 2010 by type of 
coping strategies used 
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Seasonal patterns 
Ghana’s dry season is from November to April and the rainy season is from 
late April to October49. Seasonal changes are extremely important for rural 
communities that depend on rainfed agriculture for their livelihoods as the 
seasons affect the timing of activities such as planting and harvesting of 
different crops, which in turn affect food availability and demand and supply 
of labour.  Seasonal calendars were undertaken in two districts (Amansie 
West and Amansie Central) to understand seasonal variations across the 
year, to identify vulnerable months and understand where aquaculture fits 
into the production system.  A generalised seasonal calendar is shown below 
in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16: Generalised seasonal calendar 
Month Jan Feb March Apr May June July August Sept Oct Nov Dec 
Season Dry Dry Dry 
Dry/ 
Rainy Rainy Rainy Rainy Rainy Rainy Rainy Dry Dry 
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Harvest 
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Sell Sell Sell Sell 
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Harvest Harvest 
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Plant Harvest 
       Maize 
   
Plant 
 
Harvest Harvest Harvest Harvest 
   Cocoa 
   
Plant Plant Plant Plant Harvest Harvest 
   
Oil palm Harvest 
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Harvest 
        Fish 
farming Harvest Harvest 
 
Stock pond 
       
Harvest 
Labour 
Hire/ 
sell 
Hire/ 
Sell 
Hire/ 
sell Hire/sell 
Hire/ 
Sell 
Hire/ 
sell 
Hire/ 
sell 
     Food 
   
Lean Lean Lean Lean 
      
In both districts planting and harvesting of most crops occurs in April/May, 
except for maize (harvested from June to September) and cocoa (harvested 
from August to September). The lean season for food consumption is from 
April to July during the rainy season which is the period before harvesting 
and when the previous year’s harvest has come to an end. 
 
                                                 
 
49
 There is a drier month in August so there is a major and minor rainy season even though this is not 
reflected in the seasonal calendar below. 
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Fish farmers reported that their fish production cycle usually begins in April at 
the start of the rainy season (and the lean season) when rain fills the ponds 
which are then stocked. Ponds are harvested 9 to 12 months later 
(December to February). However, most farmers do not do complete 
harvesting and do not have a fixed production cycle.  
 
5.2.8 Livelihood strategies 
Livelihood strategies are diverse and dynamic and people combine a mixture 
of activities to meet their various needs at different times. Livelihood capital 
assets (as described above) are the building blocks for livelihood strategies 
as different activities have different asset requirements. The major livelihood 
strategy of the household heads surveyed is agricultural production 
supported by off-farm and nonfarm activities such as nonfarm enterprises 
and skilled and unskilled employment, the importance of which changes 
depending on the season. This section looks at the types and importance of 
crops grown by surveyed households, the sale of crops, the involvement of 
household members in paid employment and nonfarm enterprises and the 
composition of household income.  
 
Crops 
Surveyed households grew a range of staple and cash crops in 2010 (see 
Tables 15 and 16, Appendix 5). The two most commonly grown staple crops 
were plantain and cassava (grown by over 90% of all households) followed 
by maize (83%), cocoyam (78%) and yam (63%), with little difference 
between fish farming and non-fish farming, and poor and non-poor 
households. The three most commonly grown cash crops were maize (grown 
by 88% of all households), cocoa (85%) and oil palm (76%). 60 percent grew 
vegetables, 28 percent grew citrus and 20 percent grew coconut. There are 
no significant differences (at the 10% level) between poor and non-poor 
households and fish and non-fish farming households growing different cash 
crops (see Appendix 6 for all Chi square test results). Overall the majority 
(75%) of households ranked cocoa as the most important cash crop followed 
by oil palm (71%) and maize (68%).  
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This distinction between staple and cash crops does not necessarily reflect 
reality however. While plantain and cassava are both staple crops that are 
consumed on-farm, they were also both sold by over 50 percent of 
households in 2010 (see Table 17, Appendix 5). Cocoa was sold by 84 
percent of households and oil palm and maize were sold by 48 percent and 
43 percent of households respectively.  There are few differences between 
the percentage of poor and non-poor households and fish farmer and non-
fish farmer households selling these crops.  
 
Over 76 percent of all households hire labour for their crop farming activities, 
showing the importance of agriculture as a livelihood strategy. There is little 
difference between poor and non-poor households hiring labour (74% and 
79% respectively), nor between fish farming and non-fish farming households 
(78% and 74% respectively). 
 
Off-farm activities 
Nearly 20 percent of all households have one or more members engaged in 
paid employment with little difference between poor and non-poor 
households (18% and 21% respectively) and fish farmer and non-fish farmer 
households (17% and 22% respectively). 35 percent of households are 
engaged in one or more household enterprises. While there is little difference 
in the percentage of poor and non-poor households running household 
enterprises (32% and 38% respectively), a higher percentage of fish farmer 
households (42%) than non-fish farmer households (28%) have households 
enterprises (p = .09), suggesting fish farming households are more 
entrepreneurial and less risk averse than non-fish farming households. 
Alternatively it could indicate that fish farming households have higher and 
more regular income coming from nonfarm sources, enabling them to buy 
feed and other inputs for fish farming. Section 5.2.10 below shows that on 
average fish farming households have significantly higher off-farm income 
than non-fish farming households.   
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5.2.9 Fish farming as a livelihood activity 
Fish farming is currently not a major activity for small farmers in Ghana, and 
of the fish farmers surveyed, only 10 percent classified it as their primary 
occupation. This section provides an overview of small-scale artisanal pond 
aquaculture’s role in the livelihood strategies of both poor and non-poor fish 
farmers in Ashanti Region.  
 
Species cultured 
The primary species cultured by 97 percent of all fish farmers surveyed is 
tilapia (Oreochromis niloticus), with 86 percent producing it in a mixed culture 
with catfish (Clarias gariepinus) and mudfish (Heterobranchus spp.), and just 
under 5 percent in a mixed culture with heterotis (Heterotis niloticus) (an 
endemic species). The average number of years that farmers surveyed had 
been engaged in fish farming was 6.7 years (7 years for poor farmers and 6.4 
years for non-poor farmers).  
 
Fingerlings 
Fish farmers obtain fingerlings from a variety of sources. 68 percent of all fish 
farmers obtain part or all of their fingerlings from government or private 
hatcheries (60% of poor farmers and 74% of non-poor farmers, though this 
difference is not significant at the 10% level). 38 percent obtain fingerlings 
from other farmers, 16 percent get fingerlings from the wild, and only 4 
percent use fingerlings produced from their own ponds. Nearly all fish 
farmers use mixed sex tilapia fingerlings and only 7 percent use all male 
fingerlings either all or some of the time.  
 
Fertiliser and manure 
Organic or inorganic fertiliser is used by 46 percent of fish farmers surveyed 
(33% of poor farmers and 56% of non-poor farmers (p = .057)). 42 percent of 
all farmers apply organic fertiliser such as poultry droppings, (23% of poor 
farmers and 56% of non-poor farmers (p = .006)). Only 7 percent of all 
farmers use inorganic fertiliser (13% of poor farmers and 3% of non-poor 
farmers (p = .087)).   
 
133 
 
Feed 
Fish farmers use a wide variety of feeds, ranging from formulated floating 
(pelleted) feed to cocoyam leaves and household food waste. The most 
common feeds used are rice bran and/or maize bran, mixed with groundnut 
peel, which are locally produced and readily available on the market. 91 
percent of farmers use maize bran and groundnut peel. A much lower 
percentage of farmers use formulated floating and sinking feed (25% and 
15% respectively), as these are relatively expensive compared to cereal 
brans and groundnut peel available locally. Formulated floating feed is not 
produced in Ghana and so has to be imported and is thus very expensive50. 
Other supplementary feeds used by fish farmers include kitchen wastes, 
agricultural wastes, and agricultural-industrial by-products. Feeding by most 
farmers seems to be done arbitrarily, in terms of both quantity and quality of 
feed, with little regard to standing crop. As feed is one of the major costs in 
fish farming and important for fish growth, inefficient feeding has a negative 
impact on fish productivity and fish farmer profit margins.  
 
Use of labour and government extension services 
Fish farming consists of a number of activities, such as pond construction 
and harvesting. Figure 17 shows the percentage of poor and non-poor fish 
farming households using household and hired labour for each activity. 
Several activities such as pond construction, pond preparation, and 
harvesting are undertaken by a mix of household and hired labour however 
other activities such as feed and fingerling procurement, fertilising, weeding, 
sampling, harvesting, and marketing are undertaken mainly by household 
labour. There are few differences between poor and non-poor fish farming 
households apart from with fertilising where a much higher percentage of 
non-poor households (79%) than poor households (53%) use household 
labour (neither groups use hired labour) which partly reflects that more non-
poor households use fertiliser in their ponds than poor households. 
                                                 
 
50
 Prices of Ranaan fish feed sold in Kumasi in June 2011 were as follows: GH¢37/15kg bag of catfish 
feed; GH¢33, GH¢34, and GH¢38/20kg bag of tilapia feed for 6mm, 4.5mm and 2.5mm pellets 
respectively. 
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Figure 17: Percentage of poor and non-poor fish farming households 
using household and hired labour for fish farming activities 
 
Poor fish farming households 
 
Non-poor fish farming households 
 
 
The majority of fish farmers do not use extension services for specific fish 
farming activities. Extension staff are most commonly used for harvesting (by 
21% of non-poor fish farmers and 7% of poor farmers (p = .1), reflecting a 
difference in access to extension staff between poor and non-poor farmers, 
explored in more detail below). Extension staff are also used for fingerling 
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procurement, sampling and pond construction, but again there is a difference 
between poor and non-poor fish farmers (see Table 18, Appendix 5 for 
details on use of labour and government extension services for fish farming 
activities). Analysis by gender of the type of household labour used for 
different fish farming activities shows that overall male household labour is 
used for most fish farming activities (see Table 19, Appendix 5) and is similar 
for poor and non-poor households. 
 
Information, training and support for fish farming 
Fish farming is relatively new for farmers in Ghana and access to good 
quality sources of information and training are important for fish farming to be 
a successful activity for small-scale farmers. Table 16 shows fish farmers 
obtain information from a range of sources, most commonly from government 
extension officers (including both fisheries and agriculture extension staff), 
other farmers, radio and TV. There are no significant differences between 
sources of information for poor and non-poor farmers (at the 10% level).  
 
Table 16: Sources of information available to fish farmers in 2010 by 
poverty status 
  Fish farmer households 
  Poor Non-poor Total  
% % % 
Other fish farmers 60 51 55 
Friends/relatives 47 28 36 
Government extension officers 63 64 64 
NGOs 7 3 4 
Hatcheries 10 13 12 
Radio 47 36 41 
TV 43 36 39 
Feed suppliers 10 15 13 
Total households (Nos.) 30 39 69 
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Aquaculture extension 
Aquaculture extension services in Ghana are provided for free by MoFA 
through the FC. Fisheries extension officers usually have a general training in 
agriculture but many are not specifically trained in aquaculture representing a 
major challenge to the quality of their technical assistance. Due to 
inadequate resources, extension agents usually have limited access to 
transportation and are unable to visit farmers, and are often only able to go if 
farmers can pay for their transport. Alternatively farmers can go to the 
regional FC office to seek advice. However the fish farmers are scattered 
throughout the districts and transportation costs can be high, especially for 
remote farmers, meaning that it is better off and less remote farmers who are 
more able to visit extension staff. Farmers can also contact extension staff by 
phone. 
 
Table 17 shows the average number of times in 2010 that fish farmers visited 
or contacted a fisheries extension agent or agriculture/fisheries extension 
centre to discuss fish farming and the average number of times fisheries 
extension agents visited fish farmers.  
 
Table 17: Contact between fish farmers and extension agents in 2010 by 
poverty status 
  Fish farmers 
  Poor  Non-poor  P values for 
differences 
in means (1) 
Total 
Average number of times fisheries 
extension agent or agriculture/ fisheries 
extension centre was visited or contacted 
  
0.09 
 1.3 
(0.47) 
3.0 
(0.75) 
2.3 
(0.48) 
Average number of times fisheries 
extension agent visited farmer 
1.28 3.18  
0.07 
2.37 
(0.46) (0.89) (0.55) 
Total households (Nos.) 29 39 68 68 
Notes:  SE in parentheses 
(1) Based on independent samples t-tests 
 
On average, fish farmers contacted or visited an extension agent, and 
extension agents visited fish farmers, just over 2 times each. Poor fish 
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farmers had less contact with extension agents than non-poor fish farmers, 
reflecting non-poor farmers’ increased ability to pay for transportation costs 
(both to visit extension staff and of extension staff to visit them) compared to 
poor farmers51 and to gift or ‘dash’ money or payment in kind to extension 
staff in return for visiting them.  The average frequency of contact between 
extension agents and fish farmers does not show the actual proportion of fish 
farmers that have been in contact with extension staff. Table 18 shows the 
percentage of fish farmers who had any contact with extension agents in 
2010.   
 
Table 18: Contact between fish farmers and extension agents in 2010 by 
poverty status 
  Fish farmers 
  Poor  Non-poor  P values for 
differences in 
means (1) 
Total  
% of farmers contacting/ 
visiting extension agents 43 51 
 
0.51 48 
% of farmers receiving  
visits from extension agents 33 62 
 
0.02 49 
% of farmers who have had  
any contact with extension agents 47 67 
 
0.095 58 
Total households (Nos.) 30 39 69 69 
Notes: (1) Based on chi square tests 
 
Overall Table 18 shows that a higher percentage of non-poor than poor fish 
farmers had contact with extension staff in 2010. Overall 58 percent of fish 
farmers had contact with extension agents in 2010. A significantly lower 
percentage of poor than non-poor fish farmers were visited by extension 
agents, and a lower percentage of poor compared to non-poor fish farmers 
contacted extension agents, though this difference is not significant. The high 
correlation between fish farmers visiting extension staff and fish farmers 
being visited by extension staff (Pearson correlation coefficient = 0.62, p < 
                                                 
 
51
 The Pearson correlation coefficient between per capita income and the number of times fish 
farmers visited or contacted a fisheries extension agent is 0.35 (p = .004) suggesting that the higher a 
fish farmers’ income the more times he/she visited or contacted an extension agent.  
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0.001), suggests that it is mainly the same farmers who contact or visit 
extension agents who are visited by them. 
 
Training of fish farmers  
Overall 62 percent of fish farmers had received some kind of training in fish 
farming from one or more sources with no significant difference (at the 10% 
level) between poor and non-poor fish farmers. Table 19 shows the various 
sources of training and indicates that 67 percent of farmers who had received 
training had been trained by fisheries extension staff, highlighting the 
important role of extension staff in disseminating information about fish 
farming. 
 
Table 19: Source of training in fish farming by poverty status 
  Fish farmer households 
  Poor  Non-poor Total  
% % % 
Agricultural extension staff 33 42 39 
Fisheries extension staff 80 58 67 
NGO 13 4 8 
Private company 0 4 3 
Gold mine (1) 0 8 5 
Total households (Nos.) 15 24 39 
Notes:  (1) The gold mine in Amansie West (Resolute Amansie) had supported fish farming in the mid 
2000s as part of a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programme but has since closed 
down 
 
Motivation and goals 
For small-scale pond aquaculture to have a direct impact on poverty in 
Ghana, poor farmers must be motivated to adopt it as a livelihood activity. 
Table 20 shows that the majority of farmers were influenced to start fish 
farming through observation of other fish farms and discussions with other 
fish farmers. 
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Table 20: Factors influencing fish farmers to adopt aquaculture by 
poverty status 
  Fish farmers 
  Poor Non-poor Total 
% % % 
Observation of other farms 90 64 75 
Discussions with other farmers 70 72 71 
Discussions with extension staff 40 49 45 
TV, radio or newspaper adverts/programmes 50 39 44 
Encouragement from local gold mining company 
CSR programme 13 18 16 
Total households (Nos.) 30 39 69 
 
A significantly higher percentage of poor farmers compared to non-poor 
farmers were motivated to adopt fish farming through observation of other 
farms (p = .01). There are no other significant differences (at the 10% level) 
between poor and non-poor fish farmers’ motivations.  
 
Table 21 shows the goal of almost all farmers for their fish farming operations 
is to make profit. 
 
Table 21: Main goal of fish farming operations by poverty status 
  Fish farmers 
  Poor Non-poor  Total   
% % % 
Increase profit 97 97 97 
Increase fish for own consumption 100 82 90 
Reduce seasonality of farm income 83 64 73 
Spread/minimise the risk of farm 
activities 33 23 28 
Total households (Nos.) 30 39 69 
 
Overall nearly 90 percent of farmers also aim to increase fish for own 
consumption, with all poor farmers aiming to do this compared to 82 percent 
of non-poor farmers (p = .05). A higher percentage of poor than non-poor 
farmers also aim to reduce seasonality of farm income through fish farming 
(p = .08). A minority of farmers aim to minimise the risk of farm activities 
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through fish farming with no significant difference (at the 10% level) between 
poor and non-poor farmers.  88 percent of farmers (87% of poor and 90% of 
non-poor farmers) ranked profit as their most important goal for fish farming 
with no significant difference (at the 10% level) between poor and non-poor 
farmers. 77 percent ranked fish for home consumption (87% of poor and 70% 
of non-poor farmers (p = .07)) as their second most important goal. 
 
Pond ownership 
Table 22 shows information on pond ownership and indicates that poor fish 
farmers have smaller areas of individual and total ponds than non-poor fish 
farmers.   
 
Table 22: Size of ponds owned by fish farmers in 2010 by poverty status 
  Fish farmers 
  Poor  Non-poor  Total   
Average number of 
ponds owned 
2.1 
(0.26)  
1.9 
(0.16) 
2.0 
(0.14) 
Average number of 
ponds harvested in 2010 
1.2 
(0.21)  
1.2 
(0.13) 
1.2 
(0.12) 
Average area of 
individual ponds owned 
(m
2
) 
408.3 
(67.75) 
659.9 
(139.81) 
552.1 
 (85.91)  
Average total area of 
ponds owned (m
2
) 
787.2 
(175.83) 
 (n = 27) 
1187.5 
(234.64) 
 (n = 36) 
1016.0 
(154.76) 
 (n = 63) 
Average total area of 
functional ponds owned 
(m
2
) 
681.5 
(117.29) 
 (n = 27) 
1165.3 
(230.36) 
 (n = 36) 
957.8 
(143.23) 
 (n = 63) 
Total households (Nos.) 30 38 68 
Notes:  SE in parentheses 
 
On average fish farmers own two ponds, of approximately 550 m2 each, and 
harvested one in 2010. Poor farmers have smaller ponds, total area of ponds 
and total area of functional ponds than non-poor farmers (p = .11, p = .18 and 
p = .07 respectively).  
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Culture period and harvesting  
Just over 80 percent of fish farmers surveyed undertake selective harvesting 
where desired fish of certain sizes are selected for harvesting more than 
once in a production cycle. 8 percent of all farmers do partial harvesting 
where size selection does not matter and harvesting is done more than once 
in a cycle. Only 10 percent of fish farmers undertake complete harvesting 
where all the fish are harvested once at the end of the cycle.  As so few 
farmers do complete harvesting, it is difficult to accurately estimate the 
average production cycle (the number of months between stocking and 
harvesting). However, farmers reported production cycles ranging from 6 
months to 2 years. The average production cycle for all farmers is just under 
10 months and poor farmers reported a longer cycle (11 months) than non-
poor farmers (just under 9 months) (p = .07) (see Table 20, Appendix 5). 
 
Of the fish farmers surveyed, 45 percent harvest once a year, 27 percent 
have no specific schedule and 19 percent harvest twice a year. 35 percent of 
all farmers did not do a main harvest in 2010, and a higher percentage of 
poor farmers (47%) than non-poor farmers (26%) (p = .07) did not do a main 
harvest. However just over half of those who did not do a main harvest (13 
out of 24 farmers or 19% of all farmers) still harvested something from their 
fish ponds meaning that overall 16% of all farmers did not harvest anything at 
all from their fish ponds. 
 
Figure 18 shows the months in which farmers undertook a main harvest in 
2010.  
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Figure 18: Percentage of fish farmers doing a main harvest in each 
month in 2010 by poverty status 
 
The most common harvest month was December where nearly 20 percent of 
farmers harvested. Many farmers indicated they would wait to harvest on 
special occasions such as Christmas and Easter when fish demand and 
prices were higher. August and March (close to Easter) were also relatively 
popular months for harvesting. The seasonal calendars showed the lean 
period is at its peak around May, June and July. Fish farming could make a 
significant contribution towards food security during these months, but no 
farmers harvested in May and only a few farmers (mainly non-poor farmers) 
harvested fish in June and July (6%  and 7% respectively). This could be 
because ponds are stocked at the start of the rainy season in April when they 
are flooded and the fish would not be big enough to harvest during the lean 
season. Fish prices are also likely to be low during this time as consumers 
would be short of cash, discouraging farmers from selling.  
 
Fish production, revenue and consumption 
Table 23 shows annual production figures for 2010 for all fish (tilapia, catfish 
and heterotis) produced by surveyed fish farmers (see Tables 21 and 22 in 
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Appendix 5 for disaggregated production data on tilapia and catfish 
respectively). 
 
Table 23: Production, revenue, consumption and distribution of all fish 
produced by fish farming households in 2010 by poverty status 
  
  
 Fish farmer households 
Poor  
 
Non-poor 
 
P value for 
difference of 
means 
(1) 
Total 
 
Average total fish harvested in 2010 
(kg) 
55.8 239.8 0.013 160.6 
 
Average total fish yield (kg/ha/year) 
(2) 
1303.1 
(n = 26) 
2487.2 
(n = 31) 
0.12 1947.3 
(n = 57) 
Average amount of fish sold (kg)  35.6 196.3 0.018 127.1 
 
Average amount of on-farm fish 
consumption (kg) 
15.1 
 
33.8 
 
0.19 25.7 
 
Average amount of on-farm fish 
consumption per capita (kg) 
1.9 
 
4.7 
 
0.098 3.5 
 
Average amount of fish given away 
(kg)  
8.8 
 
15.3 
 
0.35 12.5 
 
Average amount received for fish 
sold (GH¢)
52
 
129.7 
 
654.9 
 
0.019 428.7 
 
Total households (Nos.) 28 37 65 65 
Notes:  (1) Based on independent samples t-test 
(2) Outliers over 15000kg/ha omitted 
 
Table 23 shows that compared to poor fish farmers, non-poor fish farmers: 
harvested over 4 times as much fish, sold over 5 times as much fish, and 
received over 5 times as much revenue from the sale of fish, all significant 
differences. While the majority of farmers harvested some fish in 2010, only 
46 percent sold any fish (see Tables 23 and 24 Appendix 5). A lower 
percentage of poor farmers (40%) than non-poor farmers (51%) sold fish in 
2010. However, this difference is not significant (at the 10% level). The 
average yield for all farmers was nearly 2t/ha/year with no significant 
                                                 
 
52
 As not all farmers sold fish, the average price of fish per kg based on those who sold fish (omitting 
outliers who sold for prices higher than GH¢15/kg) was GH¢3.24/kg (SE 0.37, n = 12) for poor 
farmers, GH¢3.90/kg (SE 0.75, n = 17) for non-poor farmers and GH¢3.62/kg (SE 0.49, n = 29) overall. 
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difference (at the 10% level) between poor and non-poor farmers. This yield 
falls just outside the range of 2.5 to 4t/ha/year reported from experiments by 
Diana and Lin (1998) for Nile tilapia in fertilised ponds and well below the 
range of 5 to 12 t/ha in fertilised-fed ponds (Diana et al., 1994). Green et al. 
(2002) found that Nile tilapia raised in fertilised ponds supplemented with 
feed, produced a better yield (7322.50kg/ha/year) than feeding only 
(4,407.50kg/ha/year) and fertiliser only (3,210kg/ha/year). These results 
suggest that overall productivity of surveyed fish farmers is low. However 
yields from controlled experiments are usually higher than those observed in 
the field. Also these experiments used mainly sex reversed fingerlings unlike 
most of the surveyed fish farmers who use mixed sex fingerlings53, less than 
50 percent of surveyed farmers use fertiliser and most have a generally low 
level of technical knowledge which could explain these lower results. 
 
Table 23 shows that most of the fish harvested was sold and the remaining 
fish harvested was consumed by households and given away. The average 
on-farm fish consumption per capita was 3.5kg for all fish farming 
households, and higher for non-poor than poor households. Per capita fish 
consumption in Ghana is estimated to be 24kg. Both poor and non-poor fish 
farmers estimated that approximately 24 percent of fish consumed by their 
households came from their own farms.  
 
Profitability of small-scale pond aquaculture  
For aquaculture to have a positive direct impact on poverty through increased 
income for adopting households, it needs to be profitable for small-scale 
farmers. To assess if this is the case, participatory budgets (PBs) were 
undertaken with four groups of farmers across the three districts surveyed 
(described in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1). Two groups (one in Amansie West 
and one in Amansie Central) estimated an average budget for an average 
sized pond as the farmers had similar production practices and resources 
                                                 
 
53
 Green et al. (2002) found little significant difference in yield between ponds stocked with mixed 
sex and all male fingerlings which was an unexpected result as ponds stocked with all male 
fingerlings are usually more productive than those stocked with mixed sex fingerlings 
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available to them. The remaining two groups (Adansi North and Amansie 
Central) used one farmer in each group as a case study. The value of fish 
used for own consumption was included in the budgets, along with fish sold, 
to make up total revenue. All budgets are for semi-intensive tilapia and 
catfish polyculture and the results are shown in Table 24 below. 
  
Table 24: Summary of participatory budgets estimated for small-scale 
pond aquaculture enterprises 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3  Group 4  
Adansi North Amansie West Amansie 
Central 
Amansie Central 
Group size 5 2 5 6 
Type of 
budget 
Individual Average Individual Average 
Pond size (m
2
) 735 800 592 300 
Production 
cycle (months) 
9 13 11 12 
  
  GH¢ % of 
TC 
GH¢ % of 
TC 
GH¢ % of 
TC 
GH¢ % of 
TC 
Hired labour 109 12 0 0 48 12 50 7 
Lime 25 3 10 3 6.5 2 0 0 
Fertiliser 13 1 20 6 10 2 10 1 
Fingerlings 480 54 15 4 210 51 430 62 
Transportation 28.7 3 45 13 79 19 70 10 
Feed 228 26 260 73 58.5 14 84 12 
Equipment 
(water pump/ 
nets) 
0 0 5 1 0 0 55 8 
Total cost (GH¢) 883.7 355 412 699 
Total revenue 
(GH¢) 
1031.5 200 433 630 
Profit (GH¢) 147.8 -155 21 -69 
Gross profit 
margin (%) 
14 -78 5 -11 
Notes: TC = Total cost 
 
Of the four groups, two (groups 2 and 4) estimated a loss and 2 (groups 1 
and 3) estimated a profit.  Considering these budgets exclude investment 
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costs of pond construction (which is relatively expensive54) and costing of 
family labour, these results indicate that many small-scale fish farmers are 
unlikely to be making a profit at present. A key cause of this was found to be 
the lack of technical knowledge when it came to stocking density and feeding 
practices55. However, other problems such as poor quality fingerlings (even 
those that have been bought from hatcheries) have a significant impact on 
the profitability of fish farming along with low levels of fertiliser use.  None of 
the farmers involved in developing the PBs had done a budget for their 
aquaculture enterprise before and so none of them knew if their activities 
were profitable or not. This highlights the lack of not only technical knowledge 
but also business development skills, both of which are also needed for 
farmers to run their fish farming activities profitably.  
 
The PBs suggest that small-scale fish farming is not profitable for many 
farmers even though the potential is there, shown by the two fish farmers 
making a profit (Groups 1 and 3). It is possible that these two farmers were 
chosen by their groups as case studies because they were more able than 
others to give accurate accounts of their costs and revenues. Thus these 
farmers may represent ‘better farmers’ rather than ‘average farmers’. In any 
case the cost and revenue data gathered from these budgets is not detailed 
nor can it be generalised to the rest of the surveyed farmers and can only 
give an indication of how small-scale fish farmers are performing. There also 
appears to be large variability between estimates related to costs of 
fingerlings and feed. 3 of the 4 budgets estimate fingerlings to constitute 51 
to 62 percent of total costs whereas Group 2 estimated fingerlings to be only 
4 percent of total costs. Similarly, 3 of the 4 budgets estimate feed to be 
between 12 and 26 percent of total costs whereas Group 2 estimated it to be 
                                                 
 
54
 The Ashanti regional FC office estimates the cost of constructing a pond of 500 m
2
 in 2010 using 
manual labour was GH¢2000 (approximately US$1,400) and for a pond of 1000 m
2
 using a bulldozer 
was GH¢4,731 (approximately US$3,300). Nearly 80 percent of farmers interviewed built their ponds 
with hired labour, less than 2 percent used only family labour, 16 percent used a mixture of family 
and hired labour and less than 4 percent used a bulldozer and hired labour.   
55
 In several of the groups the rate at which farmers were stocking their ponds was found to be very 
low compared to the 3 fingerlings per m
2
 rate recommended by the FC. Feeding practices were also 
found to be a problem.  
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over 70 percent. However Group 2 estimated a huge and unsustainable loss 
so cannot be viewed as representative of most fish farmers though it may 
give some insight into the performance of purely subsistence fish farmers 
who do not hire any labour or buy fingerlings from hatcheries. Discussions 
with extension staff confirmed that these budgets are realistic and costs are 
likely to be highly variable between both farmers and production cycles. 
Other more detailed studies on the profitability of fish farming in Ghana have 
been undertaken (e.g. Asmah, 2008; Kaliba et al., 2007a) which suggest fish 
farming can be financially viable. This is explored further in the discussion 
section below. 
 
Perceived impacts of fish farming on households and communities 
Fish farmers were asked open ended questions about the direct impact (both 
positive and negative) of fish farming on their households. Table 25 shows 
that fish farming has increased fish for home consumption for the majority of 
fish farmers, increased income for 40 percent, has helped pay school fees for 
4 percent and has had no impact on 13 percent of households. A higher 
percentage of non-poor than poor fish farmers indicated fish farming had 
increased their income, and a lower percentage said fish farming had 
increased fish for home consumption, though these differences are not 
significant (at the 10% percent level). 
 
Table 25: Fish farmers’ perception of the impact of fish farming on their 
household by poverty status 
  Fish farmer households 
  Poor  Non-poor  Total 
% % % 
Increased fish for home consumption 70 53 60 
Increased income 33 45 40 
None 17 11 13 
Helped to pay school fees 0 8 4 
Total households (Nos.) 30 38 68 
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As noted in Chapter 4, non functional fish farmers were excluded from the 
survey. Thus while no fish farmers indicated any negative direct impacts of 
fish farming this could be because farmers who are no longer engaged in fish 
farming or who had abandoned their ponds were not interviewed. 25 percent 
of all respondents (fish and non-fish farmers) said that fish farming has 
negative impacts on the poor, all of whom attributed these to the high cost of 
fish farming. The investment cost alone can be prohibitive to poor farmers, 
e.g. the cost of constructing a 500m2 pond (approximately GH¢2000 in 2010) 
is about half the average total household income of surveyed farmers for 
2010 and almost the same as the average total household income of poor 
households (see Section 5.2.10 below).  Almost 100 percent of fish farmers 
used their own savings to fund the initial investment cost of their fish farms, 
with only 7 and 9 percent supplementing this with a loan from financial 
institutions or friends/relatives respectively. Thus it is clear that investing in 
fish farming is not an easy undertaking for the average poor farmer, 
especially with limited access to credit.  
 
All respondents were asked about the impact of fish farming on the 
community. Table 26 shows that the majority said fish farming had increased 
fish supply, followed by employment creation, and no impact. A higher 
percentage of fish than non-fish farmers said fish farming had increased fish 
supply (p = .02).  A lower percentage of fish than non-fish farmers said fish 
farming has had no impact on the community (p = .06) suggesting fish 
farmers perceive a higher benefit to the community than non-fish farmers.  A 
lower percentage of poor than non-poor households said fish farming had 
increased fish supply in the community (p = .02), and while this difference is 
not significant (at the 10% percent level) within fish farmers, the difference is 
more significant within non-fish farmers (p = .07) suggesting the poor benefit 
less than the non-poor from increased fish supply, particularly poor non-fish 
farmers. A lower percentage of poor than non-poor farmers felt fish farming 
impacted the community through employment though this difference is not 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 26: Fish farmers’ perception of the impact of fish farming on the 
community by fish farming and poverty status 
  Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
  Poor Non-
poor 
Total Poor  Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
     %      %      %      %      %      %      %      %      % 
Increased 
fish supply 57 69 64 35 56 44 44 63 54 
Employment  18 28 24 25 38 31 22 32 27 
No impact 21 18 19 45 19 33 35 18 27 
Total 
households 
(Nos.) 28 39 67 40 32 72 68 71 139 
 
5.2.10  Livelihood outcomes 
This section focuses on a number of livelihood outcomes which can also be 
thought of as poverty indicators, on which aquaculture has the potential to 
impact. These livelihood outcomes of household income, wealth and food 
security are compared between fish and non-fish farmer households.  
 
Income 
Table 27 shows average total and per capita household income levels of the 
surveyed households along with the average household income that comes 
from farm and off-farm sources.  
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Table 27: Income in 2010 by fish farming and poverty status 
  Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer households Total households 
 Poor Non-
poor 
P value 
for 
difference 
in means 
(1) 
Total Poor Non-
poor 
P value 
for 
difference 
in means 
(1) 
Total P value for 
difference 
in means 
between 
fish & non-
fish farming 
HHs 
(1) 
Total 
Average total 
HH income 
(GH¢) 
2,173               7,453         0.000 5,124     1,951      6,457     0.000 3,899      0.09 4,486       
Average per 
capita 
income (GH¢) 
233          937             0.000 626         215        904        0.000 513        0.17 567          
Average total 
farm income 
(GH¢) 
(% of HH 
income) 
1,720  
(79%)                
4,980 
(67%)         
0.000 3,542 
(69%)      
1,677 
(86%)     
5,326  
(82%)     
0.000 3,255      
(83%) 
0.62 3,392  
(76%)       
Average total 
off-farm 
income (GH¢) 
(% of HH 
income) 
454  
(21%)                 
2473  
(33%)          
0.004 1,582 
(31%)    
273 
(14%)        
1,131 
(18%)      
0.02 644  
(17%)       
0.02 1,094  
(24%)       
Total 
households 
(Nos.) 
30 38 68 68 42 32 74 74 142 142 
Notes:  The poverty line used in this thesis is GH¢390.55 
(1) Based on independent samples t-tests 
 
Household and per capita income 
Overall total household income for 2010 was estimated to be GH¢4,48656 
(approximately US$3,11557). Fish farming households have over 30 percent 
higher average total household income than non-fish farming households (p 
= .09). Overall non-poor households have nearly three and half times higher 
average household income than poor households (p = .00) (see Table 25 in 
Appendix 5 for full details) partly due to the way in which poverty groups were 
                                                 
 
56
 The GLSS5 estimated annual household income in Ashanti as GH¢1,149, equivalent to 
GH¢1,884.36 in 2010 (PPP) which is under half the household income estimated in this survey, 
however the Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis: Ghana (WFP, 2009a) 
estimated the annual per capita income for food crop farmers as GH¢441 and for cash crop farmers 
as GH¢644 which is much more comparable to the household survey results. 
57
 June 2010 exchange rate (US$1 = GH¢1.44). Available at:  http://www.exchange-
rates.org/Rate/USD/GHS/6-3-2010 (accessed 23 May 2013) 
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constructed based on income58. This difference is also reflected within both 
fish and non-fish farming household groups. There is no significant difference 
(at the 10% level) in household income between poor fish and non-fish 
farming households, or between non-poor fish and non-fish farming 
households. Table 27 shows that the differences in household income 
between groups are also reflected in per capita income. However while there 
is a significant difference in household income between fish and non-fish 
farming households (at the 10% level), the difference in per capita income is 
not significant. 
  
Farm and off-farm income 
Farm income refers to all income deriving from the household’s farm (crops, 
livestock and livestock products including fish farming). There is no 
significant difference in farm income between fish and non-fish farming 
households.  Poor households have a much lower average farm income 
(GH¢1695) than non-poor households (GH¢5138) (p = .00) (see Table 25, 
Appendix 5 for details). This difference is also reflected within fish and non-
fish farming household groups. There is no significant difference (at the 10% 
level) in farm income between poor fish and non-fish farming households, or 
between non-poor fish and non-fish farming households.   
  
Off-farm income refers to all household income that does not come from the 
household’s farm such as salaried employment, wage labour on other farms 
and income from household enterprises. Fish farming households have 
nearly 2.5 times higher off-farm income than non-fish farming households (p 
= .02). Average off-farm income of poor households (GH¢349) is less than 
one fifth of off-farm income of non-poor households (GH¢1860) (p = .00) (see 
Table 25, Appendix 5 for details). This difference is also reflected within fish 
farmer and non-fish farmer household groups. While off-farm income of poor 
fish farming households is over one and a half times higher than poor non-
                                                 
 
58
 Even so, it would be possible for poor and non-poor households to be below and above the 
poverty line but have incomes that were not significantly different if most of them had incomes 
clustered around the poverty line. However poor and non-poor households surveyed here are 
significantly different in terms of household income. 
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fish farming households, there is no significant difference (at the 10% level). 
Non-poor fish farming households have over twice as much average off-farm 
income than non-poor non-fish farming households (p = .07).  
 
To summarise, average household income of fish farmers is significantly 
higher (30%) than non-fish farmer households. While farm income is similar 
for both groups, off-farm income is significantly higher for fish farming 
households, particularly for non-poor fish farmers compared to non-poor non-
fish farmers.  
 
Income from aquaculture 
Household and farm income estimated above includes income from fish 
farming. Table 23 showed that non-poor fish farmers received over 5 times 
as much revenue from fish farming than poor fish farmers (p = .02) in 2010. 
Table 28 shows that nearly 8 percent of household income for surveyed fish 
farmers came from fish farming with no significant difference (at the 10% 
level) between poor and non-poor households. 
 
Table 28: Percentage of household income from fish farming in 2010 by 
poverty status 
  Fish farmer households 
  Poor Non-poor Total  
% of HH income from fish farming  7.6 8.1 7.9 
(2.69) (2.27) (1.72) 
   Total households (Nos.) 30 39 69 
Notes: SE in parentheses 
 
Household wealth  
A household asset index was constructed to compare levels of household 
wealth across groups59.   
                                                 
 
59 The methodology and weights used to construct the household asset index were adapted from 
BMGF (2010), described in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1. 
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Table 29 shows the average household asset index scores for household 
groups60.  
 
Table 29: Household asset index scores by fish farming and poverty 
status 
 Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
 Poor Non-
poor 
Total Poor Non-
poor 
Total Poor Non-
poor 
Total 
HH asset 
index 
33.9 
(9.77) 
63.3 
(11.09) 
50.5 
(7.72) 
29.9 
(6.00) 
29.7 
(5.68) 
29.8 
(4.17) 
31.6 
(5.33) 
48.2 
(6.86) 
39.8 
(4.38) 
Total 
households 
(Nos.) 
30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
Notes: SE in parentheses 
 
Fish farming households have a significantly higher average household asset 
index than non-fish farming households (p = .02) and poor households have 
a significantly lower average household asset index than non-poor 
households (p = .06). Although the index is lower for poor compared to non-
poor fish farming households (p = .06), asset index estimates for poor and 
non-poor non-fish farming households are virtually identical. Non-poor non-
fish farming households have a much lower average household asset index 
than non-poor fish farming households (p = .01) but smaller differences 
between poor fish and non-fish farming households are not significant (at the 
10% level). 
 
Figure 19 shows the distribution of fish and non-fish farming households 
separated between overall sample terciles of household asset index scores. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
60
 The household asset index is highly correlated with income. The Pearson correlation coefficient 
between households asset index and total household income is .425 (p < .001) and per capita income 
is .378 (p < .001). 
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Figure 19: Percentage of fish farming, non-fish farming and total 
sampled households by total sample wealth tercile 
 
A slightly higher percentage of non-fish farming households (39%) fall in to 
the lowest tercile compared to fish farming households (30%) and all 
sampled households (34%). A much higher percentage of non-fish farming 
households (39%) fall in to the middle tercile than fish farming households 
(26%) and all sampled households (33%). The largest percentage of fish 
farming households (44%) falls in to the highest tercile. This suggests that 
the household wealth distribution for fish farming households is skewed 
towards the highest tercile whereas the distribution for non-fish farming 
households is more even and concentrated mostly in the middle tercile.  
 
Food security 
Data on dietary diversity by season, and food vulnerability over the course of 
2010, indicators of food security, are presented in the sections below.   
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Dietary diversity 
Dietary diversity can be defined as the number of different foods or food 
groups consumed over a given reference period. Data were collected on the 
frequency of consumption of nutrient dense foods (fish, eggs, meat, milk and 
vegetables) (see Table 26, Appendix 5 for full table). Table 30 shows a 
summary table of the frequency of consumption of fish, meat and milk in an 
average week in the dry and rainy seasons, of different household groups. 
 
Table 30: Seasonal diversity of food items consumed by fish farming 
and poverty status 
  Fish farmer households  Non-fish farmer households  Total households 
 Poor Non-
poor 
P value 
for 
difference 
in means 
(1) 
Total Poor Non-
poor 
P value 
for 
difference 
in means 
(1) 
Total  P value for 
difference in 
means 
between fish 
& non-fish 
farming HHs 
(1) 
Total 
Dry season 
Frequency of fish 
consumption 
(days/week) 
6.6 5.8 
 
0.057 6.1 6.4 6.7 
 
0.25 6.5 
 
0.12 6.3 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
Frequency of meat 
consumption 
(days/week) 
2.2 3.5 
 
0.019 3.0 2.9 3.2 
 
0.48 3.0 
 
0.82 3.0 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
Frequency of milk 
consumption 
(days/week) 
0.3 1.3 
 
0.005 0.8 0.7 0.8 
 
0.81 0.70 
 
0.58 0.8 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
Rainy season 
Frequency of fish 
consumption 
(days/week) 
6.4 5.5 
 
0.067 5.9 6.4 6.7 
 
0.84 6.5 
 
0.023 6.2 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 Frequency of meat 
consumption 
(days/week) 
2.2 3.4 
 
0.025 2.9 2.8 3.1 
 
0.61 2.9 
 
0.89 2.9 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 Frequency of milk 
consumption 
(days/week) 
0.3 1.7 
 
0.001 1.1 0.9 1.0 
 
0.84 0.9 
 
0.65 1.0 
  
 
   
 
 
 
 Total households  
(Nos.) 
30 39 69 69 42 32 74 74 143 143 
Notes: (1) Based on independent samples t-tests 
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Dry season 
There are no significant differences in frequency of fish, meat or milk 
consumption between fish farming and non-fish farming households.  There 
are some significant differences between poor and non-poor fish farming 
households, but none within non-fish farming households. Poor fish farming 
households eat fish more frequently than non-poor fish farming households 
(p = .06) and eat meat less frequently than non-poor fish farming households 
(p = .02) suggesting that non-poor fish farmers are better able to substitute 
meat for fish than poor fish farming households.  
 
Rainy season 
In the rainy season fish farming households have a significantly lower 
frequency of fish consumption than non-fish farming households (p = .02). 
However there are no other significant differences in frequency of eggs, 
meat, milk and vegetable consumption between fish farming and non-fish 
farming households. Similar to the dry season, in the rainy season there are 
significant differences in frequency of fish, meat and milk consumption 
between poor and non-poor fish farming households, but none within non-fish 
farming households.  
 
These results indicate that fish is a more pro-poor animal protein source than 
meat and Table 26 in Appendix 5 shows that overall the average number of 
days fish is eaten by poor and non-poor households is almost the same (6.47 
and 6.18 days/week). The fact that fish is eaten so regularly among surveyed 
households corresponds with the high estimates for Ghana of percentage of 
animal protein coming from fish (60%). The importance of fish in the diet of 
rural Ghanaian households, especially poor households, highlights the 
potentially important role that fish farming could play in household food 
security.  
 
Food Security Index 
To enable simple comparison between fish and non-fish farming households 
in terms of food security, average Food Consumption Scores (FCS) and 
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Simple Food Count (SFC) (described in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1) by season 
are presented in Table 31. 
  
Table 31: Seasonal household Food Consumption Score and Simple 
Food Count by fish farming and poverty status 
  Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer households Total households 
  Poor Non-
poor 
Total Poor Non-
poor 
Total Poor Non-
poor 
Total 
Dry season 
Food 
Consumption 
Score 
35.7 38.2 37.1 36.8 38.0 37.3 36.3 38.1 37.2 
(0.57) (1.64) (0.97) (1.09) (1.03) (0.76) (0.68) (1.01) (0.61) 
Simple Food 
Count 
49.8 57.0 53.9 53.7 55.8 54.6 52.1 56.5 54.3 
(2.85) (3.45) (2.34) (2.13) (2.84) (1.72) (1.72) (2.27) (1.43) 
Rainy season 
Food 
Consumption 
Score 
35.3 39.3 37.6 37.6 38.5 38.0 36.6 38.9 37.8 
(0.57) (1.79) ( 1.06) (1.25) (1.29) (0.90) (0.77) (1.14) (0.69) 
Simple Food 
Count 
48.9 57.7 53.9 54.2 55.6 54.8 52.0 56.8 54.4 
(2.85) (3.49) (2.37) (2.26) (2.73) (1.73) (1.79) (2.26) (1.45) 
Total households 
(Nos.) 
30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
Notes: SE in parentheses 
 
Table 31 shows that overall the average FCS and SFC are very similar for all 
groups between dry and rainy season, indicating very little difference in food 
security and dietary diversity between seasons. There are also very few 
differences between fish and non-fish farming households. There are some 
differences between poor and non-poor households and in the rainy season, 
poor households have a slightly lower average FCS and SFC than non-poor 
households (p = .09 and .1 respectively). Poor fish farming households have 
a lower average FCS and SFC than non-poor fish farming households (p = 
.04 and .07 respectively).  
 
While these results allow relative comparisons between groups, they do not 
help us to understand the absolute level of food security among surveyed 
households. This can be achieved by comparing the household FCS with 
pre-established thresholds: poor food consumption: 0 to 28; borderline food 
consumption: 28.5 to 42; acceptable low food consumption: 42 – 52; and 
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acceptable high food consumption: 53+ (WFP, 2009). Although only some 
food groups were used, the average scores for the different groups of 
surveyed households in Table 31 are all in the ‘borderline’ food consumption 
group. It can be assumed that if the surveyed households are able to eat 
higher value foods such as fish almost every day, they will also be highly 
likely to be eating staple foods such as cereals and tubers every day, 
increasing the FCS by 14 thus increasing the average FCS for all households 
to over 51 in both the dry and rainy seasons. This implies that on average 
households are well above the threshold for acceptable low food 
consumption. If the remaining food groups of sugar and oil were also 
included, average FCS may be even higher, indicating a generally 
acceptable and most likely highly acceptable level of food security among 
surveyed households (WFP, 2009).  
 
Food vulnerability 
Vulnerability is another aspect of food security and respondents were asked 
to rate the difficulty of providing food for their households (from very difficult 
to very easy) for each month in 2010. Table 32 provides a summary of the 
results.  
 
Table 32: Difficulty of providing adequate food for households in 2010 
by fish farming and poverty status 
  Fish farmer 
households 
Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
  Poor Non-
poor 
Total Poor Non-
poor 
Total Poor Non-
poor 
Total 
Number of very 
difficult/ difficult 
months 
2.1 1.2 1.6 2.2 1.9 2.1 2.2 1.6 1.9 
(0.49) (0.31) (0.28) (0.40) (0.30) (0.26) (0.31) (0.22) (0.19) 
Number of neither 
difficult nor easy 
months 
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5 
(0.14) (0.28) (0.17) (0.23) (0.40) (0.21) (0.14) (0.23) (0.14) 
Number of 
easy/very easy 
months 
9.6 10.4 10.0 9.1 9.3 9.2 9.3 9.9 9.6 
(0.51) (0.41) (0.32) (0.45) (0.50) (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.23) 
Total households 
Nos.) 
30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
Notes: SE in parentheses 
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Table 32 shows that overall the household heads surveyed found it either 
very easy or easy to provide adequate food over the year for their 
households for just under 10 months, they found it very difficult or difficult for 
nearly 2 months and neither easy nor difficult for a few weeks. There are no 
significant differences (at the 10% level) between household groups in the 
number of months that were very difficult or difficult to provide food. Fish 
farmers had a higher average number of months that were easy or very easy 
than non-fish farmers (p = .08). Non-poor fish farmers also had a higher 
number of months that were easy or very easy than non-poor non-fish 
farmers (p = .09). Thus it seems fish farming households were slightly better 
off than non-fish farming households in terms of food adequacy in 2010.  
 
5.2.11 Income Determination Model 
The descriptive statistics presented above suggest that fish farming is 
associated with higher income (along with increased household wealth and 
food adequacy) of adopting households. However, these descriptive statistics 
do not account for possible differences in household characteristics, other 
than participation in fish farming, which may be causing the disparities in 
income between fish and non-fish farming households.  Therefore, a 
household per capita Income Determination Model (IDM) is used to control 
for differences in observable characteristics between households and to 
assess the factors that contribute to the differences in income between fish 
farming and non-fish farming households. The multiple log-linear regression 
model was estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  
 
An important issue in this analysis is the possibility of 
endogeneity/simultaneity between per capita income and participation in fish 
farming. This would imply that fish farming increases income but also that 
higher income induces farmers to adopt fish farming. If the causal 
relationship between income and participation in fish farming runs in both 
directions then the key assumption in the regression model, that the 
disturbance error is uncorrelated with the predictor variables, is violated. As a 
consequence the estimation by the OLS would yield biased and inconsistent 
estimates of the structural parameters. To test for endogeneity bias and 
160 
 
ensure that it is fish farming that is causing increased income and not higher 
income that affects farmers’ decision to adopt fish farming, a two stage least 
squares (2SLS) model with instrumental variables (IV) (Heckman, 1997) was 
carried out using SAS Proc Model (2SLS) procedure (SAS/STAT software). 
The Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) was used to compare the 2SLS with IV 
to the OLS estimates. The Hausman test statistic was not significant (see 
Appendix 8 for test results) indicating that IVs are not needed and the OLS 
specification is efficient. This suggests no endogeneity bias between income 
and participation in fish farming61.   
 
Another key issue is the possibility of selection bias. It is important to ensure 
that it is not unobservable characteristics such as ability, motivation or 
entrepreneurialism that leads to the self-selection of farmers into fish farming, 
which are also unobservable characteristics associated with increased 
income. Heckman (1979) suggested a simple test of the null hypothesis of no 
sample selection bias using a consistent two-step estimator. Heckman’s 
approach is based on a treatment selection equation (first step) and an 
outcome equation (second step) to estimate the correlation between error 
terms in the two equations. The null hypothesis of no sample selection bias is 
rejected when the correlation estimate is significant at the 5 percent level. To 
test for selection bias and the effect of fish farming (treatment) on income 
(outcome), a Sample Selection Model (Heckman, 1979) was conducted using 
the SAS Proc QLIM procedure (qualitative and limited dependent variable 
model, SAS/STAT software)62. The correlation parameter estimate that 
indicates the effect of treatment selection bias on the outcome is 0.02 (p = 
.95). This result indicates that selection bias is not a problem in the 
estimation of (log) per capita income63. 
 
                                                 
 
61
 The same test carried out with the other variables in the model, using all fish farmers and 
separating out fish farming types A and B (described in more detail below), also indicated no 
endogeneity issues (see Appendix 8 for results).  
62
 An econometrician was consulted about the possible biases in the model, and carried out the tests 
for endogeneity and selection bias. 
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Aside from assessing the factors that contribute to the differences in income 
between fish farming and non-fish farming households, the IDM is also used 
to assess the factors that are related to income within the population of fish 
farmers, looking in particular at how training and better management 
practices (BMPs) in fish farming may be associated with income. Per capita 
household income is treated as a function of household participation in fish 
farming (according to type of fish farming), along with household 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics. The household income 
equation can be written as: 
 
ln (y) =  β0 + βi.Fi + βj.Xj + βz.Dz + ε 
 
where y is per capita household income and ε is the error term. Fi are dummy 
variables representing different categories of farming households where i = 1 
represents households where fish farmers have been trained and/or who use 
fertiliser in their ponds (a proxy for use of BMPs) and are referred to here as 
fish farming type A. Households where fish farmers have not been trained in 
fish farming and who do not use fertiliser in their ponds are represented by i 
= 2 and are referred to here as fish farming type B. Non-fish farming 
households are represented by i = 0 (and thus F0 = 0) which is the excluded 
dummy variable category in the regression. The estimated coefficients of Fi 
reflect the impact of the two types of fish farming on per capita income and 
can be interpreted as the percentage change in per capita income for 
households involved in fish farming (types A and B) compared with non-fish 
farming households after controlling for other factors. 
 
X is a vector of household demographic and socio-economic explanatory 
variables as follows: household size; total farm area; and a quadratic term for 
the number of years households have been a member of a livelihood 
association. D is a vector of dummy variables representing household 
characteristics as follows: households living in Amansie West District; 
households with sources of off-farm income; households who sell staple 
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crops; households who sell cash crops; households who sell livestock and/or 
livestock products; households in the lowest household wealth tercile64; 
households in the highest wealth tercile; households facing difficulty in 
accessing input and output markets; and households who faced a crisis or 
shock in 2010. Different functional forms were tested and the log linear 
functional form was chosen based on R2, F – ratio, number of variables 
significant and a priori expectations of the signs and magnitudes of the 
coefficients. The parameter estimates of factors associated with per capita 
household income of surveyed farmers are presented in Table 33 below. 
 
Table 33: Parameter estimates of the Income Determination Model 
 Variables 
 
T Sig. Coefficients SE 
 (Constant) 6.404 .284 22.555 .000 
Farmer category (base non-fish farmers) 
 
F1 - Fish farmers type A - trained and/or 
using fertiliser (proxy for BMPs) 
 
 
.543 
 
 
.150 
 
 
3.616 
 
 
.000 
F2 - Fish farmers type B - not trained and not 
using fertiliser (proxy for no BMPs) 
-.301 .211 -1.429 .155 
Household size -.118 .019 -6.062 .000 
Amansie West District  .575 .149 3.857 .000 
Total farm size (ha) .026 .008 3.264 .001 
Off-farm income .334 .131 2.541 .012 
Sale of staple crops (plantain and/or 
cassava) 
.256 .135 1.898 .060 
Sale of cash crops (citrus and/or oil palm) .134 .135 .994 .322 
Sale of livestock and/or livestock products .270 .138 1.956 .053 
Wealth tercile 1 (lowest) -.276 .152 -1.813 .072 
Wealth tercile 3 (highest) .339 .151 2.240 .027 
Difficulty accessing markets  -.302 .170 -1.775 .078 
Households who faced a crisis or shock -.339 .166 -2.039 .044 
Number of years in an association -.244 .076 -3.208 .002 
Number of years in an association, squared .027 .011 2.515 .013 
     
Notes:  Dependent Variable: Log of per capita income   
Number of observations = 141 
R
2 
= .471, Adjusted R
2 
= .407, F = 7.405 (p = .000) 
                                                 
 
64
 Terciles constructed using the household asset index (see Section 5.2.10, Figure 19) which includes 
household durable goods, productive assets and livestock. 
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Overall the model is highly significant (F = 7.405, p = .000) with an R2 of .471 
indicating that the explanatory variables in the model explain approximately 
47 percent of the variation in per capita household income. The variables for 
participation in fish farming type A, household size, households located in 
Amansie West District, total farm size and number of years of association 
membership are significant at the 1 percent level. The parameter estimates 
of all the variables in the model carry signs which conform to a priori 
expectations and economic theory65.  
 
Table 33 shows that the fish farmer type A category households are much 
better off than non-fish farmer households. The model suggests that 
household participation in fish farming type A where fish farmers are trained 
and/or fertiliser is used in ponds is likely to increase household per capita 
income by 54 percent. Household participation in fish farming type B where 
farmers are not trained and do not use fertiliser has a negative association 
with income, indicating a reduction in income by 30 percent compared to 
non-fish farmer households. However the coefficient for fish farming type B is 
not significant and thus it could be that there is little difference in per capita 
income between non-fish farming and fish farming type B households. This 
suggests that adoption of fish farming is not necessarily associated with 
higher incomes unless fish farmers have been trained and/or use BMPs, in 
which case household income may be increased. Therefore the model 
confirms that fish farming type A has a positive effect on income and the 
differences in income (and most likely other outcome indicators such as 
household wealth) between fish farming and non-fish farming households 
found in the descriptive statistics presented above are not merely due to 
differences in household characteristics between groups. This may also 
explain the differences between poor and non-poor fish and non-fish farming 
                                                 
 
65
 Years of education was not found to be significantly related to income. As noted in the descriptive 
statistics above no difference was found between education levels of fish and non-fish farming 
households. Dey et al.’s (2007) impact assessment of IAA in Malawi found that while education was 
not related to adoption of IAA, as education increased so did the level of integration of IAA practices. 
Similarly here there is a significant relationship between years of education and fish farming type 
(Pearson correlation coefficient of .251, p = .041) indicating as education increases so does the 
likelihood of a fish farmer being trained and/or using BMPs. 
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households in the descriptive statistics above if BMPs are generally used by 
non-poor fish farmers. 
 
In addition to highlighting the relative importance of fish farming type A for 
income, the model also provides useful insights into other determinants of 
income. As expected, larger households have lower per capita household 
income (an increase in household size by one person on average results in a 
12% decrease in per capita household income). Households located in 
Amansie West District appear to be better off than those in the other two 
districts. Households with larger farm sizes have slightly higher incomes and 
the coefficient suggests that an increase in total farm size of 1ha is 
associated with a 2.6 percent increase in per capita household income. 
 
Households with off-farm income sources are likely to have higher incomes 
(33%) than those that rely solely on farm income sources. Households that 
sell staple crops (cassava and/or plantain) are also likely to have higher 
incomes (26%). Households that sell cash crops (citrus and oil palm) are 
likely to be better off than those that do not even though this result is not 
statistically significant. Households that sell livestock and/or livestock 
products have higher incomes (27%) than those that do not.  
 
The model shows that the more assets a household owns the higher its 
income. Compared to households in the middle wealth tercile (measured by 
the household asset index), households in the bottom wealth tercile have 28 
percent lower income while households in the highest wealth tercile have 34 
percent higher income66. If households find it difficult to access input and 
output markets, their per capita income is likely to be lower than those who 
have easy market access. Households who experienced a crisis or shock in 
2010 are also likely to have lower incomes than those that did not.  
 
                                                 
 
66
 Asset/wealth variables such as household wealth tercile are potentially endogenous (higher 
incomes lead to higher assets and vice versa). The model was estimated without these variables and 
the signs and significances of the remaining exogenous variables stayed the same, suggesting 
household wealth is not an endogenous variable. 
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Finally, the number of years spent as a member of an association has little 
effect on household per capita income (even though the coefficients in the 
model for number of years in an association are significant). The model 
suggests however that after approximately five years, additional years of 
association membership will have an increasingly positive association with 
household per capita income. 
 
Although the tests for endogeneity and selection bias indicated no problems 
in the model, it is not possible to categorically state that fish farming type A 
causes income to increase. While fish farming type A is likely to increase 
incomes of non-poor fish farmers, it appears that fish farming may have lower 
impacts on income of poor fish farmers (mainly practising fish farming type B) 
due to resource and other constraints that make them less likely or able to 
use BMPs67. Thus the model results must be interpreted alongside the 
descriptive analysis presented in the previous section. The implications of 
this are discussed in more detail in the following section. 
 
5.3 DISCUSSION 
 
5.3.1 Summary and discussion of findings 
The results presented above explore the differences between poverty status 
and livelihood activities and outcomes of surveyed fish and non-fish farming 
households. The key findings of the analysis above show that poor farmers 
(whether defined by income poverty, through communities’ perception of 
wealth or households’ own assessment of poverty status) are able to adopt 
small-scale pond aquaculture in Ashanti Region, suggesting that fish farming 
has the potential to directly impact on poverty. Few demographic differences, 
such as household size, or differences in human capital, such as occupation 
and education of household heads, were found between fish and non-fish 
farming households. There were no significant differences in average farm 
                                                 
 
67
 There is a significant relationship between household poverty status and fish farming type 
(Pearson correlation coefficient of .25, p=.043). 
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size between groups though a higher percentage of fish farming than non-
fish farming households own land.  
 
Fish farming households were found to have over 30 percent higher average 
income than non-fish farming households and while farm income between 
these groups is similar, fish farming households have nearly 2.5 times higher 
off-farm income than non-fish farming households. Non-poor fish farming 
households have over double the off-farm income that non-poor non-fish 
farming households have. The household asset index showed similar 
differences with fish farming households having significantly higher 
household wealth than non-fish farming households and non-poor fish 
farming households having a higher household asset score than non-poor 
non-fish farming households. Poor fish farming households were found to eat 
fish more frequently than non-poor fish farming households who ate more 
meat and there were significant differences between poor and non-poor fish 
farming households’ consumption of fish, meat and milk. While there were no 
differences between fish and non-fish farming households in FCS and SFC, 
poor fish farming households have lower average FCS and SFC than non-
poor fish farming households. Fish farming households and non-poor fish 
farming households had a higher average number of months in 2010 that 
were easy or very easy for food provision than non-fish farming households 
and non-poor non-fish farming households respectively.   
 
Overall from the descriptive results, fish farming households appear to be 
better off than non-fish farming households in terms of income, household 
wealth and marginally better off in terms of food adequacy. The significantly 
higher levels of income, household assets and off-farm income of non-poor 
fish farming households compared to poor fish farming households, not 
present between poor and non-poor non-fish farming households, indicate 
the income poverty criteria is only telling part of the story. The results suggest 
there may be an asset threshold over which fish farming allows higher 
income and asset accumulation. It also raises questions about poor fish 
farmers and may indicate that while overall fish farming households are 
better off than non-fish farming households, fish farming may have a higher 
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potential to increase income and assets of non-poor households (or rather 
those households over the asset threshold) than poor households who are 
below the asset threshold.  
 
These descriptive results are further developed and supported by the IDM 
which controls for the effect of household characteristics other than fish 
farming which may be associated with increased income. The model results 
suggest that household participation in fish farming type A, where fish 
farmers are trained and/or fertiliser is used in ponds, is likely to increase 
household income by 54 percent. Participation in fish farming type B, where 
farmers are not trained and do not use fertiliser, has a negative association 
with income, although since the coefficient is not significant this may suggest 
little difference in income between non-fish farmer and fish farmer type B 
households. Overall therefore the model confirms that small-scale fish 
farming has a positive effect on income and the differences in income (and 
most likely other outcome indicators such as household wealth) found in the 
descriptive statistics are not merely due to differences in household 
characteristics between groups. Specifically, the model indicates that 
adoption of small-scale fish farming is not necessarily associated with higher 
incomes unless farmers have been trained and/or use BMPs, in which case 
household income may be increased.  However as noted above, the 
descriptive analysis suggests an asset threshold over which fish farming 
allows income and capital accumulation. The descriptive results also show 
that while there is no significant difference in the percentage of poor and non-
poor fish farmers who have been trained, a significantly higher percentage of 
non-poor compared to poor fish farming households use fertiliser (used here 
as a proxy for BMPs) and a significant relationship exists between income 
poverty status and fish farming type, which may indicate a threshold in the 
use of BMPs. The results of the IDM and the descriptive analysis together 
therefore suggest that while fish farming type A, practised mainly by non-poor 
farmers (over the BMP and asset thresholds) increases income, poor farmers 
(under the BMP and asset thresholds) are less likely or able to participate in 
fish farming type A. Therefore it can be argued that while small-scale fish 
farming is likely to have a strong impact on income (and other related 
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indicators such as household wealth) of non-poor farmers practising fish 
farming type A, it is unlikely to have much impact on poor farmers unless 
their resource constraints can be overcome and they are also able to engage 
in and benefit from fish farming type A.   
 
The effect of aquaculture on income indicated by these results appears to 
correspond in part with other studies on aquaculture in SSA. For example, as 
noted in Chapter 2, Dey et al. (2007) found that IAA adopting households in 
Malawi had 1.5 times the income of non-adopters (similar to the descriptive 
statistics and IDM model results). However, this was mainly due to 
differences in farm income (as IAA increases farm sustainability and 
productivity) and larger farm size of IAA farmers which is not the case here. 
10 percent of IAA farmers’ income was from aquaculture which is similar to 
the 8 percent found for the surveyed fish farmers. A WorldFish Center project 
in Cameroon found that average net profits of fish farms in peri-urban areas 
rose from US$150 to US$1,500 over 5 years whereas those is rural areas 
rose from US$34 to US$213. While the disparity in profit was attributed to the 
increased market access for peri-urban fish farmers, this shows the 
differential impact of fish farming on household income based on context. In 
the case of surveyed fish farmers in Ashanti Region, the potential impact of 
fish farming on income (and other livelihood outcome indicators) is related to 
whether farmers are trained and/or use BMPs, but is also likely to be 
influenced by existing asset portfolios and resource constraints of farmers 
and the prevalence and effects of BMPs. Belton and Little (2011) citing 
Mosley and Hulme (1998) related to micro credit provision suggest there may 
be an ‘impact frontier’ where lending to poorer households results in relatively 
low impact on households whereas lending to better off households results in 
higher impact. While Belton and Little indicate it is unclear if this kind of 
relationship holds for other types of non credit assistance, the results above 
suggest it may. The results show that poor fish farming households are 
marginally better off than poor non-fish farming households whereas non-
poor fish farming households are significantly better off than non-poor non-
fish farming households.  
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5.3.2 Financial viability of small-scale fish farming in Ghana 
While the descriptive statistics and IDM above suggest that fish farming type 
A is associated with higher income, the results of the PBs suggest that small-
scale fish farming is not profitable for many small-scale fish farmers, despite 
the potential, shown by the two fish farmers making a profit. However, while 
these PBs are realistic, they cannot be seen as representative of all fish 
farmers. Other more detailed studies on the profitability of fish farming in 
Ghana have been undertaken (e.g. Asmah, 2008; Kaliba et al., 2007a) which 
suggest small-scale pond aquaculture can be profitable. Asmah (2008) 
looked at the financial viability of pond aquaculture in Ghana, using data from 
392 fish farms from 9 out of the 10 regions in Ghana. She found that average 
gross profit (total revenue minus total variable costs) per ha per annum was 
positive for different groups of ‘non commercial’ farms and higher than those 
estimated through the PBs. However only 47 percent of ‘non commercial’ 
farm types had a positive net profit (gross revenue less total production cost 
including interest and depreciation on capital and opportunity cost of land), 
although a higher proportion of farms were profitable if lower costings were 
used for initial capital costs in pond construction (to reflect use of household 
labour and lower opportunity cost of land).  She also found a strong 
relationship between quantities of feed applied and profitability of ‘non 
commercial’ farms and notes that underfeeding could be an important reason 
for the low yield of the unprofitable farms. This is broadly in line with the 
findings reported above.  
 
Kaliba et al. (2007a) using a dynamic model to simulate individual fish growth 
and estimate the profitability of Nile tilapia (O. Niloticus) production in Ghana 
found that the practise of mixed-sex tilapia culture with catfish predation 
using local feed of maize/rice bran and fertilising with manure (such as the 
fish farming type A farmers) was economically sustainable. Both these 
studies therefore indicate that semi-intensive small-scale pond aquaculture 
similar to fish farming type A can be a profitable enterprise and thus holds 
potential for directly impacting poverty in Ghana.  
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5.4 CONCLUSION  
 
Overall therefore, the results presented in this chapter do not strongly 
support the hypothesis set out in Chapter 2 that small-scale aquaculture has 
positive direct impacts on poverty and livelihoods of poor households in 
Ashanti Region, Ghana. However the results show that small-scale 
aquaculture has positive direct impacts on the livelihoods of non-poor fish 
farming households, and the magnitude of these impacts depends on the 
household and livelihood characteristics and aquaculture production systems 
of farmers in Ashanti Region, and the institutional and infrastructure context. 
The results also suggest that while at present aquaculture does not appear to 
have direct poverty impacts on poor households, it does have the potential to 
directly benefit poor fish farming households if their resource constraints can 
be overcome and they are able benefit from fish farming type A and the use 
of BMPs. The results of this chapter and the finding that small-scale fish 
farming type A is associated with significantly increased household income 
are built upon in the following chapter which explores the potential for small-
scale pond aquaculture and other aquaculture systems to impact indirectly on 
poverty and economic growth.  
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 CHAPTER 6: INDIRECT IMPACTS OF AQUACULTURE ON 
POVERTY 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The central theme of this thesis is concerned with assessing the actual and 
potential, direct and indirect poverty impacts of different types of aquaculture 
systems in Ghana. Chapter 5 has shown that poor households in Ashanti 
Region have adopted small-scale pond aquaculture and that overall, fish 
farming households are better off than non-fish farming households, 
particularly in terms of household assets. An Income Determination Model 
controlling for differences in household characteristics showed that per capita 
income of fish farming households, where fish farmers have been trained 
and/or are using BMPs (fish farming type A), is higher than per capita income 
of fish farming households who have not been trained and are not using 
BMPs (fish farming type B) and of non-fish farming households. The ability of 
poor fish farmers to engage in and benefit from fish farming type A is unclear 
however and overall the results do not strongly support the hypothesis that 
small-scale pond aquaculture has a positive direct impact on poverty through 
increased income of poor adopters. However they do show that fish farming 
type A has positive direct impacts on income and assets of non-poor fish 
farmers. The presence of direct livelihood impacts from small-scale 
aquaculture (fish farming type A) suggests that indirect poverty impacts 
should also be present and potentially important. SME and large-scale 
commercial cage aquaculture on Lake Volta are also unlikely to have direct 
impacts on poverty through adoption by poor farmers, as the poor are unable 
to afford cage aquaculture due to high costs of investment and working 
capital. Yet like fish farming type A, SME and large-scale cage aquaculture 
still have the potential to impact poverty through indirect impact pathways for 
example via economic linkages which could create multiplier effects and 
generate economic growth.  
 
172 
 
This chapter focuses on the importance of indirect impacts of different types 
of aquaculture systems on poverty that can occur through a variety of impact 
pathways discussed in Chapter 2.  The research question and hypothesis 
addressed in this chapter are as follows:  
 
Objective 
To assess the importance of direct and indirect poverty impact pathways 
from different aquaculture systems and examine implications for pro-poor 
growth in different contexts 
 
Hypothesis  
Indirect poverty impact pathways (such as employment, consumption and 
multiplier effects) from increased aquaculture SME activity have more 
potential to impact on poverty than indirect pathways from large-scale 
commercial operations and direct and indirect pathways from small-scale 
pond aquaculture (fish farming type A)  
 
To test this hypothesis, the chapter starts by investigating the nature and 
importance of the various linkages (production, consumption, investment, 
infrastructure, institutional, cost of living and environmental) arising from each 
of the three aquaculture systems under analysis: small-scale pond 
aquaculture (fish farming type A) in Ashanti Region; SME commercial cage 
aquaculture; and large-scale commercial cage aquaculture in Lake Volta, 
Eastern Region. This is done using data from the household survey and 
participatory budgets (PBs) of small-scale fish farmers in Ashanti Region in 
Chapter 5, the survey of cage farms on Lake Volta and FGDs conducted in 
seven communities on Lake Volta where cage aquaculture is present (see 
Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2).  After this descriptive analysis of linkages, the 
economic multiplier effects arising from these different aquaculture systems 
are estimated. These multiplier estimates quantify the amount of added 
income generated locally and nationally by an extra dollar of income from 
each aquaculture system to compare the economic growth created by the 
development of each type of aquaculture system. As one of the most 
important ways in which SME and large-scale commercial farms can 
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potentially impact on poverty is through increased labour demand, labour 
opportunities created by different systems are then estimated, along with an 
approximation of the employment created along the value chains related to 
these systems. Some characteristics of labourers on SME and large-scale 
commercial farms are then explored. Having identified the main indirect 
impact pathways between aquaculture and poverty and assessed the relative 
importance of the linkages arising from each system, the results of these 
different analyses are synthesised in a table which scores the strength of 
each of the direct and indirect impact pathways and linkages arising from 
each of the three aquaculture systems and the likely impact of each on 
poverty. Finally the discussion section explores the implications of these 
results for aquaculture’s role in generating pro-poor growth. 
 
6.2 RESULTS 
 
As outlined in Chapter 3, Section 3.8.1, the aquaculture industry in Ghana is 
clearly segmented into: i) small-scale artisanal pond aquaculture farms 
(explored in Chapter 5); ii) SME commercial cage farms; and iii) large-scale 
foreign owned commercial cage farms in Lake Volta. The SME sector, driven 
mainly by small local entrepreneurs, is the most dynamic category in the 
industry in terms of new entrants (even though production from the large 
farms is growing rapidly). A survey of cage farms conducted for this thesis 
(see Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2) showed that small-scale cage farms typically 
consist of 1-10 cages (125 to 12500 cubic meters (m3) in total based on 
cages of 125 m3) which produced 10 to 50 tonnes of tilapia per farm in 2010. 
A handful of medium sized farms are also part of the SME category and three 
out of five of those surveyed are owned by foreigners. The survey showed 
that these medium sized farms each have on average the equivalent of 
approximately 50 cages (62,500 m3) in Lake Volta and produced between 50 
and 70 tonnes each in 2010 with production growing steadily in 2011.  The 
large-scale cage farms combined produced 4800 tonnes in 2010. The 
following sections assess the linkages arising from each of the three 
aquaculture systems. 
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6.2.1 Linkages arising from small-scale pond aquaculture (fish farming 
type A) 
Backward linkages 
A sector’s backward linkages represent its relationship with the rest of the 
economy through direct and indirect purchases from other sectors. The type 
and size of backward linkages depend on factors such as agricultural 
technology, size of land holding and type of commodity. The larger the share 
of inputs into a sector that are nontradable (i.e. those not imported or 
exported to or from the area and that do not have tradable substitutes 
available locally) the stronger its backward linkages and hence multiplier 
effect will be. As shown in Chapter 5, the main inputs into small-scale pond 
aquaculture (and aquaculture generally) are fingerlings and feed.  A budget 
was estimated for fish farmers who have been trained and/or use BMPs (fish 
farming type A) based on the PBs presented in Chapter 568 and interviews 
with FC staff (see Appendix 9 for estimated budget for a 600m2 pond). The 
estimated budget shows that fingerlings represent approximately 30 percent 
of total costs (and over 40% of variable costs).  Small-scale fish farmers in 
Ashanti Region use fingerlings produced mainly by government or private 
hatcheries located outside Ashanti Region, and some from other fish farmers, 
and these are therefore defined as nationally nontradable inputs.  
 
The estimated budget shows that feed, the other main input into aquaculture 
production, represents on average nearly 24 percent of fish farming type A 
total costs (and just over 30% of variable cost).  Small-scale fish farmers use 
a wide variety of feeds. However over 90 percent of farmers surveyed use 
rice bran and/or maize bran, mixed with groundnut peel. These are locally 
produced and consumed and generally not traded outside the region 
therefore both are defined here as regionally and nationally nontradable. A 
much lower percentage of small-scale farmers practicing fish farming type A 
(27%) supplement feeding with commercially formulated imported feed69 
                                                 
 
68
 All four PBs estimated in Chapter 5 include use of fertiliser and thus represent budgets for fish 
farming type A. 
69
 As none of the small-scale fish farmers that contributed to the PBs used commercial formulated 
feed, it was not included in the estimated budget for fish farming type A in Appendix 9. Thus it is 
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which is overall a tradable input even though elements such as overhead, 
storage and distribution costs are nontradable. Other nontradable inputs into 
small-scale pond aquaculture are fertiliser, lime and transportation 
representing just over 10 percent of total costs for fish farming type A. 
 
Forward linkages 
A sector’s forward linkages represent its relationship with the rest of the 
economy through its direct and indirect sales to other sectors. Food 
processing and distribution of agricultural products seem to generate the 
largest forward linkages in rural economies (Haggblade et al., 1989). Small-
scale pond aquaculture (fish farming type A) in Ashanti Region currently has 
weak forward linkages as over 90 percent of farmers practising fish farming 
type A sell fish directly to consumers, which represent their most important 
marketing channel. 50 percent of farmers sell to consumers at the farm gate 
and over 40 percent sell to consumers in the village. Overall 90 percent of 
fish sold to all customers is unprocessed showing that distribution and 
processing of farmed fish is not important. However nearly 70 percent of fish 
farmers also sell fish to traders (63% of which is sold at the farm gate) who 
go on to sell to retailers and consumers but they are not as important a 
marketing channel as selling directly to consumers, meaning forward 
linkages are weak. Nevertheless there is potential for forward linkages to be 
stronger if adoption of small-scale pond aquaculture increases. Growth in fish 
supply in rural communities would require an increase in processing, trading 
and distribution activities, some of which is likely to be carried out by poor 
women.  
 
Consumption linkages 
Consumption linkages arise when additional income is spent on nontradable 
goods and services and this stimulates further demand for local industry and 
services. Section 6.2.4 below on economic multiplier effects estimates the 
marginal budget share (MBS) of small-scale fish farmers for regionally and 
                                                                                                                                          
 
unclear what percentage of costs commercial feed represents for the 27 percent of small-scale 
farmers practising fish farming type A that use it.  
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nationally nontradable goods in Ashanti Region. The results indicate that for 
every extra dollar of income earned by farmers from small-scale pond 
aquaculture, 44 percent will be spent on regionally nontradable goods and 
services and 62 percent will be spent on nationally nontradable goods and 
services, implying strong consumption linkages.  Spending of labourers’ 
wages on nontradable goods also contributes to consumption linkages and 
the MBS for nontradable goods for pond farm labourers is likely to be higher 
than for pond farm owners. The small-scale fish farm budget in Appendix 9 
shows that labour represents nearly 80 percent of value added. Thus, 
consumption linkages may be even stronger for pond aquaculture if 
labourers’ spending on nontradables is taken into consideration.  
 
Investment linkages 
Capital or investment linkages occur when increased income is saved and 
used to finance local investment, reducing vulnerability and increasing 
productivity of local activities and potential elasticity of supply responses 
crucial to consumption linkages. The effects of investment linkages are not 
included in conventional economic input-output models and data were not 
collected on reinvestment of aquaculture profits. However fish farmers have 
higher levels of household assets, nonfarm income and income from 
household enterprises than non-fish farming households suggesting they 
may be likely to invest in local businesses. Small-scale pond farms are also 
locally owned implying that profits are likely to stay in the local area.  
However gross profit margins for small-scale pond aquaculture are estimated 
to be modest indicating it is unlikely most fish farmers will be able to save 
much to reinvest into local businesses. 
 
Service, infrastructure and institutional linkages 
Service and infrastructure linkages are generated when increasing trade 
flows lead to improvements in local services particularly communications 
(e.g. telecommunications and transport services), increased investment in 
infrastructure such as roads, and reduced unit costs for service provision due 
to increased demand. Institutional linkages arise when increased production 
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and market activity changes institutions, for example rights and terms of 
access to land and water, or the relationship between producers and buyers 
and access to markets and market exchange. The effects of service, 
infrastructure and institutional linkages are overlooked in conventional 
economic growth linkage studies. Small-scale pond aquaculture does not 
seem to have had any effects on service provision, infrastructure or local 
institutions in the study area. However these linkages are stronger for large-
scale cage aquaculture explored below. 
 
Cost of living linkages 
Cost of living linkages can occur when increased fish supply due to 
aquaculture adoption leads to a reduction in fish prices and a rise in people’s 
real incomes which is then spent on local goods and services generating 
consumption linkages. As noted in Chapter 2, Sections 2.2 and 2.3.5, cost of 
living linkages are strongest for products with high average budget shares, 
and local production and consumption and where markets are not well 
integrated so that local supply and demand are major determinants of prices. 
While fish markets in southern and central Ghana are generally well 
integrated with fish reaching many of the inland rural communities where 
small-scale pond farms are located, the majority of fish available in these 
communities is processed (smoked and dried) and comes from the coast or 
from inland fisheries. Supply of fresh fish is not regular and does not meet 
demand at prevailing prices. These communities benefit greatly from cheaper 
and increased supply of fresh fish when fish ponds are harvested. At present, 
due to the small number of pond farms in villages and the long periods 
between harvests, harvesting is infrequent and cost of living linkages are 
very weak. However, as households spend a sizeable proportion of their 
cash income on fish70 (especially when compared to expenditure on other 
food groups) the potential for increased adoption of small-scale pond 
                                                 
 
70
 According to the GLSS5, on average 9.5 percent of household expenditure in Ghana is spent on fish 
and seafood which is nearly equal to the expenditure on bread and cereals (9.8%) (GSS, 2007:124). In 
the rural forest zone, expenditure on fish and seafood represent on average 20.8 percent of total 
expenditure (compared to 16% nationally) and is greater than expenditure on bread and cereals 
(16.4%) (GSS, 2007:129). In the rural forest zone actual and imputed expenditure on food represents 
41.2 and 14.3 percent of total household expenditure respectively (GSS, 2007:121). 
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aquaculture in rural communities to generate cost of living linkages is strong, 
and potentially higher than for SME and large-scale cage aquaculture where 
increased production may not lead to price reductions (discussed further 
below).  
 
6.2.2 Linkages arising from SME cage aquaculture 
Backward linkages 
Fingerlings and feed comprise the main backward linkages for SME cage 
aquaculture. While many cage farmers surveyed were not willing or able to 
give detailed cost and revenue data for their fish farming activities, some 
were more forthcoming. Budgets were therefore estimated using incomplete 
survey data supplemented with data gathered from key informant interviews 
at the WRI aquaculture field station in Akosombo (which is also a public 
hatchery). The budget estimated for a small-scale commercial cage farm with 
4 cages is presented in Appendix 9. While the absolute figures for each item 
depend on the number of cages in the farm, the percentage of total cost of 
each input can be assumed as an approximation for both small and medium-
scale cage farms regardless of the number of cages.  
 
Fingerlings, defined here as nationally nontradable inputs, are estimated to 
represent nearly 12 percent of total costs for SME cage farms. Nearly 80 
percent of small-scale cage farmers interviewed obtain their fingerlings from 
one or more private hatcheries and just over 35 percent from WRI. Three of 
the five medium-scale farmers interviewed produce all of their own 
fingerlings. One farmer produces some of his own and supplements them 
with fingerlings from a private hatchery in Eastern Region and one farmer 
stocks solely from fingerlings obtained from WRI.  
 
Feed represents just over 85 percent of total costs and unlike pond 
aquaculture, almost all cage farmers use imported commercial formulated 
floating feed which as a tradable input does not contribute much to the SME 
sector’s backward linkage. However the majority of small-scale cage farmers 
buy feed from local feed distributers in Eastern Region that import feed so 
there is some level of employment and income creation from feed 
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distribution. 50 percent of farmers also buy feed from an Israeli feed 
company in Ghana called Ranaan. Three of the five medium-scale cage 
farmers interviewed import feed directly from abroad and two buy from 
Ranaan. Ranaan established a feed mill in Ghana in 2012 and is currently 
producing feed locally. While data on this was not collected, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that while Ranaan’s feed prices have barely reduced 
since they started local production, the reliability of supply has improved 
(which was a serious problem before) though the number of fish farmers now 
purchasing feed from Ranaan is unknown. However even if feed is produced 
locally, while tradable substitutes are available locally and the prices of local 
and imported feed are related, locally produced feed is still classed as a 
tradable input (Delgado et al., 1998:1) and would not contribute much to the 
sector’s backward linkage aside from employment created at the local feed 
mill. 
 
Other inputs into SME cage aquaculture include the cages themselves 
(which only represent 1 percent of costs when cage costs are amortised over 
5 years). Cages are all locally produced for small-scale farmers and most of 
the medium-scale farmers except one who imported his cages from Scotland.  
 
Forward linkages  
SME cage aquaculture in Lake Volta has stronger forward linkages than 
small-scale pond aquaculture in Ashanti Region as more cage farmed fish is 
used as inputs into other sectors. Over 40 percent of small-scale cage farms 
and 60 percent of medium-scale cage farms surveyed sell directly to retailers 
including cold stores, hotels, restaurants and tilapia joints. The majority of 
cage farmed fish is distributed to markets in Accra and other urban centres 
by a network of primarily female fish traders, some of whom also trade in wild 
caught fish from Lake Volta. Very few of these traders are from communities 
located around the cage farms and community FGDs indicate this is due to 
the relatively high level of capital needed to start trading farmed fish. While 
many women in local communities trade in wild caught fish (often they are 
the wives of local fishermen), cage farmed fish is more expensive, often sold 
in 25kg crates and is not sold to traders on credit unlike wild caught fish.  
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Over 80 percent of SME cage farms surveyed sell to traders (defined here as 
those who buy less than 50kg at a time). Over 60 percent of small-scale cage 
farms and all medium-scale cage farms sell to wholesalers (defined here as 
those who buy over 500kg at a time). Over 60 percent of SME cage farms 
also sell to consumers.  
 
The same network of traders and wholesalers buy fish from all the SME and 
large-scale cage farms on Lake Volta. Information gathered from the survey, 
key informant interviews with fish traders and direct observation indicate 
there are approximately 20 wholesalers and over 200 traders within this 
network (and an additional 400 traders who buy only from one large-scale 
fish farm that has outlets in Accra and who do not buy at the farm gate, 
discussed further in Section 6.2.3 below). SME cage farmers surveyed 
ranked traders and wholesalers as their most important customers followed 
by retailers then consumers. Almost 100 percent of SME farms sell fish at the 
farm gate and some medium-scale farms also sell to consumers, traders and 
retailers in other towns.  
 
While all the fish is sold fresh and unprocessed, the cleaning, descaling and 
degutting is undertaken by women from local communities on harvest days at 
the farm and they are paid by customers, mainly traders, for this service.  
This creates casual employment for over 160 women from 6 different SME 
fish farming communities, one to four times every 2 months. Local women 
also process fish oil from the fish guts on harvest days at the medium sized 
farms providing casual employment for over 35 women. A further forward 
linkage arises from transportation of fish from farm gate to market and groups 
of traders often rent a ‘trotro’ (a van used for public transportation) to 
transport fish.   
 
Consumption linkages 
The MBS for regionally and nationally nontradable goods for small-scale 
cage farmers estimated in Section 6.2.4 below suggest that 37 and 49 
percent of each extra dollar of income earned by small-scale cage farmers 
would be spent on regionally and nationally nontradable goods respectively. 
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Small-scale cage farm owners are mainly professionals from Accra. 
Therefore, these MBS estimates are lower than for small-scale pond farmers, 
as wealthier people tend to spend higher shares of their income on imported 
or tradable goods71. Spending of labourers’ wages on nontradable goods 
also contributes to consumption linkages and the MBS for nontradable goods 
for cage farm labourers is likely to be much higher than for cage farm 
owners. However the estimated cage farm budget in Appendix 9 shows that 
labour represents a small proportion of total costs and value added while the 
gross profit margin accruing to farm owners is estimated to be nearly 23 
percent (much higher than for small-scale pond aquaculture). Thus 
consumption linkages are more likely to arise from the additional income of 
fish farm owners (rather than labourers’ wages) being spent on nontradables.  
 
The strength of consumption linkages from fish farming as perceived by local 
communities is mixed. Some community FGDs indicated that fish farming 
creates limited employment with little impact on local economic activity. 
However other, more remote, communities reported increased commercial 
activity from labourers spending money on foodstuffs from local traders, in 
drinking spots and food stalls, renting rooms and marrying local women.  
 
Investment linkages 
No data were collected on investment linkages. However all small-scale cage 
farms surveyed are owned by Ghanaian nationals making it likely for profits 
to be reinvested in Ghana. Three out of the five medium-scale cage farms 
surveyed however are foreign owned and the remaining two are owned by 
Ghanaians with strong international links suggesting some proportion of 
profits may be invested abroad. However, the lack of data on investment 
linkages means this is unknown.  
 
 
                                                 
 
71
 The MBS for nontradables for medium-scale cage farmers was not able to be estimated. As the 
majority of medium-scale farmers are expatriates a reliable proxy group was not found in the GLSS5 
expenditure data. 
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Service, infrastructure and institutional linkages 
Like small-scale pond aquaculture, SME commercial cage aquaculture does 
not appear to have had any effects on service provision, infrastructure or 
local institutions. 
 
Cost of living linkages 
Communities near small-scale cage farms could potentially benefit from 
cheaper and increased fish supply during harvests, especially as FGDs 
indicate that wild caught fish supplies from Lake Volta have been decreasing 
over the years. However, due to the small number of cage farms at present 
and production cycles of approximately 6 months, harvests are infrequent. 
One of the three communities close to small-scale farms that were 
interviewed indicated local fish consumption had increased since fish farming 
started and community members are able to buy small sized farmed tilapia 
on harvest days. Farmed fish prices depend on individual fish sizes so 1kg of 
smaller sized fish is cheaper than 1kg of larger fish. The cage farm survey 
indicates that traders and wholesalers prefer to buy larger sized fish, ideally 
400g and above. Community members are able to buy smaller size fish 
usually below 330g (known as Size 1, regular, economy and schoolboys in 
order of decreasing size). Local communities surrounding medium-scale 
farms do not seem to benefit from increased supply of fish as these farms 
usually harvest larger fish than small farms (as they have the working capital 
to pay for continuous feed for a whole cycle whereas small-scale farmers 
often harvest early due to lack of funds to buy feed) and therefore sell fish at 
a higher price. The cage farm survey shows the average price of fish from 
small-scale farms in 2010 was 3.2GH¢/kg and 4GH¢/kg from medium-scale 
farms. This price difference could also reflect the weaker bargaining position 
of small-scale farms with their customers,  compared to medium-scale farms, 
due to lack of cold storage facilities and hence willingness to sell fish at a 
lower price just to clear their harvest, thus benefiting the community.  
 
The FGDs revealed that households spend a high proportion of cash income 
on fish (one community indicated on average 70 percent of household cash 
income is spent on fish while the rest averaged around 30 percent, indicating 
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a high average budget share for fish) suggesting that reduced fish prices 
could lead to cost of living linkages. Generally though tilapia is a high value 
fish demanded by better off consumers whereas poorer consumers eat 
cheaper fish such as ‘one man thousand’ and catfish from inland fisheries 
and salmon from the sea.  
 
Environmental linkages 
The community between two of the medium sized farms use water from the 
lake for drinking, bathing and general household use due to lack of access to 
piped water. Since establishment of the fish farms the communities report 
finding that the water makes them itchy when they bathe and gives rashes to 
children who swim in the lake. A 2011 study by WRI found there were no 
clearly detectable negative impacts of cage aquaculture on water quality. 
They attributed this to the large volume of the lake relative to the number of 
fish cages (Asmah et al., 2011).  However water samples for the study were 
taken in June 2010, approximately a year before community FGDs were 
conducted for this thesis. Cage aquaculture is growing rapidly in Lake Volta 
and as noted in the WRI study, farm clusters could have cumulative negative 
environmental and ecosystem effects. Therefore even if there are limited 
effects at present, judging by the experience of the communities around the 
fish farms who use the water every day, it likely that as cage aquaculture 
grows, decreasing water quality will become a problem, particularly around 
farm clusters.  
 
Fishermen in 6 of the 7 communities interviewed reported their fish catch had 
reduced since fish farming started. However it is unclear whether this is due 
to a wider trend of overfishing and declining fish catch (attributed to a 
decrease in total rainfall, increasing fishermen population, use of illegal 
fishing methods and development of farming along the lake destroying fish 
habitats) (Béné, 2007) or directly related to fish farming. The majority of 
fishermen interviewed in the FGDs blame their decreased catch on reduced 
fishing grounds due to fish farming and increased difficulty in catching fish as 
they are attracted to the feed waste around the cages where they are 
prohibited from fishing. Conversely fish farmers claim that cages protect fish 
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spawning grounds and wild fish are benefiting from feed waste. Thus, cage 
farms are in fact increasing the number and size of fish in the lake. 
Fishermen from one community said their fish catch had increased as fish 
were attracted to the feed from the cages. However the true impact of fish 
farming on fish in Lake Volta and fishermen’s livelihoods is unclear and 
requires further research. Many of the fishermen from local communities are 
hired to work on the cage farms due to their familiarity with the water. They 
are thus benefiting in some way at the same time as their employment 
decreases the number of fishermen on the lake, potentially reducing pressure 
on the lake. 
 
6.2.3 Linkages arising from large-scale cage aquaculture 
At present there are only two large-scale farms operating on Lake Volta. The 
largest and longest established is Tropo farm owned by an expatriate who 
started pond aquaculture in Ghana in 1999 and began cage aquaculture in 
Lake Volta in 2006. At the time of interview (April 2011) Tropo had 200 
functional cages with a combined volume of 43,200 m3. Tropo produced 
3000 tonnes of tilapia in 2010 and was planning to produce 4300 tonnes in 
2011.  West African Fish ltd. (WAF) was established in 2008 as a joint 
venture between a local company called Palm Acres Ltd. and Royal Danish 
Fish Group from Denmark. WAF had 32,000 m3 of functional cages for grow 
out (i.e. not for fingerling production) in 2010, 41,720 m3 at the time of 
interview, and produced 1800 tonnes of tilapia in 2010. In addition to these 
two farms, Crystal Lake Farm Ltd. is one of the oldest cage farms on Lake 
Volta, established in 2000 by a female Ghanaian entrepreneur. However at 
the time of interview Crystal Lake was no longer functioning as a fish farm 
but as the largest hatchery in Ghana, producing tilapia fingerlings and selling 
approximately 2 million in 2010.   
 
Backward linkages 
Backward linkages from large-scale farms are limited and smaller than those 
from SME cage farms. Both Tropo and WAF import feed directly from 
Denmark, Holland, Israel and Brazil and do not use local feed distributers 
unless there are shipping delays. Tropo produces all its own fingerlings at its 
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hatchery at their original pond farm site. At the time of interview WAF was 
buying fingerlings from WRI and private hatcheries. However a hatchery 
facility imported from Holland had just been installed on site for WAF to start 
producing its own fingerlings. One nationally nontradable input used by Tropo 
are its cages which are locally made whereas WAF imported its cages, which 
therefore do not contribute to its backward linkage. 
 
Forward linkages 
Large-scale cage aquaculture in Lake Volta has stronger forward linkages 
than other types of aquaculture discussed above. Similar to fish from SMEs, 
fish from large-scale farms are used as inputs for other sectors and sold to 
retailers including cold stores, supermarkets, hotels, restaurants and tilapia 
joints and distributed to markets in Accra and other urban centres by fish 
traders. While WAF sells fish at the marketplace it created locally, Tropo 
does not sell any fish locally and sends it all directly to its 3 urban outlets in 
Accra, Tema and Kasoa where fish is sold, both retail and wholesale, nearly 
every day. A large number of traders only buy fish from Tropo’s outlets and 
not from SME cage farms or WAF due to transportation cost. Aside from the 
20 wholesalers and 200 traders estimated to buy from SME cage farms and 
WAF, an additional 400 traders buy tilapia from Tropo’s outlets to sell in a 
number of markets in and around Accra, Tema and Kasoa, to retailers, and 
to consumers either on the roadside or house to house. As all Tropo’s fish is 
sold from its outlets, no women from the local communities trade in farmed 
fish. However three times per week on harvest days at Tropo two groups of 
20 women from the local community Mpakadan make fish oil from the fish 
guts.  
 
WAF established a market in the local community, Asikuma, to sell its fish. 
As a result approximately 10 women from Asikuma are trading in farmed fish. 
However community FGDs revealed that most local women cannot get into 
the business due to lack of credit.  Also WAF mainly sells in bulk to 
approximately four wholesalers with whom it has established relationships. 
These then sell the fish to their own groups of traders.  On market days, 
twice per week, there are approximately 30 women who clean and gut the 
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fish, over half of whom are from the local community. 8 other women from 
surrounding communities sell ice in the market. 
 
Consumption linkages 
Large-scale farms employ large numbers of local workers, who are likely to 
spend a high proportion of their wages on locally nontradable goods. While it 
was not possible to collect budget data for large-scale farms, it is likely that 
large-scale farms have a similar if not lower proportion of total costs going to 
labour as SME farms, where this is already very small. However due to the 
sheer scale of the farms, the consumption linkages arising from spending by 
labourers is noticeable in local communities. For example Tropo estimates 
that every month between GH¢25,000 to GH¢50,000 (approximately 
US$16,500 to US$33,00072) is spent by their workers in local communities. 
FGDs in the communities surrounding Tropo and WAF indicated they have 
benefited from consumption linkages from labourers spending on renting 
rooms, buying farm produce and food, frequenting drinking spots (which have 
increased from 1 to 4 in the community near Tropo since it started) and 
marrying local women. There are 2 expatriate staff at Tropo and 1 at WAF 
who are housed on the farm and who are much less likely than local staff to 
spend their salaries on nontradable goods. The other source of consumption 
linkages is the spending of additional income of farm owners. However as 
Tropo is owned by an expatriate and WAF is primarily owned by a Danish 
company, it is unlikely that a high share of additional income would be spent 
on locally nontradable goods.  
 
Investment linkages 
Data on investment linkages were not collected. However as the large-scale 
farms are owned by foreigners it is more likely profits will be repatriated than 
reinvested in local businesses. At present most of Tropo’s profits are 
reinvested back into the fish farm and it is likely this is the case with WAF as 
well. However for WAF it is possible that much of the profits would be spent 
                                                 
 
72
 April 2011 exchange rate of US$1 to GH¢1.51. Available at: http://www.exchange-
rates.org/Rate/USD/GHS/4-4-2011 (accessed 24 May 2013). 
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on imported equipment such as cages and hatchery equipment from Holland. 
Tropo does not appear to use as much imported equipment and uses locally 
produced cages. 
 
Service and infrastructure linkages 
While there are no service or infrastructure linkages from small-scale pond 
aquaculture and SME cage aquaculture, large-scale cage aquaculture is 
more likely to generate these types of linkages. The two large-scale farms 
were established in remote rural areas on Lake Volta without basic 
infrastructure such as motorable roads and thus had to build or renovate 
access roads to their farms. Tropo renovated 7km of road and has graded it 
three times since 2007, costing approximately GH¢60,000 (approximately 
US$40,00073). Trotros and taxis have been using the road and it seems likely 
it has had a positive impact on the surrounding communities, but the extent 
of this impact is unclear from the community FGD. WAF built a 7.5km road in 
2008 for US$200,000 and both WAF and the local community agree this has 
greatly benefited the community as it has enabled local farmers to reach their 
farm lands much more easily whereas previously they had to walk through 
the bush for 4 to 6 hours. Farmers can also transport their farm produce to 
the village using a vehicle rather than carrying it. The community FGD 
estimated approximately 100-150 farms have been established along the 
road as a direct result. The road has also benefited local fishermen who now 
have easier access to the lake and those who wish to cross the lake now can 
also do so. Many vehicles use the road daily indicating it has improved 
transportation for community members and increased business for taxis and 
public vehicles. 
 
Since many communities that live around Lake Volta use the lake for 
drinking, bathing and household use, large-scale fish farming can have a 
detrimental effect on their water supply due to feed waste and effluent from 
the fish contaminating the water. To compensate Tropo has dug a number of 
                                                 
 
73
 June 2007 exchange rate of US$1 to GH¢1.51. Available at: http://www.exchange-
rates.org/Rate/USD/GHS/6-14-2011 (accessed 24 May 2013). 
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boreholes in local communities. One was dug in Mpakandan in 2010 costing 
GH¢13,000 (approximately US$9,00074). At the time of interview however, 
the community were still awaiting the pump to enable the borehole to be 
used. Tropo also dug a borehole in the health clinic in another local 
community, Anyansu, in 2011 costing GH¢9,000 (approximately 
US$6,00075). Similarly WAF was in the process of digging a bore hole in 
Asikuma at the time of interview.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Institutional linkages 
While no institutional linkages from small-scale pond aquaculture and SME 
cage aquaculture were observed, large-scale cage aquaculture seems to 
have had some effect on the institutions governing the buying and selling of 
fish between fish farms, fish mammies, and fish traders. Ghana’s marine and 
inland fisheries have a well developed production, processing and marketing 
system, described in detail by Ames and Bennett (1995). Fish mammies play 
an important role, in both processing and marketing, and in fishing itself as 
they own many of the fishing boats and/or prefinance fishing operations to 
ensure continuity of fish supply (Ames and Bennett, 1995). In artisanal fishing 
communities such as those around Lake Volta, fishermen often sell their 
catch to their wives or other local women. Fishermen can also sell their whole 
catch to a single fish mammy who is entitled to shares of the catch if she is 
an owner or part owner of the boat, or is entitled to buy at low prices if she 
has loaned money to the fisherman for nets, outboard motors and fuel. Fish 
mammies then sell the fish, either processed or fresh, to fish traders often at 
a considerable mark up (Ames and Bennett, 1995). Many wholesalers, who 
buy from fish farms, are fish mammies who sell fish on to traders at marked 
up prices. However Tropo has established a number of outlets in Accra, 
Tema and Kasoa where, unlike in capture fisheries, anyone can go and buy 
fish, not just fish mammies, and as they are located in urban centres and not 
in remote areas on Lake Volta, they are easily accessible to individual fish 
                                                 
 
74
 June 2010 exchange rate of US$1 to GH¢1.44. Available at: http://www.exchange-
rates.org/Rate/USD/GHS/6-14-2010 (accessed 24 May 2013). 
75
 June 2011 exchange rate. 
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traders. Tropo’s outlets have allowed traders to bypass fish mammies and 
buy fish directly from Tropo without a mark-up. Before Tropo had opened its 
own outlets and was selling at the farm gate, the harvest was sold primarily 
to fish mammies who would buy in bulk. Some of these fish mammies from 
Kasoa (on the outskirts of Accra where much of the catch from Weija Lagoon 
is sold) would sell their fish to traders in Kasoa, at Galilee market, at a 30 to 
40 percent mark up and pretend it was wild fish to ensure the status quo was 
maintained and traders did not buy directly from Tropo. Much of the power of 
these particular fish mammies came from the fact that they controlled all of 
the wild tilapia caught in Weija Lagoon that supplies much of Accra with 
tilapia. The network and institutional arrangements between buyers and 
sellers were already well established. When Tropo opened an outlet opposite 
Galilee market selling the exact same fish that traders had been buying from 
fish mammies at a much higher price, traders realised they could buy the fish 
directly from Tropo without relying on the fish mammies. The outlet at Kasoa 
has thus destroyed some of the business of these fish mammies while 
enabling traders to buy fish at a lower price. It has also allowed a large 
number of new entrants, mainly women, into the farmed fish trading 
business. Some of the fish mammies that used to buy from Tropo now buy 
from WAF (as WAF sells in bulk (1-2 tonnes at a time) to a small number of 
wholesalers/fish mammies) and also at other wild caught fish landing sites on 
Lake Volta such as Jemeni.  
 
WAF has also generated institutional linkages through its US$10,000 
regeneration of the Asikuma local market which had stopped functioning. 
WAF rebuilt the marketplace and placed their outlet for fresh tilapia there, 
encouraging others from the surrounding communities to also sell their 
products there. WAF sells its fish harvest at the market twice a week and a 
small market has developed there on those days. The FGD with Asikuma 
community indicated that employment generation from the establishment of 
the market has increased local living standards. Aside from the 17 local 
women that go twice a week to clean and gut the fish, WAF pays the chief to 
employ 4 people to clean the market, several local people sell ice, a lady who 
started off selling polystyrene boxes to pack the fish there has now been able 
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to open a small bar, several people sell vegetables, shoes, household items, 
water, food, nets and sacks to pack the fish etc. Customers from Accra 
coming to buy fish from WAF create demand for these products. WAF has 
also constructed a 30 meter deep well at the marketplace to provide clean 
water for the Asikuma community.  
 
Another important institutional linkage arising from cage aquaculture is the 
privatisation of previously open access fishing grounds. The FGD in the 
community nearby Tropo indicated many fishermen had stopped fishing or 
migrated due to the reduction in access to fishing grounds as a result of 
Tropo’s cages. Fishermen reported having to travel much further to catch 
fish, increasing not only their effort but the level of risk they face when 
fishing. However Tropo argue that this cannot be the case as the farm is 
taking up a relatively small part of the fishing grounds. Nevertheless the FGD 
estimated 60 out of 100 fishermen had migrated and of the remaining 40, 
only 30 are still actively fishing, due to the reduction in fishing grounds and 
decrease in fish catch (which as mentioned earlier is part of a wider trend in 
Lake Volta so cannot be due entirely to Tropo). Similarly, Asikuma 
community indicated that fishermen are restricted from fishing around WAF’s 
cages and the reduced fishing grounds, caused not only by WAF but other 
fish farms as well, means they must travel much further (estimated to be 15 
to 20 miles away) to fish. They have had to find alternative livelihood 
activities such as subsistence farming and burning charcoal whereas before 
they relied solely on fishing for their livelihoods. This has resulted in a 
decrease in their quality of life. Fishermen from both communities suggested 
that their reduced catch was also due to the fish being attracted to the cages 
so they are unable to catch them. However as with SME farmers, Tropo 
argues that the area around the cages acts as a conservation area, 
protecting fish spawning grounds and thus helping to repopulate the lake.  
The reduction in fishing grounds has led to a strained relationship between 
Tropo and the local community, showing how large fish farms have the 
potential to increase social conflict with local communities. 
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Cost of living linkages 
While local communities around small-scale pond and cage farms benefit 
from increased fish supply and reduced prices during harvests, this is not the 
case for communities located around large-scale farms. All of Tropo’s fish is 
transported directly from the farm to its urban outlets and is not sold locally. 
Even though WAF sells its fish in the local marketplace, the fish is sold in 
25kg crates and bought by wholesalers and fish mammies (who have a 
relationship with and are prioritised by WAF). These then sell the fish on to 
their own groups of traders who do not sell the fish in the local community. 
The FGD in Asikuma indicated that the community does not benefit at all 
from increased supplies of fish. On a national level there does not seem to be 
much potential at present to decrease the price of fish through increased 
production of tilapia from cage aquaculture. In 2011 aquaculture production 
was estimated to be just over 19,000 tonnes (FAO, 2004-13). Kaunda et al. 
(2010) estimate tilapia demand to be between 60,000 and 120,000 tonnes 
per year and they argue the market can absorb a substantial increase in 
tilapia supplies without leading to major price reductions. They also note that 
tilapia is priced alongside the better demersal species sold in Accra, 
differentiated from small pelagics that retail for less than half the price per kg 
for tilapia. This shows that tilapia is a high value product whose price is 
related to other high value fish products so increased supply will not 
necessarily decrease its price or benefit poor consumers who are unlikely to 
demand high value fish such as tilapia.  
 
Environmental linkages 
Similar to the communities surrounding SME cage farms, the FGDs in the 
Tropo community also indicated a decrease in water quality around the farm: 
fishermen reported that they can no longer bathe in the water as it makes 
their skin itchy. The lake water is no longer drinkable and water provision in 
the communities remains inadequate while they wait for the borehole Tropo 
installed in 2010 to start working. A new large-scale fish farm called Triton is 
currently being established on Lake Volta and is planning to produce 10,000 
tonnes of fish every year and is sited close to a water intake point, meaning 
their operations will pollute surrounding communities’ water supply.  Many of 
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the communities around the lake do not have piped water and rely on the 
lake as their main source of potable water and the growth of fish farming is 
likely to negatively impact them.  
 
According to an FGD in the community close to Triton, it has also been 
destroying farms as it puts up electricity poles. At least 5 community 
members had lodged complaints with the Assembly man, who was planning 
to issue them with a verbal warning. The Queen Mother and Assembly man 
reported that Triton had not informed or asked permission from the 
community or the chief to put up electricity poles.   
 
6.2.4 Economic multiplier effects of increased production from 
different aquaculture systems  
This section estimates the economic multiplier effects of small-scale pond 
aquaculture (fish farming type A) in Ashanti Region and SME commercial 
cage aquaculture on Lake Volta in Eastern Region. These multipliers 
estimate the amount of added income generated locally and nationally by an 
extra dollar of income from each aquaculture system in order to compare the 
potential economic growth created by the development of each type of 
aquaculture system.  
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Multipliers from small-scale pond aquaculture 
Parameter estimates for the semi input-output model outlined in Chapter 4 
Section 4.3.2 used to estimate multipliers from small-scale pond aquaculture 
are shown in Table 34 below. 
 
Table 34: Parameter estimates for small-scale pond aquaculture  
(fish farming type A) 
  ann ant vn vt βn S 
Regional multiplier 0.27 0.27 0.57 0.31 0.44 0.185  
National multiplier 0.27 0.63 0.57 0.31 0.62 0.185 
 
In Table 34,     is a weighted average of the shares of nontradable 
intermediate inputs into the farm and nonfarm nontradable sectors (0.12 and 
0.34 respectively) estimated by Al-Hassan and Jatoe (2007). The average is 
weighted according to the ratio of agricultural to non agricultural output 
(which are proxies for the farm and nonfarm sectors) in Ghana: this is 
approximately 3:7 (GSS, 2011). Al-Hassan and Jatoe estimated these 
parameters from a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) developed for Ghana in 
2000 and budget data on individual crops.     and    are estimated from the 
small-scale pond aquaculture (fish farming type A) budget, estimated using 
data from PBs and key informant interviews, shown in Appendix 9.    is a 
weighted average of the shares of value added in farm nontradables and 
nonfarm nontradables (0.9 and 0.43 respectively) estimated by Al-Hassan 
and Jatoe (2007) from GLSS4 data and some commodity budgets. The 
average is again weighted according to the ratio of agricultural to non 
agricultural output in Ghana (approximately 3:7).    is the MBS of 
nontradable goods (regionally and nationally) of those whose income would 
increase with the development of small-scale pond aquaculture which would 
include both fish farmers/owners and hired labourers. However     in Table 
34 above is estimated only for fish farmer households: if the MBS of farm 
labourers was included it is likely the multiplier estimate would increase as 
labourers, being poorer than fish farmers, are likely to have higher MBS for 
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nontradable goods76.   is estimated at 0.185 from Ghana National Accounts 
data (GSS 2011), where gross saving as a share of GDP is estimated at 18.5 
percent. However this is likely to be an overestimation as the GLSS5 data 
shows that household and per capita expenditure is higher than income 
implying there is dis-saving. Thus to estimate likely ranges the multipliers in 
Table 35 calculated with the parameters in Table 34 are also estimated with 
a savings rate of zero. 
 
Table 35: Estimates of growth multipliers from small-scale pond 
aquaculture (fish farming type A) 
Type of multiplier Total multiplier 
(M) 
(where s = 0.185) 
Production 
multiplier 
(Mp) 
% of multiplier  
attributable to 
consumption linkages  
(1) 
Total multiplier  
(M) 
(where s = 0) 
Regional  2.3 1.7 49.2 2.6 
National  4.3 2.6 51.4 5.0 
Notes:  (1) Calculated by (M-Mp)/(M-1) x 100 (Haggblade et al., 1991). 
 
Table 35 shows that the regional multiplier within Ashanti Region generated 
by growth of small-scale pond aquaculture is estimated to be between 2.3 
and 2.6. This can be interpreted to mean that an extra dollar of income from 
small-scale pond aquaculture in Ashanti Region will generate between 
US$1.3 and US$1.6 of further income within the region.  Nearly 50 percent of 
this multiplier effect is from consumption linkages. Table 35 also shows that 
the multiplier effect of small-scale pond aquaculture within Ghana is 
estimated to be between 4.3 and 5.0 meaning an extra dollar of income from 
small-scale pond aquaculture in Ashanti Region will generate a further 
US$3.3 to US$4.0 of income nationally with just over 50 percent of this 
multiplier effect arising from consumption linkages.  
 
  
                                                 
 
76
 For example if labourers have a MBS of 0.8, the weighted MBS of   would be 0.76 nationally, 
increasing the multiplier shown in Table 35 from to 4.3 to 5.0, an increase of just over 17 percent. 
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Multipliers from commercial SME cage aquaculture (Eastern Region) 
Drawing on parameter estimates discussed above and SME cage farm 
budgets shown in Appendix 9, parameter estimates for commercial SME 
cage aquaculture are shown in Table 36 below. 
  
Table 36: Parameter estimates for commercial SME cage aquaculture 
 ann ant  (2)  vn vt  (2) βn (1) S 
Regional multiplier 0.27 0.05 0.57 0.29 0.37 0.185 
National multiplier 0.27 0.16 0.57 0.29 0.49 0.185 
Notes: 
(1)    is an estimate of the MBS for SME cage farmer households and would not increase if the 
MBS for labourers was included as, unlike with pond aquaculture, almost all of the value 
added in SME cage aquaculture is profit for the fish farmers. 
(2)     and    are estimated from an average SME cage aquaculture budget estimated using 
cage farm survey data and information from key informants, shown in Appendix 9. 
 
The parameters in Table 36 are used to estimate growth multipliers arising 
from commercial SME cage aquaculture and the results are shown in Table 
37 below. 
  
Table 37: Estimates of growth multipliers from commercial SME cage 
aquaculture 
Type of multiplier Total multiplier 
(M) 
(where s = 0.185) 
Production 
multiplier  
(Mp) 
% of multiplier  
attributable to 
consumption linkages 
(1)  
Total multiplier 
(M)  
(where s = 0) 
Regional  1.5 1.1 71.8 1.6 
National  2.1 1.4 60.7 2.3 
Notes:  (1) Calculated by (M-Mp)/(M-1) x 100 (Haggblade et al., 1991). 
 
Table 37 shows that the regional multiplier within Eastern Region generated 
by growth in SME cage aquaculture in Lake Volta is estimated to be between 
1.5 and 1.6, while the national multiplier is estimated to be between 2.1 and 
2.3. These estimates can be interpreted as for the small-scale pond 
aquaculture multiplier estimates above. 
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These results show that regional economic growth multipliers generated by 
small-scale pond aquaculture in Ashanti Region are larger than from SME 
cage aquaculture in Eastern Region, while national multipliers from small-
scale pond aquaculture are over twice as large as those from SME cage 
aquaculture.  
 
The multiplier effect of large-scale cage aquaculture has not been estimated 
due to lack of budget and expenditure data. However as the large-scale 
farms in Ghana are primarily foreign owned and employ some expatriate 
labour, even if the nontradable input to total output ratio and value added to 
total output ratios are similar to the SME cage farmers, the MBS for 
nontradable goods is likely to be lower than for SME cage farms resulting in 
lower multiplier effects. At present though, the scale of operation of the large-
scale farms compared to small-scale pond and SME cage farms means this 
system is creating important multiplier effects (including from infrastructure 
and institutional linkages which are not generated by small-scale pond and 
SME cage aquaculture and are not included in the semi input-output model). 
 
Limitations of the model and parameter estimates 
The model used to estimate the multipliers above makes some assumptions 
which may affect the size of the multiplier estimates.  The model assumes an 
elastic supply of nontradables and thus no price increases when demand for 
nontradables increases due to increased income from a shock to the 
tradables sector. This is unrealistic however and it seems likely that in Africa 
there is less than perfectly elastic supply of nontradables and part of the 
increased local spending on nontradables will be accounted for by higher 
prices rather than increased output. This suggests these multiplier estimates 
are an upper bound and an overestimate of up to 30 percent compared to 
price endogenous models with upward sloping supply curves for 
nontradables (Haggblade et al., 1991; Delgado et al., 1998). Therefore the 
regional and national multiplier estimates from small-scale pond and SME 
cage aquaculture may be revised downwards by 30 percent to account for 
inelastic supply of nontradables as follows: 
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- regional and national multipliers from small-scale pond aquaculture 
(fish farming type A) estimated at between 2.3 and 2.6, and between 
4.3 and 5.0 respectively are reduced to between 1.6 and 1.8, and 
between 3.0 and 3.5 
- regional and national multipliers from SME cage aquaculture 
estimated at between 1.5 and 1.6, and between 2.1 and 2.3 
respectively are reduced to 1.1, and between 1.5 and 1.6. 
 
The model assumes that regional economic growth is driven primarily by 
increased production of tradables ignoring the effect of a growth in 
nontradables and also the dynamic effects of saving and investment. 
Delgado et al., (1998) do not see this as an unrealistic assumption and argue 
that if a technological breakthrough occurs for nontradables either the 
nontradable will become so cheap it will become tradable, or resources will 
flow out of the nontradable to the tradable sector. In both cases the model is 
able to capture the effects through an exogenous increase in tradables and 
its multiplier effects, so this linkage model is still appropriate when the source 
of the exogenous growth in tradables is explained. Similarly Haggblade et al. 
(2005) point out that growth based on nontradables would soon peter out in 
the absence of increased demand. However the argument that growth must 
be driven by tradables is questionable and does not apply at the global scale. 
Increased production of nontradable goods which are consumed widely and 
have high average budget shares in household expenditure also has the 
potential to generate economic growth (Dorward et al., 2003). Increased 
production of a particular nontradable good would lead to a price reduction 
increasing consumers’ real income or consumer surplus (the cost of living 
linkage described earlier and not accounted for in the semi input-output 
model estimates presented here). When this ‘extra’ income that would have 
been spent on the nontradable good before the price decrease is instead 
spent on other nontradable goods and services, consumption linkages 
generate economic multiplier effects as described above. Whether or not the 
price of the nontradable good will decrease so much it will either become 
tradable or will no longer be profitable to produce in these quantities and so 
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some resources are switched to producing other goods and services is 
unclear and dependent on the individual context.  
 
The model’s assumption that growth is driven by tradables is not a problem 
for the current analysis. As discussed earlier, fish prices are unlikely to fall 
nationally and in most areas as a result of aquaculture growth in Ghana. 
While there are certain pockets e.g. remote rural communities where markets 
are not integrated and where increased aquaculture production could 
potentially decrease fish prices, behaving like a nontradable good, 
aquaculture products are best treated here as tradable goods.  
 
The model also does not consider the effects of saving and investment as it 
uses a static equilibrium approach. Delgado et al. (1998) suggest that the 
relative absence of a large-scale landowning class in most African countries 
means investment linkages are unlikely to be strong and so this is not as 
limiting an assumption as it might be elsewhere. However it is possible that 
excluding investment linkages from the model results in an underestimation 
of the multiplier effect of SME cage farms.  The model also does not consider 
the effects of other potential linkages such as service and institutional 
linkages. However as these linkages are nonexistent for small-scale pond 
and SME cage aquaculture, this does not affect the multiplier estimates (see  
Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2. The model also makes a restricting assumption that 
production can be adequately modelled as Leontief fixed coefficients 
technology, which price endogenous models do not. 
 
There are also some limitations related to the estimation of parameters which 
may have an effect on the multiplier estimates. Firstly due to the lack of 
expenditure data for small-scale pond farmers and SME cage farmers, MBS 
were estimated using expenditure data for non-fish farmers from the GLSS5. 
As noted above, small-scale cocoa farmers in Ashanti Region were used as 
a proxy group for small-scale pond farmers and professionals from Greater 
Accra who also had agricultural income sources were used as a proxy for 
SME cage farmers. While it is difficult to know the effect of using these proxy 
groups to estimate MBS for the different types of fish farmers, the parameters 
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still reflect the higher MBS for nontradable goods for small-scale cocoa 
farmers compared to professionals from Accra which is what would be 
expected for small-scale pond farmers and SME cage farmers. It is the 
relative sizes of the MBS which are more important for this analysis as the 
primary objective is to compare the multipliers between small-scale and SME 
fish farming.  
 
Secondly, some of the model parameters were estimated from Al-Hassan 
and Jatoe’s (2007) study estimating farm multipliers in Ghana. Their 
parameter estimates for nontradable intermediate inputs into the farm and 
nonfarm nontradable sectors were  estimated from a 2000 Ghana SAM which 
did not disaggregate between tradable and nontradable sectors, which is a 
weakness in their multiplier estimates and thus in the estimates presented 
here. However as the primary purpose of this analysis is to compare the 
multiplier effects between aquaculture systems, these parameters were the 
same for the multiplier estimates of each system therefore the overall 
conclusions of the relative strength of these multiplier effects are not affected. 
 
Thirdly, the parameters for the ratios of value added and nontradable inputs 
to output from the two aquaculture systems are based on estimated budgets 
for financially viable fish farms. For small-scale pond aquaculture the 
multiplier is calculated for fish farming type A farmers (those who have been 
trained and/or use BMPs) identified in Chapter 5 as those for whom fish 
farming is associated with significantly higher incomes than non-fish farmers 
and fish farmers who have not been trained and do not use BMPs (fish 
farming type B). The parameters were estimated from an estimated budget 
based on the PBs of fish farming type A farmers in Chapter 5 and key 
informant interviews with FC extension staff. The budget (shown in Appendix 
9) estimates a profit margin of 6 percent. However, it is clear from the range 
of profit margins from the PBs estimated in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.9 and 
findings from other studies (such as Asmah, 2008) that many small-scale 
artisanal pond farmers in Ghana are not financially viable at present. Thus 
the multiplier estimate for small-scale pond aquaculture should be viewed as 
the potential multiplier effect of financially viable small-scale pond farmers 
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(who have been trained and/or are using BMPs) and not the actual multiplier 
effect of the whole small-scale artisanal aquaculture sector at present. 
Similarly the SME cage farm budget from which the parameters for the SME 
multipliers were estimated is an estimated budget based on incomplete 
survey data and key informant interviews. At the time of data collection many 
SME cage farms were going out of business and new ones were being 
established, reflecting the fact that not all SME farmers were able to make a 
profit (and also did not have the substantial working capital needed to sustain 
their farms over the 6 months production cycles). Therefore again these 
multiplier estimates reflect the potential multiplier effects of relatively well 
managed and financially viable small-scale pond and SME cage farms in 
Ghana rather than the actual multiplier effects of the sectors at present.  
 
Finally, it is important to bear in mind the limitations of these budget 
estimates. As noted above, the budget used to estimate some of the 
parameters for the small-scale pond aquaculture multipliers is based on 
findings from 4 PBs (2 case study farmers and 2 average group budgets in 
Chapter 5) and key informant interviews and thus while realistic cannot be 
considered representative of all fish farming type A farmers (see discussion 
in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2). Similarly, the cage farm budget used to estimate 
some of the parameters for the SME cage aquaculture multipliers (estimated 
from survey data and data from key informant interviews) again while 
realistic, cannot be considered representative of all financially viable SME 
cage farms. However, the differences between multiplier estimates for small-
scale pond aquaculture and SME cage aquaculture are sufficiently large to 
reduce the impact of the potential weaknesses of using these budget 
estimates. The precise multiplier estimates do not matter as much as the 
difference in multiplier estimates for these two aquaculture systems. 
 
6.2.5 Employment in small-scale pond aquaculture and commercial 
cage aquaculture 
Fish farming can potentially impact on poverty through increased demand for 
labour. The labour opportunities created by different aquaculture systems are 
estimated in this section, along with employment generated along the value 
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chains related to these systems. The level of employment generated by 
small-scale pond aquaculture (fish farming type A) is compared to the 
employment generated by crop farming and also by SME and large-scale 
commercial cage aquaculture. Employment is measured in full-time 
equivalent (FTE) jobs based on the number of days usually worked in the 
farming sector: one FTE job is estimated to represent one full time job for 
someone working 8 hours a day, 300 days a year. Wage rates between 
labourers on small-scale pond farms and SME cage farms are also estimated 
and compared to average wage rates in the agricultural sector to see if fish 
farming has the potential to increase rural wage rates. Some characteristics 
of labourers on SME and large-scale commercial farms are then briefly 
explored. 
 
Use of hired labour in small-scale pond aquaculture 
Pond aquaculture consists of a number of activities from pond construction 
and preparation to harvesting and marketing. As shown in Chapter 5, Section 
5.2.9, several activities such as pond construction, pond preparation, and 
harvesting are undertaken by a mix of household and hired labour. However 
other activities such as feed and fingerling procurement, fertilising, weeding, 
sampling, marketing, processing and record keeping are undertaken mainly 
by household labour. 46 percent of the fish farming type A households (n = 
46) and 73 percent of small-scale crop farming households (n = 69) surveyed 
hired labour for their fish farming and crop farming operations respectively: 
X2 (1, N = 115) = 8.399, p=.004. Of the farms that hired labour, on average, 
seasonal labour represents 53 percent (SE = 11.01) of FTE jobs per fish 
farm, compared to 84 percent (SE = 4.94) of FTE jobs per crop farm: t 
(28.39) = -2.573, p=.016.  
 
Comparison of employment created by small-scale pond aquaculture 
and crop farming 
Table 38 shows sample estimates of the average number of FTE jobs 
generated by small-scale pond aquaculture (fish farming type A) and crop 
farming, per farm and per hectare, and the significance of the difference 
between the two.  
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Table 38: Average FTE jobs for hired and family labour generated by 
small-scale pond aquaculture (fish farming type A) and crop farming 
 Small-scale pond 
aquaculture (fish 
farming type A) 
Crop farming Significance of difference 
between means 
(2) 
Average FTE jobs/farm – 
hired labour 
0.2 
(0.07) 
(n=46) 
0.4 
(0.10) 
(n=69) 
 
t(109.31) = -1.72, p=.088 
Average FTE jobs/farm – 
hired and family labour 
0.5 
(0.10) 
(n=43) 
1.4 
(0.14) 
(n=65) 
 
t(103) = -5.26, p=.000 
Average FTE jobs/ha – hired 
labour 
2.6 
(1.21) 
(n=45) 
0.1 
(0.02) 
(n=68) 
 
t(44.02 ) = 2.05, p=.047 
Average FTE jobs/ha – hired 
and family labour 
15.6 
(6.14) 
(n=39) 
0.3 
(0.03) 
(n=64) 
 
t(38) = 2.50, p=.017 
Average FTE jobs/ha 
assuming only 50% of farm 
land is used for crop 
farming – hired labour 
2.6 
(1.21) 
(n=45) 
0.2 
(0.04) 
(n=68) 
 
t(44.08) = 1.98, p=.054 
Average FTE jobs/ha 
assuming only 50% of farm 
land is used for crop 
farming – hired and family 
labour 
15.6 
(6.14) 
(n=39) 
0.6 
(0.07) 
(n=64) 
 
t(38.01) = 2.45, p=.019 
Notes: SE in parentheses 
(1) Labour for pond construction is not included in this comparison  
(2) Independent samples t-test 
 
Table 38 shows that while pond aquaculture generates approximately half 
the FTE jobs for hired labour per farm than crop farming, when measured per 
hectare, small-scale pond aquaculture generates over 32 times the amount 
of FTE jobs. Employment generation for fish farming per hectare may be 
overestimated however as fish ponds are generally very small compared with 
total farm size. Also there are economies of scale in employment that are not 
taken into consideration e.g. one caretaker looking after one pond could just 
as easily take care of 10 ponds. As the survey did not collect information on 
the use of farm land, FTE jobs per ha in crop farms may be underestimated  
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as it is unlikely that all farm land owned by households is in use for crop 
farming at any one time. However even if it is assumed that only 50 percent 
of farm land is used for crop farming and the estimate of labour use per 
hectare on farmed land is doubled, FTE jobs per ha generated by fish 
farming is still significantly higher than crop farming. The average FTE jobs 
per ha estimated by the survey for crop farming, assuming only 50 percent of 
land is used, of 0.6 is the same as the estimate by Victor et al. (2010:15) of 
the average FTE jobs per ha generated by high input certified cocoa 
production in Ghana’s Western Region77 and similar to the estimate by 
Vigneri (2008:22) of 216.25 person days per hectare for cocoa farming in 
Ashanti Region in 2004, equivalent to 0.7 FTE jobs per ha. 
 
Employment generated from small-scale pond aquaculture and SME 
cage aquaculture 
Table 39 compares sample estimates of FTE jobs generated from small-
scale pond aquaculture (fish farming type A) with those from small-scale 
cage aquaculture, and also compares FTE jobs generated by small-scale 
cage aquaculture with those from medium-scale cage aquaculture. While 
sample mean FTE jobs per tonne generated by small-scale pond aquaculture 
are half the amount generated by small-scale cage aquaculture when not 
including employment from pond construction, and nearly one and half times 
higher than small-scale cage aquaculture when employment from pond 
construction is included, Table 39 shows that these differences are not 
statistically significant (at the 10% level). This may be due partly to the small 
sample size of small-scale cage farms. When all SME cage farms are 
compared to pond aquaculture the difference in FTE jobs per tonne is also 
not significant (at the 10% level). It is possible that this difference would be 
significant if the sample size of cage farms was larger. However the present 
data shows little difference in FTE jobs per tonne between small-scale pond 
aquaculture and SME commercial cage aquaculture.  
 
                                                 
 
77
 Comparison with Victor et al.’s (2010) estimate based on author’s calculation averaged over 20 
years assuming 1 FTE job represents one labourer working 8 hours per day, 300 days a year.  
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Table 39: Comparison of FTE jobs generated by small-scale pond 
aquaculture and SME cage aquaculture 
 Small-scale 
pond 
aquaculture  
(fish 
farming 
type A)  
Small-scale 
cage 
aquaculture 
Significance of 
difference 
between means 
(1) 
Medium-
scale cage 
aquaculture 
Significance 
of 
difference 
between 
means 
 (2) 
Average FTE 
jobs/t – hired 
labour not 
including pond 
construction (3) 
0.6 
(0.26) 
(n=22) 
1.0 
(0.33) 
(n=8) 
 
t (28) = -0.95, 
p=.35 
 
0.6 
(0.23) 
(n=4) 
 
t(10) = 0.90,       
p =.39 
Average FTE 
jobs/t – hired 
labour  including 
pond construction  
(3) (4)  
1.5 
( 0.37) 
(n=21)  
1.0 
(0.33) 
(n=8) 
 
t(27) = 0.69,  
p=.49 
 
  
Average FTE 
jobs/farm – hired 
labour not 
including pond 
construction 
0.2 
(0.07) 
(n=46) 
4.3 
(0.61) 
(n=14) 
 
t(13.32) = -6.63, 
p=.000 
23.7 
(4.32) 
(n=5) 
 
t(4.16) = -
4.46,    p 
=.01 
Average FTE 
jobs/farm – hired 
labour including 
pond construction 
(3) 
0.3 
(0.06) 
(n=44) 
4.3 
(0.61) 
(n=14) 
 
t(13.22) = -6.51, 
p=.000 
  
Notes: SE in parentheses 
(1) Significance of difference between small-scale pond and cage aquaculture, independent 
samples t-test 
(2) Significance of difference between small and medium-scale cage aquaculture, 
independent samples t-test 
(3) Only those fish farming type A farmers that produced over 50kg in 2010 are included in 
the calculation for FTE jobs per tonne to avoid unrealistically high estimates, however all 
fish farming type A farms are included to estimate FTE jobs per farm 
(4) Labour for pond construction included in the estimate is total FTE pond construction jobs 
annualised over 20 years 
 
Average FTE jobs generated per farm however are significantly different 
between small-scale pond aquaculture and small-scale cage aquaculture, the 
latter generating between 14 and 18 times as many FTE jobs per farm than 
pond aquaculture depending on whether pond construction is taken into 
consideration. Similarly medium-scale cage farms on average create over 5 
times as many FTE jobs per farm, than small-scale cage farms, a significant 
difference.  Out of the 24 FTE jobs generated per medium-scale farm, 17 (SE 
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= 2.64) FTE jobs were suitable for poor or unskilled labourers to be trained 
on the job, such as feeders, security guards and general labourers, along 
with divers, most of whom are local fishermen.  
 
Of the two large-scale farms surveyed, detailed employment data could only 
be collected from one (WAF). In 2010 WAF generated 42 FTE jobs and 0.02 
FTE jobs per tonne which is a fraction of the FTE jobs per tonne generated 
from SME cage aquaculture shown above78. Only general employment data 
were able to be collected for Tropo, the other large-scale farm, which 
generated approximately 360 FTE jobs in 2011 and was projected to produce 
4,300 tonnes thus creating 0.08 FTE jobs per tonne, similar to WAF. 
 
Employment generated from SME pond aquaculture 
While the comparison in this thesis is between small-scale pond farms and 
SME and large-scale cage farms as these are the predominant systems 
within the aquaculture sector in Ghana, if employment created by small-scale 
pond farms and commercial SME pond farms is compared, the trend is still 
similar to that found above.  There is no significant difference in FTE jobs per 
tonne (not including pond construction labour) between small-scale artisanal 
pond farms (M = 0.6, SE = 0.26) and SME commercial pond farms (M = 0.7, 
SE = 0.46), t (22) = -0.21, p =.83. Similarly there is no significant difference in 
FTE jobs per ha (not including pond construction labour) between small-scale 
artisanal ponds farms (M = 2.6, SE = 1.21) and SME commercial pond farms 
(M = 3.3, SE = 1.01), t (46) = -0.16. p = .87. However data were only 
collected from 3 SME pond farms in Ashanti Region as this is not as dynamic 
or large a sector as SME cage aquaculture, making these results very 
approximate. The amount of labour required for pond construction for SME 
pond farms is not known however the number of ponds per farm ranged from 
3 to 20 with an average pond size of 1,634m2. Ponds of this size are usually 
built with bulldozers and do not create much employment compared to those 
                                                 
 
78
 WAF was going through a period of expansion when interviewed in 2011, increasing the number of 
cages and employees therefore these estimates are a rough approximation only. 
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of small-scale pond farmers built using mainly manual labour. To construct a 
pond of 1600m2 would require employment of a low loader driver for 4 days 
and a bulldozer driver for 5 days with minimal manual labour.  
 
Employment generated by small-scale pond and cage aquaculture per 
US$1,000 invested 
Based on the estimated small-scale pond aquaculture (fish farming type A) 
budget in Appendix 9 and the average wage rates of GH¢4/day for pond 
construction and GH¢10.8/day for seasonal labour (calculated below), small-
scale pond aquaculture generates 0.3 FTE jobs per US$1,000 invested 
(including pond construction) and 0.03 FTE jobs per US$1,000 not including 
pond construction). Based on the estimated small-scale cage farm budget 
consisting of 4 cages in Appendix 9, small-scale cage aquaculture generates 
approximately 0.1 FTE jobs per US$1,000 invested (not including labour for 
cage construction. However, this is quite small relative to the cost of the cage 
(15%)). Data on investment costs for medium and large-scale farms were not 
able to be collected. It is, however, highly likely that the FTE jobs per 
US$1,000 invested by medium and large-scale farms are lower than for 
small-scale cage farms.  While these estimates are only an approximation as 
they are based on estimated budgets, they provide an indication that if 
employment generated by pond construction is taken into consideration, 
small-scale pond aquaculture could potentially create more employment per 
dollar invested than SME or large-scale commercial cage aquaculture.  
 
Wage rates for aquaculture farm workers 
Table 40 shows the average daily wages for labourers on small-scale pond 
farms and crop farms. 
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Table 40: Average daily wages for labourers on small-scale fish and 
crop farms 
 Small-scale pond 
aquaculture (fish 
farming type A) 
Small-scale 
crop farming 
Significance of 
difference between 
means 
(2) 
Average daily wage for 
caretakers – GH¢/day (1) 
3.0 
(0.53) 
(n=6) 
5.8 
(2.11) 
(n=5) 
 
t(4.51) = -1.31, p=.25 
Average daily wage for 
regular labourers – 
GH¢/day (1) 
7.6 
(0.40) 
(n=27) 
5.6 
(0.19) 
(n=44) 
 
t(37.07) = 4.34, p=.000 
Average daily wage for 
seasonal labourers – 
GH¢/day (1) 
7.0 
(0.23) 
(n=108) 
8.8 
(0.50) 
(n=577) 
 
t(681.87) = -3.33, p=.001 
Average daily wage for all 
labourers – GH¢/day (1) 
6.9 
(0.21) 
(n=141) 
8.6 
(0.46) 
(n=626) 
 
t(763.06) = -3.24, p=.001 
 
Notes: SE in parentheses 
(1) Average length of working day varies between fish farm and crop farm labourers, shown 
in Table 41 below 
(2) Independent samples t-test 
 
While the difference between average daily wage rates for caretakers on fish 
and crop farms is not significant (at the 10% level), the daily wage rates of 
regular labourers are significantly higher on fish farms compared to crop 
farms. The daily wage rates of seasonal and overall labourers are 
significantly higher for those working on crop farms compared to fish farm 
labourers. However the average number of hours in a working day varies 
between the type of labourer and between fish and crop farms. For example, 
as shown in Table 41 below, regular labourers on fish farms work on average 
4 hours per day compared to regular labourers on crop farms who work 
nearly 2 hours longer per day which is a significant difference.  
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Table 41: Average hours worked per day by labourers on small-scale 
fish and crop farms 
 Small-scale pond 
aquaculture (fish 
farming type A) 
Small-scale crop 
farming 
Significance of 
difference between 
means (1) 
Average hours/day  
worked by caretakers  
5.8 
(1.79) 
(n=7) 
8.6 
(1.29) 
(n=5) 
 
t(10) = -1.17, p=.27 
Average hours/day  
worked by regular 
workers 
4.0 
(0.24) 
(n=29) 
5.9 
( 0.10) 
(n=45) 
 
t(37.51) = -7.05, 
p=.000 
Average hours/day  
worked by seasonal 
workers 
5.9 
(0.23) 
(n=122) 
5.9 
(0.05) 
(n=612) 
 
t(133.21) = -0.12, 
p=.91 
Notes:  SE in parentheses 
(1) Independent samples t-test 
 
Due to the varying lengths of average working days between fish farm and 
crop farm labourers, when daily wage rates are recalculated based on an 8 
hour day, as shown in Table 42, no significant differences (at the 10% level) 
are found in overall wage rates. However, regular labourers on fish farms 
earn over twice as much for an 8 hour day as those on crop farms which is a 
highly significant difference.  
 
Table 42: Average daily wages for small-scale fish farm and crop farm 
labourers based on an 8 hour day 
 Small-scale pond 
aquaculture (fish 
farming type A) 
Small-scale crop 
farming 
Significance of 
difference between 
means (1) 
Average daily wage for 
caretakers – GH¢/day  
12.78 
(6.50) 
(n=6) 
7.26 
(3.32) 
(n=5) 
 
t(9) = 0.71, p=.50 
Average daily wage for 
regular labourers – 
GH¢/day 
16.79 
(1.52) 
(n=27) 
7.61 
(0.20) 
(n=44) 
 
t(69) =7.56, p=.000 
Average daily wage for 
seasonal labourers – 
GH¢/day 
10.80 
(0.59) 
(n=108) 
12.80 
(0.81) 
(n=577) 
 
t(683) = -1.06, p=.29 
Average daily wage for 
all labourers – GH¢/day 
12.03 
(0.62) 
(n=141) 
12.39 
(0.75) 
(n=626) 
 
t(765) = -0.23, p=.82 
Notes:  SE in parentheses 
(1) Independent samples t-test 
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In reality, regular labourers on crop and fish farms do not work 8 hours a day. 
Crop farm labourers work on average 6 hours per day whereas fish farm 
labourers work 4 hours per day which would give fish farmer workers GH¢7.6 
per day and crop farmer workers GH¢5.6 per day from the above table. In 
2010 the minimum wage in Ghana was GH¢3.11/day which is lower than the 
average daily wage for all types of labourers on both types of farm. 
 
Wages on SME and large-scale cage farms 
The average daily wage rates for feeders on the 14 small-scale cage farms 
surveyed is GH¢3.8 (SE = 0.9). This mainly unskilled, temporary job, would 
be the equivalent of working as a wage labourer on a crop farm. According to 
the Labour Union representative of the nearby large-scale commercial 
banana farm in Tusker, Asuogyaman District, in 2010-2011 the wage rate for 
temporary workers was GH¢3.9 per day (GH¢105.3 per month) and for 
permanent workers GH¢4.5 per day (GH¢121.5 per month). Thus the mean 
wage rate of GH¢3.8 for small-scale cage farm labourers is almost the same 
as for agricultural wage labourers. 
 
On medium-scale cage farms, the average daily wage rate of workers doing 
jobs suitable for poor, unskilled labourers or fishermen (such as feeders, 
security guards, general labourers and divers) was 6.7 (SE = 0.18). At the 
large-scale farm WAF, the lowest paid workers were paid GH¢8.4 per day 
and on average, skilled and unskilled workers (not including managerial staff) 
were paid GH¢14.7 per day.  
 
Indirect employment created throughout the value chain 
The preceding sections estimate direct employment generated by small-scale 
pond aquaculture and SME and large-scale cage aquaculture and do not 
consider the employment multiplier effects of these different aquaculture 
systems. Additional employment is created throughout the value chain in 
feed mills, hatcheries, transportation services, ice manufacturing, cage 
construction and production and sale of materials such as drums, pipes, 
ropes and nets, production of water pumps, construction of buildings, in ‘chop 
bars’ and banku and tilapia joints etc. The indirect employment gains 
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described below are included in the multiplier effects estimated in Section 
6.2.4 as part of the backward and forward production linkages.   
 
Small-scale pond aquaculture has an undeveloped value chain at present. It 
has weak forward linkages so does not generate much employment for fish 
traders or processors. However it has stronger backward linkages which 
generate employment related to production and distribution of inputs such as 
rice and maize bran, groundnut peel, organic fertiliser, lime. This employment 
generation was unable to be directly observed or quantified however.  The 
SME and large-scale cage farm value chains are more developed with 
stronger forward linkages and thus likely to create larger indirect employment 
opportunities. For example from direct observation at least 13 people are 
employed in 2 main feed distribution companies, 80 people are employed in 
the 6 main hatcheries, at least 150 local women  clean and degut fish on 
harvest days on various cage farms, and over 80 women process fish oil on 
harvest days at the medium and large-scale farms. At least 20 wholesalers 
and over 600 traders, most of whom are women and trade fish as their 
primary livelihood activity, buy from the cage farms and the large-scale farm 
retail outlets of Tropo Farm, to sell to consumers, hotels, restaurants and 
tilapia joints etc. Thus nearly 1000 people are indirectly employed on a full or 
part time basis, in the SME and large-scale cage farm value chain not 
including the employment generated in the transport and retail sectors. 
Nearly 900 people are employed directly on a full or part time basis by SME 
and large-scale cage farms indicating that at least one indirect job is 
generated in the value chain for each direct job generated on-farm. 
 
Poverty self assessment and education of SME and large-scale cage 
farm employees 
This section presents data on poverty and education levels of those 
employed by SME and large-scale cage farms to understand possible 
poverty impacts of employment generated by cage farms.   In total 86 
employees on 3 small-scale farms, 5 medium-scale farms, 2 large-scale 
farms and the largest hatchery (Crystal Lake) were selected at random to be 
interviewed. 88 percent of those interviewed were full time permanent 
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employees and the remainder were seasonal or temporary workers. 
Respondents were asked about their own subjective perception of their 
poverty level. Table 43 shows that the majority of employees surveyed 
considered themselves to be poor or not so poor with very few stating they 
were either very poor or rich. Apart from small-scale cage farm employees 
however, less than 50 percent of those interviewed viewed themselves as 
poor or very poor. 
 
Table 43: Employees’ self assessment of poverty by farm type 
  
Small-scale 
cage farm 
% 
Medium-scale 
cage farm 
% 
Large-scale 
cage farm 
% 
Hatchery 
% 
Total  
% 
Very poor 0 0 19 0 7 
Poor 57 39 19 36 33 
Not so poor 29 42 38 36 38 
Well off 14 17 22 27 20 
Rich 0 3 3 0 2 
n 7 36 32 11 N = 86 
 
Table 44 shows the highest level of education of employees surveyed. Nearly 
all respondents had some level of education and almost 50 percent had 
reached middle school (MSLC) but not completed. Nearly 25 percent overall 
and close to 40 percent of large-scale farm employees had completed 
secondary school.  
 
Table 44: Highest level of education of surveyed employees by farm 
type 
 
  
Small-scale 
% 
Medium-scale 
% 
Large-scale  
% 
Hatchery  
% 
Total  
% 
None 0 6 0 0 2 
Primary incomplete 0 6 0 9 4 
Primary complete 14 3 3 18 6 
MSLC incomplete 43 61 41 36 49 
MSLC complete 43 3 9 0 8 
Secondary complete 0 14 38 36 24 
University/tertiary 0 8 9 0 7 
n 7 36 32 11 N = 86 
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These results could suggest that overall cage farms recruit a higher 
proportion of ‘less poor’ than ‘poor’ workers. The results could also indicate 
the impact of cage farm employment on poverty levels. The relatively higher 
levels of education, particularly of large-scale cage farm employees, may 
suggest the former. However, more detailed research is needed to 
understand the impact of cage farm employment on poverty levels.  
 
6.2.6 Summary of impacts and linkages between aquaculture and 
poverty 
The direct and indirect impacts and linkages from the different aquaculture 
systems presented in the preceding sections are summarised in Table 45 
below. Scores are assigned to each impact or linkage from each aquaculture 
system to indicate its current strength as follows: weak (1), medium (3) or 
strong (5). The table also scores the potential of linkages (at their current 
strength) to impact on the poor from - 5 to + 5. While some of the impacts on 
the poor have been studied in detail in this thesis (e.g. the direct impact of 
small-scale pond aquaculture on income and food security in Chapter 5) the 
poverty impacts of indirect linkages such as the various economic linkages 
and multiplier effects from different systems have not been quantified. Rather 
the likely impact on poverty is inferred from the strength of the linkage, 
supplemented with knowledge of the characteristics of the likely beneficiaries 
gathered from the quantitative and qualitative data collected here and the 
broader aquaculture and agriculture literature.  
 
Similarly, while the actual impact of multiplier effects from different 
aquaculture systems on poverty are not estimated in the present analysis, 
the relationship between agricultural growth and poverty is well documented 
in the literature (Irz at al., 2001; World Bank, 2007). For example Irz et al. 
(2001) analyse the relationship between agricultural productivity and poverty 
in a cross section of developing countries and find that a 1 percent increase 
in agricultural yields decreases the percentage of the population living under 
the US$1 a day poverty line by 0.91 percent (and by 0.96 percent in SSA).  
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Table 45: Summary of the strength of impacts and linkages from 
different aquaculture systems and the likely strength of impacts on the 
poor 
 Small-scale artisanal 
pond aquaculture  
(fish farming type A) 
SME commercial cage 
Farming 
Large-scale 
commercial 
cage aquaculture 
Direct impacts 
Impact  Strength of impact Strength of impact Strength of impact 
Increased income of poor adopters 1 0 0 
Increased food security of poor 
adopters 
2 0 0 
Indirect impacts 
Linkages Strength 
of 
linkage* 
Likely 
strength of 
impact on 
the poor** 
Strength of 
linkage* 
Likely 
strength of 
impact on 
the poor** 
Strength 
of 
linkage* 
Likely 
strength of 
impact on 
the poor** 
Backward linkages – purchase of 
inputs such as feed and fingerlings 
4 3 1 1 0.5 0.5 
Forward linkages – processing, trading 
and distribution of farmed fish 
1 (3) 1 (3) 2 1 (2) 3 2 (3) 
Consumption linkages – general 
economic activity 
4 4 3 3 2 2 
Investment linkages – local 
investment in labour intensive 
businesses 
1 1 2 2 0 0 
Service and infrastructure linkages – 
improved access to transportation 
and potable water 
0 0 0 0 2 2 
Institutional linkages - changes in 
access to markets and market 
exchange and/or rights and terms of 
access to land and water (e.g. 
privatisation of previously open 
access fishing grounds). 
0 0 0 0 +3-1=2 
(1) 
+3-1=2  
(1) 
Cost of living linkages – decreased 
price of fish for poor consumers 
leading to increased real incomes and 
consumption linkages 
1 (3) 1 (3) 1 for small-
scale (2) 
0 for 
medium-
scale 
1 for small-
scale (2) 
0 for 
medium-
scale 
0 0 
Environment – changes in the 
natural/physical environment that 
may affect the poor (especially 
fishermen and surrounding  
communities) 
0 0 -1 (-3) 
 
 
-1 (-3) 
 
-2  
(-3 or -4) 
 
 
-2  
(-3 or -4) 
Economic multiplier effect (the total 
impact of backward, forward and 
consumption linkages) 
4 
 
3 2 
 
1 1 0.5 
Direct employment opportunities – 
FTE/t/US$1,000 
3 3 1 1 0.5 0.5 
Notes:  * Current strength of linkage, potential strength of linkage with scaling up in brackets () 
** Potential impact on poor at current strength of linkage, potential impact on poor with 
scaling up in brackets () 
Scoring:  
Positive: weak (1), medium (3), strong (5) 
Negative: weak (-1), medium (-3), strong (-5) 
None (0) 
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The World Development Report 2008 also highlights that cross-country 
estimates show increased GDP from growth in agriculture is at least twice as 
effective in reducing poverty as increased GDP from growth outside the 
sector (World Bank, 2007). Thus multiplier effects from aquaculture, as part 
of the agriculture sector, would be expected to have an impact on poverty.  
 
While the scoring is subjective and relative, the primary purpose of the table 
is to give an overview of the strength of the various impacts and linkages 
arising from each aquaculture system, to discern general patterns which may 
be lost in the detail of the preceding text and enable overall comparison 
between systems and their potentials for poverty alleviation.  
 
Chapter 5 showed the direct impacts of increased income and food security 
are weak for poor small-scale pond farmers (though not for non-poor small-
scale pond farmers). Table 45 shows these direct poverty impacts are not 
present at all for SME and large-scale cage farms as poor farmers are unable 
to adopt cage aquaculture. The economic multiplier effects and associated 
linkages (backward, forward, consumption and investment) have been 
discussed in detail in Section 6.2 above and the scores reflect the relatively 
strong multiplier effects for small-scale pond aquaculture (fish farming type 
A), medium effects for SME cage aquaculture and likely weaker effects for 
large-scale cage aquaculture. However as not all the benefits of economic 
growth are likely to accrue to the poor, the scores are not as strong for likely 
poverty impact as for the multiplier effects themselves. The effectiveness of 
economic growth to reduce poverty depends in part on the overall equality of 
income distribution. If growth is generated by those in higher income groups 
(such as large-scale and SME cage farmers) more income growth is needed 
to reduce poverty than if growth is generated by those in lower income 
groups (such as small-scale farmers) (Lustig et al., 2002). Therefore lower 
scores are given (in relation to the strength of the multiplier effects) for the 
potential poverty impacts of multipliers originating from SME and large-scale 
cage farms. Other linkages such as service, infrastructure and institutional 
linkages are only present for large-scale cage farms.  
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While the scores assigned to each linkage reflect the strength of the 
observed linkage at present, there is potential for many of these linkages to 
increase in strength and poverty impact if adoption of the particular 
aquaculture system were scaled up. Where relevant these are shown in 
brackets in Table 45. For example, at present forward linkages from small-
scale pond aquaculture are low hence the likely poverty impact is also low. 
However if aquaculture adoption increased, thereby increasing the supply of 
fish from small-scale rural farms, employment along the value chain and the 
potential impact on poverty through unskilled job creation such as trading and 
processing of fish by poor rural women, provision of other services such as 
public transport, would also increase. Negative environmental impacts of 
declining water quality have also been scored currently as very weak for 
SME and large-scale cage farms but these are likely to get stronger and have 
a negative impact on the surrounding poor communities as the number of 
cage farms increase.  
 
Some scores reflect the combined effect of more than one impact. For 
example, institutional changes from large-scale farms would have been given 
a medium score for their role in enabling low income women to bypass fish 
mammies and become traders, were it not for the negative effects of the 
privatisation of previously open access fishing grounds and the resulting 
social conflict. As SME and large-scale cage aquaculture expands, the 
potential for social conflict and negative impacts on local fishermen from 
further reduction in access to fishing grounds is likely to increase. Cost of 
living linkages have been scored as being weak for small-scale pond 
aquaculture. However, if adoption and hence fish supply were to increase, 
the potential for fish prices to decrease in more remote communities with 
poorly integrated fish markets and stimulate further demand for nontradable 
goods from increased real income is high as is the potential poverty impact.   
 
Overall the table suggests that at present, small-scale pond aquaculture (fish 
farming type A) has stronger direct and indirect impact pathways and higher 
potential to impact on poverty than SME or large cage scale farming given 
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equivalent increases in scale.  However the small-scale pond aquaculture 
sector may not be the most dynamic sector in terms of growth and may also 
require more support than the SME and large-scale sectors in terms of 
reducing constraints to adoption and provision of training and extension to 
enable farms to become financially viable and increase production, thus the 
table may not be telling the whole story.   
 
Further while most of the linkages in Table 45 are scored according to the 
same unit of analysis (i.e. strength of linkage per tonne of fish produced) 
which follows much of the analysis found in the aquaculture literature, the 
strength of backward linkages is related more to the level of investment in 
each type of aquaculture system than to the level of production (although 
levels of production and investment are also related). Further, the service 
and infrastructure linkages are not strongly related to either production or 
investment levels, rather they are lump sum investments made by large-scale 
farms. Thus making a straightforward comparison between systems 
becomes slightly more complex, especially if the costs of production differ 
between systems. The implications of this are explored further in the 
discussion section below.  
 
6.3 DISCUSSION  
 
This section discusses the results presented in Section 6.2 above in relation 
to other studies looking at different aspects of indirect impacts of aquaculture. 
The multiplier effects estimated here are compared to estimates of farm 
multipliers from a range of developing countries including Ghana. The 
estimates of employment generation from different types of aquaculture are 
compared to results of research from Asia and Africa relating to indirect 
impacts of aquaculture on poverty.  The overall results are then discussed in 
relation to the hypothesis being tested, that indirect poverty impact pathways 
from increased aquaculture SME activity have more potential to impact on 
poverty than indirect pathways from large-scale commercial operations and 
direct pathways from small-scale artisanal farms, as set out in Chapter 2.  
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6.3.1 Multiplier effects of aquaculture  
In Section 6.2.4 above, it was estimated that adding US$1.00 of new income 
from: (i) small-scale pond aquaculture (fish farming type A) in Ashanti Region 
and (ii) SME commercial cage aquaculture in Lake Volta, would potentially 
increase total income in the national economy by between US$3.0 and 
US$3.5, and between US$1.5 and US$1.6 respectively. While no multiplier 
estimates for the aquaculture sector in developing countries were found in 
the literature, there are many studies estimating agricultural and farm 
multipliers in Africa and Asia, discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2. 
Agriculture multiplier estimates from a range of studies using fixed price -
models, similar to that used in the current analysis, are presented in Table 46 
below.  
 
Table 46 shows estimates of agricultural multiplier effects, adjusted 
downwards for inelastic supply of nontradables, ranging from 1.05 in Sierra 
Leone and Nigeria to 2.02 in Burkina Faso. The adjusted national farm 
multiplier for Ghana has been estimated to be 1.72. However, if the extra 
income is generated by the lowest income tercile (with MBS for nontradables 
at 0.93) then the adjusted farm multiplier is estimated to be 2.93 (similar to 
the adjusted lower national multiplier for small-scale pond aquaculture of 3). 
If growth is generated by the highest income tercile (with MBS for 
nontradables at 0.6) the adjusted farm multiplier is estimated to be 1.51 (the 
same as the adjusted lower national multiplier for small-scale cage 
aquaculture of 1.5). 
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Table 46: Fixed-price agricultural growth multipliers in Africa and Asia 
adjusted for an inelastic supply of nontradables 
Study Location Multiplier  
    Dollars of total income growth 
     from US$1.00 of direct growth in 
    agricultural income after adjustment 
Bell, Hazell, and Slade (1982) Malaysia, Muda River region 1.65 
Hazell (1984) Malaysia, Muda River region 1.64 
Hazell and Haggblade (1990) India, average 1.48 
  India, Punjab and Haryana 1.74 
  India, Madhya Pradesh and 
Bihar 
1.31 
Hazell, Ramasamy, and Rajagopalan 
(1991) 
India, North Arcot, Tamil Nadu 1.64 
Haggblade, Hazell, and Brown (1987) Sierra Leone and Nigeria 1.05 
Haggblade, Hazell, and Brown (1987) 
assuming millet, sorghum, and maize 
are nontradables 
Nigeria, Gusau 1.97 
Delgado et al. (1998) Burkina Faso   
  National 2.02 
  Local (100km radius) 0.92 
  Poorest third* 2.23 
  Richest third 1.72 
Delgado et al. (1998) Niger, Dosso   
  National  1.37 
  Local (100km radius) 1.24 
  Poorest third 1.42 
  Richest third 1.37 
Delgado et al. (1998) Senegal, south-eastern Groundnut Basin  
  National  1.57 
  Local (100km radius) 1.23 
  Poorest third 1.54 
  Richest third 1.62 
 Delgado et al. (1998) Senegal, central Groundnut Basin  
  National  1.74 
  Local (100km radius) 1.42 
  Poorest third 2.14 
  Richest third 1.61 
Al-Hassan and Jatoe (2007) Ghana 1.72 
  Poorest third 2.93 
  Middle third 2.03 
  Richest third 1.51 
Notes:  Table adapted from Delgado et al. (1998:16) and extended. 
Haggblade, Hammer, and Hazell (1991) compared price endogenous models to fixed price 
models of the kind used in this analysis and the studies presented in the table above. They 
found that fixed price models overestimated multipliers by 30% in Africa and 10% in Asia. The 
multiplier estimates in the table have been adjusted downwards accordingly.  
* multiplier estimates originating from the poorest and richest income terciles are all national 
estimates 
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The adjusted lower national multiplier for small-scale pond aquaculture of 3 is 
nearly twice as high as the farm multiplier estimated for Ghana and 1.5 times 
higher than the highest agricultural multiplier estimated for West Africa by 
Delgado et al. (1998) of 2.02 in Burkina Faso. One reason for this is the 
presence of strong backward production linkages in the aquaculture sector 
(the production multiplier alone is estimated to be nearly 50% of the total 
multiplier) as discussed in Section 6.2.1 above, compared to agriculture 
where backward linkages in Africa are very weak (Delgado et al., 1998). The 
adjusted lower national multiplier estimated for SME cage aquaculture of 1.5 
is half that estimated for small-scale pond aquaculture and is at the lower end 
of the range of agriculture multiplier estimates by Delgado et al. (1998).  
 
Other studies from the agriculture literature also support the results 
presented here. For example Haggblade and Hazell (1989) compare 
multipliers generated by different sized farms using different technologies. 
The general trend seems to be slightly larger multipliers are generated from 
larger farms using more sophisticated technology in Asia while in Africa 
larger farms generate slightly smaller multipliers than smaller farms (and 
again multipliers are higher with more sophisticated technology which require 
more nontradable inputs as a ratio of output). The multipliers range from 1.25 
to 1.47 for rain fed rice in Africa. The difference in their parameters compared 
to those used for the multiplier analysis here includes a lower level of value 
added in aquaculture, a higher ratio of nontradable inputs to outputs and 
higher MBS for nontradable goods estimated for aquaculture farmers. 
 
It is possible that the multipliers estimated here for small-scale pond 
aquaculture do not reflect the reality of many small-scale artisanal farms. 
Brummett et al. (2008) suggest the majority of artisanal farms in SSA consist 
of a small number of ponds constructed and operated with family labour, use 
few purchased inputs, have low productivity levels, sell only a small 
proportion of production and generate minimal profits and little or no 
economic growth. This description of small-scale farms is rather different to 
the characteristics of the small-scale pond farms surveyed here. While these 
farmers have low productivity and profit levels they do however use 
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purchased inputs, hire labour for pond construction and some hire labour for 
production, and sell the majority of their fish (see Chapter 5).   If the multiplier 
estimates for small-scale pond aquaculture presented above are adjusted to 
take the characteristics described by Brummett et al. into account, it is likely 
the multiplier effect would decrease. For example keeping all else equal, if 
the backward linkage is reduced by approximately 50 percent (reducing the 
ratio of nontradable inputs to output from 0.6 to 0.3), the adjusted lower 
national multiplier estimate reduces by approximately 30 percent from 3 to 2. 
This is however still 1.3 times larger than the adjusted SME multiplier. If it is 
then assumed that no labour is hired for either pond construction or 
production, the ratio of value added to total output would either stay the same 
(as value added is shifted from labourers to owners) or increase (due to a 
decrease in output resulting from reduced inputs), further decreasing the 
multiplier effect.  If small-scale pond farmers are making a loss then the 
multiplier effect would be negative.  
 
6.3.2 Employment generation from aquaculture  
Along with economic multiplier effects, direct employment generation from 
aquaculture has the potential to impact on poverty. The results show that 
average employment generation per hectare is significantly higher for small-
scale pond aquaculture compared to small-scale crop farming. Few studies 
compare employment from aquaculture with agriculture, especially in SSA. 
Ahmed and Lorica (2002), focusing on Asia, suggest household labour use in 
aquaculture is relatively low compared with crop agriculture noting that most 
studies show aquaculture using very little labour, most of which is family 
labour. However they point to some studies suggesting aquaculture requires 
higher amounts of labour, for example in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, hired 
labour cost accounted for nearly 37 percent of labour costs. Costa and 
Sampaio’s 2004 study cited by Stevenson and Irz (2009), also found that 
shrimp farms in Brazil have higher labour demand (1.89 jobs/ha) than crop 
farming.  
 
Studies that estimate employment generation by aquaculture have mixed 
results. Stevenson (2006) shows that labour intensity of aquaculture 
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production varies substantially across farm types in the Philippines, and 
estimates mean demand for hired labour on low-input systems to be four 
times higher than for larger farms. Brummett et al. (2008) estimate a small-
scale commercial pond farm in Cameroon generates approximately 0.5 jobs 
per tonne excluding pond construction which is very similar to the 
employment created by small-scale artisanal pond aquaculture excluding 
pond construction estimated here (0.6 FTE jobs per tonne). Belton et al. 
(2012) also estimate ‘quasi capitalist’ pangasius farmers in Bangladesh 
(equivalent to small-scale commercial farmers by most definitions), to 
generate 2 jobs per hectare which is slightly lower than employment 
generated by the small-scale pond farmers surveyed here (2.6 FTE jobs per 
ha). These results suggest that the direct employment generated by small-
scale artisanal farmers in Ghana is similar to that generated by small-scale 
commercial farms in other countries, highlighting the ambiguous nature of 
definitions used to categorise farm types and by extension the difficulty of 
shifting support to SME farms when based on these ambiguous definitions. 
For example, Hishamunda and Ridler (2006) estimate intensive aquaculture 
uses three times more labour per hectare than extensive aquaculture in SSA. 
Extensive farming is unlikely to generate much if any employment and while 
the definition of small-scale artisanal pond aquaculture would include both 
extensive and semi-intensive farms, it is semi-intensive farms such as those 
surveyed here, that are likely to generate employment and economic growth.  
 
While the results show no significant difference in overall hourly wage rates 
of labourers on small-scale pond and crop farms, regular labourers on small-
scale pond farms earn over twice as much as those on crop farms for an 8 
hour day. Also while the mean wage rate for small-scale cage farm labourers 
is almost the same as for agricultural wage labourers, on medium and large-
scale cage farms wages are over one and a half times higher. This suggests 
that small-scale pond aquaculture and medium and large-scale cage 
aquaculture have the potential to increase rural wage rates. The theory that 
aquaculture increases labour productivity and has the potential to put upward 
pressure on rural wage rates is supported by results from other studies such 
as Dey et al. (2010) and Belton et al. (2012).  
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Overall the results suggest that small-scale artisanal pond farms may not 
create as much employment as SMEs if farmers do not hire labour to dig 
ponds rather using household or communal labour. However if hired labour is 
used for pond construction it is likely that small-scale semi intensive fish 
farming generates the same if not more direct employment than SME cage 
and pond farms per tonne and per dollar invested. Indirect employment along 
the value chain is currently higher from SME and large-scale cage farms, due 
to the undeveloped nature of the small-scale artisanal value chain and weak 
forward linkages. However this is partly due to the current low level of 
production from small-scale pond farms. If production were to increase it is 
likely that employment for fish traders and processors and other support 
services (provision of ice, transport etc.) for small-scale pond farms would 
develop. While some of these results are approximations due to small 
sample size for SME cage farms and the use of estimated budgets, when 
viewed alongside the multiplier estimates discussed above, they do not 
support the hypothesis that SME cage farms have more potential to impact 
on poverty than small-scale pond aquaculture or large-scale cage farms.  
 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
 
The direct and indirect impacts and linkages from the different aquaculture 
systems presented in the preceding sections and the likely impact of each on 
poverty were summarised in Table 45. Overall the results presented in this 
chapter suggest that small-scale pond aquaculture (fish farming type A) has 
more potential to impact on poverty in Ghana than SME and large-scale cage 
aquaculture, given equivalent increases in scale. This is due primarily to fish 
farming type A’s stronger indirect linkages, ranging from higher potential 
multiplier effects and labour intensity to increased potential from cost of living 
linkages and relatively lower chances of creating negative environmental 
impacts, compared to SME and large-scale farming. Thus the results 
presented in this chapter do not support the hypothesis that indirect poverty 
impact pathways from growth in SME cage aquaculture have more potential 
to impact on poverty than indirect pathways from large-scale commercial 
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operations and direct and indirect pathways from small-scale pond 
aquaculture (fish farming type A).  
 
This conclusion does not appear to support the arguments being proposed in 
much of the recent aquaculture development literature, for a shift of focus 
away from small-scale artisanal fish farming towards more commercially 
oriented farmers. The apparent conflict between this emerging paradigm in 
aquaculture development and the results and conclusions presented here 
could be due to a number of reasons including definitional issues (already 
touched upon earlier), along with institutional issues which may be hindering 
the development of aquaculture in SSA. The following chapter therefore 
analyses these aquaculture systems in terms of the different institutional 
challenges they face. 
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 CHAPTER 7: INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF 
AQUACULTURE SYSTEMS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis is concerned with assessing and identifying ways to increase the 
direct and indirect impacts of aquaculture on poverty and assessing the 
conditions required for pro-poor aquaculture development in Ghana. The 
results presented in Chapters 5 and 6 indicate that aquaculture has the 
potential to directly and indirectly impact on poverty and suggest that overall, 
small-scale artisanal pond aquaculture (fish farming type A) has more 
potential to impact on poverty than SME and large-scale cage aquaculture. 
However, at present, the small-scale artisanal pond sector is much less 
productive and dynamic than the more commercially oriented SME and large-
scale cage aquaculture sectors. Thus there are clearly important constraints 
to the development of the small-scale sector that must be overcome if this 
potential is to be realised. While small-scale artisanal pond aquaculture (fish 
farming type A) was found to have the highest potential for poverty impact, 
SME and large-scale cage aquaculture were also found to have important 
potential indirect poverty impacts summarised in Table 45 in Chapter 6, 
including economic multiplier effects for SME cage aquaculture and forward 
linkage effects for large-scale cage aquaculture. This chapter builds on these 
results by analysing the existing institutional environment and institutional 
arrangements supporting the three aquaculture systems and their associated 
value chains, but which may also be inadequate and thus constraining their 
development and hence their direct and indirect impacts on poverty. The 
research objective and hypothesis addressed in this chapter are as follows:  
 
Objective 
To identify the institutions needed for different aquaculture systems to have 
the highest potential to promote poverty reduction in different contexts. 
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Hypothesis 
Due to the institutionally demanding techno-economic characteristics of 
aquaculture products, complementary technical and institutional development 
is necessary for aquaculture to develop and impact poverty. 
 
This hypothesis is tested using the conceptual framework for institutional 
analysis developed by Dorward and Omamo (2009) shown in Figure 20 
below.  
 
Figure 20: Conceptual framework for institutional analysis 
 
 
Source: Dorward and Omamo (2009:79) 
 
The action domain defines the areas of activity and interest of the analysis 
while institutional analysis identifies and examines the important attributes of 
the institutions, activities, and actors in the action domain. The structure and 
behaviour of the action domain is established in and affected by a wider 
environment (physical and infrastructural, socioeconomic, and policy and 
governance environments). Interactions among institutions, actors, and 
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activities lead to direct and indirect outcomes which may reinforce or change 
the environment, institutions, activities, and actors leading to institutional 
change.  
 
Thus this chapter tests the hypothesis by first defining the two action 
domains under analysis (the pond and cage aquaculture sectors). It then 
reviews some important aspects of the institutional environment in which 
aquaculture development in Ghana is taking place. It goes on to assess the 
activities and their attributes in pond and cage culture systems focusing on 
the ‘techno-economic’ characteristics of aquaculture commodities. The 
implications of these characteristics for the expected institutional 
arrangements in the different aquaculture systems are then considered. The 
pond and cage aquaculture systems are then looked at individually, and the 
key actors and institutional arrangements observed in each system are 
analysed. In this analysis, actors’ characteristics and economic behaviour, 
and the role, form and functions of institutional arrangements in reducing 
transaction costs and risks are highlighted. Based on this analysis, the 
chapter identifies key constraints to development in the different sectors and 
identifies actors and institutions that may be missing. The institutions needed 
for different aquaculture systems to have the highest potential to promote 
poverty reduction are explored in the following chapter based on the findings 
of this analysis along with the results of Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
7.2 RESULTS 
 
The activities, actors and institutions analysed in this chapter are those 
identified within two action domains. The action domains encompass the 
economic exchange of farmed fish and include those actors involved in the 
exchange of fish produced in the three main aquaculture systems under 
analysis. They also include activities that directly interact with these 
exchanges and actors and the institutions that govern these interactions 
(Dorward and Omamo, 2009). In this chapter two distinct but related action 
domains are analysed: 
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i) the production and exchange of tilapia and catfish produced by small-
scale artisanal pond farmers in Ashanti Region and  
ii) the production and exchange of cage farmed tilapia produced by SME 
and  large-scale commercial cage farmers in Lake Volta, Eastern 
Region. 
 
While these are separate action domains with different activities, actors and 
institutions, there are some overlaps between the two in terms of analysis. 
For example the institutional environments within which each action domain 
is embedded are broadly similar as are many of the techno-economic 
characteristics of pond and cage farmed fish. However the actors involved in 
these two action domains along with the various institutional arrangements 
linking these actors within individual value chains are different and lead to 
different outcomes. Therefore, the results presented below start by reviewing 
the overall institutional environment and techno-economic characteristics of 
both pond and cage farmed fish without separating out the action domains, 
while the main part of the chapter subsequently analyses the actors and 
institutional arrangements in each action domain individually. 
 
7.2.1 Operational environment 
This section reviews aspects of the operational environment in which the two 
action domains are embedded. This environment influences and conditions 
how the actors, institutions and their attributes in the action domains combine 
to shape outcomes. The section looks at key aspects of the physical, 
socioeconomic and policy and governance environments. 
 
Physical environment 
In aquaculture, as in agriculture, biophysical conditions such as soil quality 
and water availability are important determinants of production potential. 
Overall most of Ghana has been found to have favourable biophysical factors 
suitable for aquaculture (Kapetsky, 1994; Blow and Leonard, 2007; Asmah, 
2008). However Asmah’s 2008 analysis of infrastructure, using road density 
as an indicator, showed the majority (55%) of land was only fairly suitable 
with the very suitable locations largely in regions along the coastal zone and 
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the Kumasi metropolitan area. Areas with good potential for farm gate sales 
were relatively wide spread and market potential for commercial aquaculture 
production was best around Accra and Kumasi where about a sixth of the 
country’s population reside (Asmah, 2008).  This is supported by 
observations from the field. Most small-scale artisanal pond farmers 
interviewed in Ashanti Region were difficult to reach using public transport 
and many farmers in Amansie West District, where there is no tarmac road 
beyond the district capital, were located off the feeder roads and needed a 4 
by 4 to reach, indicating the poor transport infrastructure and physical 
connection to markets faced by many rural farmers. Most SME cage farmers, 
however, are located in more accessible areas and can be reached by a 
combination of public transport in ‘trotros’ from Accra travelling on the main 
trunk road from Accra to Ho/Aflao, and hiring a shared or private taxi to 
access cage farms using feeder roads. Large-scale cage farms which are 
located in the main Lake, however, are in more remote areas and as noted in 
Chapter 6 have had to build access roads and put in electricity at their own 
expense. However both large-scale farms have had the means to build roads 
and to establish outlets and market areas in more accessible areas. 
Communication infrastructure is growing and there is good coverage of 
mobile phone services in the country. However, mobile phone penetration 
into more remote rural areas of Ghana is still inadequate and while most 
surveyed small-scale artisanal farmers had mobile phones, many farmers 
had very limited or no network coverage much of the time. This indicates that 
physical remoteness is compounded by lack of good quality communication 
infrastructure in some rural areas, constraining market development beyond 
individual communities.  
 
Socioeconomic environment 
Ghana’s overall socioeconomic characteristics were discussed in Chapter 3 
while Chapter 4 outlined some key characteristics of the survey areas. The 
socioeconomic environment of the two survey regions is influenced mainly by 
the fact that they are predominantly rural and dominated by agriculture. In 15 
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of the 18 districts in Ashanti Region, over half the population live in rural 
areas and some districts are entirely rural (such as Amansie West)79. 
Similarly in Eastern Region agriculture is the major occupation of most 
people in all districts, representing 55 percent of occupational activities80.  As 
noted in Chapter 5, Ghana’s strong economic performance since the mid-
1990s has had a significant impact on poverty, though regional imbalances 
remain, especially between the north and south (Coulombe and Wodon, 
2007). Economic growth has been driven partly by high prices for cocoa and 
gold. Ashanti Region is an important producer of these commodities 
indicating the dynamic socioeconomic environment in which aquaculture 
development is taking place.  
 
Policy and governance 
Ghana’s macroeconomic performance has been positive over recent years, 
supported by relative political stability and macroeconomic reforms which 
have encouraged the entry of foreign investments (KPMG, 2012). This can 
be seen in the level of foreign investment in medium and large-scale cage 
farms in Lake Volta.  The government has been actively building a policy and 
regulatory environment that is more conducive to enterprise development 
and Ghana was ranked twice as a top 10 reformer globally by the World 
Bank's Doing Business report (World Bank, 2013b). However there are still 
many constraints for example the length of time taken to find, buy and 
register land (often taking over 2 years for some of the SME and large-scale 
farmers interviewed) along with access to finance, a key challenge cited by 
Ghanaian businesses in general (World Bank, 2012) and the SME and large-
scale commercial cage farmers interviewed.   
 
The commercial aquaculture sector appears to be growing ahead of the 
development of government policy and regulations. While aquaculture is 
included in the 2010 Fisheries Regulations, there is currently no regulation 
                                                 
 
79
 http://www.modernghana.com/GhanaHome/regions/ashanti.asp?menu_id=6& (accessed 26 May 
2013). 
80
http://www.modernghana.com/GhanaHome/regions/eastern.asp?menu_id=6&sub_menu_id=132
&gender (accessed 26 May 2013). 
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specifically for cage culture. There are no formal regulations specifying for 
example minimum distances between cage farms and this can cause conflict. 
Similarly there are no specific guidelines for interactions between aquaculture 
and fishing rights (Kaunda et al., 2010), again increasing conflict between 
fish farmers and fishing communities as outlined in Chapter 6. Along with the 
lack of regulations relating to cage culture there is also a lack of enforcement 
of current legislation. For example all cage farmers, small and large, are 
required to undertake environmental impact assessments (EIAs) before 
starting operations. However due to the high cost of undertaking EIAs for 
small-scale farmers at present this is only being enforced for medium and 
large farms. Similarly, the regulation relating to certification of hatcheries has 
only recently started to be enforced. This will hopefully improve and regulate 
fingerling quality, reducing uncertainty for farmers.  There are also a number 
of illegal small-scale cage farms on Lake Volta which have been allowed to 
continue as the government is committed to development of the sector. The 
focus of government support of the aquaculture sector is shown in the 2012-
2016 GNADP discussed in Chapter 3 which concentrates almost entirely on 
the development of SME and large commercial aquaculture with little mention 
of the small-scale artisanal sector.  
 
7.2.2 Activities and their attributes 
The term ‘activities’ includes the production and exchange processes that 
actors engage in and the resources and products that are managed, used, 
produced and exchanged (Dorward and Omamo, 2009). The attributes of 
these activities (including the goods and services being exchanged) are 
important as they can affect the benefit, costs and risks to actors and their 
ability to invest and take part in them (Dorward and Omamo, 2009). As noted 
in Chapter 2, Jaffee and Morton (1995) view the ‘techno-economic’ 
characteristics of commodities as important determinants of the institutional 
arrangements between actors. Dorward (2001) separates these 
characteristics into commodity and transaction characteristics. This section 
explores the commodity and transaction characteristics of farmed fish within 
the two action domains under analysis. 
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Commodity characteristics of farmed fish 
The following commodity characteristics are considered in turn below: price 
and volume uncertainty, long production cycles, high perishability, the need 
for high levels of technical knowledge and for multiple specialised and 
coordinated inputs, quality characteristics, seasonality, economies of scale in 
marketing, geographical dispersion of farmers, and information asymmetry in 
credit provision. 
 
Price and volume uncertainty  
As noted in Chapter 5, small-scale pond farmers in Ashanti Region are 
dispersed over large areas and produce low volumes of fish over long 
production cycles leading to production volume uncertainty. This uncertainty 
is increased by the use of poor quality fingerlings, lack of working capital for 
continuous feeding, and limited fish sampling by farmers resulting in poor 
feeding practices and small fish. The use of mixed sex fingerlings also 
increases uncertainty as farmers are unable to estimate the population 
increase in the pond. Scattered supply leads to high costs for dissemination 
of technical and market information plus high transportation costs to take fish 
to market. Production volumes are also too low for buyers to make ‘lumpy’ 
investments in vehicles or to travel long distances to buy from only one or a 
few fish farms. Similarly, output is inadequate to justify investment in cold 
storage facilities by producers and traders, contributing to additional 
uncertainty and higher transaction risks and costs.  
 
While SME cage farms are less dispersed, production from small-scale cage 
farms can also be uncertain and is relatively low as usually only one or two 
cages are harvested at a time, and production cycles are approximately 6 
months. Farmers have variable access to both fingerlings and feed which are 
of inconsistent quality and are highly priced, further increasing volume 
uncertainty. Some small-scale cage farmers also lack working capital to buy 
feed throughout the production cycle, resulting in a higher proportion of 
smaller sized and lower value fish at harvest than expected. Medium and 
large-scale cage farmers have more certain production volumes and larger 
numbers of cages so can produce regularly throughout the year. However 
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they still face production uncertainties due to variable quality inputs, for 
example the large-scale farm WAF was producing much lower volumes than 
expected at the time of interview due to a batch of poor quality fingerlings. 
Low supply was also a result of their harvesting most of their cages, some 
prematurely, to meet the high demand over Christmas.  
 
Despite the volume uncertainty, there is less price uncertainty for farmed fish 
than for wild caught fish. The Ashanti Fish Farmer Association (AFFA) sets 
the price for tilapia and catfish in Ashanti. In 2010 the price was 4GH¢/kg 
regardless of size even though larger fish, especially tilapia, over 500g could 
fetch higher prices (generally however sizes range from 150g to 500g and 
are usually 200g to 250g). Most association members use this price as a 
guide but most pond farmers surveyed were not part of the AFFA and FC 
data along with survey data presented in Chapter 5 shows the farm gate 
price is closer to GH¢3.5/kg. Price also depends on the relative bargaining 
power of farmers and traders. Farmers can have a strong negotiating position 
if there is high demand for fresh fish within the community or if the farm is 
close to a town where there is high demand and higher prices for fish. 
Traders can also be in a strong bargaining position due to the large 
investment farmers have made in ponds (a specific asset) and the 
perishability of fish (explored more below) which can enable them to push 
down prices. 
 
At the time of interview the most common size of cage farmed tilapia 
(approximately 330g) was selling at GH¢5.3/kg (US$3.5/kg81). Key 
informants indicated that cheap imported Chinese tilapia had been selling at 
a much lower price (approximately US$1/kg) despite a government ban. 
However, the government strengthened enforcement of the ban in 2010 
which has resulted in increased demand for domestically produced cage 
farmed tilapia and less price uncertainty. The demand for cage farmed fish 
around Lake Volta decreases however when supply of wild caught fish is 
high. The season for wild caught white tilapia (May to June) reduces demand 
                                                 
 
81
 April 2011 exchange rate of US$1 to GH¢1.51. 
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and price for farmed tilapia and the supply of small pelagics which peaks 
around July to September during the ‘herring season’ can depress the whole 
market (Ames and Bennett, 1995). Unlike farmed fish prices, the price of wild 
caught fish fluctuates widely based on the size of fish landings and seasonal 
variability in supply along with distance from the source of supply (Ames and 
Bennett, 1995). 
 
Long production cycles 
Due to the 8 month or longer production cycle for semi-intensive pond farmed 
fish there is a yield lag and yield uncertainty, increasing risk for fish farmers. 
Long production cycles can create the need for medium term financing for 
producers and expose them to long-term market entry (and price) risks.  The 
long production cycle of pond farmers and the 6 month production cycle of 
small-scale cage farmers, lower the elasticity of supply faced by traders 
causing coordination problems for them in obtaining steady supplies, 
meaning traders have to diversify their sources. Long production cycles do 
not affect medium and large-scale cage farmers in the same way as they 
have enough cages to time their stocking and harvesting to enable regular 
production throughout the year.  
 
High perishability 
Fish is highly perishable especially in the tropics. Small fish spoil within 6 to 8 
hours and become rotten within 12 hours while large fish are of poor quality 
within a day. Packing on ice effectively preserves fish, retaining its 
appearance, flavour and texture. However, ice is expensive in many areas in 
Ghana (Ames and Bennett, 1995:376) and unavailable in some remote rural 
areas. Fish harvested from small-scale rural pond farms is usually sold un-
iced to customers, mainly community members buying small quantities for 
home consumption. Traders buying larger quantities from pond and SME 
cage farms either buy ice from the local community or from ice sellers at the 
farm (or in some cases use ice provided by the farm), and pack fish directly 
on ice in baskets lined with sacks or in insulated ice boxes, ready to transport 
to market to be sold fresh.  
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Fish can also be cured (smoked or dried) and in Ghana wild caught tilapia is 
often preserved by salt drying to make ‘kobi’ while catfish is usually hot 
smoked in kilns made from oil drums meaning  fish can be kept for several 
months depending on the extent they are dried. Both methods are efficient 
with small quantities. When compared to wild caught tilapia however cage 
farmed tilapia is of poorer quality when processed due to its high fat content 
(attributable to poor feed quality), has a shorter shelf life and is more prone to 
rancidity. Inability to process cage farmed fish makes its perishability more of 
a constraint and increases uncertainty for producers and traders. Pond 
farmed tilapia not fed commercially formulated feed are slightly better than 
cage farmed fish when processed and catfish from ponds around Kumasi 
which are smoked are of higher quality and value than wild caught catfish 
which is smoked at landing sites and suffers breakages when transported to 
Kumasi.  
 
The high perishability of farmed fish and lack of cold storage facilities at 
small-scale pond and cage farms reduce the marketing options of producers 
once fish has been harvested, limiting its marketable life as a fresh 
commodity and the time period for processing. This increases market risks 
for producers as once harvested, they cannot keep the fish in their 
possession for long while waiting for higher prices and this can lead to an 
unfavourable bargaining position in relation to buyers. Perishability also 
increases risks of post harvest losses and reduction in quality and value of 
fish during transport. Thus, there may be need for investment by traders and 
producers in specialised and ‘lumpy’ transport and storage facilities to 
develop a cold chain such as refrigerated trucks, fridges and freezers. 
However due to the economies of scale in transportation and storage, so far 
there has been little investment in these by traders (and investments have 
only been made by a few of the larger wholesalers who have long been 
trading in wild caught fish). Perishability also restricts the role of storage in 
balancing the supply and demand of fish over time.  
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High level of technical knowledge required  
Production of farmed fish requires technical knowledge and skill which is 
more specialised than in many other types of agricultural activities and is not 
indigenous to Ghanaian farmers. This technical knowledge can be costly to 
obtain, especially for poor farmers in rural areas with limited access to 
extension services and other information sources.  Along with the relatively 
high fixed costs of digging ponds for poor farmers or acquiring land and 
establishing cages for cage farmers, the need for specialised technical 
knowledge means there are potentially high barriers to entry in fish farming 
for less skilled and less well off farmers and this requires institutions to 
support the flow of low cost information.  
 
Need for multiple specialised and coordinated inputs 
Pond and cage aquaculture are high ‘linkage intensity’ technologies as 
defined by Dorward et al. (2000) and discussed in Chapter 2.  They require 
specialised inputs such as fingerlings and feed to be brought onto the farm. 
Fingerlings require careful transportation to ensure minimum mortality, and 
feed, which is bulky, is usually brought onto the farm regularly due to lack of 
on-farm storage facilities and/or limited working capital for bulk purchase. 
Input supply also requires coordination so that feeding can start at stocking. 
However coordination is difficult due to the variable supply of fingerlings and 
feed. Fish farmers need to place orders in advance with hatcheries and 
sometimes with feed distributers and there is still no guarantee orders will be 
met on time or in the right quantities. Hatcheries have limited capacity to 
produce large numbers of fingerlings of specified sizes82, and supply of 
imported feed is hindered by shipping delays and bureaucratic customs 
procedures83. Local feed distributers are also used to smooth out the supply 
of feed for large-scale farmers who import feed directly, which can also affect 
the availability of feed for SME farmers. In the case of some pond farmers, 
the time needed to source fingerlings from other farmers also makes input 
                                                 
 
82
 The quality of fingerlings is also extremely variable and hard to ascertain at purchase and can only 
be seen sometime into the production cycle. 
83
 Anecdotal evidence suggests that since Ranaan established a feed mill in Ghana, feed supply is 
more reliable. 
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coordination difficult. Producers, especially cage farmers, also rely on 
developed marketing chains (involving wholesalers, traders, transport service 
providers and ideally a cold chain) to take fish to consumers. The need for 
coordinated inputs to be brought to the farm along with the need for 
‘sophisticated’ marketing chains suggest both pond and cage aquaculture are 
‘high linkage intensity’ technologies. This implies that they require high levels 
of institutional development to reduce the associated transaction costs and 
risks (e.g. risks of opportunistic behaviour of transacting parties, costs of 
negotiating and enforcing contracts) and enable their successful 
development (Dorward et al., 2000). Without this institutional development, 
the transaction costs and risks may be too great, leading to market failure.  
 
Quality characteristics 
Grading of farmed fish is based on size (or number of pieces per kg) with 
larger fish having a higher price per kg than smaller fish. As most pond 
farmed tilapia fed on local feed are small, their price is not usually based on 
size. However cage farmed tilapia are categorised into five grades from 
smallest ‘economy’ size to largest ‘Size 3’ with each cage likely to contain 
different sized fish. Interviews with traders and farmers revealed some 
confusion around grades. Traders grade and sell fish by the number of 
pieces per kg and farmers grade and sell fish within a certain weight range84.  
This results in traders grading fish lower than farmers e.g. traders would 
classify a fish of 650g as Size 2 whereas farmers would classify it as Size 3 
which has a higher price). The variability in size and categorisation create 
uncertainty for both farmers and traders and can be a major source of conflict 
between them, especially for small-scale cage farmers who may lack 
bargaining power, increasing transaction risks and costs. While traders buy 
according to weight in kg, they still sell to consumers by piece (e.g. 3 pieces 
for GH¢10). This suggests that the losses traders incur in cases where they 
                                                 
 
84
 Most traders interviewed graded fish as follows:  Size 3 is one piece per kg; Size 2 is 1.5-2 pieces 
per kg; Size 1 is 2-3 pieces per kg; regular size is 3-4 pieces per kg; and economy size is 4-5 pieces per 
kg. However most fish farmers interviewed graded fish within a weight range which works out as 
being smaller than traders’ classifications, as follows: Size 3 is 650g and above (or 3 pieces per 2kg); 
Size 2 is 450-500g (or 2 pieces per kg); Size 1 is 300-450 (or 3 pieces per kg); regular size is 250-300g 
(or 4-5 pieces per kg); and economy size is less than 250g (or 5-6 pieces per kg). 
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have less bargaining power than farmers (for example when buying from 
large-scale cage farmers, discussed below), could be passed onto 
consumers through higher prices for smaller sized fish. Cage farmers who 
produce larger fish (specifically Size 1 and 2) earn higher returns.  
 
Seasonality  
There is some limited seasonality in aquaculture production. Many pond 
farmers stock their ponds at the start of the rainy season in March/April and 
harvest at Christmas when fish demand and prices are higher.  Wild caught 
tilapia traders (who source their produce from Barakesie dam near Kumasi 
and from Yeji in the north of Lake Volta) also buy from fish ponds at 
Christmas when wild tilapia is scarce and demand is high. While agricultural 
production is inherently risky due to the important influence of weather, pond 
aquaculture in Ashanti seems to be less so, partly because the majority of 
pond farmers do not rely solely on the rain and have other sources of water. 
However there are seasonal weather related risks such as flooding and 
drought and these have affected some pond farmers (see Chapter 5). SME 
and large-scale cage farm production is not affected much by seasons 
except that the seasonal variability in supply of wild caught fish affects fish 
prices and can reduce demand for farmed fish from July to September. Like 
pond farmers, many small-scale cage farmers stock their cages to harvest at 
Christmas. 
 
Economies of scale in marketing  
There are economies of scale in marketing both pond and cage farmed fish 
due mainly to high transport costs. Scattered pond farms producing low 
volumes make it unprofitable for traders or processors to make ‘lumpy’ 
investments in transport or marketing services and cold storage facilities. 
Due to the limited marketing infrastructure most traders and processors use 
public transport or hire private taxis or public vehicles (‘trotros’). Currently 
many cage farmed fish traders operate in groups, hiring vehicles together 
and some also undertake joint marketing. While most tilapia is not processed 
due to high demand for fresh fish, catfish smokers in Kumasi who buy fish 
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from some pond farmers in Ashanti Region can function efficiently at 
relatively low production levels. 
 
Geographical dispersion 
Small-scale pond farmers are geographically dispersed (and produce low 
volumes) raising transport and transaction costs for buyers. SME cage 
farmers are less dispersed and generally form small clusters in more easily 
accessible areas between Akuse and Akosombo dams. The large-scale 
farms are located further into the lake. However, Tropo sells from outlets in 
Accra and WAF sells from Asikuma market. These outlets are easily 
accessible and therefore reduce transport and transaction costs for buyers. A 
related challenge is the medium to long distance between small-scale pond 
farms and central urban markets of Kumasi exacerbated by poor transport 
infrastructure. The distance between SME and large-scale cage farms from 
the main market centres around Accra and Kpong is less of a challenge due 
to better transport infrastructure between Akosombo and Accra.  All the 
elements that comprise transaction costs and risks (ex ante and ex post 
transaction costs and risks along with the costs and risks of transferring 
ownership of goods) tend to increase with distance, for example costs related 
to acquiring information, communication, monitoring and enforcing contracts. 
Thus the further away producers are from central markets the more likely it is 
for market failure to occur unless transaction costs and risks are reduced.  
 
Information asymmetry in credit provision 
The relatively high fixed costs of pond and cage aquaculture, high working 
capital requirements especially for cage aquaculture and medium to long 
production cycles, create the need for medium term financing.  However, as 
shown in Chapter 5, less than 6 percent of small-scale pond farmers had 
accessed credit (either formal or informal) in the past 5 years. Small-scale 
farmers indicated in FGDs  that the main constraints to accessing credit were 
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high interest rates85 and the unwillingness of credit institutions such as rural 
banks to lend money for aquaculture projects without the borrower already 
having savings in the bank and a good track record in fish farming. The 
majority of small-scale cage farmers and all medium-scale cage farmers 
started their activities using their own resources with very few accessing 
supplementary loans from financial institutions. Barriers to financing arise 
due partly to asymmetric information where producers have better 
information than lenders about their credit worthiness (Jaffee and Morton, 
1995). Asymmetric information leads to the risk of adverse selection, a 
screening problem where the borrower conceals information and can use 
contract agreements in ways not anticipated by the lender (Owusu-Antwi and 
Antwi, 2010). Incomplete information can also lead to moral hazard where 
the borrower may have incentives to change his course of action which may 
affect the lender negatively, such as using the money for a more risky project 
than agreed or for the borrower to put less effort into the project than if he 
were using his own money (Owusu-Antwi and Antwi, 2010). The 
requirements for collateral and high interest rates which hinder fish farmers 
accessing credit are a product of the risks and transaction costs of lending to 
small enterprises and the related problem of imperfect information. These 
issues are not specific to aquaculture but to credit provision generally and are 
especially prominent in the small-scale agriculture sector (Jaffee and Morton, 
1995).  
 
Table 47 below summarises the commodity characteristics described above 
and identifies possible gaps or bottlenecks in the flow of goods, information 
and finance within the aquaculture systems that may result from these 
characteristics.  
 
  
                                                 
 
85
 For example Pro Credit, a German Savings and Loan company in Ghana which has given loans to 
commercial fish farmers around Kumasi, were charging 2.2 to 5.6 percent interest per month in 
2010.   
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Table 47: Summary of commodity characteristics of farmed fish and 
effects on system flows 
Commodity characteristics/problems Physical product 
flows 
Information 
flows 
Financial 
flows 
Price and volume uncertainty  X X X 
Long production cycles  X  X 
High perishability X  X 
High level of technical knowledge required   X  
High linkage intensity  X X  
Quality characteristics/heterogeneity (size)  X  
Seasonality (though limited) X X X 
Economies of scale in marketing/transport 
infrastructure 
X   
Geographical dispersion (mainly pond 
farmers) 
X X  
Information asymmetry in credit provision   X 
Notes:  Table adapted from Jaffee (1995:39). 
 X = potential gaps or bottlenecks. 
 
Transaction characteristics 
Commodity characteristics influence transaction characteristics which 
determine contractual arrangements. Transaction cost economics literature 
focuses on exchange relationships and shows that different institutional 
arrangements have their own advantages and disadvantages based on their 
operating conditions, and emphasis is given to certain elements in defining 
these conditions (Jaffee, 1995).  As noted in Chapter 2, Williamson (1991) 
identifies asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency of exchange (referred to 
here as transaction characteristics) as important influences on actors’ 
preferences for spot market, hybrid (bilateral), and hierarchical contractual 
forms (Dorward and Omamo, 2009). Higher levels of asset specificity, 
uncertainty, and transaction volume and frequency are associated with 
increased vertical integration and decreased spot market exchange. Higher 
asset specificity and uncertainty raise transaction risks, increasing the 
transaction risk to return ratio, while potentially high returns from transactions 
reduce this ratio. The transaction risk to return ratio influences actors’ choice 
of institutions. With a high ratio, longer term contractual forms such as hybrid 
or hierarchical arrangements which join buyers and sellers in a transaction, 
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improve communication and provide monitoring and incentive systems to 
control opportunism, are preferred (Dorward and Omamo, 2009). 
Establishing and maintaining these arrangements can be costly however and 
if transaction costs are too high relative to expected returns, potential 
transaction partners may not invest (Dorward and Omamo, 2009).  
 
Asset specificity 
Greater investment in more specific assets (whose returns are specific to a 
particular set of transactions) increases the risk of financial loss if a 
transaction fails (Dorward and Omamo, 2009). The actor who has invested in 
specific assets is also susceptible to opportunistic bargaining with other 
transacting parties who know the actor has little other use for the asset and 
so must agree to their terms (Jaffee, 1995). Thus the actor is likely to look for 
ways to reduce the risk through contractual arrangements which ensure their 
investment remains profitable (Poulton and Lyne, 2009). Both pond and cage 
farmers have high levels of asset specificity. Small-scale pond aquaculture 
requires relatively ‘lumpy’ investment in pond construction and fingerlings, 
both specific assets that have no alternate use other than pond aquaculture, 
which is also the case with investments in cages and fingerlings for cage 
aquaculture. This type of asset specificity is known as physical specificity. As 
the absolute level of fixed costs increase from small-scale pond aquaculture, 
to SME and large-scale cage aquaculture, so do the levels of physical 
specificity. As described above, pond and cage aquaculture also have high 
degrees of specialisation in production inputs and technical knowledge (the 
latter known as human specificity) compared to other more common 
agricultural activities such as cultivation of staple crops, and this increases 
asset specificity (Poulton and Lyne, 2009). Intensive cage aquaculture has 
higher human specificity than semi-intensive pond aquaculture. The high 
levels of physical and human specificity indicate higher barriers to entry in 
both pond and cage aquaculture for less skilled and less well endowed 
farmers without effective channels for credit, inputs and technical advice 
(Jaffee and Morton, 1995).  
 
 
242 
 
Uncertainty and scope for opportunism 
Greater uncertainty increases the potential for incomplete contracts, 
increasing the risk of transaction failure. Uncertainty is affected by imperfect 
information and bounded rationality86 of actors, along with an unpredictable 
environment (where commodities are affected by seasonality, variable yields, 
uncertain prices etc.) which can increase actors’ opportunism (e.g. traders 
quoting prices lower than actual central market prices to producers) (Dorward 
and Omamo, 2009). There is generally high uncertainty associated with fish 
farming, described in detail above, which increases the potential for 
opportunistic behaviour of traders and buyers. Uncertain volumes and 
scattered supply of small-scale pond farms also lead to transport difficulties 
for traders and imperfect market information for producers resulting in 
production which is not linked to supply and demand or responsive to price 
signals, further increasing uncertainty and transaction costs and risks.   
 
Volume and frequency of exchange 
Higher volume and frequency of exchange increases the likelihood of actors 
establishing hierarchical or hybrid arrangements. These arrangements 
decrease the incentive for opportunistic behaviour as ongoing trading 
relationships build trust and transacting parties know they can gain from 
future transactions. Increased frequency of exchange also spreads the fixed 
costs of the relationship over more transactions, and trading higher volumes 
reduces per unit transaction costs, reducing the transaction risk to return ratio 
(Dorward and Omamo, 2009). As noted above, small-scale pond and cage 
farmers have low transaction volumes and frequencies which reduce the 
incentive to establish non-market arrangements, due to the high fixed costs 
per transaction, and are thus likely to hinder market development. Medium-
scale cage farmers have medium transaction volumes and frequencies and 
large-scale cage farmers have high transaction volumes and frequencies. 
Higher transaction volumes and frequencies increase the potential for hybrid 
or hierarchical contractual forms and are thus likely to encourage market 
development.  
                                                 
 
86
 An inability to make use of all available information. 
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Table 48 below summarises the transaction characteristics described above, 
the risk to return ratio for the three main aquaculture systems and the 
implications of these for likely methods of coordination or institutional 
arrangements according to transaction cost theory (Dorward and Omamo, 
2009). As there is no way of quantifying or weighting these variables the 
table presents a simple approximation (rating them as low, medium or high), 
based on the descriptions above. 
 
Table 48: Transaction characteristics of aquaculture systems and 
implications for expected institutional arrangements 
Aquaculture 
system 
Asset 
specificity 
 
Uncertainty Volume 
and 
frequency 
of 
exchange 
Risk/return 
ratio 
Expected institutional 
arrangements 
Small-scale 
artisanal 
pond 
aquaculture 
Medium High Low High  
(medium to 
high risk, 
low returns) 
 
Limited market 
development/market 
failure/state intervention due 
to low volume and frequency 
of exchange 
SME cage 
aquaculture 
Medium 
to high 
High  
 
Low for 
small-scale 
farmers 
 
Medium for 
medium-
scale 
Farmers 
Medium  
(high risk,  
medium to 
high 
returns) 
Hybrid arrangements (long 
term, relational contracts)   
- more market oriented 
hybrid arrangements for 
small-scale farmers due to 
lower volume and 
frequency of exchange 
- more hierarchy oriented 
hybrid arrangements for 
medium-scale farmers 
due to medium volume 
and frequency of 
exchange 
Large-scale 
cage 
aquaculture 
High High 
 
High Medium  
(high risk,  
high 
returns) 
Hierarchy 
Notes: Predicted institutional arrangements informed by Dorward and Omamo (2009:96), Figure 3.4 (b)  
 
Table 48 shows that due to the demanding techno-economic characteristics 
of aquaculture products from each system, there are medium to high levels of 
asset specificity and high levels of uncertainty in all systems resulting in 
medium to high risk return ratios. These high ratios imply that increased 
vertical integration through hybrid and hierarchical arrangements between 
and within firms is the most likely method of coordination along the value 
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chain. It is unclear what effect the low levels of volume and exchange 
frequency will have on the commodity systems for small-scale pond 
aquaculture: it is likely, however, that it would result in limited market 
development unless there is state or other external intervention. Due to the 
high levels of asset specificity, uncertainty and overall risk faced by 
producers and traders in all the systems, it is unlikely that the primary form of 
institutional arrangements between input suppliers, producers and traders 
would be spot market transactions other than for surplus market clearing 
purposes. The following sections take the pond aquaculture and cage 
aquaculture action domains in turn and explore the actors and key 
institutional arrangements found within each, allowing comparison between 
the market organisation observed within each system with those predicted in 
Table 48 above. 
 
7.2.3 Key actors and institutional arrangements observed in the small-
scale pond aquaculture action domain 
This section analyses the key actors and institutional arrangements observed 
in the small-scale pond aquaculture action domain. The first part of this 
section analyses the key actors i.e. fish farmers, local fish traders, 
consumers, urban traders and processors and extension staff. Many of these 
actors have already been discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 but the attributes 
which affect their economic behaviour have not been fully explored. Actors’ 
attributes depend on their own inherent characteristics and the 
characteristics of their activities (discussed in the second part of this section 
within the context of institutional arrangements). Actors’ characteristics are 
analysed to understand the effect on their economic behaviour. 
Characteristics such as actors’: power; access to information; wealth; 
alternative livelihood options; links to urban centres; networks; education; 
previous experience; access to capital, land and labour; gender; and age are 
considered as they affect actors’ levels of imperfect information, bounded 
rationality, self interest and opportunism (Dorward and Omamo, 2009). 
 
The latter part of this section analyses institutional arrangements and their 
attributes. It was hypothesised above that there would be limited market 
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development in the pond aquaculture sector and that linkages between 
actors in the cage aquaculture sector would most likely be governed by 
hierarchical or hybrid contractual arrangements. This hypothesis is tested 
here (both in the current section and in the following section on the cage 
aquaculture action domain), by exploration of the key institutional 
arrangements supporting the coordination and exchange of farmed fish in 
each system. While the focus is on the institutional arrangements between 
fish farmers and buyers (traders, wholesalers and consumers), linkages 
between other actors are also discussed where considered important, for 
example between input suppliers and farmers, and between traders in trader 
groups.  
 
Key actors and their attributes 
Fish farmers 
As described in Chapter 5, most small-scale pond aquaculture farmers are 
male crop farmers engaged in diversified farm and nonfarm livelihood 
activities. The survey estimated approximately 43 percent of fish farming 
households to be below the income poverty line while wealth rankings found 
fish farming households were evenly distributed between three different 
wealth categories. Poor fish farmers are less productive and likely to be more 
risk averse with less access to technical and market information than non-
poor fish farmers (though most fish farmers in remote rural communities are 
likely to have imperfect information and face high transaction costs). Fish 
farmers may however be less risk averse and more entrepreneurial than 
other types of farmers, seeing as they have invested in an uncertain and 
potentially risky activity. Most farmers in Ashanti Region with the ability to 
establish a pond farm could also engage in other livelihood activities, 
especially in production of commodities which are less inherently risky and 
technologically linkage intense than fish farming. They also have the 
opportunity to engage in illegal gold mining operations which many of the 
youth are involved in and which, while risky, is also potentially lucrative. The 
range of alternative livelihood options open to potential fish farmers may 
partly explain the low adoption of small-scale pond aquaculture.  As most fish 
farmers sell to buyers (consumers and local traders) from within their own 
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communities they are less likely to behave opportunistically than if they were 
conducting impersonal trade outside the community (as they are constrained 
by community norms, social capital and local enforcement mechanisms). 
  
Traders and consumers 
Local fish traders are mainly women from the community and are classed by 
the wealth rankings in Chapter 5 in the medium and higher wealth categories. 
Compared with fish farmers these traders are likely to have more market 
information on demand and prices outside the community, due to their 
involvement in wild fish marketing chains, potentially encouraging 
opportunistic behaviour. Consumers buying at the farm gate are mainly local 
community members. While both poor and non-poor community members 
buy farmed fish, a lower percentage of poor than non-poor non-fish farmers 
surveyed thought fish farming has increased community fish supply, 
suggesting better off community members benefit more. 
 
Tilapia traders from Kumasi are likely to be better off than local traders, with 
more access to market and exchange information than pond farmers as they 
are full time fish traders functioning in a well established supply chain with 
alternative supply sources. However, most urban based wild tilapia traders 
are still from low income categories, indicated by the fact they are unable to 
afford market stalls and so sell from house to house. The main catfish 
processor/trader that buys catfish from pond farmers around Kumasi 
(discussed more below) is relatively better off and is able to pay for a 
permanent stall in Kejetia market, processing facilities, and part time 
labourers. However as she is currently unable to meet the high demand for 
catfish this may moderate her potentially powerful bargaining position as a 
monopsonistic buyer in many instances. 
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Aquaculture extension staff 
Fisheries extension staff are the main public sector actors within the small-
scale pond aquaculture action domain. Their role as brokers between fish 
farmers and buyers, along with their role in information dissemination and 
coordination is explored in more detail below. As public sector workers with a 
commitment to developing the aquaculture sector they have different 
incentive systems than private sector actors and are able to bear higher 
transaction costs and risks. Extension officers have relatively high levels of 
market and technical information but are not likely to behave opportunistically 
as farmers and traders can make complaints to the FC, and trust is important 
in their coordination roles. However, their limited resources mean their 
capacity to reach more remote fish farmers is constrained. 
 
Key institutional arrangements and their attributes 
It was suggested in Section 7.2.2 that due to high uncertainty and medium 
asset specificity related to fish produced by small-scale artisanal farmers, it 
was likely that linkages between actors would face high transaction costs and 
risks and there would be limited market development and/or state 
intervention depending on the volume and frequency of exchange. The actual 
organisation of the small-scale pond aquaculture sector in Ashanti reflects 
elements of this as overall there is limited market development beyond 
individual rural communities. Where the market for pond farmed fish is 
developing around Kumasi, this is linked to some informal state intervention 
in marketing in the form of extension officers acting as brokers, and also 
playing a coordination role in accessing fingerlings for farmers. Alternatively 
where rural producers sell direct to consumers one might consider this 
integration of production and retail functions in the same ‘firm’ as a form of 
hierarchy between production and marketing activities albeit on a very small-
scale. As discussed below, most farmers produce and retail their fish directly 
to consumers at the farm gate (with some at the local market). The 
predominant institutional arrangement between producer/retailers and buyers 
is spot market purchase, usually at the farm gate. Within these spot markets 
not all transactions are characterised by impersonal trade as community 
members and local traders usually know the fish farmers and some traders 
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have developed ongoing relationships with farmers to overcome some of the 
transaction risks, explored further below. Thus the predominant institutional 
arrangement between producers and buyers can be placed somewhere 
between pure spot market purchase with impersonal trade and market 
reciprocity or bilateral agreements between transacting parties. These 
arrangements are summarised in Figure 21 and explored in detail below. 
 
Figure 21: Small-scale pond aquaculture value chain and key 
institutional arrangements 
 
Notes:  Market channels in order of importance for surveyed rural pond farmers:  
1=most important, 4= least important 
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Social reciprocity 
Of the 69 fish farmers surveyed, approximately 35 percent did not undertake 
a main harvest in 2010 and only 44 percent sold any fish. While this could be 
due to a number of factors (including production cycles over 12 months, the 
desire to keep fish in the pond as an indicator of wealth, the use of fish in 
ponds as a form of financial capital etc.), this low figure indicates limited 
market development and corresponds to the prediction above that with low 
volume and frequency of transactions, market failure occurs.  The majority of 
farmers surveyed did however give away some fish in 2010 suggesting the 
importance of gift exchange or social reciprocity (Dorward and Omamo, 
2009), especially for poorer fish farmers who on average gifted a higher 
percentage of their total harvest than non-poor fish farmers, meaning their 
actual volume of sales was even smaller (see Table 23 in Chapter 5). Gift 
exchange means payment for fish is not in money but in increased social 
capital. Gifting fish could also increase the fish farmer’s direct and indirect 
access to labour, food, money and social support from community members 
(Dorward and Omamo, 2009). 
  
Farm gate sales to consumers and local traders 
Almost all farmers surveyed sell fish directly to consumers, their most 
important marketing channel, indicating a short supply chain with few 
intermediaries and limited market development. Nearly 70 percent of fish 
farmers also sell fish to local fish traders. Over 50 percent sell to consumers 
and local traders at the farm gate where fish quality is checked, prices are 
negotiated and fish is exchanged ‘on the spot’. The majority of farmers 
reduce the uncertainty and risk associated with selling a highly perishable 
product by undertaking selective rather than total harvests, thus avoiding 
holdup problems and reducing the potential for buyers to behave 
opportunistically. Over 40 percent of farmers also sell to traders, consumers 
and retailers directly in the village at the local market. In most villages there is 
high demand for fresh fish and farmers can sell their harvest easily. However 
community members may not have the purchasing power to buy highly 
priced fresh fish and from the PBs presented in Chapter 5 it seems farm gate 
prices are often not high enough for farmers to cover production costs and 
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make much, if any, profit. While only 25 percent of fish farmers surveyed 
indicated low price of fish being a major or minor problem, the average farm 
gate price of pond farmed fish was approximately GH¢3.5/kg in 2010 
whereas the farm gate price of cage farmed fish for similar sizes was 
between GH¢3.9 and GH¢4.8/kg indicating low prices in rural areas. The low 
prices received by small-scale pond farmers could be partly due to their weak 
bargaining power in sales to traders and their acceptance of some gift 
exchange element in sales to community members. 
 
Selling to local traders 
Selling to traders is a secondary marketing channel for farmers. Traders 
carry more of the burden of coordination costs of exchange than producers 
especially in more remote communities where transport and communication 
infrastructure are less developed. These high transaction costs help to 
explain the limited market development for fish farming in rural areas beyond 
individual communities. The high costs provide incentives for development of 
hybrid arrangements and collective action of producers and/or traders where 
possible. The local traders who buy farmed fish in communities are mainly 
wild caught fish traders and in many villages surveyed these traders lacked 
interest in buying farmed fish. However in some villages closer to larger 
market centres where there is high demand for fresh fish which can fetch 
high prices, traders are more interested. For example in the village of 
Tweapease, one trader has developed relationships with a number of fish 
farmers and buys their fish to sell in the nearby mining town of Obuasi, while 
a number of other traders want to do the same.  
 
Coordination roles of extension staff  
The FC plays a vertical and complementary coordination role. FC staff assist 
farmers to source fingerlings from other farmers or from government 
hatcheries, provide technical information and advice on stocking and feeding, 
and help with harvesting and marketing (see Chapter 5). Some pond farmers 
near Kumasi have been helped by FC extension staff, acting as brokers, to 
sell their catfish to a processor/trader from Kejetia Market (Kumasi’s Central 
Market) trading mainly in smoked marine fish. The processor/trader began 
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selling smoked catfish in 2008 due to increasing demand from customers and 
started sourcing catfish directly from some SME pond farmers around 
Kumasi. However as a result of her inability to source adequate fish supplies 
due to lack of information, she developed a relationship with extension staff 
and built up enough trust to now rely on them to act independently to source 
fish for her. The processor/trader smokes 100-200kg of catfish per week but 
even with the help of the extension staff she does not always get the supply 
she needs. The extension officers travel to the fish farm for harvesting, start 
the preservation process of salting as soon as the fish are harvested and 
deliver the fish to her. They use their own personal vehicle and the farmer 
and processor/trader share the fuel cost. The processor/trader pays the fish 
farmers in cash and though there is no formal agreement to pay the 
extension staff, they are usually ‘dashed’ something small by both the 
farmers and the processor/trader for each exchange.  
 
The extension staff bear much of the transaction costs of searching for 
farmers ready to harvest, travelling on harvest day and sometimes before to 
check the amount and size of fish, inspecting the size and quality of fish at 
harvest and sometimes negotiating prices with farmers on behalf of the 
processor/trader etc. but are not fully remunerated for it. Some of these costs 
(e.g. those related to supply information and harvesting) are part of their job 
as extension officers. The additional costs of negotiating price or enforcing 
the previously negotiated price between farmer and processor, monitoring 
fish quality and delivering the fish to the processor are all extra costs, 
however are viewed by them as part of their contribution to sector 
development. These costs are also partly borne by the farmer and 
processor/trader who give the staff something small for each exchange as 
noted above. At the time of interview due to the overall higher transport and 
transaction costs involved with transacting with smaller more remote farmers 
with more uncertain supply, most farmers surveyed had not been linked to 
the processor/trader, only the farmers that were more regularly in contact 
with extension staff closer to Kumasi. As shown in Chapter 5, extension staff 
helped 20 percent of non-poor fish farmers and only 7 percent of poor 
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farmers surveyed to harvest in 2010 indicating the low level of marketing 
assistance given to small-scale rural pond farmers. 
 
Overall FC extension staff are extremely under resourced and unable to 
reach all fish farmers. The FC is linked to farmers through district level FFAs 
(two of the three districts surveyed have FFAs), but is unable to help FFA 
members market their fish as, first, many cannot produce a reliable surplus 
and, second,  farmers, traders and extension staff face high transport and 
other related constraints. The FFAs are mainly a forum for information 
exchange between farmers and a way to receive training from the 
government and do not play much of a vertical or horizontal coordination role 
at present. No private sector coordination mechanisms were observed but at 
the time of interview the commercial feed supplier Ranaan was negotiating 
with the FC to use their training facility and hatchery in Kumasi to establish a 
training centre for fish farmers. Ranaan would then support the hatchery to 
produce high quality, all male fingerlings and help farmers to source these 
fingerlings. The fingerlings would be 12-15g as opposed to 5g or less which 
is the standard size sold by most hatcheries in Ghana, so the risk of mortality 
would be reduced for the farmer and taken on by the hatchery. By 
encouraging the farmers to buy Ranaan feed along with increasing the 
productivity of farmers through the trainings and sourcing of good quality 
fingerlings, Ranaan hopes to increase its market for feed.  
 
Selling to wild tilapia traders from Kumasi 
Many better off farmers located close to Kumasi, also use the FC to help 
market their fish. Tilapia is often sold to staff at institutions in Kumasi where 
FC staff have links, such as MoFA and various chop bars and restaurants. 
There are very few farmed fish traders operating around Kumasi and 
currently extension staff are cultivating relationships with several wild tilapia 
traders who are increasingly interested in farmed tilapia due to declining 
supplies from the wild. These traders are among the approximately 100 
traders who buy wild tilapia from fishermen at Barakese dam, Kumasi’s main 
water source, and sell around Kumasi, either house to house, in markets, or 
to various restaurants and hotels serving fresh tilapia. They sell most of their 
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fish within a day or two and often sell fish on credit for up to a week to 
restaurants and chop bars. Extension staff have connected a few interested 
traders to fish farmers and taken them to harvests to buy relatively small 
amounts of fish (approximately 20kg each) at the farm gate where prices are 
negotiated directly. At the time of interview these traders had not been linked 
to any of the rural pond farmers surveyed.  
 
Most of the wild tilapia traders in Kumasi interviewed were not interested in 
selling farmed tilapia due to its light weight compared to wild tilapia, due to 
the better market for wild tilapia because of its larger size, and due to the 
inferior quality of farmed tilapia when smoked. Most of these traders only buy 
farmed tilapia at Christmas when demand is high and wild tilapia supply is 
inadequate. In the past, some pond farmers used to sell directly to a trader 
who was also a fish farmer. Having realised the problem of fish marketing, he 
had bought a cold van and advertised to attract fish farmers and customers. 
He went farm to farm, aggregating fish and selling to restaurants and hotels 
in Kumasi. He could not, however, maintain the regularity of supply (or the 
size of the fish which needed to be ‘table size’, over 500g) so retailers 
stopped buying from him and he went out of business. This example is a 
good illustration of the wider problem of low volume and frequency of 
transactions in the small-scale sector, contributing to coordination risk (the 
risk of an investment failing because no other actors in the supply chain 
make the necessary complementary investments) in turn leading to a ‘low 
level equilibrium trap’, explored in more detail in the discussion section 
below.  The transaction costs of sourcing uncertain supplies from small and 
scattered farmers producing small sized fish is too great at present for 
traders to invest in building relationships with farmers unless they have a 
good market where they can sell at high prices and balance some of these 
costs. As wild caught tilapia becomes scarcer and demand for smoked 
catfish in Kumasi increases, it is likely more traders will turn to processing 
and trading farmed fish, but only if transaction costs can be lowered and/or 
returns increased. 
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7.2.4 Key actors and institutional arrangements observed in the cage 
aquaculture action domain 
This section looks at the key actors and institutional arrangements in the 
cage aquaculture action domain. Due to the overlap in actors between the 
SME and large-scale cage farm systems, the actors associated with each 
system are analysed together in the first part of the section to reduce 
repetition. The institutional arrangements supporting the SME and large-
scale cage aquaculture systems are then discussed separately and the value 
chains encompassing the key actors, market channels and institutional 
arrangements related to small, medium and large-scale cage aquaculture are 
illustrated in Figure 22, Figure 23 and Figure 24. 
 
Key actors in the SME and large-scale cage aquaculture action domain 
SME cage farmers 
SME cage farmers are in much higher socio-economic categories than small-
scale artisanal pond farmers. As noted in Chapter 6, small-scale cage farm 
owners are mainly professionals from Accra, absentee farmers who usually 
visit the farm on weekends. These farm owners are well educated and 
relatively well resourced and thus have access to technical and market 
information. However, as these farms have been established only recently, 
farm owners’ level of information on transaction partners is likely to be 
imperfect, so that costs of searching, screening, bargaining, transferring, 
monitoring and enforcing processes of exchange between both input 
suppliers and buyers are likely to be high. This reduces their bargaining 
power with traders who have more information about other farmers and the 
market (discussed below). There seems to be a high turnover of small-scale 
cage farms, with many going out of business while new ones are coming up. 
This could partly be due to the lack of experience and expertise of small-
scale cage farmers, because they leave the running of their farms to often 
untrained and casual labourers, leading to low productivity and profitability. 
 
Three of the five medium-scale cage farmers surveyed are expatriates with 
good technical knowledge. Fish farming is the primary occupation of four of 
the five farmers who manage their farms themselves and employ trained 
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staff. These farmers have better access to technical, market and exchange 
information than small-scale farmers and are likely to be more risk taking and 
have a stronger bargaining position in relation to buyers than small-scale 
cage farmers.  
 
Large-scale cage farmers 
Tropo is owned by an expatriate private investor whereas WAF is a joint 
venture between the Royal Danish Fish Group from Denmark and a local 
partner, mainly funded by soft loans and grants from international donors. 
These are large private enterprises that have a lot of power in the farmed fish 
marketing systems, with good information on markets and exchange. Tropo 
is the main price setter; however, both Tropo and WAF face high transaction 
risks due to their large investments in specific assets, explaining their more 
hierarchical structures (discussed below). 
 
Traders and wholesalers 
The majority of cage farmed fish traders, while not poor, are from lower 
income households located in towns and urban centres around Lake Volta 
and Accra. Most traders interviewed had not had any secondary education 
and some had had no formal education at all. For most, trading farmed fish is 
their only occupation and other than petty trading they have limited 
alternative employment opportunities. Some had been trading in wild fish 
before but others had not had any experience in trading fish before they 
started. As many of these traders buying from SME and WAF cage farms 
work in groups, they have higher levels of market and exchange information 
than small-scale cage farmers. Due also to the perishability of the fish and 
the limited ability of farmers to take fish to market, traders often behave 
opportunistically, especially with small-scale cage farmers as discussed 
above. Traders buying from Tropo outlets and WAF however have limited 
scope for opportunism as there is no negotiation, prices and grades are set 
and demand is higher than supply.  
 
Three of the four wholesalers/group leaders observed are female. All have 
higher socio-economic status than traders in varying degrees (the fish 
256 
 
mammie from Kasoa and the male wholesaler from Accra are much better off 
than the other group leaders from Kpong) and due to their purchasing power 
can behave more opportunistically than traders, especially where they are in 
a monopsonistic position such as when buying from small-scale cage farms. 
Wholesalers are able to sell fish to traders on credit. Nevertheless, due to the 
scarce supply of fish and the ability of traders (those who do not need credit) 
to buy fish individually from Tropo and other SME cage farms, they are not as 
powerful as fish mammies in the wild fish sector. Group leaders also face 
transport costs and transaction costs and risks, for example those related to 
ensuring repayment of credit. 
 
Input suppliers 
The main feed supplier, Ranaan, is a private sector company with the major 
share of the feed market and it can set high prices due to limited alternative 
supplies. Hatcheries are both public and private but they all lack capacity to 
produce large numbers of high quality fingerlings and they all charge high 
prices. Their investment in specific assets involves high losses from 
transaction failures, hence the need for advance payment or forward market 
contracts with farmers. However due to high costs to farmers of monitoring 
the terms of exchange, (the quality and quantity of fingerlings), hatcheries 
can behave opportunistically (specification opportunism) in some instances.   
 
Key institutional arrangements in the SME cage aquaculture system 
SME cage aquaculture has high levels of uncertainty and medium to high 
levels of asset specificity depending on the scale of investment. Therefore 
the likely method of coordination for SME cage farms was hypothesised to be 
hybrid arrangements, leaning more toward market oriented arrangements for 
small-scale farmers (with lower volume and frequency of exchange) and 
more toward hierarchy for medium-scale farmers (with medium volume and 
frequency of exchange).  Small-scale cage farms were generally found to 
have developed a variety of hybrid arrangements with buyers while medium-
scale farms were observed to have developed a different mixture of 
institutional arrangements. These arrangements are summarised in Figure 22 
and Figure 23 and explored in detail below. 
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SME sales to traders 
The majority of SME cage farms sell some fish directly at the farm gate to 
retailers and consumers but sell primarily to traders and wholesalers who 
come from and distribute fish to markets and retailers in Accra, other nearby 
urban centres such as Tema, Ashaiman and Kasoa, and further afield from 
Aflao on the Togo border. Traders also come from towns such as Kpong on 
Lake Volta, close to a landing site for wild caught fish from the lake and 
where wild fish is traditionally traded by the road side, in the market and by 
the lake. Farmed fish is distributed by a network of primarily female traders, 
many of whom traded in wild fish before switching to trading a mixture of 
farmed and wild fish or completely switching to farmed fish. This network of 
traders and wholesalers buy fish from all the SME and large-scale cage 
farms on Lake Volta. As estimated in Chapter 6, there are approximately 20 
wholesalers and over 200 traders within this network (and an additional 400 
traders who buy mainly from Tropo’s outlets in Accra). Many belong to trader 
groups (discussed in the large-scale cage aquaculture subsection below). 
Very few traders are from communities located around the cage farms, partly 
because SME cage farmers do not sell to local fish traders on credit, unlike 
fishermen who usually have established credit arrangements with local fish 
traders.  
 
Hybrid arrangements for small-scale cage farms 
All SME cage farms surveyed sell to several regular traders and wholesalers. 
The majority of small-scale farms surveyed have developed relationships 
with particular buyers whom they call at harvest time and often sell to on 
credit, ranging from three days to one month. Two of the 14 small-scale cage 
farmers surveyed also pay the transport costs of wholesalers who buy over 
one tonne. These hybrid market reciprocity arrangements are informal but 
based on trust developed from personalised repeat trading. Although fish is 
mainly exchanged at the current market price set by Tropo, they are not pure 
spot market transactions due to the provision of credit and in some cases 
payment of wholesalers’ transport costs. Despite these relationships and 
perhaps because some are relatively new, traders can still behave 
opportunistically:  9 of the 14 small-scale farmers surveyed indicated that 
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traders’ not sticking to the agreed price was a major problem.  The traders 
and wholesalers with whom farmers have not developed relationships and 
other buyers (such as local traders and consumers from the community) who 
buy at the farm gate, make spot market purchases and play a supplementary 
market clearing role, especially for smaller fish that are less demanded and 
less profitable.  
 
Figure 22: Small-scale cage aquaculture value chain and key 
institutional arrangements 
 
Notes:  Market channels in order of importance for surveyed small-scale cage farmers:  
1=most important, 2= least important 
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Mixture of arrangements for medium-scale cage farms 
Medium-scale cage farmers in accessible areas and who harvest regularly 
(three of the five farms interviewed) have predominantly market based 
arrangements with traders to whom they sell fish at the farm gate. Of these 
three farms, two have no arrangements with their buyers who are mainly 
traders with high demand. One sells primarily to a small number of 
wholesalers buying one to two tonnes at a time and with whom he has 
developed relationships. These three farmers have no incentives to invest in 
hierarchical arrangements between production and marketing. Another 
medium-scale farmer who was undertaking his first harvest at the time of 
interview found himself in a weak bargaining position. However, despite the 
high number of traders and his relationship with a wholesaler, due to the high 
volume of fish harvested and lack of cold storage facilities leading to 
opportunistic behaviour of traders over fish grading and price. To avoid this 
problem, the final medium-scale cage farm surveyed, located in a less 
accessible area, hires a refrigerated truck to transport his fish to sell directly 
to consumers, retailers and traders at market prices at an outlet of a fellow 
medium-scale fish farmer (not surveyed) in Tema. However this was the only 
hierarchical arrangement between production and marketing observed 
among SME farmers. The predominance of market arrangements, not 
hypothesised above, appears to be due to the excess demand for fish 
diminishing sellers’ risks (unless they flood the market with a particularly 
large harvest which the market cannot easily absorb). 
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Figure 23: Medium-scale cage aquaculture value chain and key 
institutional arrangements 
 
 
 
Notes:  Market channels in order of importance for surveyed medium-scale  
cage farmers: 1=most important, 4= least important 
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Information flows 
Cage aquaculture is knowledge intensive and various sources of information 
and training of varying quality are available to farmers. However as noted 
above, most small-scale cage farmers are absentee farmers. Most have 
caretakers, employed on a temporary and informal basis and paid monthly 
wages to look after the farms and feed the fish: it is these caretakers that 
require training. Only 4 of the 14 small-scale farms surveyed have caretakers 
with some external training while the remaining have had on the job or no 
training at all. Most of the medium and both large-scale cage farms employ 
trained managers. Ranaan feed gives technical advice on production 
including a feeding chart as part of their service. WRI also gives technical 
advice to cage farmers who buy their fingerlings and employs a number of 
extension staff. Crystal Lake hatchery conducts occasional week long 
residential trainings on cage aquaculture and related topics. There are also 
many one day training courses on fish farming run by private companies but 
these are of dubious quality. There is only one active district level FC 
extension officer, who barely goes to the field, and 6 of the 14 small-scale 
farms and 3 of the 5 medium-scale farms interviewed indicated lack of 
access to extension services was a major problem. As a result many small-
scale cage farmers have very limited working knowledge of cage aquaculture 
and do not employ trained staff to manage their farms, resulting in poor 
production practises and variable productivity and fish sizes.  
 
Arrangements for input supply 
To reduce the production risk associated with poor quality and limited supply 
of fingerlings currently available on the market, some medium-scale cage 
farmers produce their own. Small-scale cage farmers however are unable to 
do this due to the high levels of specialised technical knowledge and capital 
required. Instead, they make informal forward market arrangements with 
fingerling suppliers ordering specified quantities and sizes of fingerlings 
ranging from two weeks to several months in advance, at set market prices. 
Farmers usually pay in advance or pay half up front and the rest on receipt. 
However there can be issues of enforcement due to the limited capacity of 
fingerling suppliers to produce large amounts of fingerlings and ensure 
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orders are met on time and to the specified requirements. Opportunistic 
behaviour of private fingerling suppliers was reported by some farmers, for 
example not supplying the number and/or sizes ordered, neither of which are 
easily detectable by farmers and result in lower than expected harvests. High 
fingerling mortality is also a major risk and can be caused by poor 
transportation or rough handling along with the cage environment itself. 
Some hatcheries transport fingerlings to farms for a fee.  Most hatcheries will 
replace dead fingerlings if farmers provide evidence by collecting them. 
Hatcheries usually also give 5 percent more fingerlings than are paid for, but 
mortality is generally higher, estimated by many farmers to be around 15 to 
20 percent.  
 
Some medium-scale cage farms also import feed directly from abroad, but 
the large fixed costs of establishing a feed mill to integrate all input and 
production activities is too high for fish farms. Small-scale farmers do not 
import feed directly as they require much less feed so rely on spot market 
purchases from local commercial feed distributers. However these are 
subject to variable supply, and delays then force farmers to find alternative 
feed at short notice, often resulting in use of feed of different size pellets and 
protein content than required.  
 
Key institutional arrangements in the large-scale cage aquaculture 
system 
Due to the high levels of uncertainty, asset specificity and volumes and 
frequency of exchange, it was suggested above that hierarchical 
arrangements would dominate the large-scale cage aquaculture system. This 
was observed to be true for the two large-scale cage farms surveyed. The 
value chain and institutional arrangements are summarised in Figure 24 and 
discussed below. 
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Figure 24: Large-scale cage aquaculture value chain and key 
institutional arrangements 
 
 
Notes:  Market channels in order of importance for surveyed large-scale cage farmers:  
1=most important, 3= least important 
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stimulated consumer demand in a market which is in its early stages of 
development, and has allowed Tropo to increase its market share and reach 
a much higher number of buyers than it would if it was still selling at the farm 
gate. Many of these buyers are individual traders, who can now bypass the 
fish mammies and buy fish at a lower price, plus a large number of new 
entrants into farmed fish trading, mainly low income women from Accra and 
surrounding areas.  While WAF has not integrated all its production and 
marketing activities like Tropo, it has integrated production with the first stage 
of marketing by building a market place in Asikuma so that fish is not 
exchanged at the farm gate, and the benefits of being a seller in a seller’s 
market are maintained. The retail end of fully or partially vertically integrated 
operations such as Tropo and WAF face lower risks than independent 
traders and wholesalers in a seller’s market when fish supplies are uncertain. 
 
Trader groups 
Of the estimated 200 traders within the cage farmed fish trading network, 
approximately half belong to one of five trader groups from Greater Accra 
and Eastern Regions (Accra, Kasoa, Asutuare and two groups from Kpong). 
Four of the groups are headed by a wholesaler (or a ‘fish Queen’ in the case 
of the Kasoa group) while the Asutuare group is composed only of traders 
and joins the Accra group when buying fish from WAF (discussed below). 
The groups were formed in response to the scarce and uncertain supply of 
farmed fish relative to demand. For example the Asutuare group, formed in 
1999 and one of the oldest groups, consists of 20 members mostly from one 
extended family and was established to guarantee access to fish from Tropo 
farm when it first started as a pond farm87. Many members had been trading 
individually in wild fish since 1990 but when Tropo started pond aquaculture 
near Asutuare they switched to trading farmed fish. Demand outstripped 
supply as increasing numbers of wild fish traders decided to trade farmed fish 
so Tropo encouraged traders to form groups to guarantee supply. Since 
                                                 
 
87
 While currently Tropo is the largest cage farm on Lake Volta, it started in the late 1990s as a pond 
farm located in Asutuare in Eastern Region which was converted into to their hatchery once it 
started its cage operations. 
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Tropo opened wholesale and retail outlets around Accra from 2007/2008 
onwards and no longer sells at the farm gate, the group now buys mainly 
from WAF and SME cage farms.  
 
When WAF started, traders were sold fish on credit as a strategy to increase 
WAF’s market share. However due to the low recovery rate WAF stopped 
this and now sells in bulk to the wholesalers heading the four groups. This 
arrangement lowers WAF’s transactions costs compared to dealing with 
many small traders, and passes the risk and cost of providing credit to 
traders onto the wholesalers. These group leaders were WAF’s first loyal 
bulk buyers; thus, the system is based on patronage and trust.  WAF sells 
over 70 percent of their fish to the four group leaders, each of whom buys 
one to two tonnes per market day (twice a week) at a 3-5 percent discount, 
having placed an order one week in advance. The wholesalers then sell on to 
their traders at market price, some on credit. The Kasoa group leader sends 
a truck from Kasoa to buy fish from WAF and sells the fish to traders in 
Kasoa while the other wholesalers and trader groups go to WAF to buy and 
distribute the fish from there.   
  
The horizontal coordination among traders enables them to overcome some 
of the transaction costs and risks associated with trading in a highly 
perishable good with uncertain supply over a large area of operation and with 
poor marketing and transport infrastructure. The main advantage for traders 
of belonging to a group is more certainty over access to fish supplies in a 
seller’s market as it ensures priority access to fish from WAF and increases 
the likelihood of obtaining the more desired larger sized fish. Belonging to a 
group also reduces transportation costs as traders can share the cost of 
hiring a trotro or other vehicle. Group members are often able to get fish on 
credit from their group leaders, usually for 2 weeks, and sometimes from 
other group members. This can be important as many traders also sell to 
their customers on credit, especially tilapia joints and chop bars. Group 
membership also helps traders to reduce costs related to monitoring fish 
grading; for example, in the Asutuare group when a farm is ready to harvest, 
one member will travel to the farm and inspect the fish to make sure the fish 
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are mainly Size 1 or larger and will inform the other members. Often small-
scale farms harvest a majority of smaller fish due to poor feeding practices 
which traders would not know until the day of harvest, thus increasing 
information costs and making futile trips to farms.   
 
Personalised trading network 
The personalised trading network that has developed around WAF is based 
on repeat trading and informal understanding between WAF and the group 
leaders/wholesalers and helps to reduce the costs of bargaining, monitoring, 
enforcement and information in an uncertain environment as detailed above. 
However as noted by Jaffee (1995:51) there are some limitations to 
personalised trading networks which may hinder adaptation to market 
changes that require adjustment in trading relationships and they may also 
have production cost disadvantages, since group preference for buying from 
WAF may leave other less expensive supply alternatives undeveloped. Also 
while ‘insider trading networks’ such as these trader groups may reduce 
transaction costs of insiders, they provide significant barriers to entry to 
individual traders outside the groups, many of whom indicated they were 
unable to join these groups.  
 
Input supply 
Like some of the medium-scale farmers, Tropo produces its own fingerlings 
and at the time of interview WAF had just installed a hatchery on site but was 
still buying fingerlings until the hatchery was functional. Vertically integrating 
fingerling supply with production overcomes a number of constraints: 
reducing logistical costs of purchasing fingerlings from a number of different 
hatcheries and reducing risk and uncertainty related to variable supplies, 
sources and quality. For similar reasons, both farms import feed directly from 
abroad mainly due to the reduced cost and to ensure adequate and assured 
quality supply. 
 
Summary of results 
Table 49 summarises the information presented in the previous sections. 
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Table 49: Key characteristics of commodities, transactions, actors and 
institutional arrangements for each aquaculture system 
Characteristics of commodities, 
transactions, actors and institutional 
arrangements 
Small-scale 
artisanal pond 
aquaculture 
SME cage 
aquaculture 
Large-scale 
cage 
aquaculture 
Commodity characteristics 
Price and volume uncertainty  Medium Medium Medium 
Production cycle Long Medium Medium 
Perishability High High High 
Level of technical knowledge required  Medium High High 
Linkage intensity  Medium High High 
Quality characteristics/heterogeneity 
(size) 
Low Medium Medium 
Seasonality  Medium Low Low 
Economies of scale in marketing/transport High High High 
Geographical dispersion High Medium Medium 
Information asymmetry in credit High High High 
Transaction characteristics 
Uncertainty High High High 
Asset specificity Medium Medium to high High 
Volume and frequency of exchange Low Low (SSF)  
Medium (MSF) 
High 
Risk/return ratio High Medium Medium 
Expected institutional arrangements 
Market, hybrid and/or hierarchy Limited market 
development/ 
market failure/ 
state intervention  
SSF - Market oriented 
hybrid arrangements  
MSF - Hierarchy 
oriented hybrid 
arrangements  
Hierarchy due 
to high volume 
and frequency 
of exchange 
Key actors and attributes 
Producers Technical & market 
information 
Low Low to medium High 
Self interest Medium High High 
Opportunism Low Low (SSF)  
Medium (MSF) 
Medium 
Bargaining power over 
traders 
Low Low (SSF) 
Medium (MSF) 
High 
Traders/ 
whole- 
salers 
Market information Medium High High 
Self interest High High High 
Opportunism High High (SSF) 
Medium (MSF) 
Medium 
Bargaining power over 
producers 
Medium High (SSF)  
Medium (MSF) 
Low 
Extension 
staff 
Technical & market 
information 
Medium Medium  Medium 
Self interest Medium Medium Medium 
Opportunism Medium Medium Medium 
Observed institutional arrangements 
Overall market development Low Medium Medium 
Gift exchange/social reciprocity Yes No No 
Spot market exchange (producers & 
buyers) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Hybrid arrangements (producers & 
buyers) 
No Yes Yes 
Hierarchy (production & marketing) No No Yes 
Trader associations No Yes Yes 
Coordination by extension staff Some No No 
Notes: SSF - Small-scale cage farmers. MSF - Medium-scale cage farmers 
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7.3 DISCUSSION 
 
This section outlines the general outcomes of the systems analysed above 
with regard to system development and potential for growth. Missing actors 
and institutions within systems are also identified and with the findings of this 
chapter are explored with respect to their wider theoretical and policy 
implications. These implications are then discussed in the context of the 
debate surrounding the effectiveness of supporting small-scale non 
commercial rural fish farmer development to promote poverty reduction, 
increasingly being questioned by some analysts (e.g. Brummett et al., 2008; 
Little et al., 2012) as noted in Chapters 2 and 6. The section concludes by 
assessing the hypothesis being tested, in the light of the overall results of this 
chapter. 
 
7.3.1 System outcomes and potential for growth 
As noted above, the current organisation of the small-scale pond aquaculture 
sector suggests it is stuck in a low level equilibrium trap. This is explored in 
more detail below. In essence the outcome of this situation implies that at the 
moment new entrants have little incentive to adopt aquaculture, current 
farmers have little incentive to intensify production, and traders have little 
incentive to invest in marketing fish from rural artisanal pond farmers in urban 
markets. It is possible that the situation may gradually evolve if local demand 
for fish rises due to higher local incomes from cocoa, artisanal mining etc. 
However, production levels and market development are unlikely to shift to 
an alternative, more commercial equilibrium in the short to medium term 
unless producers are able to benefit from higher urban market prices through 
developing institutional arrangements to reduce transaction costs and risks 
and increase non-market coordination along the value chain.  
 
The lack of credit institutions serving small-scale fish farmers is also a factor 
limiting the poor growth potential of the system. Fish farming, even on a small 
artisanal scale, can demand relatively high lumpy investments in pond 
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construction88 and fingerlings. Intensification often requires increased 
purchased inputs of fingerlings, feed and fertiliser (along with improved 
management practices) thus medium term credit may be needed. However, 
as noted above, small-scale lending to scattered farmers for risky enterprises 
results in high transaction costs for lenders and high risks of default. These 
must be covered by high interest rates increasing the risk for farmers thus 
both decreasing demand and increasing lending costs (Binswanger and 
Rosenzweig, 1986).  Owusu-Antwi and Antwi (2010) suggest that high costs, 
high interest rates, lack of collateral, lack of innovation and high delinquency 
rates are the main constraining factors in rural credit markets in Ghana. The 
absence of affordable, accessible and good quality training and technical 
information is also a constraining factor and is generally lacking for farmers, 
many of whom do not have much or any interaction with extension staff. 
While the district FFAs play an information exchange role, to increase 
productivity farmers require more improved technical knowledge and training. 
 
These findings suggest limited growth potential for the small-scale system at 
present. While Asmah (2008) estimated that the mean annual growth rate in 
number of pond farms (97 percent of which were classified as non 
commercial) established since 2000 is 16 percent in Ghana and 26 percent in 
Ashanti Region, over 50 percent of the small-scale pond farmers on the FC 
list for the three study districts were found to be non functional. Therefore it is 
unclear whether in fact this growth is coming from more commercial peri-
urban pond farmers (who may still have been regarded by Asmah as ‘non 
commercial’ based on commonly used definitions and characterisations,  
explored further in Chapter 8) while more rural artisanal farming is declining. 
In any case, it is unlikely that the artisanal pond aquaculture sector will 
develop to any great extent without a reduction in transaction costs and risks 
and/or an increase in returns through a ‘developmental coordination’ 
approach, discussed below. Thus, while there are some important outcomes 
related to increased income and household assets for non-poor producers 
                                                 
 
88
 Unless farmers construct ponds themselves and with family or community labour, however the 
majority of farmers were found to have hired labour to construct ponds. 
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discussed in Chapter 5, there are few noteworthy or widespread benefits at 
present for consumers and other actors such as poor groups within the 
community that could potentially benefit from the relatively high multiplier 
effects of a well developed small-scale pond aquaculture sector as presented 
in Chapter 6.  
 
Elements of this limited market development were also found in the small-
scale cage aquaculture sector, although all small-scale cage farm owners 
surveyed were attempting to overcome the transaction costs related to 
accessing output markets by developing hybrid arrangements with traders. 
While many traders were found to behave opportunistically, most farmers 
had started their operations very recently so these relationships have not 
been established for long. There is therefore scope for reduction in 
opportunism as relationships mature and trust is built. There is also good 
potential for further development due to the higher socio-economic status of 
small-scale cage farm owners, their increased access to market and 
technical information, the relative proximity of cage farms to input markets 
around Akosombo and to lucrative output markets in and around Accra, and 
the expected high returns compared to risks. However increased productivity 
relies partly on training farm managers/caretakers on efficient feeding 
practices as well as the supply of good quality fingerlings. The impact of the 
system on rural communities is limited at present (explored in Chapter 6) but 
the potential for multiplier effects and by implication the impact on poverty is 
important as adoption increases and cage farms become more sustainable.  
 
Unlike small-scale pond and cage farms, medium and large-scale cage 
farmers were found to have the resources and knowledge to overcome many 
of the constraints facing smaller farmers, through establishing hybrid and 
hierarchical arrangement.  Both systems are developing and increasing in 
output and have high potential for growth and to contribute to national fish 
supplies. While large-scale cage farms have low potential multiplier effects, 
the outcome of the institutional arrangements supporting both medium and 
large-scale systems on low income women traders is an important benefit.  
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7.3.2 Coordination failure and low level equilibrium traps 
From the above analysis it appears that growth of the small-scale pond 
aquaculture system (and to a lesser degree the small-scale cage aquaculture 
system), is currently constrained. Intensification of aquaculture, like most 
agricultural intensification, requires technical change along with input, credit 
and marketing systems to increase production and supply fish to consumers 
at competitive prices (Poulton et al., 2006). Credit may be needed to enable 
increased purchase of good quality fingerlings and feed as well as for 
potential new entrants to construct ponds, thus problems with delivery of both 
credit and inputs to fish farmers are linked. In turn limited credit and input 
supply can hinder development of output markets as without increased 
production, sale of surplus fish will be low, leading to higher transaction costs 
and risks for buyers (as seen in the small-scale pond aquaculture system).  
The outcome of these mutually reinforcing problems, is transaction failure 
where transaction returns are lower than the costs and risks involved 
(Poulton et al., 2006; Dorward et al., 2005a). 
 
High costs of coordination and opportunism constrain market development 
and limit access to more lucrative urban markets and are key causes of 
transaction failure. They pose serious challenges for making the 
simultaneous and complementary investments needed at a number of 
different points in the supply chain for it to function (Dorward et al., 2005b). 
The high risk of coordination failure in the small-scale pond aquaculture 
system was illustrated above by the case of the fish trader in Kumasi who 
invested in a cold van and sold fish from rural pond farmers to urban retailers 
but was unable to sustain his business due to the irregular supply of table 
size fish. The trader’s investment in marketing services was not matched by 
investment by farmers in increased quantity and quality of supply, resulting in 
transaction failure. Similarly, opportunism was seen in the small-scale cage 
system where traders have stronger bargaining power than farmers and often 
do not pay the agreed price, which could lead to transaction failure in some 
cases and be a contributing factor to the high turnover of small-scale cage 
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aquaculture farms. Transaction failure can then lead to a low level equilibrium 
trap89 which occurs where constraints, low levels of institutional development, 
lack of incentives for actors to invest, limited economic activity and thin 
markets and poor coordination continually reinforce each other and restrict 
economic and technological development (Dorward et al., 2003; Dorward et 
al., 2005a and 2005b; Poulton et al., 2006).  
 
Thus, the key challenge for small-scale pond and cage aquaculture 
development is to develop supply chains that are able to offer farmers a 
range of input (feed and fingerlings), financial, technical, information and 
other services at the same time as enabling them to access urban and other 
markets that offer higher prices. It is likely that state provision of public goods 
will not be enough to stimulate growth of the small-scale pond aquaculture 
sector in the survey areas. As argued by Dorward et al. (2005a) and 
illustrated above, non-market coordination is needed to overcome the risks 
that constrain the simultaneous and complementary investments needed 
along the supply chain. The non-market coordination mechanisms required, 
and the potential actors and institutional arrangements that could provide and 
support them, are explored in the following chapter. 
 
7.3.3 Institutional perspective in current aquaculture development 
discourse 
As mentioned above, some analysts are questioning the efficacy of focusing 
on small-scale artisanal fish farmers to impact on poverty and increase fish 
production. They argue for the need to support SME farmers while also 
broadening the current emphasis on producers to include the whole value 
                                                 
 
89
 Poulton et al. (2006) illustrate the effect on the optimal level of supply chain investment of 
increased marginal factor costs (MFCs), especially at low levels of supply chain investment, when 
costs of opportunism, coordination and rent seeking are added to transformation costs. They show 
that when these transaction costs and risks are taken into consideration, optimal supply chain 
investment (where Marginal Value Product is equal to MFC) can occur at multiple equilibriums. 
There may then be a critical threshold level of total supply chain investment below which the 
marginal returns to investment are negative and below this threshold the supply chain is stuck in a 
low level equilibrium trap.  They use this analysis to help explain individual choices around a stable 
low level equilibrium in smallholder farming areas with an atomistic market of many small players 
without non-market coordination or collective action which is a common situation in SSA. 
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chain. The question of which aquaculture systems have the most potential to 
impact on poverty was addressed in Chapter 6 where it was argued that 
small-scale artisanal pond aquaculture (fish farming type A) in Ashanti 
Region has more potential to impact directly and indirectly on poverty 
compared to SME cage farming in Eastern Region for a given level of value 
added. However the current chapter has shown that the small-scale artisanal 
pond aquaculture system has the highest constraints to growth and faces 
difficult challenges in realising this potential. Medium and large-scale 
systems, on the other hand, may have less potential to impact on poverty 
than the small-scale artisanal sector, but hold the most potential for growth 
and to impact on national fish supplies. Therefore while there may appear to 
be some divergence between the results of this thesis and the changing view 
relating to which system has the most potential to impact on poverty, there 
may in fact be more convergence of views once systems’ relative potential 
for growth is taken into account. These issues are explored further in the 
following chapter.  
 
The argument that a value chain approach is needed to maximise the 
development of aquaculture is supported by the analysis in this thesis. 
Chapter 6 showed that the indirect poverty impacts of any aquaculture 
system, through economic multiplier effects and other linkages along the 
value chain and in the local economy should be considered when 
understanding each system’s potential for poverty impact and growth. 
However the increased focus of analysts on value chain development along 
with the policy and institutional environment and market access, does not 
appear to go far enough in addressing the high transaction costs and risks 
associated with the coordination and exchange of aquaculture commodities 
along the value chain or the need for ‘development coordination’ (Dorward et 
al., 2005b) to overcome constraints to aquaculture development. As 
discussed above, high transaction costs and risks pose many challenges to 
aquaculture development especially in areas with poor institutional 
development, typical of rural areas in SSA where aquaculture has failed to 
take off.  NIE theory suggests that development of risk reducing institutional 
arrangements is needed in these areas for market development of ‘linkage 
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intense technologies’. Institutional arrangements observed in the SME and 
large-scale aquaculture systems above support this theory.  
 
Pouomogne and Pemsl (2008) highlight that recent surveys have identified 
socio-economic and institutional factors, specifically related to accessing 
inputs and capital, and market development, to have much more influence on 
aquaculture development than agro-ecological or technological factors. 
However the insights from these surveys have not led to recommendations 
which focus specifically on institutional arrangements, reducing transaction 
costs and risks, and overcoming opportunism and coordination challenges 
(Dey et al., 2008; Russell et al., 2008; Brummett et al., 2008 and 2011). 
Rather, the individual recommendations of these various studies are focused 
on value chain development and technical support, and are not coherently 
linked in such a way that emphasises the need to support actors to make 
simultaneous and complementary investments in the supply chain to reduce 
coordination risk and transaction failure.  
 
However Pouomogne and Pemsl (2008) note that by the end of the last DfID-
funded project to develop small-scale IAA systems in Cameroon, production 
had increased and this demanded and led to the development of a collective 
marketing strategy with a local NGO managing purchase of fingerlings on 
credit, basic technical training, collective harvesting, and joint marketing 
(through linking farmers with urban fish traders) of 32 members of local 
farmers’ groups. Fish farmers could obtain quality fish seed at a lower price 
and get higher prices for fish, while others who benefited from buying 
fingerlings on credit established small fish farms which had survived the 3 
years since the project ended. This type of intervention addressing several 
elements of the supply chain simultaneously is an example of the 
‘developmental coordination’ approach discussed above and should be 
explored further. However Brummett et al. (2011) note of the same project 
that peri-urban farmers with market access responded much better to project 
interventions than small-scale rural artisanal farmers with poor market 
access, and their results were more sustainable as were their rates of return 
to donor investments. Thus it was concluded that in areas with limited market 
275 
 
access, while aquaculture adoption and productivity can be increased and 
local food security enhanced, the sustainability of interventions without 
extension subsidies is questionable.  
 
The experience of the project, which Brummett et al. (2011) state is typical of 
many small-scale aquaculture support projects undertaken in SSA over the 
past five decades, supports the argument above that access to urban 
markets with higher prices can intensify aquaculture and shows that small-
scale rural artisanal farmers face much higher constraints to growth than 
those closer to markets and those who are well resourced. However the 
conclusions and recommendations do not reflect the importance of 
institutional innovation (such as the case of collective marketing and supply 
chain coordination above or of alternative business models be they support 
for contract farming schemes or development of forward contracts between 
farmers and traders) as a potentially low cost and high impact intervention 
area which could help rural farmers overcome constraints and access 
markets.  
 
Thus it could be suggested that the failure of interventions, directed mainly at 
small-scale farmers, to develop African aquaculture over the past five 
decades, may not be entirely due to the low growth potential of small-scale 
fish farmers per se, but rather a result of the lack of attention to overcoming 
the transaction costs and risks facing farmers and other actors functioning in 
weak institutional environments, to make complementary and mutually 
dependent investments in supply chains (as argued by Dorward et al., 2005b 
for smallholder agricultural development). It could further be suggested that 
the reasons for the limited development of aquaculture in SSA are related to 
the overall lack of development in SSA and are similar to the reasons that 
smallholder agriculture, especially in staple crops, in SSA has also not 
intensified. Belton and Little (2011) observe that the expansion of Asian 
aquaculture generally accompanied high growth rates in other rural and 
urban sectors so can be viewed as a product of development and not a driver 
of it. Belton and Little (2011) cite Kelly et al. (2003) who conclude that the 
failure of interventions to intensify staple crop production in SSA is inevitable 
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without prior development by the state of public goods such as infrastructure 
and services, themselves indicators of development.  Dorward et al. (2004) 
argue that state-led development policies in successful Green Revolutions 
kick started markets by overcoming coordination failures and stimulated 
activity by large organisations (within which economic exchange and 
coordination could occur) in poor rural areas where the basic necessary 
conditions for growth such as communications infrastructure and productive 
technologies had been established. In this way, farmers and other actors in 
the small-scale agriculture sector had been able to escape the low level 
equilibrium trap by the time liberalisation occurred. However in SSA prior 
necessary conditions had not been established therefore government efforts 
to kick start markets and develop large organisations in rural areas failed. As 
agriculture had not escaped from the low level equilibrium trap, later market 
liberalisation was unable to stimulate market development (Dorward et al., 
2005b). These arguments can thus shed some further light on the failure of 
interventions to develop small-scale aquaculture in SSA and support the 
contention in this chapter that developmental coordination to overcome 
transaction costs and risks and transaction failure, is necessary for 
aquaculture to develop and realise its full potential for poverty impact in SSA. 
  
7.4 CONCLUSION 
 
The techno-economic characteristics of farmed fish from different 
aquaculture systems along with actors, institutional arrangements and their 
attributes were analysed in this chapter and summarised in Table 49. Overall 
the results suggest that the demanding commodity and transaction 
characteristics and high linkage intensity of aquaculture in different systems 
result in medium to high risk to return ratios and require non-market 
institutional arrangements to support their efficient coordination and 
exchange. While medium and large-scale farmers were observed to have the 
resources and high returns to overcome these constraints through various 
institutional arrangements which coordinate individual activities in the supply 
chain, small-scale pond and cage farmers, especially the former, require 
institutional development to support system development. Therefore the 
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hypothesis being tested, that due to the institutionally demanding techno-
economic characteristics of aquaculture products, complementary technical 
and institutional development is necessary for aquaculture to develop and 
impact poverty, is supported by the findings of this chapter. The types of 
institutional innovations which can potentially support the development of 
these aquaculture systems and increase their uptake, productivity and 
poverty impact, along with the implications of the results from Chapters 5 and 
6, are explored in the following chapter. 
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 CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The objective of this thesis is to understand the actual and potential impacts 
of different aquaculture systems on poverty and livelihoods in Ghana and the 
institutions required for aquaculture development to maximise its potential for 
poverty reduction. These issues have been explored by: i) investigating the 
direct poverty and livelihood impacts of small-scale artisanal pond 
aquaculture in Ashanti Region; ii) assessing the significance of indirect 
impacts such as economic linkages and employment, of the three main 
aquaculture systems in Ghana (small-scale artisanal pond aquaculture, SME 
and large-scale commercial cage aquaculture) and their implications for pro-
poor growth; and iii) analysing these systems from an institutional 
perspective to understand the institutions needed for different aquaculture 
systems to have the highest potential to promote poverty reduction in 
different contexts. 
 
This chapter reviews the key findings from the previous three chapters in 
order to understand the overall implications of these results. These 
implications are discussed in the context of the emerging paradigm in 
aquaculture development, referred to in previous chapters, which is shifting 
away from a narrow focus on supporting small-scale artisanal, non 
commercial, poor fish farmers (the predominant approach to supporting 
aquaculture by governments and aid agencies in SSA in previous decades) 
towards a broader value chain focus on SME commercial farming (e.g. Little 
et al., 2012). This discussion is then expanded to explore some examples of 
institutional arrangements and innovations which may have relevance for the 
promotion of aquaculture in Ghana in the context of weak institutional 
development, a context found in many rural areas in SSA where aquaculture 
is being promoted. The outcomes of these discussions and the results of this 
thesis are then brought together by outlining some broad principles for pro-
poor aquaculture development in Ghana to inform policies aimed at 
maximising the potential for aquaculture to impact on poverty in Ghana and 
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more widely in SSA. Some areas for further research are then suggested and 
the chapter ends with some concluding remarks. 
 
8.2 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
 
8.2.1 Direct impacts of small-scale pond aquaculture on poverty in 
Ashanti Region 
The results presented in Chapter 5 explored the differences between 
livelihood status, activities and outcomes of fish and non-fish farming 
households surveyed in Ashanti Region. This descriptive analysis showed 
that poor farmers are able to adopt pond aquaculture suggesting that 
aquaculture has the potential to directly impact on poverty. Fish farming 
households were found to have over 30 percent higher average income and 
nearly 2.5 times higher off-farm income than non-fish farming households. 
Non-poor fish farming households were found to have over double the off-
farm income of non-poor non-fish farming households. Fish farming 
households also had significantly higher household wealth (measured by the 
household asset index) than non-fish farming households and non-poor fish 
farming households had a higher household asset index score than non-poor 
non-fish farming households. Overall, therefore, fish farming households 
appear to be better off than non-fish farming households in terms of income, 
household wealth and slightly better off in terms of food adequacy. 
Significantly higher levels of income, household assets and off-farm income 
of non-poor fish farming households compared to poor fish farming 
households suggest that there may be an asset threshold over which fish 
farming allows higher income and asset accumulation. It also suggests that 
fish farming may have a higher potential to improve livelihoods for non-poor 
households over the asset threshold, than for poor households below the 
asset threshold.  
 
To account for possible differences in household characteristics, other than 
participation in fish farming, which may cause differences in poverty status 
and livelihood outcome indicators between fish farming and non-fish farming 
households, a household Income Determination Model (IDM) was used. The 
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IDM statistically controlled for differences in observable characteristics 
between households and was used to assess the factors that contribute to 
differences in income between fish farming and non-fish farming households. 
The conclusions of the descriptive analysis above are supported by the 
results of the IDM which indicated that participation in fish farming type A 
(where fish farmers are trained and/or use fertiliser in their ponds, a proxy for 
use of Better Management Practices (BMPs)) is associated with a 54 percent 
increase in household income when controlling for other household 
characteristics. Participation in fish farming type B, where farmers are not 
trained and do not use fertiliser, was not found to have a significant 
association with income, suggesting little difference in income between non-
fish farming and fish farming type B households. Although the tests for 
endogeneity and selection bias indicated no problems in the IDM, it is not 
possible to categorically state that fish farming type A causes income to 
increase. However the model suggests that fish farming has a positive effect 
on income and the differences in income (and most likely other outcome 
indicators such as household wealth) found in the descriptive statistics were 
not merely due to differences in household characteristics between groups.  
The results also suggest that adoption of fish farming is not necessarily 
associated with higher incomes unless farmers have been trained and/or use 
BMPs, in which case household income may be increased. However as 
noted above, the descriptive analysis points to the existence of an asset 
threshold over which fish farming allows income and capital accumulation, 
and also a threshold in the use of BMPs. The results of the descriptive 
analysis and IDM together therefore indicate that while fish farming type A 
increases income for non-poor farmers, poor farmers (under the BMP and 
asset thresholds) are less likely or able to participate in fish farming type A. 
Therefore it can be argued that while small-scale aquaculture is likely to have 
a strong impact on income and household wealth of non-poor farmers 
practising fish farming type A, it is unlikely to have much impact on poor 
farmers unless their resource constraints can be overcome and they are also 
able to engage in and benefit from fish farming type A.   
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Overall the results presented in Chapter 5 do not strongly support the 
hypothesis being tested that small-scale aquaculture has positive direct 
impacts on poverty and livelihoods of poor households in Ashanti Region. 
However the results do suggest that small-scale aquaculture has positive 
direct impacts on the livelihoods of non-poor households, and the magnitude 
of these impacts depends on the household and livelihood characteristics 
and aquaculture production systems of fish farmers in Ashanti Region, and 
the institutional and infrastructure context. The results also suggest that while 
aquaculture does not appear to have direct poverty impacts on poor 
households in Ashanti Region at present, it does have the potential to directly 
benefit poor fish farming households if their resource constraints can be 
overcome and they are able to use and benefit from BMPs. Chapter 5 
therefore identified two broad categories of small-scale farmers (poor and 
non-poor) that experience different levels of direct impacts from small-scale 
aquaculture under present conditions. 
 
8.2.2 Indirect impacts of different aquaculture systems on poverty in 
Ghana 
Given that as discussed above, fish farming was found to have direct impacts 
on non-poor farmers practising fish farming type A, Chapter 6 assessed the 
importance of actual and potential indirect impacts of: i) small-scale artisanal 
pond aquaculture (fish farming type A); ii) SME commercial cage 
aquaculture; and iii) large-scale commercial cage aquaculture. The national 
economic multiplier effect generated by fish farming type A was estimated to 
be approximately twice that of SME cage aquaculture (between 3.0 and 3.5, 
and between 1.5 and 1.6 respectively). Overall the economic multiplier 
effects and associated linkages (backward, forward, consumption and 
investment) were found to be relatively strong for small-scale pond 
aquaculture (fish farming type A), medium for SME cage aquaculture and 
weaker for large-scale cage aquaculture. However as not all the benefits of 
economic growth from each aquaculture system are likely to accrue to the 
poor, small-scale pond aquaculture was estimated to have more potential to 
indirectly impact on poverty at a medium level, as compared with weaker 
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impacts from SME cage aquaculture, with large-scale cage aquaculture 
generating the weakest impacts. 
  
Chapter 6 also estimated that small-scale artisanal pond farms (practising 
fish farming type A) may not create as much employment as SMEs if farmers 
do not hire labour to dig ponds, although if they do it is likely that small-scale 
pond aquaculture generates the same if not more direct employment than 
SME cage and pond farms per tonne of fish produced and per dollar 
invested. Indirect employment along the value chain was found to be higher 
from SME and large-scale cage farms at present due to the undeveloped 
nature of the small-scale pond aquaculture value chain and weak forward 
linkages. 
 
The results therefore indicate that at present, small-scale pond aquaculture 
(fish farming type A) by non-poor farmers has stronger indirect impact 
pathways and higher potential to impact on poverty than SME and large cage 
scale farming (and small-scale artisanal pond aquaculture by poor farmers 
practising fish farming type B). Thus for equivalent increases in scale, it is 
likely that small-scale pond aquaculture (fish farming type A) by non-poor 
farmers would have the most potential to impact on poverty. The results from 
Chapter 6 therefore do not support the hypothesis that SME cage 
aquaculture has more potential to impact on poverty than small-scale pond 
aquaculture or large-scale cage aquaculture.  
 
8.2.3 Institutional analysis of aquaculture systems in Ghana 
The techno-economic characteristics of farmed fish from different 
aquaculture systems along with actors, institutional arrangements and their 
attributes were analysed in Chapter 7. Overall the results suggest that the 
demanding techno-economic characteristics and high linkage intensity of 
aquaculture in different systems result in medium to high risk to return ratios 
and require non-market institutional arrangements to support their efficient 
coordination and exchange. Analysis of the current organisation of the small-
scale pond aquaculture system suggested the sector is stuck in a low level 
equilibrium trap: new entrants have little incentive to adopt aquaculture, most 
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current farmers have no motivation to intensify production, and traders have 
little incentive to invest in marketing fish from rural artisanal pond farmers in 
urban markets. In order to overcome this trap, producers need to be able to 
benefit from higher urban market prices through the development of 
institutional arrangements to reduce transaction costs and risks and increase 
non-market complementary coordination along the value chain. However, 
while these difficulties currently constrain growth of the small-scale pond 
aquaculture system (and to a lesser degree the small-scale cage aquaculture 
system), medium and large-scale farmers have resources and higher returns 
which enable them to overcome these constraints through various 
institutional arrangements that coordinate individual activities in the supply 
chain. Small-scale pond and cage farmers, especially the former, thus 
require support for institutional development to encourage system 
development.  
 
This analysis indicates that the key challenge for small-scale pond and cage 
aquaculture development is to develop coordinated supply chains that are 
able to offer farmers a range of input (feed and fingerlings), financial, 
technical, information and other services at the same time as enabling them 
to access urban and other markets that offer higher prices. It was suggested 
that state provision of public goods would not be enough to overcome the 
risks that constrain the simultaneous and complementary investments 
needed along the supply chain and non-market coordination would be 
required. The findings of Chapter 7 support the hypothesis that due to the 
institutionally demanding techno-economic characteristics of aquaculture 
products, complementary technical and institutional development is 
necessary for aquaculture to develop and impact poverty. 
 
8.3 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EMERGING 
PARADIGM SHIFT IN AQUACULTURE DEVELOPMENT 
 
This section discusses the key findings of the thesis in the context of the 
emerging paradigm in aquaculture development discussed in Chapter 2.   
The current move away from a narrow focus on poor producers, which has 
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been the dominant approach to developing the aquaculture sector in SSA for 
several decades (Brummett et al., 2008), is supported by the results of this 
thesis. It is unclear however whether the arguments in the aquaculture 
development literature (advocating for: expanding support to include 
‘commercial’, ‘quasi-capitalist’, SMEs; and taking a wider value chain or 
‘whole industry’ approach (Brummett et al., 2008; Beveridge et al., 2010; 
Little et al., 2012)) are fully, or only partially, supported by the thesis results. 
This is due to some areas of ambiguity within the emerging paradigm. This 
section briefly summarises the key findings of the thesis and explores the 
ambiguities within the emerging paradigm highlighted by these findings. 
 
Overall the thesis results suggest that potential impacts on poverty (direct or 
indirect) and growth potential together constitute a necessary and sufficient 
set of conditions for pro-poor aquaculture development. Individually each of 
these conditions is necessary for pro-poor aquaculture development but 
neither is sufficient on its own. Table 50 shows scores for the performance of 
each aquaculture system on these two dimensions based on the analysis in 
the previous chapters.  
 
Table 50: Summary of poverty impact and growth potential of different 
aquaculture systems in Ghana 
 Small-scale, artisanal,  ‘non 
commercial’, pond aquaculture 
systems 
‘Commercial’ cage aquaculture 
systems 
Contribution to pro-poor 
development  
Fish farming 
type B (poor 
farmers) 
Fish farming 
type A (non-
poor farmers) 
Small-
scale  
Medium-
scale  
Large-
scale  
Direct poverty impacts  x x x x 
Indirect poverty impacts x     
Current growth potential 
(farmers’ technical, institutional 
and financial capabilities) 
     
Notes:  
x  = none 
  = weak 
  = medium 
 = strong 
 
Table 50 suggests that the highest potential for aquaculture development 
poverty impacts in Ghana does not reside with small-scale, artisanal, ‘non 
285 
 
commercial’ pond aquaculture (fish farming type B) undertaken by poor 
farmers (with very limited growth potential despite potential direct poverty 
impacts) nor with ‘commercial’ cage aquaculture undertaken by SME and 
large scale farmers (with limited poverty impacts despite high growth 
potential). Instead it is the ‘intermediate’ aquaculture system, classified here 
as small-scale, artisanal, ‘non commercial’ pond aquaculture (fish farming 
type A), practised by non-poor farmers, that holds the greatest potential – as 
a result of its strong indirect poverty links and low but nevertheless important 
potential growth impacts if the constraints to growth faced by non-poor, 
small-scale artisanal fish farming type A farmers, can be addressed by 
supportive investment. 
 
The current rethinking in the aquaculture development literature of how 
aquaculture can reduce poverty most effectively by supporting value chain 
development of more commercial aquaculture, rather than focusing only on 
poor producers (Little et al., 2012) is thus broadly in line with the results of 
the thesis which also suggest that aquaculture development has more 
potential to reduce poverty through indirect, rather than direct, impact 
pathways. However, the extent to which the results support or question the 
shift towards ‘commercial’ aquaculture (e.g. Moehl et al 2006; Brummett et 
al., 2008) and a value chain approach (e.g. Beveridge et al., 2010) depend 
critically upon: i) the definition and classification of different types and scales 
of fish farming; ii) the importance of economic linkage effects (including but 
not limited to employment generation along the value chain); iii) the growth 
potential of different aquaculture systems and the role of institutional 
development  in overcoming constraints to growth; and iv) the objectives 
of policies and interventions seeking to expand aquaculture. These four 
issues are considered in turn. 
 
Challenges of definition 
The thesis results’ suggestion that non-poor, small-scale fish farmers, 
categorised here as ‘non commercial’, have a higher potential to impact on 
poverty than ‘commercial’ aquaculture SMEs may appear to question the 
move towards ‘commercial’ aquaculture in the emerging paradigm. However, 
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this apparent difference may be partly due to the difficulties of defining and 
characterising the wide variety of aquaculture systems and farmers between 
different contexts. These difficulties are illustrated by examination of a range 
of different aquaculture classifications used in the literature. These 
classifications tend to focus on very broad farmer categorisations such as 
‘commercial’ or ‘non commercial’ (Ridler and Hishamunda, 2001; Moehl et 
al., 2006), and extensive, artisanal, SME or large-scale (Brummett et al., 
2008). Each category then encompasses a range of farm types that differ in 
scale and intensity of production, amount of hired labour and purchased 
inputs, production levels, market orientation and overall motivation for fish 
farming. Consistent application of these categorisations in particular 
situations is difficult – as the Ghana case illustrates. 
 
Thus, as noted in Chapter 2, Moehl et al. (2006) define ‘non commercial’ 
farmers as farmers with ponds (as opposed to primarily fish farmers) who 
produce predominantly for profit.  While the small-scale farmers surveyed in 
this study in Ghana are farmers with ponds as part of diversified livelihood 
strategies, the primary motivation for the majority of both poor and non-poor 
farmers is profit (see Chapter 5). Thus there is some ambiguity as to which 
category (commercial or non commercial) these farmers belong to.  Asmah 
(2008) estimated nearly 97 percent of fish farms in Ghana were ‘non 
commercial’ according to the criteria outlined by Ridler and Hishamunda 
(2001). Hence, the majority of small-scale artisanal fish farmers surveyed for 
this thesis, including the non-poor farmers practising fish farming type A, are 
likely to be defined as ‘non commercial’. Similarly Beveridge et al. (2010:3) 
suggest that while aquaculture may be one component of a diversified 
livelihood strategy for the smallest commercial enterprises, many SMEs are 
characterised by livelihoods largely dependent on aquaculture and by 
production that is typically semi-intensive with production levels between 1 
and 100 tonnes per farm per annum. The non-poor, small-scale fish farmers 
surveyed here fit some but not all of these criteria and fall well below the 
minimum one tonne per annum to be considered SMEs. These ambiguities 
are also reflected in the characterisation of artisanal farmers. Overall, the 
small-scale farmers classified as artisanal in this thesis do not correspond to 
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the characteristics of Brummett et al.’s (2008) artisanal farmers (see Chapter 
6, Section 6.3.1). However the characteristics of the surveyed poor, small-
scale farmers appear to correspond much more closely with Brummett et al.’s 
artisanal farmers (particularly in relation to their levels of production and 
proportion of fish sold) than those of the non-poor, small-scale farmers (see 
Chapter 5). These non-poor farmers however also do not resemble the 
commercial SME farmers characterised by Brummett et al. and are located 
between artisanal and SME categories, while also overlapping with both on 
certain characteristics.  
 
Little et al. (2012) note that definitions of aquaculture based on scale of 
production using indicators of area and levels of inputs and/or outputs 
reveals contradictions. Belton et al. (2012) argue for a ‘relations of 
production’ approach defining aquaculture in terms of relationships (‘quasi-
peasant’, ‘quasi-capitalist’ and ‘capitalist’) as a way of overcoming some of 
the difficulties with relating scale to levels of intensity, employment, and 
production. While overall, these categories still correspond to the definitions 
related to commercial orientation discussed above, these new categories 
enable a wider range of farm characteristics to be incorporated including use 
of hired labour, farmer motivations, aquaculture’s place in farmer’s 
livelihoods, while also situating the farms in various value chains. Belton et 
al. (2012) found that in Bangladesh, commercially oriented ‘quasi capitalist’ 
aquaculture may have stronger potential to reduce poverty than ‘quasi-
peasant’ aquaculture. Using this typology, both poor and non-poor small-
scale pond aquaculture farmers surveyed here fall under the ‘quasi peasant’ 
(similar to ‘non commercial’) rather than the ‘quasi capitalist’ (similar to 
‘commercial’) category90, though it could be argued that the non-poor farmers 
                                                 
 
90
 Small-scale pond aquaculture analysed for this thesis corresponds to ‘quasi-peasant’ aquaculture 
(poor farmers practising fish farming type B fit in the low production intensity group and non-poor 
farmers practising fish farming type A fit in the moderate production intensity group). Small-scale 
cage aquaculture corresponds to ‘quasi capitalist’ aquaculture (moderate or intensive production 
intensity), medium-scale cage aquaculture corresponds to ‘capitalist’ aquaculture (moderate or high 
production intensity) and large-scale commercial cage aquaculture corresponds to ‘capitalist’ 
aquaculture (high production intensity).  
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fall somewhere between the two due to their use of hired labour (see Chapter 
6). 
 
Figure 25 locates the different categories of fish farmers analysed in this 
thesis within the standard classifications commonly used, to illustrate these 
ambiguities.  
 
Figure 25: Definitions of aquaculture systems and fish farmer 
categories 
 
 
Figure 25 shows that non-poor, small-scale farmers practicing fish farming 
type A are located somewhere between: artisanal and SME; ‘non 
commercial’ and ‘commercial’; and ‘quasi-peasant’ and ‘quasi-capitalist’ 
categories, while overlapping more with artisanal, ‘non commercial’, ‘quasi-
capitalist’ categories. The binary classification by Martinez-Espinosa (1995) 
of Type I and Type II rural aquaculture representing the ‘poorest of the poor’ 
and ‘less poor’ farmers respectively appears to correspond best with the poor 
and non-poor small-scale farmers analysed in this thesis. It is clear however 
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that the non-poor, small-scale farmers practising fish farming type A, 
identified in this thesis as having the highest potential for poverty impact in 
Ghana, do not fit neatly into the standard, commercially oriented categories 
which the emerging paradigm is moving towards. 
 
This discussion indicates that the categories commonly used to define types 
and scales of aquaculture systems and farmers, do not reflect the wide 
spectrum of fish farmers operating in SSA nor correspond to the reality of the 
Ghanaian small-scale artisanal and SME farmers surveyed here. These 
broad categories are thus likely to cause some confusion when targeting 
interventions and development assistance. They are also a source of 
ambiguity between the findings of this thesis and the emerging paradigm’s 
move towards supporting ‘commercial’ aquaculture. In reality farmers are 
located along a continuum and the classification of aquaculture systems and 
farmers are likely to differ between contexts. Relying on these broad 
classifications to help to target aquaculture development efforts may risk 
overlooking important aquaculture systems and fish farmer categories with 
high potentials to impact on poverty. It is therefore important to further 
develop an understanding of relevant classifications of aquaculture systems 
and farm types that are more easily comparable across different contexts.  
 
The importance of economic multiplier effects 
The shifting focus of aquaculture development strategies towards support of 
‘commercial’ farmers may not only be a response or reaction to the apparent 
failures of past efforts to develop the small-scale ‘non commercial’ 
aquaculture sector, but is also in line with changing paradigms in the wider 
development sector. Belton and Little (2011) citing Gibbon and Schulpen 
(2002), refer to this as the current private-sector development consensus 
among multilateral and bilateral institutions based on the understanding that 
economic growth (needed for poverty alleviation) is best achieved through 
facilitating private sector development (e.g. World Bank, 2007). The current 
shift towards ‘commercial’ aquaculture development appears to be influenced 
by this general development trend and is thus partly based on the view that 
‘commercial’ SMEs and ‘quasi capitalist’ enterprises have more potential to 
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impact on poverty through generating employment along the value chain and 
creating economic growth than ‘non commercial’, ‘quasi peasant’, artisanal 
aquaculture (Brummett et al., 2008; Belton et al., 2012; Little et al., 2012). 
This argument does not, however, appear to be grounded in analysis or 
evidence of the relative importance of potential economic multiplier effects 
(incorporating both production linkages along the value chain as well as 
consumption linkages) and other economic linkage effects generated by 
different aquaculture systems to impact on poverty (investigated in Chapter 
6). While there have been an increasing number of studies recently showing 
the potential of commercial aquaculture to create employment on-farm and 
along the value chain (e.g. Faruque, 2007; Irz et al, 2007a; Macfadyen et al., 
2011; Belton et al., 2012), there are no studies estimating economic multiplier 
effects of aquaculture in developing countries.  
 
Chapter 6 has shown the most important indirect benefits of aquaculture 
development on poverty are likely to be through economic multiplier effects. 
The magnitude of these effects is determined to a large extent by 
consumption linkages. It appears therefore that though the results of this 
thesis are in agreement with broadening support beyond poor fish farmers, 
they also question the shifting of support to ‘commercial’, SME, ‘quasi-
capitalist’ fish farms on the basis that they create higher indirect poverty 
impacts, when there is no evidence that this category of fish farmer has the 
potential to generate higher economic multiplier effects than other farmer 
categories. The results of this thesis have shown that in Ghana, non-poor 
small-scale farmers practising fish farming type A, likely to be characterised 
as ‘quasi peasant’ and ‘non commercial’ according to commonly used 
definitions, have the potential to create greater economic multiplier effects 
and broad based economic growth and hence higher poverty impacts than 
‘commercial’, ‘quasi capitalist’ SME cage aquaculture farmers. These results 
again suggest that the poverty impacts generated by different aquaculture 
systems and farmer groups are likely to differ between contexts. Thus, the 
characteristics of different types of farmers and the range of economic 
linkages arising from different systems, must be understood if support is to 
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be correctly targeted to the aquaculture systems and farmer categories with 
the highest potentials to impact on poverty in different contexts.  
 
Institutional innovation to overcome constraints to growth in 
aquaculture development 
The analysis in this thesis supports the general trend towards taking a 
broader value chain perspective for aquaculture development. This 
perspective is important not only due to the benefits of employment 
generation along value chains, but also due to the importance of making 
simultaneous and complementary investments along the value chain in order 
for aquaculture systems to grow and hence realise their potential to impact 
on poverty, economic growth and local and national food security (see 
Chapter 7). The potential for aquaculture systems to grow is related to the 
potential of producers to intensify (based on their technical and institutional 
capabilities) and of systems to attract new entrants. While non-poor farmers 
practising fish farming type A may have the greatest poverty impact potential, 
the small-scale artisanal sector also faces the highest constraints to growth. 
This is due to the high transaction costs and risks faced by actors within the 
small-scale sector, leading to transaction failure and a low level equilibrium 
trap, and the lack of financial and social resources of dispersed farmers to 
overcome these challenges to growth. Thus despite its potential for poverty 
impact in Ghana, supporting the small-scale artisanal sector would appear to 
be much more challenging and expensive for donors and governments than 
supporting the SME sector where farmers have higher levels of financial and 
social resources to overcome constraints, are less dispersed and are already 
linked to growing urban markets and demand for fish. Therefore, there may 
be more convergence between the findings of the thesis and the move 
towards ‘commercial’ aquaculture development when systems’ relative 
potential for growth is considered, but the move towards more ‘commercial’ 
aquaculture development should not be taken too far. 
 
While this thesis has compared aquaculture systems at a given level of 
output or value added (see Chapter 6), assessing the potential impact of 
these aquaculture systems on poverty according to levels of donor 
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investment may also contribute to debates about the emerging paradigm 
which suggests that aquaculture SME’s give higher returns on donor 
investment than small-scale artisanal farmers (Brummett et al., 2011). 
However this analysis is difficult to undertake with the available evidence, 
especially without knowing what form donor investment should take. Chapter 
7 found that development of aquaculture in Ghana may be better supported 
through institutional rather than (or in addition to) technical or other types of 
support, and institutional innovations do not require huge investments of 
donor funds. Rather they require knowledge and understanding of the 
institutional arrangements and environment of these farming systems. 
Focusing on returns to donor investment therefore may not be so relevant 
without consideration of these issues. While the small-scale artisanal sector 
may face the greatest challenges to growth, if these challenges can be 
overcome through coordinated value chain development facilitated by 
institutional innovation, it may still hold the most potential for poverty impact 
in Ghana. Thus not only is a broader value chain approach important for 
aquaculture development, so is institutional innovation to maximise the 
potential for aquaculture system growth. 
 
Objectives of policies and interventions to develop aquaculture 
Another issue in clarifying some of the ambiguities around the thesis results 
and the move towards supporting ‘commercial’ aquaculture is the recognition 
of a number of distinct but overlapping goals for aquaculture development in 
SSA namely: national food (or fish) security goals, development and poverty 
reduction goals, and local and/or household food security goals. It is likely in 
most contexts, and certainly in Ghana, that different aquaculture systems 
may be best suited to addressing different goals. For example the thesis 
results suggest that non-poor artisanal farmers practising fish farming type A 
have the most potential to generate economic multiplier effects and thus 
reduce poverty. Commercial SME and large-scale cage aquaculture on the 
other hand has more potential to impact on national fish supplies and face 
less constraints to growth than fish farming types A and B which have more 
potential to impact on the household food security of poor fish farming 
households. Donor and national government objectives for the aquaculture 
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sector in SSA usually encompass this range of goals. If projects designed to 
achieve household food security and poverty alleviation goals are then 
judged on their ability to increase national fish supplies, they may unfairly be 
viewed as unsuccessful. If the priority of governments is to increase national 
fish supplies, targeting support towards commercial SME and large-scale fish 
farming would be a more appropriate strategy.  
 
Taking account of these considerations, the key findings of this thesis and 
their implications for aquaculture development discussed in this section can 
be summarised using Figure 26 below. 
 
Figure 26: Potential of different aquaculture systems to reduce poverty 
and increase production in Ghana 
 
 
Figure 26 highlights two of the main goals of aquaculture development 
discussed above: increased national fish production and poverty reduction. 
The figure illustrates the potentials of the different aquaculture systems 
analysed in this thesis to increase production and reduce poverty in Ghana. 
Poor farmers practising fish farming type B have the least potential to reduce 
Limited production 
growth for small 
scale pond and 
cage farms
unless 
coordinated 
value chain 
support
Medium-
scale commercial
cage farms
Small-
scale commercial
cage farms
Production  
potential
Poverty reduction potential
High
Low
Low High
Large-scale 
commercial
cage farms
Poor pond 
farmers 
Type B
Non poor 
pond farmers 
Type A
Limited poverty reach 
unless outgrowers
Limited uptake & 
production or 
poverty impact 
due to resource 
limitations
GOAL
294 
 
poverty or increase national fish production (though they do have potential to 
increase household food security). Non-poor small-scale farmers practising 
fish farming type A have the highest potential to reduce poverty but less 
potential to increase national production, though both of these potentials 
would increase if coordination along the value chain was supported through 
institutional innovation (discussed further in Section 8.4 below). At present 
small-scale commercial cage farmers have low to medium potential to 
increase fish production and reduce poverty however their potential to 
increase national fish production would also increase through coordinated 
value chain support. Medium-scale cage farmers have medium potential to 
increase production and low to medium potential to reduce poverty. Large-
scale commercial cage farmers have the highest potential to increase 
national fish production but low potential to reduce poverty, unless they 
develop institutional innovations to benefit small-scale farmers for example 
through contract farming schemes (discussed below).  
 
While the findings of this thesis support the emerging paradigm’s view of the 
limited potential of poor aquaculture producers to impact on poverty either 
directly or indirectly, there remains some ambiguity around the category of 
fish farmer that has the most potential to reduce poverty through indirect 
impact pathways. Thus, in order to correctly identify and target the 
aquaculture systems and farmer categories with the highest potential for 
poverty impact in different contexts, increased emphasis and clarity are 
required on the following areas within the emerging paradigm:  
i) an understanding of farm classifications which are relevant across 
aquaculture systems and contexts needs to be developed; 
ii) the aquaculture systems and farmer categories targeted for 
support should be those with the potential to generate the 
strongest economic multiplier effects; 
iii) institutional innovation to overcome high transaction costs and 
risks is a key requirement for aquaculture systems to grow and 
hence realise their potential to impact on poverty, economic growth 
and local and national food security (discussed below).   
 
295 
 
8.4 EXAMPLES OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR NON-
MARKET COORDINATION 
 
The failure to develop small-scale aquaculture in SSA may not be due to the 
low growth potential of small-scale fish farmers per se, but rather a result of 
the lack of attention to overcoming the transaction costs and risks facing 
farmers and other actors functioning in weak institutional environments, to 
make complementary and mutually dependent investments in supply chains. 
This section presents examples of some potential institutional arrangements 
which could be relevant for non-market coordination of small-scale pond and 
cage aquaculture to overcome these transaction costs. While the exact type 
and form of the institutional innovations required to develop the small-scale 
aquaculture sector in Ghana requires further research which is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, some examples of the types of coordination mechanisms 
which could be considered, especially forward market contracts and contract 
farming models are explored below.  
 
Contract coordination represents institutional arrangements between spot 
market exchange and hierarchy or vertical integration (as found in the large-
scale cage farms in Chapter 7) and can offer many of the advantages of 
vertical integration while allowing producers to retain some independence 
(Jaffee, 1995:52).  Contracts which cover a production cycle and trade in 
promised rather than already produced goods are referred to as forward 
market contracts and can vary in form and intensity. Forward 
resource/management contracts combine forward market sale and purchase 
commitments with conditions which require producers to use particular inputs 
and production methods. Arrangements such as these, which incorporate 
many factor and product transactions, are found in a variety of agreements 
including franchising and contract farming in the agriculture sector (Jaffee, 
1995:53). When comparing a wide range of institutional measures to 
enhance commodity system coordination, efficiency and market power, 
Jaffee (1995:62) finds that only two types of arrangement, forward contracts 
and vertical integration (hierarchy), positively affect all flows, risks and market 
issues that are likely to hinder market development including information, 
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product, and financial flows, procurement and market risk, and achievement 
of economies of scale and market power.  
 
Delgado (1999) assesses the role of vertical integration of smallholders with 
processors and marketers of high value items in SSA and suggests the most 
common arrangements of contract farming and producer co-operatives 
provide some of the most lucrative opportunities available to smallholders in 
SSA. Contract farming arrangements are described as ways to enable small-
scale farmers to behave independently except for having a contract with 
other farmers, traders, processors for the supply of at least one input or 
factor, and/or sales of output, thus providing the non-market coordination 
required to support many small-scale farmers. In their guide to contract 
farming Eaton and Shephard (2001) identify a range of contract farming 
models (e.g. centralised, nucleus estate, multipartite or joint venture, 
intermediary and informal models) which are suitable to address the 
coordination needs of different commodities and their characteristics, 
resources of the contractor, the social and physical environments and the 
needs of the farmers and their farming systems. They emphasise that these 
arrangements must be commercially rather than donor or government driven 
in order to be successful. A range of contract types are also identified, 
summarised by Jaffee and Morton (1995) as marketing contracts, production-
management contracts and resource providing contracts in order of 
increasing levels of control given to the contractor with regard to production 
management and provision of inputs.  
 
Bijman (2008) notes that products which have heterogeneity in quality and 
are high value, perishable and technically difficult to produce are more likely 
to require vertical coordination between buyers and sellers (as argued in 
Chapter 7). Bijman (2008) indicates that contract farming is thus likely to be 
used for perishable products such as dairy and commodities which involve 
technical difficulty in production such as poultry and quality sensitive products 
such as high value fruits and vegetables. Thus contract farming is likely to be 
appropriate for production of farmed fish, which incorporates all these 
commodity characteristics. Delgado (1999) also arrives at similar conclusions 
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using a rough analysis which scores 24 commodities commonly produced in 
rural Africa for the presence of 10 commodity specific transaction cost factors 
related to production and marketing, identifying the common forms of market 
organisation observed in SSA for each commodity. Aquaculture was among 
the commodities with the highest level of production and marketing related 
transaction costs (scoring 8 out of 10, the same as cocoa, industrial swine, 
palm oil and tobacco, with export vegetables, Arabica coffee, dairy, tea and 
cut flowers scoring higher). The market organisation of all these commodities 
were found to involve predominantly contract farming and/or large farms. 
Delgado argues that due to the significant transaction costs associated with 
aquaculture (as well as with other commodities such as cotton and cocoa) in 
both production and marketing, it is difficult for independent smallholders to 
undertake and is better suited to contract farming than large farms due to 
factors such as quality specificity and the difficulties of monitoring producer 
effort. 
 
In a rare case study of institutional innovation in aquaculture development in 
SSA, Karaan (2009) uses a transaction costs approach, similar to Delgado 
(1999), to show the importance of coordination in the mussel mariculture 
industry in South Africa. The small-scale sector is characterised by high 
levels of asset specificity, uncertainty and low transaction volumes and 
frequency, similar in many ways to the small-scale artisanal pond 
aquaculture and small-scale cage aquaculture sectors analysed in this thesis. 
Karaan compares the transaction costs of mussel farming and their possible 
causes in relation to a range of institutional arrangements. Franchising91 
followed closely by contract farming were found to be more favourable 
coordination arrangements to deal with these transaction costs than large-
                                                 
 
91
 Karaan (2009:248) cites Rudolph (1999) in defining business-format franchising (not product or 
brand franchising) as a contractual relationship between two or more businesses when certain 
conditions hold which make this arrangement more long term and vertically integrated than 
conventional contract farming. Franchisees are provided with the resources, services and inputs 
required for them to use the franchisor’s business model giving franchisees a competitive advantage 
over other independent farmers. This requires payment of an initial fee and royalties to the 
franchisor and requires a long term contractual relationship amongst other conditions (Karaan, 
2009). 
298 
 
scale vertically integrated farms or small-scale independent farmers engaged 
in spot market exchange. The theoretical advantages of this type of 
coordination arrangement were also reflected in practise as the case study 
was based on a fishing and mussel farming company which implemented a 
successful pilot project where growers (in this case fishing company workers) 
were provided assets on a cost-recovery basis as well as extension services, 
guaranteed markets, inputs on credit, and other logistical assistance.  
 
While no established contract farming or franchising models for aquaculture 
were observed during field work for this thesis, the relevance of these types 
of vertically coordinated arrangements for aquaculture development is 
reflected in the growing private sector interest in establishing such business 
models in Ghana. At the time of survey, a social enterprise called Tilapiana 
was conducting pilot testing in Ghana with a view to establishing an 
aquaculture social enterprise using a franchise business model.  Tilapiana’s 
website states that ‘just as traditional franchises provide a business in a box, 
Tilapiana provides a “Profit in a Pond” and gives its franchisees all of the 
training, supplies, and resources necessary to successfully run a Tilapiana 
Fish Farm’92. While the current status of the project is unknown, it is an 
indication that innovative institutional arrangements such as franchising for 
non-market coordination may have an important role to play in developing the 
small-scale aquaculture sector and that incentives exist for social 
entrepreneurs and other private sector actors such as larger scale farmers 
and agribusiness companies to invest in these contractual arrangements. 
Franchising may be a superior business model to contract farming for small-
scale pond aquaculture among poorer farmers in Ghana as a key constraint 
to adoption is the high and lumpy investment needed in specific assets of 
pond and fingerlings. As a more vertically integrated model than contract 
farming, franchising could help to overcome this constraint by facilitating and 
encouraging farmers to invest in these specific assets, giving them the 
assurance that the complementary investments needed to make their 
                                                 
 
92
 http://tilapiana.com/?page_id=57 (accessed 8
 
March 2013). 
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investment profitable are also being made along the supply chain at the 
same time. 
 
This interest in developing commercially driven institutional arrangements is 
also seen in the cage aquaculture sector. The Triton Group, an international 
seafood trading company with an annual turnover of over US$500 million, 
was in the process of establishing a cage farm in Lake Volta in 2010/2011. 
The company had decided to vertically integrate their marketing activities 
with production by producing farmed fish to sustain their seafood trading 
business and compensate for the declining supplies from capture fisheries. 
The cage farm was at the pilot stage at the time of interview but was 
expected to expand rapidly as Triton was planning to invest US$20 million in 
the coming three years on a feed plant, hatchery, and grow out cage farm. 
The manager indicated that Triton was interested in establishing a contract 
farming scheme with small-scale cage farmers once their farm and input 
production operations were established in 2013/2014. Triton plans to produce 
10,000 tonnes of fish per year but requires a further 50 to 100,000 tonnes. 
However due to the high risks involved in large-scale production related to 
management of such a large labour force93 such as shirking, as well as theft 
which was thought to be an even bigger problem (also experienced by both 
Tropo and WAF), Triton plans to establish a contract farming scheme with 
small-scale cage farmers who can take on these risks. The farmers would 
make an agreement with Triton where they would provide collateral in the 
form of property deeds, land94 etc. to reduce the incentive for side selling and 
contract default and ensure compliance. The agreement would involve supply 
of fingerlings, feed and technical advice to farmers along with output 
marketing where Triton would set the price of fish that they will buy from them 
in 6 months in a forward contract95.  
                                                 
 
93
 For 100,000 tonnes it was estimated that 1,500 local labourers would be needed along with 100 
expatriates 
94
 While land and property may be hard for small-scale artisanal farmers to offer as collateral, this is 
not the case for small-scale cage farmers who are generally better off (see Chapters 6 and 7). 
95
 The economics to produce 1kg of fish in this way were calculated as follows:  
Seed cost of US$0.3, feed cost of US$1.2, additional costs (e.g. labour, capital costs etc.) of US$0.7 
totalling US$2.2. Triton would then buy at US$2.8/kg and sell at US$3/kg. 
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As noted above, contract farming involves risks of farmers defaulting on 
contracts due to side selling, production failure or avoidance of credit 
repayment. Contractors may also face high transaction costs due to the small 
size of farmers and their dispersion in rural areas while small-scale farmers 
may have less bargaining power than with sales to independent buyers. 
These risks can be reduced if contract farming is coupled with farmer 
cooperation. Farmer cooperation through establishment of farmer 
organisations can also provide services to farmers. For example Delgado 
(1999) points to cases of specialised producer co-operatives, such as dairy 
co-operatives in Kenya that process and market milk and that often play a 
similar role to contract farming arrangements in enabling access to assets, 
information, services and markets, especially for perishable items such as 
milk, which could also be appropriate for farmed fish. While Kenya has a long 
and mixed history of supporting smallholder dairy farmers (Omore et al., 
1999), there have been successes in the promotion of coordination systems 
for development of the dairy sector and small farmer intensification in recent 
years through the ‘hub’ business model established by Heifer International 
and scaled up through the East Africa Dairy Development project funded by 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF). The hub model is a system 
for facilitating complementary investments in the smallholder dominated milk 
supply chain and overcoming coordination failure, for a perishable good such 
as milk with some similar techno-economic characteristics to those of farmed 
fish.  
 
The Hub Model was developed to increase access of small farmers in remote 
rural areas to lucrative urban output markets, and respond to the need for 
training, services and supplies to increase smallholder dairy farm 
productivity.  Heifer International – Kenya96 launched a pilot farmer owned 
milk collection and chilling centre with a Dairy Farmers Cooperative Society 
between 1996 and 1999 (where farmers and community members are 
shareholders in the business) and supported scaling up of a further three 
                                                 
 
96
 Funded by USAID and Heifer International.  
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from 2000 to 2003. In 2008 these plants were further scaled up with funding 
from BMGF, and numbered 20 in 2010 and supplied 10 percent of Kenya’s 
commercially processed milk (Kruse, 2012). Farmers supply their surplus 
milk to the dairy plant via a network of local transporters. The plant tests, 
filters, and chills the milk, and sells it on to processors at higher prices than 
individual farmers are paid due to the large volume of quality controlled milk 
they can deliver. The well established milk plants have evolved into complex 
and financially independent rural business centres referred to as Chilling 
Hubs (CHs), the most successful of which have an annual turnover of over 
US$2 million, over 70 percent of which is farmer income (Kruse, 2012). 
These CHs have expanded to include agro-vet supply shops, animal health 
assistants and veterinary services, artificial insemination services, and deliver 
farm services, inputs and extension training to farmers. These services have 
further increased farmers’ productivity and enabled the CHs to provide 
community services such as health insurance and village banking and credit 
facilities to become financially viable (Kruse, 2012). 
 
Dairy farmers in Kenya face a number of similar constraints to small-scale 
pond farmers in Ashanti Region outlined in previous chapters such as poor 
infrastructure and transportation services, limited government services and 
extension, inadequate private sector service provision and missing markets 
for credit. These constraints are being successfully addressed through the 
CHs which provide coordinated and complementary input and marketing 
services to farmers enabling production intensification and supply chain 
development despite the weak institutional environment.  However the small-
scale aquaculture sector in Ghana does not have as long a history of support 
as the small-scale dairy industry in Kenya.  Large numbers of smallholders 
own dairy cows for household milk consumption in Kenya while in Ghana 
there are very low number of functional fish farmers. An important 
prerequisite for the success of the CH model is the ability for farmers to 
produce a surplus. It appears that the establishment of such a model for 
aquaculture in Ghana would therefore have to be preceded by direct 
government or donor support or other means for increasing the level of 
adoption and productivity of small-scale fish farming beyond a certain 
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threshold, after which a financially sustainable CH or a comparable ‘cold 
store’ model could be developed. Also while the volume of smallholder dairy 
transactions is low, the transaction frequency is high (often daily) albeit 
seasonal, whereas small-scale fish farming has low volume and frequency of 
transactions over long production cycles requiring production coordination to 
ensure a steady supply of fish. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
study the experiences of this model in depth, analysis of successful 
coordination models such as this could yield important lessons for promoting 
small-scale aquaculture in Ghana and elsewhere in SSA and help develop a 
vision of how the sector could be organised in the future.  
 
In response to farmer demands, a coordination model called One Stop Aqua 
Shops (OSAS), similar in concept to the CHs above, was started in India by 
the Network of Aquaculture Centres of Asia-Pacific’s (NACA) Support to 
Regional Aquatic Resources Management (STREAM) initiative in 2005 in 
Eastern India, benefiting 20,000 farmers97. The model has been replicated in 
Pakistan and Vietnam (Wood and Mayer, 2007) and is currently being piloted 
in Western Kenya by a consortium of partners coordinated by FARM Africa 
and funded by DfID. In India the OSASs act as hubs for commercial and 
small-scale farmers to access good quality seed, feed and technical advice, 
and help farmers develop linkages with markets and service providers 
including rural banks (Wood and Mayer, 2007). The OSAS function under a 
range of models for example in India, some were established by the local 
Department of Fisheries and others by federations of farmer self help groups 
(Haylor et al., 2005). In Western Kenya the project is aiming to develop a 
network of commercially viable franchised outlets in up to 6 locations 
servicing up to 1000 farmers with local entrepreneurs as franchise owners98. 
While there is limited documentation on OSAS and their impact, and they 
require more widespread piloting, they provide examples of institutional 
innovations which have the potential to overcome some of the constraints 
                                                 
 
97
 http://www.maendeleo-atf.org/News/aquashop.html (accessed 10 June 2012) 
98
 http://www.maendeleo-atf.org/News/aquashop.html (accessed 10 June 2012) 
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discussed in Chapter 7 and above, such as the risk of commitment failure 
and the need for value chain coordination to enable simultaneous and 
complementary investments in the aquaculture value chains. The OSAS may 
thus be an effective way to encourage private sector driven growth of the 
aquaculture sector and create private-public partnerships in service 
provision. 
 
The various examples discussed above show the potential for institutional 
innovation and coordination to overcome some of the transaction costs and 
risks of small-scale fish farmers in rural areas.  
 
8.5 PRINCIPLES FOR AQUACULTURE DEVELOPMENT 
 
This section outlines some broad principles for aquaculture development, 
distilled from the results of this thesis, to help guide the development of the 
small-scale pond aquaculture sector in Ghana. For aquaculture to have the 
highest potential to impact on poverty, both directly and indirectly, access of 
small-scale artisanal farmers to the necessary assets, information, skills, 
capital, services and input and output markets needs to be improved in order 
to enable them to respond to the growing demand for fish in local and urban 
markets. These principles therefore focus on the need for institutional 
innovation and development to enhance the capacity of private sector actors 
to address the problems of service delivery in thin rural markets for the small-
scale artisanal aquaculture sector, though they are also applicable to the 
development of cage aquaculture, especially the small-scale cage 
aquaculture sector. 
 
Public goods alone are not sufficient to develop the aquaculture sector 
The findings of this thesis lead to the conclusion that while state provision of 
transport and communications infrastructure, aquaculture research and 
extension, good governance, and other public goods required to strengthen 
the institutional environment are extremely important for overall development 
and economic growth, on their own they may not be enough to encourage 
private sector participation and investment in the small-scale aquaculture 
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sector. The role of government and other development actors promoting 
aquaculture in Ghana should be aimed not only at developing a favourable 
institutional environment but also at promoting institutional arrangements that 
reduce the high transaction costs and risks currently faced by all actors within 
the sector while increasing their transaction returns. 
 
Institutional innovation 
If small-scale aquaculture is to be promoted then support is required to 
facilitate the development of different institutional arrangements to improve 
farmers’ access to production services and output markets, overcome risks of 
coordination and market failure, engaging both state and private actors. 
Government policy may be required to support the development of credit, 
input and output markets so that the transaction costs and risks for farmers 
and traders and other actors are reduced and they are encouraged to 
increase their participation in these markets and the wider value chain. Once 
these markets have increased in volume and effective institutional 
arrangements have developed to support them and transaction costs and 
risks have lowered sufficiently, external involvement in these markets can be 
reduced (Dorward et al., 2004). Since government may not itself have the 
capacity to develop the necessary institutional arrangements or to effectively 
support institutional development, there is likely to be an important role for 
NGOs, donors and development agencies to undertake interventions to 
develop key credit, input and output markets and institutional arrangements 
to support aquaculture development. The role of Heifer International and 
BMGF in developing and scaling up the dairy CHs in Kenya discussed above 
may provide instructive examples here. 
 
Action research should also be supported to develop and test different types 
of institutional arrangements (Dorward et al., 2004) with a focus on 
interlinked contractual arrangements through contract farming and franchise 
type schemes. As discussed above, these business models appear to 
provide promising opportunities for growth of the small-scale pond and cage 
aquaculture sectors. Large farms can also represent a potentially useful 
source of skills and assets to help organise smallholders into contract 
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farming or franchising schemes and government can play an important role 
to encourage these types of arrangements by exploring and facilitating links 
between large farms or agribusiness firms and small-scale farmers. 
Promoting farmer organisations, building farmers’ capacity for example in 
numeracy and recordkeeping and developing good working relationships 
between farmers groups and agribusiness is also important. Coordination of 
input supply and output marketing can be supported by facilitating links 
between farmers, processors, traders and fingerling suppliers. While this is 
already being done at a low level by extension staff as noted in Chapter 7, 
their coordination role is limited by lack of resources and most small-scale 
artisanal fish farmers in rural areas are not reached therefore development of 
alternative coordination mechanisms is required. 
 
Stakeholder coordination 
Public and private stakeholders need to be brought together, either by 
government or through a private organisation such as the national Ghana 
Aquaculture Association99 (GAA), to address critical issues in the aquaculture 
sector (such as poor quality fingerlings) and to encourage coordinated 
investment in the supply chain. Key stakeholders should include small and 
large farmers, input suppliers, credit providers, traders, farmer organisations, 
relevant government departments, research organisations, donors and 
NGOs. 
 
8.6 THESIS LIMITATIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Limitations in the research conducted for this thesis result from limited 
resources and data available for analysis of some of the issues addressed in 
Chapters 5 and 6.  
Chapter 5 used a quasi-experimental approach to assessing the impact of 
small-scale aquaculture as constructing a treatment and comparison group 
                                                 
 
99
 If the GAA is the coordinating body, stakeholder interests and representation of small-scale pond 
farmers will have to be overcome. At present, though it is not functional, its membership consists 
mainly of commercial farmers and service providers. 
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using an experimental design was not possible. While sampled fish farmers 
were informally matched with a sample of ‘equivalent’ non-fish farmers, and 
multivariate regression analysis was used to control for observable 
characteristics, a rigorous counterfactual scenario was not constructed 
making it difficult to definitively establish causality between increased income 
and aquaculture. Further research is needed on the impact of aquaculture on 
poverty using methodologies that are as close to an experimental design as 
possible (i.e. randomised control trials), preferably using a ‘difference in 
difference’ estimation method, in order to overcome the attribution problem 
and establish causality between aquaculture development and poverty 
reduction. 
The parameters used to estimate the potential economic multiplier effects 
from fish farming type A and SME cage farming in Chapter 6 were estimated 
using a range of data sources. The limitations of these estimates were 
discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.2.4. A particular weakness was the 
reliance on budget data which may not be representative of the two groups. 
However the very large differences between the estimated multiplier effects 
for the two groups suggest that the broad finding of substantial differences is 
robust. Nevertheless further research is needed to estimate more precise 
multiplier effects from aquaculture development, using better representative 
data to estimate parameters for the multiplier models.  
Although Chapter 6 assessed potential environmental linkages of different 
aquaculture systems, the thesis does not compare the consumption of and 
contribution to ecosystem services by these different systems. While the 
growth potentials of different aquaculture systems have been emphasised, 
assessing the environmental and ecological sustainability of this growth was 
beyond the scope of the thesis. However consideration of the sustainability of 
development of different aquaculture systems should be an important 
component of a comprehensive assessment of aquaculture’s potential 
contribution to poverty reduction. Further research is thus required to 
investigate the linkages between different aquaculture systems, the 
environment and ecosystem services. 
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Building on the findings of this thesis, further research is also needed to 
better understand the situation of poor fish farmers in Ghana and if there is 
an asset and/or a BMP threshold under which fish farmers are unable to 
increase income and use BMPs respectively, as suggested in Chapter 5. If 
so, research on the resource constraints faced by poor farmers and ways to 
overcome these to enable them to maximise the benefits from aquaculture 
may be required. Alternative production practices or technologies such as 
Integrated Aquaculture Agriculture (IAA) may also need to be researched for 
poorer farmers who adopt fish farming primarily to increase fish for home 
consumption. Research could build on the farmer participatory experiments 
by Lightfoot et al. (1996) which showed the potential positive impact of IAA 
on farm sustainability in Ghana.  Evidence from Malawi suggests that IAA 
significantly increases overall farm sustainability as well as protein 
consumption (Dey et al., 2007). Further research could also investigate the 
possible poverty alleviation and resilience effects of aquaculture on poor 
farmers (as opposed to the poverty reduction effects assessed in this thesis). 
Further research may also be needed to assess the potential poverty impact 
of SME pond aquaculture development, not investigated in this thesis. 
 
This thesis reports on only one country case study and as noted above, the 
impact of different aquaculture systems and farmer categories on poverty are 
likely to vary between contexts. More case studies are needed on 
aquaculture’s direct and indirect contribution to poverty reduction in other 
SSA countries. Further research is also required on the specific institutional 
innovations needed in different contexts and on how their development is 
best facilitated. While contract farming, franchising and the hub model were 
all discussed as examples of potentially appropriate institutional 
arrangements, effective institutional innovations need to be developed 
through participatory action research to enable experimentation with different 
models, to understand the type of institutional arrangements needed and the 
forms they should take in different contexts.  
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8.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Promotion of pro-poor aquaculture development requires careful 
consideration of farmer characteristics and production practices, the relative 
importance of direct and indirect benefits generated by different aquaculture 
systems in different contexts, the transaction costs and risks faced by 
farmers and how they can be overcome, and the institutional environment in 
which fish farmers and other actors within the sector operate. While it may 
seem to make intuitive sense that development of ‘commercial’ SME farming 
holds more potential to create economic growth and impact on poverty than 
growth of ‘non commercial’ artisanal farmers, decisions to target support to 
one category of farmer over another based on broad and ambiguous 
definitions have important implications for the direction, focus and impacts of 
aquaculture development in Ghana and other SSA countries and could result 
in the misdirecting of aid and aquaculture development efforts. 
 
This thesis has shown that non-poor fish farmers who have been trained 
and/or are using BMPs (fish farming type A) hold the most potential to impact 
on poverty indirectly through generating broad based economic growth. 
However, these better off farmers, would still be categorised as artisanal or 
‘non commercial’ according to standard definitions used by most analysts. 
The results of this thesis also suggest that support for poor farmers 
predominantly engaged in fish farming type B and who are unable or unlikely 
to use BMPs, is not likely to be effective in increasing farmers’ incomes or 
generating economic growth unless their resource constraints are overcome. 
However due to the demanding techno-economic characteristics of farmed 
fish and high transaction costs and risks associated with rural aquaculture 
production and marketing, it is likely the constraints faced by poor farmers 
would be difficult to overcome. It is these farmers whose characteristics are 
more likely to correspond to those of the artisanal, ‘non commercial’ and 
‘quasi peasant’ farmers described in much of the literature. These poor fish 
farmers may benefit more, along with other poor non-fish farmers, from the 
potential indirect economic multiplier and other linkage effects generated by 
small-scale aquaculture development by non-poor rural fish farmers using 
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BMPs, than through direct impacts of aquaculture. Therefore depending on 
the definition and characterisation of fish farmers used, the results of this 
thesis could be seen to either support or question the emerging paradigm. If 
fish farming type A farmers are categorised as commercial micro enterprises 
then the thesis results support the paradigm shift. However, it is more likely 
that these farmers lie somewhere between ‘non commercial’ and 
‘commercial’ categories and some may be in the process of transitioning 
between the two. Therefore a more nuanced approach to aquaculture 
development, which takes in to account the existence of a wide spectrum of 
farmers whose characteristics and needs differ between contexts and 
locations as do their categorisations between ‘non commercial’ or artisanal 
and ‘commercial’ farmers, is required if the paradigm shift in aquaculture 
development is to be successful in being more effective than past efforts to 
develop the sector in SSA. 
 
Along with highlighting the importance of non-poor small-scale artisanal 
farmers engaged in fish farming type A to maximise the poverty impact of 
aquaculture development in Ghana, through their relatively stronger 
economic multiplier effects, this thesis has also shown the value of taking an 
institutional perspective on aquaculture development. The transaction costs 
and risks facing small-scale pond and cage farmers and other actors in the 
associated value chains are key constraints to aquaculture development, 
especially in contexts where institutional development is weak. Non-market 
coordination and institutional innovation are necessary to overcome these 
costs and risks and for the small-scale aquaculture sector to develop and 
realise its potential for poverty reduction in Ghana. Such an institutional 
perspective has not been emphasised in aquaculture development efforts in 
the past and may well be an important reason that previous efforts to develop 
small-scale aquaculture in SSA have not been successful. The need for 
aquaculture development efforts to pay more attention to this is perhaps the 
most important lesson from this thesis. 
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 APPENDIX 1: HOUSEHOLD SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
We are conducting a study on rural aquaculture. We are interested in understanding the situation of 
fish farming households in your area and how fish farming has affected people’s lives. Your 
participation in this study will be very useful in generating valuable insights. We would like to assure 
you that all responses at the individual level would be kept strictly confidential to safeguard your 
identity.  Do you agree to be interviewed? 
    
 
Yεreyε nhwehwε  mu bi wↄ nkuraankuraa εkuadwuma ho, yεn ani bεgye ho sε yε bεhu tebea a 
nkurofoↄ a εyεn  nsuomu nnam no wↄ mu, ne senea nsuomo nnaw yεn aka wↄn a wↄyεn no 
asetena.  Woho a wode bεhyε saa dwumadi yi mu bεboa ama yεanya adwuma no mu nhumu yie. 
Yεn ani bεgye ho sε yε bεka akyεrε wo sε mmuae biara a wode bεma yεn wↄha no yε nea yeremma 
obiara nte bi. So wani gye ho sε yε bεbisabisa wo nsεm bi? 
 
 
Consent: Interviewer signs that respondent has consented to be interviewed: ……………………………………… 
 
 
Name of Respondent: 
 
Telephone number: 
 
……………………………………………… 
 
……………………………………………… 
 
 
Questionnaire ID 
Number (to be 
filled in the office) 
 
  
 Village District Region Country 
Location   Ashanti Ghana 
 
Code     
 
 
 
Name of Interviewer  
 
Date of Interview  
 
Time Started  
 
Time Finished  
 
 
 
 
Checked by  
 
Date  
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Instruction to interviewer: Fill in the blanks and/or choose the code corresponding to each 
response. 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
 
1. Have you farmed fish in the past 2 years? 
Wa yεn nsuomu nam wↄ mfe mienu a atwam  
no? 
1=yes (Go to Q2)  2=no (Go to 1.a.)  
1.a. If not, why? 
Sε εyε daabi a, adεnti? 
 
………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………….. 
1.b. Have you completely stopped farming  
fish? 
So wagyae nsuomu nnam yεn koraa? 
1=yes (Go to Q1.c.)   
2=no (End interview) 
 
1.c. If yes, why? 
Sε aane a, aden ntia? 
 
 
………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………….(End Interview) 
2. What year did you start fish farming?  
Afe bεn mu na wohyεε nsuommu nnam yεn ase?                          
 
3. What is your link to fish farming? Are you an  
owner-operator or caretaker?   
Saa adwuma yi (nsuomu nnam adwuma yi) so  
εyε wo ankasa wadwuna:so εyε wo ankasa  
wadwuma, anaase; wohwε so ma obi; εyε  
εkuo bi dea? 
1=owner-operator     
2=caretaker     
3= other (specify) …….. 
 
 
 
4: What type of fish farming do you do?   
Nsuo mu nnam adwuma no, εmu deε εwↄ he  
na woyε?  
(Multiple response) 
 
1=yes 2=no 
Extensive (no feeding)  
Semi intensive (using mixture of  
commercial and non commercial feed) 
 
Intensive pond aquaculture (using  
only commercial feed) 
 
Other (specify) _________________ 
 
 
 1=yes  
2=no  
5: What type of fish do you farm?   
Enam bεn na wo yεn wↄn? 
 
(Multiple response) 
 
1=yes 2=no 
Tilapia 
 
 
Catfish 
 
 
Heterotis   
 
 
Other (specify) _________ 
 
 
6. How many ponds did you harvest from in the past 12 months? 
 
Ponds dodow sεn na wo yii nam firiimu bεyε bosome dummienu a atwam yi? 
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B. HUMAN CAPITAL 
 
7. How many years have you resided in this village? 
 
Mfe dodow sεn na wode atena kurow yi so? 
 
8. Where did you reside before? 
 
Ɛhe fa na na wote ansa na worebεtena  
kurow yi mu? 
1= Here since birth  2=Elsewhere in Ashanti 
Region   3=Elsewhere in Ghana   
4=abroad ……………… 
 
9. To what religious group do you belong?   
ↄsom bεn na wo wↄ mu? 
 
1= Christian   2=Muslim   3=Traditional  
4=No religion  5=Other (specify)…………. 
 
10. To what ethnic group do you belong? 
 
Wo ye deεn nii? 
1= Asante   2= Akwapim   3=Fanti    
4=Other Akan   5=Ga-Adangbe   6=Ewe   
 7=Guan  8=Nzema   9=Hausa    
10=Dagomba   11=Mamprusi   12=Gonja     
13=Grussi/Frafra   14=Dagarti  15=Kusasi    
16=Kassena-Nankani   17=Konkomba    
18=Nanumba   19=Builsa   
20=Other (specify)……………………… 
 
11. How many people are there in your household? 
Wכ a woni wכn ti fie no, mo doduכ yε sεn?  
 
(A person is considered part of the household if he/she usually lives and eats his/her  
meals in the household’s dwelling/compound and if he/she is not away from the  
household for more than 9 months a year) 
 
12. How many are male? 
    Mmerema ahi na εwכ hכ? 
 
 
13. How many are female? 
     Mmaa ahi na εwכ hכ? 
 
 
14. How many are 14 years of age and younger? 
     Wכnaa wכn adi mfie duεnan εni wכn a wכmo εiinn mfie duεnan wכmo duduכ εyε  
     sεn? 
 
 
15. How many are 65 years of age and older? 
     Wכnaa wכn adi mfie εduosea εnum aboroso no wכn doduכ yε sεn?  
 
 
16. How many are going to school? 
      Emu duduכ sεn na εkכ sukuul? 
 
 
17. How many household members own a non-farm enterprise?  
      Wo fie foכ no, εmu duduכ sεn na εwכ εdwuma a εnyε εfuo? 
 
 
18. How many household members are engaged in paid employment?  
     Wo fie foכ no, εmu duduכ sεn na wכ εdwuma etua εdwumayεfuכ εka? 
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19. Information on Household head, spouse and fish farmer.  (Fill in the table below) 
 
No 
 
 
Household member 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Col. 1 
Sex 
Is (the 
household 
member) 
male or 
female? 
 
 
 
 
ↄyε ↄbaa 
anaa 
barima? 
 
 
Col. 2 
Marital Status 
 
What is (the 
household 
member’s) 
marital status? 
 
 
 
 
So (edin) aware 
anaa ↄnwaree? 
 
 
 
Col. 3 
Age 
(in yrs) 
 
How old is 
(the 
household 
member)? 
 
 
 
(Edin) adi 
mfie sεn? 
 
 
 
Col. 4 
Highest level 
of education 
 
What is the 
highest level of 
school 
(household 
member) has 
attended? 
 
Ehefa na(edin} 
kↄↄ sukuu kↄd 
uu yε 
 
 
Col. 5 
Primary Occupation 
(respondent to 
decide which is 
most important 
occupation) 
 
What is (the household member’s) 
most important occupation in the 
dry season? And in the rainy 
season? 
 
Adwuma titiriw bεn na (edin) yε no 
כpε bere εna sutↄ bere? 
 
 
Col. 6                     Col. 7 
Secondary Occupation 
(respondent to 
decide which is 
second most important 
occupation) 
 
What is (the household member’s) 
second most important occupation in 
the dry season? And in the rainy 
season? 
 
Sε woyi adwuma titiriw a (edin) yε no 
firi hↄ a nea εwↄ he na εdi hↄ wↄ sutↄ 
bere ne ↄpε bere mu? 
 
Col. 8                    Col. 9 
      Dry season Rainy season Dry season Rainy season 
1 Household head 
 
        
2  Spouse 
 
        
3 Fish farmer if not one of the above 
 
        
Col. 2: 1=male, 2=female 
Col. 3: 1=married  2=never married  3=widowed 4=separated 
Col. 5: 0=None 1=pre-primary 2=primary incomplete 3=primary completed 4= MSLC incomplete 5=MSLC complete 6=secondary incomplete 7=secondary completed 8=university degree 9=other 
(specify)…............ 
Cols. 7 to 10:  1=fish farmer 2=maize farmer  3=cocoa farmer 4=farmer of other crops 5=livestock raiser 6=skilled public sector worker 7=unskilled public sector worker 8= skilled private sector worker 
(artisan) 9= un unskilled private sector worker (labourer, trader) 10=business person – own account 11=business person – employee 12=housewife 13=unpaid family labour (in the home) 14 = unpaid 
family labour (on-farm or enterprise) 15= house helper/maid 16=below school age 17= at school 18=in higher education 19= unemployed 20= invalid 21=others (specify)__________
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20. What are the three most important sources of your household income? Include remittances, if 
any. 
Nneεma mmiensa a εdi kan a εma wo nya sika wↄ wabusua yi mu paa ne deεn. Sε yemane wo sika 
a fa ka ho yε no nidiso nidiso fa fi akεseε mu. 
 
Degree of Importance Income Source 
 
Percent of Total Household 
Income (%) 
Col. 1 Col. 2 
1
st
   
2
nd
   
3
rd
   
Col. 1: 1=fish farming 2= cocoa farming 3=farming of other crops 4= livestock raising 5=salaried employment (skilled)  
6=salaried employment (unskilled) 7=trading/vending  8=wage labour 9=own enterprise (farm) 10=own enterprise (nonfarm)  
11=remittances 12=others (specify) …………...........  
 
21. What percentage of total household income came from fish farming in the past 
12 months? 
Sika a abusua no nya fii nsuomu nnam yεn mu bεyε afe ni no, bεyε ↄha mu 
nkyekyemu ahe? 
 
 
22. What is the division of labour between men, women and children within your household in the 
following activities related to fish-farming? Which activities are done by hired labour? Which 
activities are done by the Government Fisheries Department?  
 
Nnwuma bεn na mmarima, mmaa ne mmofra a wↄyε wabusuafoↄ ne apaafoↄ εyε wↄ 
nsuomunnam adwuma no ho. Adwuma bεn na Aban asoↄyεfoↄ a yεfrε wↄn fisheries foↄ no yε fa 
nsuomu nnam yεn adwuma no ho? 
(Read out each activity and fill in the table below) 
 
Activity Labour 
Division 
 
 
 
Col. 1 
Hired 
Labour 
1= yes  
2 = no 
 
Col. 2 
Government 
Fisheries 
Department 
1= yes  
2 = no 
Col. 3 
Pond construction/  Pond tuo    
Pond preparation/  Pond a yeresiesie mu    
Fingerling procurement/  Adwenemma ne mpataa mma a 
worekↄtↄ 
   
Feed procurement/  Mmoa no aduane a worekↄtↄ    
Fertilising/  ↄyɛasase yie     
Feeding/  Wo mmoa no aduane ma    
Weeding/  Pond no ho adodↄadodↄ    
Sampling fish for growth/ Woo yi mmoa no bi afiri pond no 
mu ahwɛ sɛdeɛ wↄn nyini te 
   
Harvesting/ Woo yi ɛnnam no afi pond no mu    
Marketing/ Woo tↄn ɛnnam no    
Processing/ Wo resiesie Ɛnnam no ho    
Record keeping/  Wo reyƐ mmoa no ho kyerew tohכ    
Others (specify) ____________ nea Ɛkeka hoo    
Col.1 
1= Household labour - purely male activity/ Wo abusuafoↄ a woyε wo mmoa - εyε mmarima nkoaa adwuma   
2= Household labour - mainly male activity/ Wo abusuafoↄ a woyε wo mmoa -  εyε mmarima na Ɛtaa yƐ saa adwuma yi   
3= Household labour - purely female activity/ Wo abusuafoↄ a woyε wo mmoa - εyε mmaa nkoaa adwuna   
4= Household labour - mainly female activity/ Wo abusuafoↄ a woyε wo mmoa - εyε mmaa na εtaa yε saa adwuma yi   
5= Household labour - shared by both males and females/ Wo abusuafoↄ a woyε wo mmoa - mmaa ne mmarima nyinaa yε bi   
6= Household labour - purely children’s activity/ Wo abusuafoↄ a woyε wo mmoa - εyε mmofra nkoaa adwuma   
7= Household labour - mainly children’s activity/ Wo abusuafoↄ a woyε wo mmoa - εyε mmofra na εtaa yε saadwuwa yi   
99=not applicable (N.A.) 
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C. NATURAL CAPITAL 
 
23. Access to Land (Fill in the table below). 
 
Landholding Size  
No. of  
Units 
Col.1 
Unit 
 
Col. 2 
23a. What is the area of land owned by the household?  
 
Asaase a wodi yε kua a εyε wo ni wo abusuafoכ dea no, ne kεseε yε sεn? 
  
23b. What is the area of land leased from the government or the chief?  
 
Wo asaase a wo de yε kua dwuma a εfiri aban anaa ohene hכ no, ne kεseε no 
εyε sεn?  
  
23c. What is the area of land rented from others? What is it used for? 
 
Wo asaase a wo de yε kua dwuma a wo ahan no ne kεseε no εyε sεn? 
  
23d. What is the area of land used for sharecropping?  
 
Wo asaase a wo de yε kua dwuma no emu dodow sεn na wode ayε dכ ma yε 
nkyε. 
  
23e. What is the area of agricultural land leased to others? 
Wo asaase a yε de yε kua dwuma a wodi ama afoforoↄ no, ne kεseε no εyε 
sεn? 
  
     Col. 2: 1=square meters 2=hectares 3= acres 4= feet  5=other (specify______) 
 
24. What sources of freshwater are  
available to you for your fish farming  
operations?   
Nsuo a wobεtumi de ayεn nnam ahorow  
Sεn na wahu wↄ ha?  (Multiple response) 
1=yes 2=no 
deep well/ground water   
Rainwater  
irrigation canal  
river/stream/lake  
Reservoir  
others (specify) ……  
25. How many pond(s) do you currently have access to for fish farming?  
Ponds dodow sεn na wobεtumi de ayεn nsuo mu nnam seesei yi ara? 
 
 
26. Access to ponds (Fill the table below) 
 
Ponds  
No. 
Size  Used 
for 
What? 
 
 
Functional 
in 2010?  
1=yes 
2=no 
 
No. 
of 
units 
Units 
 
 
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 
26.a. List the surface area of each pond owned. 
What is the size of each pond? 
What is each one used for? 
Which ones were functional in 2010? 
 
Kyerε yεn wo pond biara a εyε wo dea sεnea ne kεseε 
teε 
Εdeεn na wodi biara εyε? 
Deεhi na εyεε adwuma paaa afi 2010 ni mu? 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Col. 2: 1=square meters 2=hectares 3= acres 4=feet 5= other (specify______) 
Col. 3: Land use 1=rearing pond  2=nursery pond  3= hatchery  4=other (specify_____)  5=other (specify____) 
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D. SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
27. What sources of information (e.g. advice, technical assistance etc.) on fish farming are available 
to you? How useful have they been? (very poor, poor, satisfactory, good, very good?). 
 
Mmeae a wobεnya nsuomunnam yεn ho nsεm bεn na wo nnim? ↄkwan bεn so na ↄmo aboa wo? 
(εnyε koraa, εnyε, εyε kakra, εyε, εyε paa?). (Multiple response) (Read out options and fill in table 
below) 
 
Provided by 1=yes 2=no 
Col. 1 
Quality  
Col. 2 
a. other farmers/ akuafoↄ afoforo   
b. friends/relatives nnanfoↄ / abusuafoↄ   
c. government extension staff/ Extensionfoↄ   
d. university/ Sukuupↄn   
e. NGO   
f. hatchery/ Baabi a yεyεn nsuomu nnam mma   
g. radio   
h. TV   
i. feed supplier/ Wↄn a wↄtↄn mmoa no aduan   
j. other (specify)_______________   
k. other (specify)_______________   
Col. 2: 1=very poor/ ƐnyƐ koraa   2= poor/ ƐnyƐ 3= satisfactory/ ƐyƐ kakra  4=good/ ƐyƐ 5=very good/ ƐyƐ paa  99=NA 
 
28. Have you received any training in fish farming? 
So wanya nsuo mu nnam yεn ho nteteε bi da? 
1=yes (Go to Q29)   
 2=no (Go to Q30) 
 
 
29. If yes, who provided the training? When? How useful was it? (Fill in table below). 
Se mmuaeε no yε aane a,Hwan na כmaa wo saa  nteteε no? Dabεn na wo faa saa nteteyeε ni mu? 
Mfasoↄbεn na sa nteteε yi εdi abere wo? 
 
 Provided by Whom? 
Col. 1 
Year 
Col. 2 
How useful? 
Col. 3 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
Col.1: 1=Agricultural Extension staff  2= Government Fisheries Department 3=NGO  4=University  5=Private Company  
6-other specify……………. 
Col. 3: 1=very poor/ εnyε koraa   2= poor/ εnyε 3= satisfactory/ εyε kakra  4=good/ εyε 5=very good/ εyε paa  99=NA 
 
30. How many times in the last 12 months did members of your household visit or contact 
a fisheries extension agent or an agricultural/fisheries extension center to discuss fish 
production?  
Mpεn dodow ahe wↄ bosome 12 a atwam ni na wabusua no mu nii bi kↄsraa Agric  
Extension foↄ no, anaa Fisheries foↄ no,  anaa wↄn asoeε hↄ kↄ dii εnnam yƐn no ho  
nkↄmmↄ. 
 
31. How many times in the last 12 months has any aquaculture extension agent visited?  
Mpεn dodow ahe wↄ bosome 12 a atwam ni na Fisheries Extension mpaninfoↄ no bεsraa  
wo? 
 
32. At present, are you a member of any livelihood association  
(including Fish Farmers’ Association, Cooperative Society etc.)? 
 
Mprenpren so woka nkↄsoↄ kuo bi ho, te sε nsuomu nnam  
yen kuo anaa nkabom kuo bi ho? 
1=yes (Go to Q33) 
2=no (Go to Q34,  
Section E) 
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33. If yes, what association(s) are you a member of? How has your association helped disseminate 
information on fish farming technology and management practices? What else has your association 
helped you with? How long have you been a member of the association?  
 
Sε mmuaeε no yε aane a, εkuo bεn na woka ho? Ɛkwan bεn so na εkuo no aboa wo ama wanya 
εnnam yεn ho nimdeε a εbεboa wo wↄ wadwuna no mu. Ɛdeε bεn bio na εkuo no aboa wo wↄ mu. 
Mfie dodow ahe na wode ayε εkuo yi ba. (Fill in table below) 
 
No.  
 
 
 
Name of Association 
 
 
Col. 1 
Role of the Association in 
Information Dissemination on 
Technology 
Col. 2 
 Role of Association in other 
areas (e.g. input purchase, 
marketing, credit etc.) 
Col. 3 
No. of 
Years as 
Member 
Col. 4 
1. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
2. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
3. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
E. FINANCIAL CAPITAL 
 
34. Have you received any financial assistance (for anything  
including fish farming) in the past 5  years? 
 
Wↄↄ mfie nnum a atwan yi no so woanya mmoa a εfa sika  
ho a εbεboa wo wↄ wadwuma yi ho? 
1=yes (Go to Q35)   
2=no (Go to Q36) 
 
 
35. If yes, when did you obtain assistance? How much did you obtain? Who provided the financial 
assistance? What was it used for?  
 
Sε mmuae no yε aane a? Bere bεn na wo nyaa saa mmoa no? Sika dodow ahe na wo nyaa yε. hena 
na ↄde maa wo. Deεn na wodi sika no yεε yε? (Fill in the table below) 
  
Year Amount 
(cedis) 
Col. 2 
Provided 
by 
Col. 3 
Use of the Funds 
 
Col. 4 
 
Col. 1 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
   
Col. 3: 1= trader   2=moneylender 3=feed supplier  4=fingerling supplier/hatchery 5=relatives/friends 6=private financier  
7=rural bank  8=commercial bank 9=cooperative/association 10=NGO 11=government agency 12=savers group 13=village fund  
14=others (specify)………… 
 
36. Have you received any other assistance (apart from  
financial and technical assistance) for your fish farming  
operations (e.g. labour or seed supply etc.) in the past 5 years? 
 
So woanya mmoa foforo a εnyε sika anaa nsuo mu nnam  
yεn ho nimdeε, εma saa wadwuma yi wↄ mfie nnum a atwamu yi?  
1=yes (Go to Q37)  
2=no (Go to Q38,  
Section F) 
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37. If yes, when did you receive assistance? What kind of assistance did you receive? Who provided 
the assistance?    
Sε mmuae no yε aane a? Bere bεn na wo nyaa saa mmoa no? Mmoa bεn na wo nyaa yε? Hena na 
ↄde saa mmoa no maa wo?  (Fill in table below) 
 
Year 
Col. 1 
What kind of assistance? 
Col. 2 
Provided by? 
Col. 3 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
Col. 3: 1= trader   2=moneylender 3=feed supplier  4=fingerling supplier/hatchery 5=relatives/friends 6=private financier  
7=rural bank  8=commercial bank 9=cooperative/association 10=NGO 11=government agency 12=savers group 13=village fund  
14=others (specify)………… 
 
F. PHYSICAL CAPITAL 
 
38. Is the main house/dwelling unit:  
 
Ɛfa efie no ara ho/anaa baabi a woteε ho: 
(read out options) 
1=owned/ wo ankasa dea   
2=rented/ wo han    
3=free use/ wo te mu kwa 
4=others (specify)/ …………. 
 
39. What materials are used for outside  
walls of the best house? 
 
Ɛnneεma bεn na wↄde ayε afie a edi mu  
paa no abↄnten fasuo no? 
1= mud/mud bricks  2= wood   
3= corrugated iron  
4= stone/burnt bricks   
5=cement/concrete 
6=other (specify)……………….. 
 
40. What materials are used for the roofing  
of the best house? 
 
Ɛnneεma bƐn na wode abↄ afie a edi mu  
paa no so? 
1= thatch/grass/straw  2= wood   
3= corrugated iron  
4= cement/concrete   
5=asbestos   
6=other (specify)………………… 
 
 
41.  What household assets and facilities do you own? Which are functioning?  
Ɛnneεma a yεde siesie εdan mu bεn na mo wↄ? Ɛmu nea εwↄ he na εyε adwuma? (Read out assets 
and fill in table below). 
 
Item 1=yes 
2=no 
Col. 1 
Functioning 
 
Col. 2 
a.  Radio   
b.  Television    
c.  Electric fan   
d.  Refrigerator   
e.  Telephone/cell phone   
f.   Gold jewelry   
g.  Bicycle   
h.  Boat   
i.   Motorcycle   
j.   Vehicle (jeep, pick-up, van, etc.)   
k.  Water pump   
l. Flush toilet   
m. Latrine   
Code for Col. 2:  1=owned and functioning  2=owned but not functioning 99=NA 
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42. Please describe the situation you face in the rainy season and the dry season regarding the 
following (Is it very difficult, difficult, neither difficult nor easy, easy or very easy?):  
Me pa wo kyεw kyerεkyerε yεn tebea a wo kↄ mu wↄ sutↄ bere ne ↄpε bere mu εfa nsεm a εdidiso 
yi ho (εhoo asεm yε den paa, εhoo asεm yε den, εhoo asεm yε den kakra, εhoo asem yε mmerεw, 
εhoo asεm yε mmerεw paa?) 
 
Facilities Rainy season 
Col. 1 
Dry season 
Col. 2 
a. Road access/ 
 Lorry akwan ho asεm 
  
b. Access to transport facilities (to transport 
people/fish/goods/livestock)/ 
Car a yεde fa nnipa ho nsεm 
  
c. Availability of communication facilities/ 
Mfidie a εma yε ne obi di nkitaho ho asεm 
  
d. Access to input markets/ 
Beaeε a mo tↄ nsuomu nnam wↄyεn  ho nsεm 
  
e. Access to output markets/ 
Beaeε a mo tↄn nusomu nnam wↄ ho nsεm 
  
f. Access to a reliable water supply for fish farm/ 
 Nsuo a εboa ma mo yεn nnam afe mu no nyinaa 
  
Cols 1 and 2:  1=Very Difficult  2=Difficult  3=Neither Difficult nor Easy  4=Easy/ εhoo asem yε mmerεw 5=Very Easy 
 
G. LIVELIHOODS AND AQUACULTURE 
 
43. Who or what influenced you  
to go in to fish farming?  
Rank them in  
order of importance. 
 
Whana, anaa deεn na εmaa wo  
kↄ yεn nsuomu nnam?Sε woyε  
no nnidiso nnidiso a, εmu nea  
εwↄ he na εhia paa. 
 
Read out options 
(Multiple Response) 
 
1=yes 2=no 
 1=yes 
2=no 
Rank 
observation of other fish farms/  
wo hwεεbi wↄ beaε bi a wahyεda ayε bi sε 
nnipa nhwε 
  
discussions with other farmers/ 
wo ne afoforo bↄↄ ho nkↄmmↄ 
  
discussions with extension worker/  
wo ne extension adwumayεfo no bↄↄ ho 
nkↄmmↄ 
  
advert/programme on TV, radio and/or 
newspaper 
Adwuma no ho dawurubↄ/wↄ TV so 
  
encouragement from gold mining company/ 
Yε nyaa εho anigyeno fii Adwuma a εtu sika 
kↄkↄↄ foↄ hↄ  
  
others (specify)/ nea εkeka ho…………………   
 1=yes 
2=no 
Rank 
44. Currently, what is your main  
goal(s) for your fish farming  
operations? Rank them in order of  
importance. 
 
Mprepren wo botaeε a εwo  
nsuomu nnam yεn no ho ne sεn?  
Sε woyε no nnidiso nnidiso a, εmu nea εwↄ 
he naεhia paa. 
 
Read out options 
(Multiple Response) 1=yes 2=no 
to increase profit/  
sε εbεma manya mfasoↄ  
  
to increase availability of fish for own 
consumption/  
sε εbεma manya nsuomu nnam pii adi 
  
to increase farm sustainability/  
sε  εbεma kua dwuma akↄ so bere nyinaa 
  
to reduce seasonality of farm income/  
sε εbεma manya sika bere biara   
  
to spread the risk of farm activities/  
sε εbεsi afuo foforo no anan, sε afuo no bi sεe 
a 
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others (specify) ……………………..   
45. What is your average culture period?  Ɛdi mmere pↄtee bɛyɛ sɛn ansa ana wayi 
ɛnnam no? 
 (Indicate the number of months) 
 
46. How often do you harvest your 
fish?  
6pεn dodoכ ahe na woyi εnam yi bi? 
 
1=quarterly  
2= twice yearly   
3=once a year 
4=less than once a year   
5=no specific schedule 
 
47. In which month(s) did you harvest your main fish  
harvest in the past 12 months?  
Bosome bεn mu na wo yii nam paa wↄ bosome  
dummienu a atwam yi? 
(Multiple Response) 
 
1=yes 1=no 
1= Jan    
2=Feb    
3=March    
4=April  
5=May    
6=June    
7=July   
8=August    
9=September    
10=October    
11=November   
12= December  
13=Didn’t harvest  
14=other  
 
48. Value of Annual Fish Production in 2010 
 
Type of 
fish 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sold Quantity of 
fish eaten 
 
 
Ɛnnam dodow 
ahe na mo dii 
yε  
(kg) 
 
 
 
 
 
Quantity of 
fish given 
away 
 
Ɛnnam 
dodow ahe 
na wode 
kyεε 
nkurofo 
(kg) 
 
 
 
Others 
(specify) 
_____________ 
(kg) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Harvest: 
Sold, Eaten, 
Given Away, 
etc. 
(kg) 
sε wo ka ne 
nyinaa bom a, 
εnnam 
dodow ahe na 
wo yii yε 
 
 
Quantity of 
fish sold  
(kg) 
 
Ɛnnam 
dodow sεn 
na wo tↄm 
Yɛ 
 
 
 
 
 
Amount  
received  
 
Sika dodow 
ahe na wo 
nya fii mu 
(if they can’t 
remember 
ask the farm 
gate price and 
calculate) 
(cedis) 
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 5 Col. 6 Col. 7 Col. 8 
 
 
      
 
 
      
 
 
      
TOTAL 
 
      
Col. 1. 1=tilapia 2=catfish 3=heterotis 4= Others (specify)………………………………………….. 
Interviewers’ note: If the farmer is unable to answer ask the respondent to estimate how many ‘34  buckets’ 
(25kgs) of fish they sold, ate and gave away and then calculate  
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49. How did you pay for the initial investment  
cost of your fish farming operations?  
Rank them in order of importance.  
 
ↄkwan bƐn so na wofa tuaa εka a wo bↄↄ no  
kane wↄ nsuomu nnam yεn adwuma yi ho? 
Sε woyε no nnidiso nnidiso a, εmu nea εwↄ  
he na εhia paa. 
 
(Multiple Response) 
1=yes 2=no 
 1=yes 
2=no 
Rank 
With own savings     
With a loan from a financial  
institution   
  
With a loan from a friend/relative    
With assistance from the gold  
mining company 
  
Other (specify)……………….   
 1=yes  
2=no 
Rank 
50. Where do you obtain your main stocking 
 material?  Rank them in order of importance. 
Ɛhe fa na wo nyaa εnam no mma, a wode  
hyεε aseε no fii yε? Sε woyε no nnidiso  
nnidiso a, εmu nea εwↄ he na εhia  
paa. 
(Multiple Response) 
1=yes 2=no 
From a government hatchery    
From a private hatchery     
From other farmers   
From own ponds     
From the wild    
 6= other (specify)…………..   
51. Do you use all male fingerlings? 
 
So wo tumi di mmarima mma no nkwiaa di  
yεnsuכmunam kua adwuma no anaa?   
1=yes  2=no 3=sometimes  
52. At present what do you feed your fish?  
Rank them in order of importance.  
 
Seesei εdeεn na wo de ma wo nsuomu nnam  
no di? Sε woyε no nnidiso nnidiso a, εmu  
nea εwↄ he na εhia paa. 
 
(Multiple Response) 
 
1=yes 2=no 
 
 
 1=yes  
2=no 
Rank 
Formulated floating commercial 
feed 
  
Formulated sinking commercial 
feed  
  
Farmer’s own prepared feed   
Rice bran and groundnut peels   
Maize bran and groundnut peels   
Plankton     
Brewing waste (e.g. malt, pito)   
Cocoyam leaves     
Pawpaw leaves    
Food waste   
Other (specify)…………………   
53. Do you use fertilisers in your ponds?  
 
So wode ↄyεasaaseyiye (fertilisers) gu ponds 
no mu? 
 
 
1=yes (Go to Q54) 2=no (Go to 
Q55) 
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54. What type of fertiliser do you use? ↄyε asaaseyiye bεn na wode di dwama? 
Fertiliser Category Using or Not? 
1=yes 2=no 
Organic/Black soil e.g Poultry manure, cow dung etc.  
Inorganic (chemical)/aburokyire yεasaaseyiye  
 
 
55. Which of the following problems have you experienced in your fish farming operations? Have 
they been major, minor or insignificant problems?  
ↄhaw a edidi so yi mu nea εwↄ, he na wahyia wↄ nsuomu nnam yen adwuma yi mu. So na ↄhaw no 
yƐ kεseε anaa ketewa? (Multiple response) Read out problems below. 
 
Problem Significance 
 Col. 1 
a. Limited supply of fingerlings on the market/Ɛnam no mma a ne nya εyε den  
b. Limited suppIy of feed on the market/Won aduane a ne nya εyε den   
c. Late supply of feed/ Won aduane no, εkyε ansa na aba?  
d. Limited supply of fertiliser on the market/ↄyε asaase yie no nsεm, ne duduↄ wo 
dwom te sεn 
 
e. High price of fingerlings/ Ɛnam no mma a ne boↄ yε den  
f. High price of feed/Won aduane a ne boↄ yε den   
g. High price of fertiliser/ↄyε asaase yie a ne boↄ yε den  
h. Difficulty of recruiting labourers/ Apaafoↄ ho asεm a εyε den  
i. High cost of labour/ Apaafoↄ boↄ a εyε den  
j. Lack of technical knowledge/ Adwuna no ho nimdee a wonya  
k. Poor water quality for fish farming/ Nsuo a εnye papa a wode yε adwuma no  
l. Disease (describe)/Nyarewa( kyerεkyerεmu)_________________________  
m. Existence of predators (e.g. birds, etc.)/ Ɛmmoa bi a εkyekye εnnam no  
n. High fish mortality rate/ εnnam no εtaa wu paa  
o. Theft/ Korↄnosεm  
p. Conflict with others/ Wo ne afoforo ntεm ntawatawa die  
q. High cost of constructing structures (ponds, etc.)/ Ponds no tuo ne εho nneεma a 
ne boↄ εye den 
 
r. Lack of access to land/Nsaase sεm a εho yε den   
s. Lack of access to credit/Sika sem a εho ye den   
t. Lack of access to extension services/Extension adwunay εfoↄ no a yεnnya wↄn 
mma wↄn mmoa yεn 
 
u. Declining net profits/ Mfasoↄ a yεnya wↄ adwuma no so a εso rete dabiara  
v. Drought/ ↄpe  
w. Flooding/ nsuyiri  
x. Others (specify)/Nneεma foforo ________________________  
 Col. 1: 1=major 2=minor  3=insignificant 
  
H. FUTURE OF AQUACULTURE OPERATIONS 
 
56. What are your plans for your fish farming  
operations in the next five years? 
Ntotoyε bεn na wo wↄ ma saa adwuma yi wↄ  
Mfie nnum a edi hↄ no? 
1= continue     
2= expand     
3=reduce    
4=discontinue  
5= undecided 
 
57. Why? Adεn ntia? ………………………………………………………………………..
…………………………………………………………………………
……………………………..…………………………………………
……………………………………………………………..………… 
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I. LIVELIHOODS - AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK 
 
 
58. What were the staple crops that your  
household produced in the past year.  
Rank them in order of importance. 
 
Εdeεn εnobayε na wo ni wo fie foכ enya yε afi a 
εtwaa mu yi? Sε woyε no nnidiso  
nnidiso a, εmu nea εwↄ he na εhia  
paa. 
 
 1=yes  
2=no 
Rank 
plantain   
cassava   
yam   
rice   
maize   
cocoyam   
other (specify)…………….   
59. What were the cash crops that your  
household produced in the past year.  
Rank them in order of importance. 
 
Εdeεn εnobayε na wo ni wo fie foכ enya yε afi a 
εtwaa mu yi? Sε woyε no nnidiso  
nnidiso a, εmu nea εwↄ he na εhia  
paa. 
 
 
 1=yes  
2=no 
Rank 
cocoa   
vegetables   
oil palm   
coconut   
citrus   
maize   
other (specify)…………….   
other (specify)…………….   
 
60. Of the following animals, which ones does 
your household own? How many of each?  
 
Mmoa yi a edidi so yi mu nea Ɛwↄ he na mo wↄ 
bi? εbiaa dodow yε sεn? 
 
(Read out list of animals one by one and record 
the number owned by the household for each) 
 
 
 
1=draught animals (e.g. horse, bullock, 
donkey) 
εmmoa a yɛde wↄn yɛ kuadwuma 
 
2=cattle including cows  
3=sheep  
4= goats  
5=pigs  
6=rabbits  
7=chicken  
9=other livestock (specify)  
10= others (specify)……………………….  
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J.  INCOME  
 
61. How much did your household receive in the last 12 months from each of the following sources 
including the value of any payment in the form of goods?  
 
Sika dodow ahe na wabusua nya fii nneεma a εdidid so yi mu wↄ bosome dummienu a atwamu yi 
sε wode nneεma bi a εnye sika εka ho anaa? 
 
 SOURCE INCOME 
(cedis) 
1. Transfers from the state/ aban sika  
 a. Pension/ pension sika  
 b. Illness/disability  ɛdɛm anaa yareɛ bi maa wonyaa sika  
 c. Social assistance payment/  sika bi a yɛde boa ahiafoↄ  
 d. Other (specify)/ nea ɛkeka ho___________________  
2. Rental income/ sika a yɛnya fi  ade hire mu  
 a. Land/ asaase  
 b. House/ ɛfie  
 c. Car/ kaa  
 d. Other (specify)  nea ɛkeka ho____________________  
3. Sale of assets (specify)/ agyapadeɛ  bi a yɛtↄn  
 a.  
 b.  
 c.  
4. Sale of crops (specify)/ aduade a yɛtↄn  
 a.   
 b.   
 c.  
 d.  
 e.  
5. Sale of livestock (specify)/ ayɛmoa a yɛtↄn  
 a.   
 b.  
 c.  
 d.  
6. Sales of livestock produce (e.g. milk, eggs etc.) (specify)/ ayɛmoa ho biibi a yɛtↄn___  
 a.  
 b.  
 c.  
7. Sale of fish/  nsuomu nnam a yɛtↄn  
 a.  
8. Employment/ adwumasɛm  
 a. Salary, wages, allowances in employment/ akatua a yɛnya wↄ adwuma mu  
 b. Other (specify)/ nea ɛkeka ho________________________  
9. Household enterprises (specify)/ ɛfie nnwuma (kyerɛkyerɛ mu)  
 a.  
 b.  
 c.  
10. Gifts (including remittances)/ akyɛdeɛ (amanↄne sika ka ho)  
 a. Cash/ sika  
 b. Food/ aduane  
 c. Other (specify)/ nea ɛkeka ho__________________________  
11. Other income   
 a. Private pension  
 b. Investment income, interest from savings  
 c.   
 d.  
 e.  
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K. EMPLOYMENT 
 
62. How many people have worked on your fish farming operations for the past 12 months? What 
types of workers are they? How many days did they work? How much were they paid? 
 
Nnipa dodw sεn na ayε adwuma wↄ wo nsuomu nnam yεn adwuma yi ho wo bosome dummienu a 
atwam ni? ↄmo yε adwumayεfo ko bεn? Nna dodou sεn na wↄ yεε adwum no? Sika dodow ahe na 
wo tuaa yε? 
 
Type of Worker Number 
of 
persons 
No. of days 
worked 
No. of hrs 
worked 
per day 
Average 
monthly 
wage 
 
 
 
Total Salary/ 
Wages paid for 
last 12 months   
(cedis) 
Additional 
benefits if 
any 
 Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5 Col. 6 
Owner       
Caretaker       
Regular workers       
Seasonal labourers        
Family labour       
Others _________       
Cols 1-7: 99=NA 
 
63. Did you hire any labourers to work on your crop  
farming operations in 2010?  
Wo fa edwumayε foכ bi ma wכn yεε adwuma wכ  
wo afuo num? 
 
1=yes 2=no 
 
 
 
 
L. OUTPUT MARKETS 
 
64. To whom do you sell your fish harvest? 
Henanom titiriw na wo tↄn εnnam no ma wↄn? 
(Multiple response, insert code 1=yes 2=no) 
 
65. Rank in order of importance. 
Sε woyε no nnidiso nnidiso a, εmu nea εwↄ he  
na εhia paa. 
 
66. Where do you sell your fish harvest for each 
type of buyer?  
Ɛhe fa na wotↄn nnam no ma wↄn a wↄtↄ no εwכ 
nsutכ bere no mu. 
1= at the farm gate 2 = in the village   
3= in the town  4= in other towns (specify 
where)…………………… 
 
67. Who determines the final price of your product 
in each market channel?   
Hena na ↄkyerε εboↄ a εsε sε wotↄn nnam no? 
(Multiple response) 
                    
                   1=myself  2=buyer/trader  3=Fish Farmer Association   
                   4=Cooperative Society  5=Government (Fisheries  
                   Department)  6=we negotiate  
                   7=others (specify)………....... 
 Q.64 
1=yes 
2=no 
Q. 65 
Rank 
 
 
 
Q.66 
 
Q.67 
Trader 
 
 
    
Wholesaler/ 
assembler 
 
 
    
Retailer 
(incuding 
restaurants) 
 
    
Consumer 
 
 
    
Other 
(specify) 
…………………. 
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68.  What were your reasons for choosing each 
market outlet? 
Ɛdeεn nyinasoↄ na εmaa wotↄn εnam no wↄ baabi a 
wotↄn no no? 
                       1=existence of a buyer-seller relationship   
                   2=convenience (proximity/trader comes over)      
                   3 =offers the best price  4=buyer pays in cash   
                   5=others (specify)….……. 99=NA 
Trader  
Wholesaler/assembler  
Retailer (incuding restaurants)  
Consumer  
Other (specify)…………………  
 
69. What restricts you from seeking other  
market outlets? 
 
Ɛdεn na εsi wokwan sε wobεpε baabi foforo  
aka baabi a wotↄn εnam no ho? 
 
………………………………………………………………..…………………
…………………………………………………………………………………….
.……………………………………………………………………………………
…………………..……………………………………………………………… 
 
70. What problems have you faced in marketing your fish? Have these problems been major, minor 
or insignificant?  
ↄhaw bεn na wanya wↄ wo nnam tↄn no mu? So כhaw no ƐyƐ kƐse, anaa nea edi hↄ anaa ketewaa 
bi? (Read out options and fill in table below) 
 
Problem Significance 
Col. 1 
a. Traders do not stick to agreed price/ wↄn a εtↄn nnam no bi ntaa ntↄn no εboↄ a 
yεagge atom 
 
b. Unable to take fish to market due to lack of transportation/ yε ntumi mfa nnam no 
nkↄ dwa so εsane sε car ho asεm yε den nti 
 
c. Unable to take fish to market due to lack of cold storage facilities/yε ntumi mfa 
nam no nkↄ dwa so εsiane sε yε ni εsuokokyea adaka nti 
 
d. Unable to get buyers to come to the farm when fish are ready/yε ntumi nya atↄfoↄ 
mma wↄn mma mmεtↄ εnnam no εwↄ afuom ha bere a εnnam no anyin no  
 
e. Low price of fish/ εnnam no boↄ yε fo dodow  
f. Lack of demand as consumers prefer wild caught fish/Nnipa bεbree no pε nsutene 
mu nnam no kyεn nea yε yεn wↄn no  
 
g. Lack of demand for smaller size fish/ wↄn ani ngye εnnam a εsusua ho  
h. Others (specify)/ nea εkeka ho……………………..  
i. Others (specify)/nea εkeka ho……………………..  
Col. 1: 1=major  2=minor  3=insignificant 
 
71. What harvesting system do you practice? 
 
ↄkwan ben so na wofa so yi εnnam no tↄn? 
1=selective (selection of desired fish size for 
sale and harvesting is done more than once) 
2=partial (size selection does not matter 
and harvesting is done more than once)  
3=complete (all the fish are harvested only  
once) 
 
72. In the dry season what percentage of fish  
do you sell?: 
 
Wo ↄpε brε mu no εnnam no mu ↄha mu  
nkyekyem sεn na wotↄn? 
 
1=fresh/ nnam mono  
2= frozen/ nea yεde ahyε fridge mu  
3=salted/ nea yεahyε no nkyene  
4=dried/ nea yεahata  
5= smoked/ nea yεaho  
6= other (specify)/ nea εkekaho  
73. In the rainy season what percentage of  
fish do  you sell?: 
 
Wo sutↄ brε mu no εnnam no mu ↄha mu  
nkyekyem sεn na wotↄn? 
  
1=fresh/ nnam mono  
2= frozen/ nea yεde ahyε fridge mu  
3=salted/ nea yεahyε no nkyene  
4=dried/ nea yεahata  
5= smoked/ nea yεaho  
6= other (specify)/ nea εkekaho  
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M. FOOD AND NUTRITION (Ask the respondent’s wife or the most knowledgeable household 
member on food items consumed) 
 
74. How often does your household consume  
the following items in a typical week during the  
dry season? (No. of days) 
 
Wↄ ↄpε brε mu no, mpεn dodow ahe na mo di  
nnuane a edidi so yi wↄ nawↄtwe no mu? 
Farmed fish/ nsuomu nnam a yε yεn 
wↄn 
 
Wild caught fish/ Ɛnnam a yε kye 
wↄn wↄ nsutene mu 
 
Eggs/ nkosua  
Meat/ Ɛnnam a εnyε nsuomu nnam  
Milk  
Vegetables/ atosodeƐ  
75. How often does your household consume  
the following items in a typical week during the  
rainy season? (Number of days) 
 
Wↄ sutↄ brε mu no, mpεn dodow ahe na mo di  
nnuane a edidi so yi wↄ nawↄtwe no mu? 
Farmed fish/ nsuomu nnam a yε yεn 
wↄn 
 
Wild caught fish/ Ɛnnam a yε kye 
wↄn wↄ nsutene mu 
 
Eggs/ nkosua  
Meat/ Ɛnnam a εnyε nsuomu nnam  
Milk  
Vegetables/ atosodeε  
76. How many days in the last 7 days did your household eat farmed fish?  
Nna dodow ahe wↄ nnawↄtwe mu na mo abusua no di εnnam a yε yεn wↄn wↄ nsuomu? 
 
 1=yes  
2=no 
77. If you eat tilapia, where do you get the  
tilapia that your household consumes?  
  
Sε wo di apataa a, hene fa na wo nya apataa  
na wo fie foכ no di? (Multiple response) 
1=yes 2=no 
    
Own farm  
Caught from open waters     
Purchased from the market  
Neighbors, friends and relatives     
Fish farms in the village  
Fish farmers in other villages  
Others (specify)…………………………..  
We do not eat tilapia  
 1=yes 
2=no 
78. If you eat catfish, where do you get the  
catfish that your household consumes?  
 
Sε wo di adwene a, Ɛhe fa na mo abusua no  
nya adwene a mo di no? (Multiple response) 
1=yes 2=no 
 
Own farm  
Caught from open waters     
Purchased from the market   
Neighbors, friends and relatives     
Fish farms in the village  
Fish farmers in other villages  
Others (specify)…………………………..  
We do not eat catfish  
    79. What percentage of the fish your household consumed in the past year came from your 
own farm? 
    Sε yerekyekyem ↄha a, εnnam a mo adi no afe nie no mu sεn na εyε wo nsuomu nnam? 
 
 
80. Over the last 12 months how has your  
household’s consumption changed for the  
following types of fish compared to the year  
before? Has it increased,  
decreased or stayed the same?                                                                           
Sε yεde afe wεi toto nea atwam ni no ho a,  
ↄkwan bεn so na wabusua no nnam a wodi no  
asesa wↄ nnam a edidid so yi ho?so akↄ soro  
anaa εso ate anaa εte sεdeε εteε. 
1=increased 
2=decreased 
3=no change 
a. Tilapia/ apataa  
b. Catfish/ adwene  
c. Other fresh water 
fish/ nsuo mu nnam 
foforo biara 
 
d. Other marine fish/ 
Ɛpo mu nnam biara 
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81. Over the last 12 months, how difficult  
was it to provide adequate food for your  
household in each month? Was it: 
 
Wo bosome dummienu a atwaa ni no ↄkwan  
bƐn so na na εyε den ma wo sε wobe nya  
aduane a edi mu wↄ bosome biara mu?Na: 
1=very difficult / 
Na εyε den paa   
2=difficult/  
εyε den kakra 
3=neither difficult nor 
easy/  
εno a εnyε den Ɛno nso 
a ƐnyƐ mmerεw   
4=easy/ na εyε mmerεw  
5=very easy/  
na εyε mmerεw paa 
 
 
Jan 2010  
Feb 2010  
Mar 2010  
April 2010  
May 2010  
June 2010  
July 2010  
Aug 2010  
Sept 2010  
Oct 2010  
Nov 2010  
Dec 2010  
82. For the very difficult months, explain why  
they were so difficult. 
 
Wↄ bosome a na εmu yε den paa no kyerε yen 
nea εnti a na εmu εyε den saa. 
 
………………………………………………………………………..………
…………………………………………………………………………………
……………..…………………………………………………………………
……………………………………..…………………………………………
……………………………………………………………..…………………
…………… 
 
N. POVERTY AND VULNERABILITY 
 
83. Do you consider your household to be:  
So wo bu wabusua no sε: 
(Read out options) 
1=very poor/ ahia wↄn paa  
2=poor/ahia wↄn  
3=not so poor/Ɛnhiaa wↄn kεse  
4=well off/εyε mma wↄn  
5=rich/ wↄ yε asikafoↄ 
 
 
84. What type of crisis have you experienced in the last 12 months?  
ↄhaw bƐn na wakom wↄ bosome dumeεnu? (read out crises and fill in table below).  
 
Crisis 1 = yes 
2 = no 
 Col.1 
a. flood/ nsuyiri  
b. drought/ ↄpɛ  
c. illness in the family/ abusua no mu nii bi yaree  
d. death of a household member/ abusua no mu nii bi wuuyɛ  
e. loss of job/ adwuma a εfii nsa    
f. eviction/ yɛ tuumi  
g. financial loss from livelihood/ me bↄↄka wↄ madwuma mu  
h. others (specify) nea ɛkeka ho_____________________  
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85. How did you cope with the crisis? How significant was each coping strategy used, major, minor or 
insignificant?  
ↄkwan bεn so na wofa gyinaa ano? ↄkwan a wofaa so no, sεn na na Ɛbiara yε soronko? (Read out 
strategies). 
Coping Strategy Significance 
 Col. 1 
a. got a loan from money lender/ me nyaa bosea fii obi a ↄbↄ bosea hↄ  
b. got a loan from friends, relatives, and other persons/ me nyaa bosea fii nnamfoↄ, 
abusuafoↄ ne nnipa afofoforo hↄ 
 
c. sold household assets (appliances, etc.)/ me tↄn me fie nneɛma bi  
d. sold livestock/ me tↄn me nnyɛnmmoa bi  
e. sold jewelry/ me tↄn magudeɛ bi  
f. sold land/ me tↄn masaase bi  
g. used family savings/ me de abusua no sika bi a yɛ de ato hↄ na ɛyɛɛ   
h. pawned jewelry me de magude/ ɛ kↄ sii awoa  
i. pawned land me de masaase/ kↄ sii asiwa  
j. did extra work to earn money/adwuma bi a εka ho di sika bi baayε  
k.  others (specify)/nea ɛkekaho___________________________  
Col.1: 1=major  2=minor 3=insignificant  
 
O. POVERTY AND AQUACULTURE  
 
86. Does fish farming primarily benefit the  
poor or the rich? 
                       Nsuomu nnam yεn wↄ hↄ yi εhe foↄ na εboa  
            w        ↄnw paa, ahiafoↄ anaa asikafoↄ? 
1=poor 2=rich 3=both 4=neither  
5=it depends 6=don’t know 
 
87. How? 
ↄkwan bɛn so? 
…………………………………………………………………………... 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
88. Do the poor practice fish farming? 
So ahiafoↄ yε saa adwuma yi bi anaa? 
1=yes (Go to Q90)  
2=no (Go to Q89)    
3=don’t know (Go to Q90) 
 
89. If not, why not? (probe if necessary e.g.  
lack of information, financial resources,  
suitable land etc.)    
Sε ↄmo nyε bi a, adεn ntia? 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
90. Does fish farming have any negative 
Impact on the poor? 
So nsuomu nnam yεn adwuma no tumi de  
ↄhaw bi a εnyε ba ahiafoↄ so? 
1=yes  (Go to Q 91) 
2=no (Go to Q92) 
 
91. If yes, what? 
Sε aane a, εyε dεn? 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
92. What impact has fish farming had on your  
household? 
Ɛden nsunsuansoↄ na nsuomu nnam yεn anya  
wↄ wabusua so? 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
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93. Has fish farming had any impact on the 
community?  
So nsuomu nnam yεn anya nsunsuasoↄ bi wↄ  
mpↄtam ha?  
(Interviewer can probe –  
e.g. increased fish availability, employment). 
1=yes  (Go to Q 94)  
2=no  (Go to Q95, Section R) 
 
94. If yes, what? 
SƐ mmuaeε no yε aane a? εyε dεn?  
 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
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 APPENDIX 2: CAGE FARMER SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
 
1. What year was this fish farm established?  
 
 
2. Are you the owner-operator or a  
caretaker?   
 
1=owner-operator    2=caretaker     
3= other (specify) ………… 
 
3. Are you Ghanaian? 1=yes, 2=no 
 
 
4: What type of fish farming do you do?   
(medium of production) 
  
(Multiple response) 
 
1=yes 2=no 
Extensive/culture based fisheries  
(no feeding) 
 
 
Semi intensive pond aquaculture   
(using mixture of commercial and non 
 commercial feed) 
 
Intensive pond aquaculture (using only  
commercial feed) 
 
Intensive cage culture 
 
 
Other (specify)…………………. 
 
 
 1=yes  
2=no 
5: What type of fish do you farm?   
 
(Multiple response) 
 
1=yes 2=no 
Tilapia 
 
 
Catfish 
 
 
Heterotis   
 
 
Other (specify) _________ 
 
 
6. How many cages did you harvest in 2010? 
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7. Information on respondent.  (Fill in the table below) 
 
No 
 
 
Fish farm owner 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sex 
 
 
Marital 
Status 
 
What is your 
marital 
status? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Age 
(in yrs) 
 
How old are 
you? 
 
 
 
 
Highest level 
of education 
 
What is the 
highest level 
of school you 
attended? 
 
Primary Occupation 
(respondent to 
decide which is 
most important 
occupation) 
 
What is your most important 
occupation in the dry season? 
And in the rainy season? 
 
 
 
Secondary Occupation 
(respondent to 
decide which is 
second most important 
occupation) 
 
What is your second most 
important occupation in the 
dry season? And in the rainy 
season? 
 
 
 Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5 Col. 6                 Col. 7 Col. 8                  Co. 9 
      Dry season Rainy season Dry season Rainy season 
1 Farm owner 
 
        
Col. 2: 1=male, 2=female 
Col. 3: 1=married  2=never married  3=widowed 4=separated 
Col. 5: 0=None 1=pre-primary 2=primary incomplete 3=primary completed 4= MSLC incomplete 5=MSLC complete 6=secondary incomplete 7=secondary 
completed 8=university degree 9=other (specify)…............ 
Cols. 7 to 10:  1=fish farmer 2=maize farmer  3=cocoa farmer 4=farmer of other crops 5=livestock raiser 6=skilled public sector worker 7=unskilled public sector 
worker 8= skilled private sector worker (artisan) 9= un unskilled private sector worker (labourer, trader) 10=business person – own account 11=business person 
– employee 12=housewife 13=unpaid family labour (in the home) 14 = unpaid family labour (on farm or enterprise) 15= house helper/maid 16=below school 
age 17= at school 18=in higher education 19= unemployed 20= invalid 21=others (specify)__________
  
8. What percentage of your total household income came from fish farming in 
2010? 
 
 
 
9. Access to Land (Fill in the table below). 
 
Landholding Size  
No. of  
Units 
Col.1 
Unit 
Col. 2 
9a. What is the area of land owned by the household?   
9b. What is the total area of land used for fish farming?   
Col. 2: 1=square meters 2=hectares 3= acres 4= feet  5=other (specify______) 
 
10. Access to cages (Fill the table below) 
 
Cages  
No. 
Size   Functional 
in 2010?  
1=yes 
2=no 
 
 
Length 
m2 
 
Breadth 
m2 
Diameter 
m 
Depth 
m2 
 
 
Total 
volume 
m3 
Quantity 
Col. 1 Col.2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Co. 5 Col. 6 Col. 7 
10.a. What is the 
size of each cage 
owned? 
 
10.b. Which ones 
were functional 
in the past 12 
months? 
 
 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
If more than 14 list average size of cage and number of each size 
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B. PRODUCTION 
 
11. What is your average culture period? (in months) 
 
 
12. How often do you harvest 
your fish?  
 
1=weekly, 2=twice a month, 3=once a month,  
4= quarterly,  5= twice yearly, 6=once a year 
7=less than once a year, 8=no specific schedule 
 
 
 1=yes  
2=no 
13. In which month(s) did you harvest your main fish  
harvest in 2010?  
 
(Multiple Response) 
 
1=yes 1=no 
1= Jan    
2=Feb    
3=March    
4=April  
5=May    
6=June    
7=July   
8=August    
9=September    
10=October    
11=November   
12= December  
13=Didn’t harvest  
14=other  
 
14. Value of Annual Fish Production from cages in 2010 
 
Per 
cage 
 
 
 
Sold Quantity of 
fish eaten 
 (kgs) 
Quantity 
of fish 
given 
away 
 (kgs) 
 
Others 
(specify) 
_____________ 
(kgs) 
Total 
Harvest: 
Sold, 
Eaten, 
Given 
Away, etc. 
(kgs) 
Quantity 
of fish sold  
(kgs) 
Amount  
received  
 
 
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 5 Col. 6 Col. 7 Col. 8 
 
 
      
 
 
      
 
 
      
 
 
      
 
 
      
 
 
      
TOTAL 
 
      
Col. 1. 1=tilapia 2=catfish 3=heterotis 4= Others (specify)………………………………………….. 
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15. What was your average size at harvest (kgs)? 
 
 
16. Why did you decide to harvest at that  
size? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. INITIAL INVESTMENT 
 
17. How much was the initial investment/start up cost of your fish farming operations? 
(Including cost of acquiring land if applicable, cages, EPA approval, stocking of cages,  
labour etc.) GH¢ 
 
 
18. In what year did you make this investment? 
 
 
19. How did you pay for the initial  
investment cost of your fish farming  
operations?  
Rank them in order of importance.  
 
 (Multiple Response) 
1=yes 2=no 
 1=yes 
 2=no 
Rank 
With own savings     
With a loan from a financial institution     
With a loan from a friend/relative    
With assistance from an NGO   
With assistance from a friend/relative   
Other (specify)……………….   
 
D. INPUTS 
 
 1=yes  
2=no 
Rank 
20. Where do you obtain your main 
stocking  material?   
 
Rank them in order of importance. 
 
 (Multiple Response) 
1=yes 2=no 
WRI (pure Akosombo strain)   
Another government hatchery   
Crystal Lake (pure Akosombo strain)   
Data Stream (pure Akosombo strain)   
Aqua Consult    
Tropo Farms   
Maleka Farms   
Fish Reit   
Another private hatchery (specify)……………   
Other farmers   
Own ponds     
The wild    
Other (specify)…………..   
21. Do you have any special  
arrangements with your fingerling  
suppliers (e.g. purchase on credit,  
cheaper if bulk purchase etc.)? 
 If so, what? 
 
 
 
 
 
22. Do you use all male fingerlings? 
 
1=yes  2=no 3=sometimes  
23. Do you use the Akosombo strain of  
tilapia to stock your cages?  (bought from WRI 
Akosombo, Crystal Lake and/or Data  
Stream)? 
1=yes  2=no 3=sometimes  
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24. If yes, what impact has the use of the 
Akosombo strain had on your fish farming 
operations? 
 (e.g. increased profit, shorter growth  
cycle, increased number of cycles per  
year,  larger fish size, increased  
feed costs etc….) 
 
25. At present what do you feed your  
fish?  
Rank them in order of importance.  
(Multiple Response) 
1=yes 2=no 
 
 
 1=yes  
2=no 
Rank 
Formulated floating commercial feed   
Formulated sinking commercial feed    
Farmer’s own prepared feed – what 
ingredients do you use? 
  
Other (specify)…………………   
26. If  you prepare your own feed what  
ingredients do you use? 
 
 
27. Where do you get your feed from?   
Rank in order of importance. 
 
(Multiple response) 
1=yes 2=no 
 1=yes  
2=no 
Rank 
Ranaan   
Nikolesi (Atimpoku)   
Pira feed depot at Akrade   
Paul Ansong   
Maleka   
CSG Fish Farming (Bioma)   
Import from abroad   
Others………………………   
28. Do you have any special 
 arrangements with your feed suppliers?  
(e.g. purchase on credit, cheaper if  
bulk purchase etc.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E. PROBLEMS 
 
29. Which of the following problems have you experienced in your fish farming operations? Have 
they been major, minor or insignificant problems?  (Multiple response) Read out problems below. 
 
Problem Significance 
 Col. 1 
a. Limited supply of fingerlings on the market  
b. Limited suppIy of feed on the market   
c. Late supply of feed  
d. Late supply of fingerlings  
e. High price of fingerlings  
f. High price of feed   
g. Low quality fingerlings  
h. Difficulty of recruiting labourers  
i. High cost of labour  
j. Lack of technical knowledge  
k. Poor water quality for fish farming  
l. Disease (describe) _________________________  
m. Existence of predators (e.g. birds, etc.)  
n. High fish mortality rate  
o. Theft  
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p. Conflict with others  
q. High cost of constructing structures (cages, etc.)  
r. Lack of access to land   
s. Lack of access to water  
t. Lack of access to credit   
u. Lack of access to extension services  
v. Declining net profits  
w. Drought  
x. Flooding  
y. Turnover/fish kill in August 2010  
z. Water pollution from Akosombo Textiles and other companies   
  Col. 1: 1=major 2=minor 3=insignificant 
 
F. INCOME 
 
30. What income bracket would you put 
your household in for 2010? (i.e. total 
household earnings from all sources 
including sale of crops, livestock, assets, 
employment, remittances, government 
transfers etc. for 2010).    Tick  
 
0-2500 GH¢  
2500-5000 GH¢  
5000-7500 GH¢  
7500-10000 GH¢  
10000-12500 GH¢  
12500-15000 GH¢  
15000-20000 GH¢  
20000-25000 GH¢  
25000-30000 GH¢  
30000-35000 GH¢  
35000-40000 GH¢  
40000-45000 GH¢  
50000-60000 GH¢  
60000- 70000GH¢  
Over 70000 GH¢  
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G. EMPLOYMENT 
 
31. What permanent and temporary staff were employed in your fish farm in 2010? 
 
Position No. 
engaged 
Skilled / 
unskilled 
Perm/ 
temp 
Number 
of days 
worked 
per 
year 
Number 
of 
hours 
worked 
in a day 
Average 
pay per 
month (or 
per day if 
casual 
staff) 
No 
employed 
from nearby 
communities 
Training 
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5 Col. 6 Col. 7 Col. 8 Col. 9 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
        
Col. 9 1=on the job training, 2=on the job training with support of non company staff resource persons, 3= external, in 
country training  4=external, out of country training, 5=other(specify)…………….  
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H. OUTPUT MARKETS 
 
32. To whom do you sell your fish 
harvest? 
 (Multiple response) 1=yes 2=no) 
 
33. Rank in order of importance. 
 
34. Where do you sell your fish 
harvest for each type of buyer?  
1= at the farm gate 2 = in the village  
3= in the town   
4= in other towns (specify 
where)…………………… 
 
35. Who determines the final price of 
your product in each market channel?   
 
                    1=myself  2=buyer/trader   
                    3=Fish Farmer Association   
                    4=Cooperative Society  5=Government (Fisheries  
                    Department)  6=we negotiate  
                    7=others (specify)………....... 
 Q.33 
1=yes 
2=no 
Q. 34 
Rank 
 
Q.35 
 
Q.36 
Trader (500kgs and 
below) 
 
    
Wholesaler/ 
assembler 
 
    
Retailer (including 
restaurants) 
 
    
Consumer 
 
    
Other 
(specify)………………… 
 
    
36. How many regular traders does the farm deal with?   
37. Do you have any special  
arrangements with any  
0f your customers - wholesaler/ 
traders?  
E.g. sale of fish on credit, reduced  
prices for bulk purchase etc. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………….……………………………………………………………………………
…………………………….……………………………………………………………
…………………………………………….……………………………………………
…………………………………………………………….……………………………
…………………………………………………………………………….……………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
.…………………………………………………………………………………………
……………….………………………………………………………………………… 
 
38. Does the farm have a schedule of  
fish sales to the public? 
1=yes, 2=no  
39. What is the interval of sales? 1=weekly, 2=twice weekly,  
3=once a fortnight 4=monthly,  
5=quarterly, 6=other……………….. 
 
40. How much fish can a regular 
wholesaler/trader,  
obtain in a week and/or a month from 
this farm? 
Kgs in a week  
Kgs in a month  
 
41. Additional notes on value chain: e.g. where do the traders sell the fish? To the community or does it 
go to Accra/Tema/Kumasi etc?? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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42. What restricts you from seeking other  
market outlets? 
 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
…….……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
43. What problems have you faced in marketing your fish? Have these problems been major, minor or 
insignificant?  
 
Problem Significance 
Col. 1 
a. Traders do not stick to agreed price  
b. Unable to take fish to market due to lack of transportation  
c. Unable to take fish to market due to lack of cold storage facilities  
d. Unable to get buyers to come to the farm when fish are ready   
e. Low price of fish  
f. Lack of demand as consumers prefer wild caught fish   
g. Lack of demand for smaller size fish  
h. Difficulty in agreeing a fair price for different size categories of fish  
i. Others (specify) ……………………..  
j. Others (specify) ……………………..  
Col. 1: 1=major  2=minor  3=insignificant 
 
44. What harvesting system do you  
practice? 
 
1=partial (size selection does not matter 
and harvesting is done more than once)  
2=complete (all the fish are harvested only  
once) 
 
45. In the dry season what percentage of  
fish do you sell?: 
 
 
1=fresh from cage  
2=fresh on ice  
3= frozen  
4=salted  
5=dried  
6= smoked  
7= other (specify)  
46. In the rainy season what percentage of  
fish do you sell?: 
 
 
1=fresh from the cage  
2=fresh on ice  
3= frozen  
4=salted  
5=dried  
6= smoked  
7= other (specify)  
47. If  iced or frozen, who provides ice or 
 freezing facility? 
1= farm 
2= buyer 
3= local ice producers/ sellers near the 
farm 
4=other ………………. 
 
 
I. POVERTY 
 
48. Do you consider your household to be:  
(Read out options) 
1=very poor 
2=poor  
3=not so poor  
4=well off  
5=rich 
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J. SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
                        49. Are you a member of a Fish Farming Association? 
 
1=yes 2=no  
 
50. If yes, what association(s) are you a member of? How has your association helped disseminate 
information on fish farming technology and management practices? What else has your association 
helped you with? How long have you been a member of the association? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
K. BUDGET 
 
52. Budget for 2010 
 
Item Quantity Unit Unit Price Total 
Cost 
% of total costs 
Variable costs  
Hired labour  
Permanent       
Temporary      
Skilled/unskilled 
Ratio and % labour cost to each 
 
Feed  
Feed type 1………………      
Feed type 2………………      
Feed type 3……………….      
Fingerlings      
Electricity      
Fuel      
Other costs 1      
Other costs 2      
Other costs 3      
Fixed costs  
Operators salary      
Lease costs      
Maintenance costs      
Cage      
Equipment      
Water rent      
Marketing costs      
Preservation      
Processing      
Storage      
Transport      
Commissions      
Waste      
Other costs       
Total cost  
Gross revenue  
Net profit  
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53. What was the average cost of your cages? 
 
L. LINKAGES WITH SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES 
 
54. What is the status of your relationship  
with the nearest community/communities? 
1=needs improvement  2=good  3=very good   
55. What are the distances between your  
farm and the two nearest communities  
(km) 
Distance to community 1  
Distance to community 2  
56. Have any of the infrastructure or 
other investments made for the purposes 
of developing your fish farm had any 
impacts (positive or negative) on nearby 
communities? E.g. building of access 
roads, electrification etc.?  
 
1=yes 2=no 
 
 
57. If yes, which ones? 
 
Fish farm investment 
activity 
Year Cost (GH¢) Impact on community 
1. 
 
 
   
2. 
 
 
   
3. 
 
 
   
4. 
 
 
   
5. 
 
 
   
 
 
58. Have you used the profits from fish 
farming to invest in any other local 
activities? E.g. starting up new businesses 
etc. 
 
1=yes, 2=no 
 
 
 
 
What was the 
average cost of each 
cage? GH¢ 
Dimensions Volume Quantity 
bought 
Year bought 
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59. If yes, which ones? 
 
 Investment activity Year Cost (GH¢) Impact on community 
1. 
 
 
   
2. 
 
 
   
3. 
 
 
   
4. 
 
 
   
5. 
 
 
   
 
 
60. Has the farm been involved in any other specific 
 developmental activity of nearby communities?  
1=yes 2=no  
 
61. If yes, which ones? 
 
Development activity Year Cost (GH¢) Impact on community 
1. 
 
 
   
2. 
 
 
   
3. 
 
 
   
4. 
 
 
   
5. 
 
 
   
 
62. What other impacts has your fish farm had on nearby communities? E.g. Increased fish supply, 
increased employment (labourers, traders, processors, tilapia joints, transporters of 
fingerlings/fish/feed etc.), reduced price of fish, increased adoption of cage aquaculture within the 
community, reduced livelihoods for fishermen through decreased access to fishing grounds, etc.  
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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63. What constraints to growth does your farm and the fish farming sector in Ghana face? E.g. 
Demands for traceability, certification requirements, lack of cold chain, government regulations, 
difficulty exporting, EPA requirements, high costs of doing business etc. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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APPENDIX 3: EXPRESSIONS FOR MARGINAL BUDGET 
SHARES AND EXPENDITURE ELASTICITIES100 
 
 
Using equation (2) in Section 4.3.2: 
 
                                                                                        (A1) 
 
 
the MBS for good j and household i is defined as follows: 
 
       
    
   
 
 
where     is the consumption of good j by household i, and     is the total 
consumption by household i.  
 
The budget share of good j and household i is defined as: 
 
     
   
  
 
 
so the partial derivative of the budget share with respect to total consumption 
is: 
  
    
   
 
   
    
   
    
   
   
  
  
  
  
                     (A2) 
 
By solving for 
    
   
 in equation (A2) we get: 
  
         
   
  
                   (A3) 
 
  
The OLS estimates and the mean budget shares can be used to calculate 
MBS (A3).  
 
The expenditure elasticity of good j for household i is computed as: 
  
            
 
   
  
  
   
           (A4) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
100
 The derivation of expressions for MBS and expenditure elasticity is taken from Castaldo and Reilly 
(2007). 
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 APPENDIX 4: CAGE FARM LABOURER SURVEY 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Questionnaire ID……………………………………… 
Name of farm…………………………………………… 
Location …………………………………………………… 
Date…………………………………………………………. 
 
 
1.Name of labourer………………………………………………………………................................................ 
 
2. Gender……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
3. Age……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
4. Highest level of education………………………………………………………………………………………………... 
 
5. Marital status……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
6. Home town (within community, district, region, Ghana)  
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
7. Are you the head of your household?.................................................................................... 
 
8. How many people are there in your household?….……………………………................................. 
 
9. How many dependents do you have?…………………………………………........................................ 
 
10. What is your position at the farm? Is it skilled/unskilled, 
permanent/temporary/seasonal? 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
11. Are you engaged in any other occupations? E.g. are you also a fisherman, a farmer 
etc?.………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
12. What are your core activities at the farm? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
13. Cash earnings per month (or per day if seasonal labourer) 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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14. How does this compare to wages for other jobs that you may be qualified for?  e.g. 
agricultural labourer. Give examples. 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
15. Other benefits of the job (knowledge gained, training opportunities, loan possibilities, 
bonus, social security contribution, health provision support, appreciation of work, increased 
access to fish, other benefits…) 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
16. What alternative employment could you get? Are there other jobs readily available to 
you?  
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
17. Duration at current farm…………………………………………………………........................................ 
 
 
18. Past jobs (last 5 years, list most recent first)  
 
………………………………………………………………………………………..………………………………………………….…
………………………………………..……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………..……………………………………………….…
………………………………………..……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………..……………………………………………………
….…………………………………………..………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
19. Do you consider your household to be: very poor, poor, not so poor, well off or 
rich?............................…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
20. What impact (positive and/or negative) has working at the fish farm had on your 
household? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………….………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………….………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….……
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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21. If from a nearby community, what impact (positive/negative) have the fish farms in this 
area had on your community? 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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 APPENDIX 5: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES FOR 
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY DATA ANALYSIS PRESENTED IN 
CHAPTER 5 
 
Table 1: Location of sample households by fish farming and poverty 
status 
  Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
 District Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
  % % % % % % % % % 
Amansie West 27 28 28 24 31 27 25 30 27 
Amansie 
Central 33 26 29 29 22 26 31 24 27 
Adansi North* 40 46 43 48 47 47 44 46 45 
Total 
households 
(Nos.) 30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
Notes: *Including 2 fish farmer and 2 non-fish farmer households from Obuasi Municipality 
 
Table 2: Poverty headcount of surveyed population by fish farming 
status 
Poverty status Fish farmer 
households 
Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
%  % % 
Poor 47 63 55 
Non-poor 53 37 45 
Total population (Nos.) 595 622 1217 
 
Table 3: Household’s own perception of poverty by fish farming and 
poverty status 
  Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer households Total households 
  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
% % % % % % % % % 
Very poor 
and poor 37 31 33 57 41 50 49 35 42 
Not so poor 53 38 45 24 38 30 36 38 37 
Well off 10 31 22 19 22 20 15 27 21 
Total 
households 
(Nos.) 30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
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Table 4: Household and demographic characteristics of sample 
households by fish farming and poverty status 
 Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer households Total households 
Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
Female headed 
households (%) 
10 0 4 0 9 4 4 4 4 
Married household 
heads (%) 
93 97 96 98 88 93 96 93 94 
Average household 
size 
9.3 
(0.68) 
8.1 
(0.58) 
8.6 
(0.45)  
9.3 
(0.47) 
7.3 
(0.48) 
8.4 
(0.36) 
9.3 
(0.39) 
7.7 
(0.39) 
8.5 
(0.28) 
Average age of 
household head 
51.0 
(1.95) 
46.9 
(1.90) 
48.7 
(1.38) 
50.8 
(1.61) 
47.1 
(1.91) 
49.2 
(1.24) 
50.9 
(1.23) 
47.0 
(1.34) 
48.9 
(0.92) 
Average number of 
children age 14 and 
below  
4.0 
(0.45) 
2.7 
(0.30) 
3.3 
(0.27) 
3.3 
(0.27) 
2.8 
(0.34) 
3.1  
(0.21) 
3.6 
(0.25) 
2.8 
(0.22) 
3.2 
(0.17) 
Average number of 
household members 
going to school 
4.7 
(0.50) 
4.0 
(0.37) 
4.3 
(0.30) 
4.6 
(0.34) 
3.5 
(0.42) 
4.1 
(0.27) 
4.6 
(0.29) 
3.8 
(0.28) 
4.2 
(0.20) 
Average 
dependency ratio (2) 
101.9 
(13.33) 
67.4 
(7.45) 
82.4 
(7.40) 
83.8 
(9.06) 
87.7 
(12.51) 
85.5 
(7.41) 
91.3 
(7.68) 
76.5 
(7.02) 
84.0 
(5.22) 
Average number of 
years household 
head has resided in 
the village 
36.2 
(3.52) 
 
30.2 
(2.48) 
 
32.8 
(2.09) 
 
31.4 
(2.74) 
 
30.7 
(3.48) 
 
31.1 
(2.15) 
 
33.4 
(2.17) 
 
30.4 
(2.06) 
 
31.9 
(1.50) 
 
Total households 
(Nos.) 
30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
Notes:   (1) Standard errors (SE) in parentheses 
(2) Dependency ratio: number of people aged under 15 years and 65 years and over, divided 
by no of people aged 16-64, multiplied by 100 
 
Table 5: Education of household head by fish farming and poverty 
status 
  Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
% % % % % % % % % 
None/pre 
primary 20 8 13 17 6 12 18 7 13 
Completed 
primary 80 90 86 81 94 86 81 92 86 
Completed 
MSLC 63 67 65 67 63 65 65 65 65 
Completed 
secondary 17 23 20 21 13 18 19 18 19 
University  3 8 6 5 0 3 4 4 4 
Total 
households 
(Nos.) 30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
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Table 6: Primary occupation of household head in dry season by fish 
farming and poverty status 
 Fish farmer household 
heads 
Non-fish farmer household 
heads 
Total household heads 
 Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
 %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  % 
Fish farmer 10 10 10 0 0 0 4 6 5 
Maize farmer 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 1 
Cocoa farmer 23 13 17 19 28 23 21 20 20 
Farmer of other 
crops 
57 39 46 57 50 54 57 44 50 
Livestock raiser 3 3 3 0 3 1 1 3 2 
Unskilled worker 0 8 4 2 0 1 1 4 3 
Skilled worker 0 13 7 5 3 4 3 9 6 
Business person-
own account 
3 10 7 10 9 10 7 10 8 
Business person-
employee 
3 3 3 2 0 1 3 1 2 
Unemployed 0 0 0 2 6 4 1 3 2 
Others 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Total households 
(Nos.) 
30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
 
Table 7: Primary occupation of household head in rainy season by fish 
farming and poverty status 
 Fish farmer household 
heads 
Non-fish farmer household 
heads 
Total household heads 
 Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
% % % % % % % % % 
Fish farmer 17 8 12 0 0 0 7 4 6 
Maize farmer 3 3 3 2 6 4 3 4 4 
Cocoa farmer 57 59 58 69 69 69 64 63 64 
Farmer of other 
crops 
23 18 20 26 22 24 25 20 22 
Livestock raiser 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unskilled worker 0 3 1 2 0 1 1 1 1 
Skilled worker 0 5 3 0 0 0 0 3 1 
Business person-
own account 
0 3 1 0 3 1 0 3 1 
Business person-
employee 
0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Unemployed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total households 
(Nos.) 
30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
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Table 8: Primary occupation of spouse of household head in dry 
season by fish farming and poverty status 
 Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
 Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
% % % % % % % % % 
Fish farmer 4 3 3 0 0 0 1 2 2 
Maize farmer 0 0 0 2 0 2 1 0 1 
Cocoa farmer 7 16 12 12 22 16 10 19 14 
Farmer of other 
crops 
57 29 41 54 37 47 55 32 44 
Livestock raiser 4 0 2 0 4 2 1 2 2 
Unskilled public or 
private sector worker 
11 26 20 10 7 9 10 18 14 
Skilled public or 
private sector worker 
4 5 5 0 7 3 1 6 4 
Business person-
own account 
14 18 17 17 19 18 16 19 17 
Business person-
employee 
0 0 0 2 0 2 1 0 1 
Unemployed 0 0 0 2 4 3 1 2 2 
Others 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 
Total households 
(Nos.) 
28 38 66 41 27 68 69 65 134 
 
Table 9: Primary occupation of spouse of household head in rainy 
season by fish farming and poverty status 
 Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
 Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
% % % % % % % % % 
Fish farmer 7 3 5 0 0 0 3 2 2 
Maize farmer 7 0 3 2 4 3 4 2 3 
Cocoa farmer 54 42 47 76 48 65 67 45 56 
Farmer of other 
crops 
18 21 20 17 33 24 17 26 22 
Livestock raiser 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unskilled public or 
private sector worker 
7 21 15 3 4 4 4 14 9 
Skilled public or 
private sector worker 
0 5 3 0 4 2 0 5 2 
Business person-
own account 
7 5 6 2 7 4 4 6 5 
Business person-
employee 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unemployed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Others 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 
Total households 
(Nos.) 
28 38 66 41 27 68 69 65 134 
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Table 10: Average land size by fish farming and poverty status 
 Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
 Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
Size of land owned 
(ha)  
6.0 
 (1.38) 
Median  
3.5 
8.2 
 (1.28) 
Median  
5.1 
7.2 
 (0.94) 
Median  
4.1 
4.4 
(0.75) 
Median  
3.7 
7.2 
(1.35) 
Median  
4.9 
5.7 
(0.73) 
Median 
 4.1 
5.1 
(0.72) 
Median  
3.5 
7.8 
(0.93) 
Median  
4.9 
6.4 
(0.59) 
Median 
 4.1 
Size of land leased 
(ha) 
0.1 
(0.08) 
Median  
0 
0 
 
0.04 
(0.04) 
Median  
0 
0.02 
(0.02) 
Median  
0 
0.3 
(0.32) 
Median  
0 
0.2 
(0.14) 
Median  
0 
0.1 
(0.04) 
Median  
0 
0.1 
(0.14) 
Median  
0 
0.1 
(0.07) 
Median  
0 
Size of land rented 
(ha) 
0.1 
(0.11) 
Median 
 0 
0.2 
(0.12) 
Median  
0 
0.2 
(0.08) 
Median  
0 
0.1 
(0.08) 
Medan  
0 
0.8 
(0.52) 
Median  
0 
0.4 
(0.23) 
Median  
0 
0.1 
(0.06) 
Median  
0 
0.4 
(0.24) 
Median  
0 
0.3 
(0.13) 
Median  
0 
Size of land 
sharecropped (ha) 
1.4 
(0.95) 
Median 
 0 
1.0 
(0.49) 
Median 
 0 
1.1 
(0.49) 
Median  
0 
1.7 
(0.69) 
Median  
0 
0.9 
(0.36) 
Median  
0 
1.4 
(0.42) 
Median 
 0 
1.6 
(0.56) 
Median  
0 
0.9 
(0.31) 
Median  
0 
1.3 
(0.32) 
Median 
 0 
Farm size (land 
owned, leased, 
rented and 
sharecropped) (ha) 
(1) 
7.6 
(1.52) 
Median  
4.5 
9.4 
(1.44) 
Median  
5.9 
8.6 
(1.05) 
Median  
5.3 
6.3 
(1.06) 
Median  
4.1 
9.2 
(1.62) 
Median  
6.9 
7.6 
(0.93) 
Median  
4.9 
6.8 
(0.88) 
Median  
4.1 
9.3 
(1.07) 
Median  
6.1 
8.0 
(0.70) 
Median  
4.9 
Total households 
(Nos.) 
30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
Notes:  SE in parentheses 
(1) Average farm size is the sum of land owned, leased, rented and sharecropped but is not 
necessarily the amount of land under production 
Table 11: Housing conditions by fish farming and poverty status 
 Fish farmer 
households 
Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
 Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
% % % % % % % % % 
Households who own their 
homes 
90 77 83 79 72 76 83 75 79 
Households with corrugated 
iron roofs 
93 100 97 93 97 95 93 99 96 
Households with outside walls 
made of  mud/bricks 
50 62 57 57 69 62 54 65 59 
Households with outside walls 
made of  wood 
3 0 1 2 0 1 3 0 1 
Households with outside walls 
made of  stone/burnt bricks 
27 5 15 14 13 14 19 9 14 
Households with outside walls 
made of  cement/concrete 
20 33 28 26 19 23 24 27 25 
Total households (Nos.) 30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
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Table 12: Households owning livestock by fish farming and poverty 
status 
  Fish farmer 
households 
Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
  Poor Non-
poor 
Total Poor Non-
poor 
Total Poor Non-
poor 
Total 
% % % % % % % % % 
Households owning 
draught animal 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Households owning 
cattle 0 5 3 2 0 1 1 2 2 
Households owning 
sheep 20 33 28 17 22 19 18 28 30 
Households owning 
goats 37 33 35 57 38 49 49 35 42 
Households owning pigs 
7 10 9 2 6 4 4 8 6 
Households owning 
rabbits 0 5 3 0 0 0 0 3 1 
Households owning 
chicken 77 59 67 86 75 81 82 66 74 
Households owning 
grasscutter 3 5 4 0 0 0 1 3 2 
Households owning 
livestock 87 72 78 93 75 85 90 73 82 
Total households (Nos.) 30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
 
Table 13: Livestock ownership by fish farming and poverty status 
  Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
Average number 
of draught 
animals owned 
0 0.05 0.03 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.01 
  (0.05) (0.03)         (0.03) (0.01) 
Average draught 
animal (TLUs) (1) 
0 0.04 0.02 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.01 
  (0.04) (0.02)         (0.02) (0.01) 
Average number 
of cattle owned 
0 0.4 0.2 0.1 0 0.04 0.04 0.2 0.1 
  (0.34)  (0.19) (0.07)   (0.04) (0.04) (0.19) (0.09) 
Average cattle 
(TLUs) 
0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0.03 0.03 0.2 0.1 
  (0.24) (0.13) (0.05)   (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.07) 
Average number 
of sheep owned 
4.3 3.9 4.1 1.6 2.3 1.9 2.7 3.2 3.0 
(2.47) (1.34) (1.30) (0.79) (0.88) (0.58) (1.13) (0.83) (0.70) 
Average sheep 
(TLUs) 
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 
(0.25) (0.13) (0.13) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.11) (0.08) (0.07) 
Average number 
of goats owned 
3.6 3.1 3.4 4.7 2.5 3.7 4.2 2.8 3.5 
(1.25) (1.02) (0.79) (1.27 ) (0.75) (0.80) (0.90) (0.65) (0.56) 
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Average goat 
(TLUs) 
0.4 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 
(0.13) (0.10) (0.08) (0.13) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) 
Average number 
of pigs owned 
1.7 1.0 1.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 1.0 0.7 0.9 
(1.22) (0.53) (0.61) (0.48) (0.32) (0.30) (0.58) (0.33) (0.33) 
Average pig 
(TLUs) 
0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 
(0.24) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) 
Average number 
of rabbits owned 
0 0.4 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.1 
  (0.31) (0.18)         (0.17) (0.09) 
Average rabbit 
(TLUs) 
0 0.01 0.002 0 0 0 0 0.002 0.001 
  (0.01) (0.002)         (0.002) (0.001) 
Average number 
of chickens 
owned 
19.9 33.7 27.7 18.6 41.1 28.4 19.2 37.0 28.0 
(3.42)  (2.99) (7.50) (3.95) (24.67) (10.88) (2.69) (13.44) (6.67) 
Average chicken 
(TLUs) 
0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3 
(0.03) (0.13) (0.07) (0.04) (0.25) (0.11) (0.03) (0.13) (0.07) 
Average number 
of grasscutters 
owned 
1.3 0.9 1.1 0 0 0 0.6 0.5 0.5 
(1.33) (0.68) (0.70)       (0.56) (0.38) (0.34) 
Average 
grasscutter 
(TLUs) 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0.005 0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)       (0.01) (0.004) (0.003) 
Average total 
livestock 
holdings (TLUs) 
1.3 1.6 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.2 
(0.45) (0.40) (0.30) (0.23) (0.28) (0.18) (0.23) (0.26) (0.17) 
Total households 
(Nos.) 
30 38 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
Notes:  SE in parentheses 
(1) Tropical Livestock Units (TLUs) based on Jahnke (1982) using the following conversion 
factors: draught animals, 0.80; cattle, 0.70; sheep, 0.10; goats, 0.10; pigs, 0.20; rabbits, 0.01; 
chickens, 0.01; and grasscutters, 0.01. Conversion factors for rabbits and grasscutters were 
not estimated by Jahnke (1982) but are assumed here to be equal to chickens (0.01) 
 
Table 14: Sources of credit by fish farming and poverty status 
  Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
% % % % % % % % % 
Relatives/Friends 0 33 25 25 0 14 20 17 18 
Private financier 0 0 0 0 33 14 0 17 9 
Rural bank 0 33 25 125 0 71 100 17 55 
Cooperative/ 
Association 0 0 0 0 33 14 0 17 9 
NGO 0 0 0 0 33 14 0 17 9 
Government agency 100 0 25 0 0 0 20 0 9 
Other 0 67 50 0 0 0 0 33 18 
Total households  (Nos.) 1 3 4 4 3 7 5 6 11 
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Table 15: Staple crops grown by households in 2010 by fish farming 
and poverty status 
  Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer households Total households 
  Poor Non-poor Total  Poor Non-poor Total  Poor Non-poor Total  
% % % % % % % % % 
Plantain 97 92 94 90 94 92 93 93 93 
Cassava 93 85 88 98 94 96 96 89 92 
Yam 77 59 67 60 59 59 67 59 63 
Rice 3 8 6 0 9 4 1 8 5 
Maize 83 82 83 83 84 84 83 83 83 
Cocoyam 83 72 77 79 78 78 81 75 78 
Total households 
(Nos.) 30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
 
Table 16: Cash crops grown by households in 2010 by fish farming and 
poverty status 
  Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
% % % % % % % % % 
Cocoa 83 79 81 83 94 88 83 86 85 
Vegetables 63 49 55 64 66 65 64 56 60 
Oil palm 77 85 81 67 75 70 71 80 76 
Coconut 23 23 23 14 19 16 18 21 20 
Citrus 27 38 33 26 19 23 26 30 28 
Maize 90 90 90 83 91 86 86 90 88 
Total households 
(Nos.) 30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
 
Table 17: Sale of crops by fish farming and poverty status 
  Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer 
households 
Total households 
  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  Poor Non-
poor 
Total  
% % % % % % % % % 
Cocoa 87 74 80 83 94 88 85 83 84 
Vegetables 23 23 23 21 19 20 22 21 22 
Oil palm 47 49 48 50 47 49 49 48 48 
Coconut 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 
Citrus 10 15 13 2 9 5 6 13 9 
Maize 37 38 38 45 50 47 42 44 43 
Plantain 50 56 54 50 56 53 50 56 53 
Cassava 43 54 49 69 56 64 58 55 57 
Total households 
(Nos.) 30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
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Table 18: Labour participation and government extension services 
involved in fish farming activities by poverty status 
 
  Fish farmer households 
  Poor Non-poor Total  
% % % 
Pond construction   
Household labour 87 87 87 
Hired labour 93 87 90 
Government extension services 10 18 14 
Pond preparation    
Household labour 87 87 87 
Hired labour 80 67 72 
Government extension services 10 15 13 
Fingerling procurement   
Household labour 83 90 87 
Hired labour 20 10 14 
Government extension services 20 18 19 
Feed procurement   
Household labour 87 95 91 
Hired labour 7 0 3 
Government extension services 10 5 7 
Fertilising   
Household labour 53 79 68 
Hired labour 0 0 0 
Government extension services 0 5 3 
Feeding   
Household labour 97 95 96 
Hired labour 10 10 10 
Government extension services 0 3 1 
Weeding   
Household labour 87 95 91 
Hired labour 33 31 32 
Government extension services 0 0 0 
Sampling for fish growth   
Household labour 70 82 77 
Hired labour 20 8 13 
Government extension services 10 18 14 
Harvesting    
Household labour 83 90 87 
Hired labour 47 38 42 
Government extension services 7 21 14 
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Marketing   
Household labour 77 79 78 
Hired labour 17 3 9 
Government extension services 3 5 4 
Processing   
Household labour 63 74 70 
Hired labour 20 5 12 
Government extension services 3 0 1 
Record keeping   
Household labour 73 74 74 
Hired labour 13 0 6 
Government extension services 3 3 3 
Total households (Nos.) 30 39 69 
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Table 19: Type of household labour used in fish farming activities 
by poverty status 
  Fish farmer households 
  Poor Non-poor Total  
% % % 
Pond construction   
Purely male 67 67 67 
Mainly male 3 0 1 
Purely female 0 0 0 
Mainly female 0 0 0 
Shared by both males and females 13 21 17 
Purely children 0 0 0 
Mainly children 3 0 1 
Total 87 87 87 
Pond preparation    
Purely male 77 77 77 
Mainly male 0 3 1 
Purely female 0 0 0 
Mainly female 0 0 0 
Shared by both males and females 10 8 9 
Purely children 0 0 0 
Mainly children 0 0 0 
Total 87 87 87 
Fingerling procurement   
Purely male 73 90 83 
Mainly male 3 0 1 
Purely female 7 0 3 
Mainly female 0 0 0 
Shared by both males and females 0 0 0 
Purely children 0 0 0 
Mainly children 0 0 0 
Total 83 90 87 
Feed procurement   
Purely male 77 95 87 
Mainly male 3 0 1 
Purely female 7 0 3 
Mainly female 0 0 0 
Shared by both males and females 0 0 0 
Purely children 0 0 0 
Mainly children 0 0 0 
Total  87 95 91 
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Fertilising   
Purely male 30 64 49 
Mainly male 10 13 12 
Purely female 7 0 3 
Mainly female 0 0 0 
Shared by both males and females 7 3 4 
Purely children 0 0 0 
Mainly children 0 0 0 
Total 53 79 68 
Feeding   
Purely male 80 82 81 
Mainly male 0 0 0 
Purely female 10 0 4 
Mainly female 0 0 0 
Shared by both males and females 7 13 10 
Purely children 0 0 0 
Mainly children 0 0 0 
Total 97 95 96 
Weeding   
Purely male 87 92 90 
Mainly male 0 0 0 
Purely female 0 0 0 
Mainly female 0 0 0 
Shared by both males and females 0 3 1 
Purely children 0 0 0 
Mainly children 0 0 0 
Total 87 95 91 
Sampling for fish growth   
Purely male 63 82 74 
Mainly male 0 0 0 
Purely female 0 0 0 
Mainly female 0 0 0 
Shared by both males and females 7 0 3 
Purely children 0 0 0 
Mainly children 0 0 0 
Total 70 82 77 
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Harvesting    
Purely male 73 85 80 
Mainly male 0 3 1 
Purely female 0 3 1 
Mainly female 0 0 0 
Shared by both males and females 10 0 4 
Purely children 0 0 0 
Mainly children 0 0 0 
Total 83 90 87 
Marketing              
Purely male 57 38 46 
Mainly male 0 8 4 
Purely female 17 15 16 
Mainly female 0 8 4 
Shared by both males and females 3 10 7 
Purely children 0 0 0 
Mainly children 0 0 0 
Total 77 79 78 
Processing   
Purely male 33 28 30 
Mainly male 7 10 9 
Purely female 17 21 19 
Mainly female 7 13 10 
Shared by both males and females 0 3 1 
Purely children 0 0 0 
Mainly children 0 0 0 
Total 63 74 70 
Record keeping   
Purely male 63 69 67 
Mainly male 0 3 1 
Purely female 3 3 3 
Mainly female 0 0 0 
Shared by both males and females 7 0 3 
Purely children 0 0 0 
Mainly children 0 0 0 
Total 73 74 74 
Total households (Nos.) 30 39 69 
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Table 20: Production cycle of fish farmers by poverty status 
  Fish farmers 
  Poor  Non-poor  Total   
Production cycle (months) 11.2 
(1.10) 
Range: 6 - 24 
8.9 
(0.73) 
Range: 4 - 24 
9.9 
(0.64) 
Range: 4 - 24 
Total farmers (Nos.) 22 30 52 
Notes:  SE in parentheses 
 
Table 21: Production, revenue and distribution of tilapia by fish 
farming households in 2010 by poverty status 
  Fish farmer households 
  Poor Non-poor Total 
Average total tilapia 
harvested (kg)  
40.4 
(8.59) 
Range: 0 - 175 
131.4* 
(37.39) 
Range: 0 - 1020 
91.6 
(21.98) 
Range: 0 - 1020 
Average amount of tilapia 
sold (kg)  
21.5 
(5.86) 
Range: 0 - 100 
109.2 
(34.43) 
Range: 0 - 1000 
71.5 
(20.38) 
Range: 0 - 1000 
Average amount of on-farm 
consumption of tilapia (kg) 
11.9 
(3.67) 
Range: 0 - 100 
14.8 
(6.23) 
Range: 0 – 216 
13.5 
(3.86) 
Range: 0 - 216 
Average amount of tilapia 
given away (kg) 
7.0 
(2.01) 
Range: 0 – 40 
7.8 
(2.40) 
Range: 0 – 80 
7.5 
(1.61) 
Range: 0 – 80 
Average amount received 
for tilapia sold (GH¢) 
74.5 
(23.71) 
Range: 0 – 500 
359.7 
(112.09) 
Range: 0 - 3000 
236.8 
(66.61) 
Range: 0 - 3000 
Total households (Nos.) 28 37 65 
Notes:  SE in parentheses 
*Based on 36 households  
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Table 22: Production, revenue and distribution of catfish by fish 
farming households in 2010 by poverty status 
 
  Fish farmer households 
  Poor Non-poor Total 
Average total catfish 
harvested (kg)  
20.7 
(6.54) 
Range: 0 – 105 
125.0 
(41.17) 
Range: 0 - 931 
78.2 
(23.75) 
Range: 0 - 931 
Average amount of catfish 
sold (kg)  
15.1 
(5.95) 
Range: 0 - 100 
100.7 
(37.70) 
Range: 0 - 875 
62.3 
(21.57) 
Range: 0 – 875 
Average amount of on-farm 
consumption of catfish (kg) 
3.5 
(0.98) 
Range: 0 - 15 
15.7 
(6.94) 
Range: 0 – 216 
10.2 
(3.91) 
Range: 0 – 216 
Average amount of catfish 
given away (kg) 
20.2 
(0.75) 
Range: 0 – 15 
8.6 
(4.00) 
Range: 0 – 120 
5.7 
(2.26) 
Range: 0 – 120) 
Average amount received 
for catfish sold (GH¢)  
59.5 
(24.04) 
Range: 0 – 400 
341.4 
(123.36) 
Range: 0 -  3500 
215.0 
(72.45) 
Range: 0 – 3500 
Total households (Nos.) 26 32 58 
Notes:  SE in parentheses 
 
Table 23: Fish farmers who harvested fish in 2010 by poverty status 
 Fish farmers 
 Poor  Non-poor Total 
% % % 
Fish farmers who harvested fish  82 84 83 
Total farmers (Nos.) 28 37 65 
 
 
Table 24: Fish farmers who sold fish in 2010 by poverty status 
 Fish farmers 
 Poor  Non-poor Total 
% % % 
Fish farmers who sold fish 40 51 46 
Total farmers (Nos.) 30 39 69 
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Table 25: Income in 2010 by fish farming and poverty status 
  Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer households Total households 
  Poor Non-
poor 
Total Poor Non-
poor 
Total Poor Non-
poor 
Total 
Average total 
household 
income 
2,173                 
(253.42)   
7,453            
(828.47)  
5,124      
(571.54)  
1,951      
(174.84)  
6,457      
(749.28) 
3,899      
(425.59)  
2,043      
(146.28)  
6,998      
(564.51)  
4,486       
(354.76)  
Average per 
capita income 
233          
(16.89)   
937          
(74.90)   
626         
(60.01)  
215         
(15.89)  
904          
(90.41)  
513         
(56.36)   
223         
(11.60) 
922         
(57.58)  
567          
(41.25)    
Average total 
farm income 
1,720                 
(189.81)   
4,980         
(623.44)  
3,542      
(407.36)  
1,677      
(178.97)  
5,326      
(783.62)  
3,255      
(409.56)  
1,695       
(130.11)  
5,138      
(489.58)  
3,392        
(288.38)  
Farm income 
(%) 
79 67 69 86 82 83 83 73 76 
Average total 
off-farm 
income 
454                 
(205.00)  
2,473           
(633.61)  
1,582      
(383.31)  
273         
(71.45)  
1,131      
(331.36)  
644         
(155.77)   
349         
(94.78)  
1,860      
(381.96)  
1,094        
(203.80)  
Off-farm 
income (%) 
21 33 31 14 18 17 17 27 24 
Total 
households 
(Nos.) 
30 38 68 42 32 74 72 70 142 
Notes:  SE in parentheses 
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Table 26: Seasonal diversity of food items consumed, by fish farming 
and poverty status 
  Fish farmer households Non-fish farmer households Total households 
  Poor Non-
poor 
Total Poor Non-
poor 
Total Poor Non-
poor 
Total 
Average number 
of days per week 
fish is consumed 
in the dry season  
6.6 5.8 6.1 6.4 6.7 6.5 6.5 6.2 6.3 
(0.20) (0.36) (0.22) (0.21) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.21) (0.13) 
         Average number 
of days per week 
eggs are 
consumed in the 
dry season  
1.7 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 
(0.32) (0.29) (0.21) (0.20) (0.33) (0.18) (0.18) (0.22) (0.14) 
         Average number 
of days per week 
meat is 
consumed in the 
dry season  
2.2 3.5 3.0 2.9 3.2 3.0 2.6 3.4 3.0 
(0.37) (0.40) (0.29) (0.27) (0.36) (0.22) (0.22) (0.27) (0.18) 
         Average number 
of days per week 
milk is consumed 
in the dry season  
0.3 1.3 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.5 1.0 0.8 
(0.11) (0.31) (0.19) (0.22) (0.26) (0.17) (0.14) (0.21) (0.12) 
         Average number 
of days per week 
vegetables are 
consumed in the 
dry season  
6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 7.0 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.9 
(0.10) (0.13) (0.08) (0.14) (0.00) (0.81) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) 
         Average number 
of days per week 
fish is consumed 
in the rainy 
season  
6.4 5.5 5.9 6.4 6.7 6.5 6.4 6.0 6.2 
(0.25) (0.37) (0.24) (0.21) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.22) (0.14) 
         Average number 
of days per week 
eggs are 
consumed in the 
rainy season  
1.7 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.8 
(0.32) (0.32) (0.23) (0.20) (0.34) (0.19) (0.18) (0.23) (0.15) 
         Average number 
of days per week 
meat is 
consumed in the 
rainy season  
2.2 3.4 2.9 2.8 3.1 2.9 2.6 3.3 2.9 
(0.37) (0.41) (0.29) (0.30) (0.33) (0.22) (0.23) (0.27) (0.18) 
         Average number 
of days per week 
milk is consumed 
in the rainy 
season  
0.3 1.7 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.6 1.4 1.0 
(0.11) (0.36) (0.23) (0.28) (0.32) (0.21) (0.17) (0.25) (0.15) 
         Average number 
of days per week 
vegetables are 
consumed in the 
rainy season  
6.9 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.6 6.7 6.9 6.6 6.7 
(0.10) (0.23) (0.14) (0.12) (0.28) (0.14) (0.08) (0.18) (0.10) 
         Total households 
(Nos.) 
30 39 69 42 32 74 72 71 143 
Notes:  SE in parentheses 
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 APPENDIX 6: CHI SQUARE TEST RESULTS FOR 
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY DATA ANALYSIS PRESENTED IN 
CHAPTER 5 
 
Reference 
 (1) 
Variable Description of test df 
(2) 
N X
2
 p value phi 
Table 7 Proportion of households 
under the poverty line 
Difference between 
FF and NF 1 143 2.52 0.11 -0.13 
Table 2, Appendix 5 
 
Proportion of population 
under the poverty line  
Difference FF and NF 
population 1 1217 30.71 <0.001 -0.16 
Table 8 HH own perception of 
poverty 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor HHs 1 143 2.64 0.1 -0.14 
Table 8 HH own perception of 
poverty 
Difference between 
FF and NF 1 143 4.07 0.04 -0.17 
Table 11 HH ownership of land 
 
Difference between 
FF and NF 1 143 5.36 0.02 0.2 
Table 11 Sharecropping 
 
Difference between 
FF and NF 1 143 1.35 0.25 -0.1 
Section 5.2.4 & 
Table 11,  
Appendix 5 
 HH who own their homes 
 
  
Difference between 
FF and NF 
 
1 
 
 
143 
 
 
1.04 
 
 
0.31 
 
 
0.09 
 
 
Table 11 
Appendix 5 HH who own their homes 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor HHs 1 143 1.63 0.20 0.11 
Table 11 
Appendix 5 
HH with corrugated iron 
roofs roofing mat 
Difference between 
FF & NF 1 143 0.56 0.46 0.06 
Table 11 
Appendix 5 
HH with corrugated iron 
roofs roofing mat 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor HHs 1 143 2.73 0.099 0.14 
Table 13 TV ownership 
 
Difference between 
FF & NF 1 143 0.68 0.41 0.07 
Table 13 TV ownership 
 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor HHs 1 143 3.2 0.07 -0.15 
Table 13 Refrigerator ownership 
 
Difference between 
FF & NF 1 143 3.6 0.06 0.16 
Table 13 Refrigerator ownership 
 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor HHs 1 143 5.63 0.02 -0.2 
Table 13 
Phone/mobile ownership 
Difference between 
FF & NF 1 143 2.76 0.097 -0.14 
Table 13 
Phone/mobile ownership 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor HHs 1 143 9.47 0.002 -0.26 
Table 13 Bicycle ownership 
 
Difference between 
FF & NF 1 143 0.19 0.66 0.04 
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Reference Variable Description of test df N X
2
 p value phi 
Table 13 Bicycle ownership 
 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor HHs 1 143 1.92 0.17 -0.12 
Table 13 Motorcycle ownership 
 
Difference between FF 
& NF 1 143 0.59 0.44 0.06 
Table 13 Motorcycle ownership 
 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor HHs 1 143 1.78 0.18 -0.11 
Table 13 Vehicle ownership 
 
Difference between FF 
& NF 1 143 3.75 0.053 0.16 
Table 13 Vehicle ownership 
 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor HHs 1 143 1.52 0.22 -0.1 
Table 13 Water pump ownership 
 
Difference between FF 
& NF 1 143 7.51 0.06 0.23 
Table 13 Water pump ownership 
 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor HHs 1 143 0.46 0.5 -0.06 
Table 13 Latrine ownership 
 
Difference between FF 
& NF 1 143 0.32 0.57 0.05 
Table 13 Latrine ownership 
 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor HHs 1 143 1.35 0.25 -0.1 
Table 12 
Appendix 5 
Livestock ownership 
 
Difference between FF 
& NF 1 143 1.13 0.29 -0.089 
Table 12,  
Appendix 5 
Livestock ownership 
 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor HHs 1 143 6.98 0.008 0.221 
Table 15 Association membership 
 
Difference between FF 
& NF 1 143 19.27 0.01 0.37 
Table 15 Association membership 
 
Difference poor & non-
poor FF 1 143 0.056 0.81 -0.02 
Figure 14 HH facing crisis 
 
Difference between FF 
& NF 1 143 2.35 0.13 -0.13 
Figure 14 HH facing crisis 
 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor HHs 1 143 1.91 0.17 0.17 
Figure 14 
 
Crisis – Flood 
 
Difference between FF 
& NF 1 143 0.4 0.53 0.05 
Figure 14 Crisis – Flood 
 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor HHs 1 143 0.003 0.96 -0.004 
Figure 14 Crisis drought 
 
Difference between FF 
& NF 1 143 7.46 0.006 -0.23 
Figure 14 Crisis drought 
 
Difference between 
poor FF & NF 1 72 7.86 0.005 -0.33 
Figure 14 Crisis drought 
 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor HHs 1 143 2.05 0.16 0.12 
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Reference Variable Description of test df N X
2
 p value phi 
Figure 14 Financial loss 
 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor FF 1 143 3.05 0.08 -0.15 
Figure 14 Financial loss 
 
Difference between FF 
& NF 1 143 2.76 0.097 0.14 
Section 5.2.8 & 
Table 16,  
Appendix 5 
Vegetable production 
 
Difference between FF 
& NF 1 143 1.43 0.23 -0.1 
Section 5.2.8 & 
Table 16,  
Appendix 5 
Vegetable production 
 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor HHs 1 143 0.85 0.36 0.077 
Section 5.2.8 & 
Table 16,  
Appendix 5 
Oil palm production 
 
Difference between FF 
& NF 1 143 2.29 0.13 0.13 
Section 5.2.8 & 
Table 16,  
Appendix 5 
Oil palm production 
 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor HHs 1 143 1.73 0.19 -0.11 
Section 5.2.8 & 
Table 16,  
Appendix 5 
Citrus production 
 
Difference between FF 
& NF 1 143 1.9 0.17 0.12 
Section 5.2.8 & 
Table 16,  
Appendix 5 
Citrus production 
 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor HHs 1 143 0.18 0.67 -0.036 
Section 5.2.8 
Proportion of HHs 
engaged in HH 
enterprises 
Difference between FF 
& NF 1 143 2.93 0.09 -0.14 
Section 5.2.8 
Proportion of HHs 
engaged in HH 
enterprises 
Difference between  
poor & non-poor FF 1 69 1.65 0.20 -0.16 
Section 5.2.8 
Proportion of HHs 
engaged in HH 
enterprises 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor HHs 1 143 0.58 0.45 0.06 
Section 5.2.9 HHs using fertiliser 
(organic and/or inorganic) 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor FF 1 69 3.63 0.057 -0.23 
Section 5.2.9 HHs using organic 
fertiliser  
Difference between 
poor & non-poor FF 1 69 7.614 0.006 0.332 
Section 5.2.9 HHs using inorganic 
fertiliser  
Difference between 
poor & non-poor FF 1 69 2.926 0.087 -0.206 
Table 18 Fish farmers contacting 
extension agents 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor FF 1 69 0.43 0.51 0.08 
Table 18 Extension agents visiting 
fish farmers 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor FF 1 69 5.4 0.02 -0.28 
Table 18 Contact with extension 
agents 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor FF 1 69 2.78 0.095 0.2 
Section 5.2.9 FF received training 
 
Difference between  
poor & non-poor FF 1 69 0.722 0.40 -0.1 
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Reference Variable Description of test df N X
2
 p value phi 
Table 20 
Motivation to adopt fish 
farming from observation 
of other farms 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor FF 1 69 6.125 0.013 0.3 
Table 21 Goal increase profit 
 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor FF 1 69 0.036 0.85 -0.023 
Table 21 Goal increase fish own 
consumption 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor FF 1 69 5.99 0.048 0.24 
Table 21 Goal increase farm 
sustainability 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor FF 1 69 3.91 0.048 0.24 
Table 21 Goal reduce seasonality 
farm income 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor FF 1 69 3.14 0.08 0.21 
Table 21 Goal minimize risk 
 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor FF 1 69 0.89 0.34 0.11 
Section 5.2.9 
Figure 18 
Did not undertake a  
main harvest in 2010 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor FF 1 69 3.31 0.07 0.22 
Section 5.2.9 & 
Table 24, Appendix 5 
Sale of fish 
 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor FF 1 69 0.868 0.35 0.112 
Table 25 Impact of fish farming on 
HH income 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor FF 1 69 0.911 0.34 -0.116 
Table 25 Impact of fish farming on 
HH fish consumption 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor FF 1 69 2.112 0.15 0.176 
Table 26 Impact of fish farming on 
community fish supply 
Difference between 
FF & NF 1 139 5.441 0.02 0.198 
Table 26 No impact of fish farming 
on community 
Difference between 
FF & NF 1 139 3.448 0.06 -0.157 
Table 26 Impact of fish farming on 
community fish supply 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor 1 139 5.188 0.02 -0.193 
Table 26 Impact of fish farming on 
community fish supply 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor FF 1 139 1.036 0.31 -0.124 
Table 26 Impact of fish farming on 
community fish supply 
Difference between 
poor & non-poor NF 1 139 3.251 0.07 -0.212 
Notes:  (1)   Tables refer to those in Chapter 5 unless otherwise stated 
(3) df = degrees of freedom 
HH = household(s), FF = fish farming households, NF = non-fish farming households 
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 APPENDIX 7: INDEPENDENT SAMPLES T-TEST RESULTS 
FOR HOUSEHOLD SURVEY DATA ANALYSIS 
PRESENTED IN CHAPTER 5 
 
Reference 
 (1) 
Description Mean SE df  
(2) 
T- 
Statistic 
p value Mean 
difference 
95% CI 
(3) 
Table 9 HH Size             
 
  Poor HHs 9.29 0.39 
141 2.86 0.005 1.57 
0.49 to 
-2.66   Non-poor HHs 7.72 0.39 
Table 9 Age HH head 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 46.96 1.34 
141 2.17 0.03 3.95 
0.34 to 
7.55   Non-poor HHs 50.9 1.23 
 
Dependency 
ratio FF 
    
  
  Table 4, 
Appendix 5 Poor HHs 101.86 13.33 
  
  
  
 
Non-poor HHs 67.39 7.45 46.48 2.26 0.03 34.47 
3.74 to 
65.20 
 
Dependency 
ratio             
 Table 4, 
Appendix 5 
Poor HHs 91.33 7.68 
141 1.42 0.16 14.79 
5.79 to 
35.37   Non-poor HHs 76.54 7.02 
 
No of children 
FF             
 Table 4, 
Appendix 5 Poor HHs 3.97 0.45 
  
  
  
  Non-poor HHs 2.69 0.3 67 2.44 0.018 1.27 
0.23 to 
2.32 
 
No of children              
  Table 4, 
Appendix 5 Poor HHs 3.6 0.25         
 
  Non-poor HHs 2.75 0.22 141 2.56 0.012 0.85 
0.19 to 
1.51 
 Table 10 
HH head 
education (yrs) 
– FF             
 
 
Poor HHs 8.48 0.71         
 
  Non-poor HHs 9.87 0.54 65 -1.58 0.12 -1.39 
-3.14 to 
0.37 
Table 12 Ha land owned 
    
  
  
 
FF 7.24 0.94 
140 1.34 0.18 1.59 
-0.75 to 
3.93   NF 5.65 0.73 
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Reference 
  
Description Mean SE df  
 
T- 
Statistic 
p value Mean 
difference 
95% CI 
 
 
Table 12 
 
Ha land owned             
 
  Poor HHs 5.1 0.72 
131.15 -2.26 0.025 -2.65 
-4.97 to  
-0.34   Non-poor HHs 7.76 0.93 
 
Table 12 
Ha land owned 
–FF 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 6.03 1.38 
66 -1.14 0.26 1.89 
-5.94 to 
1.62   Non-poor HHs 8.19 1.28 
Table 12 
Ha land owned 
–NF             
 
  Poor HHs 4.44 0.75 
49.23 -1.81 0.08 -2.8 
-5.90 to 
0.31   Non-poor HHs 7.24 1.35 
Table 12 
Land owned 
FF&NF  - poor 
HHs 
    
  
  
 
FF 4.44 0.75 
70 1.09 0.28 1.59 
-1.32 to 
4.50   NF 6.03 1.38 
Table 12 
Land owned - 
non-poor 
FF&NF              
 
  FF 7.24 1.35 
68 0.51 0.61 1.87 
-2.78 to 
4.69   NF 8.19 1.28 
Table 12 
Total farm size 
ha 
    
  
  
 
FF 8.58 1.05 
140 0.74 0.46 1.03 
-1.73 to 
3.78   NF 7.55 0.93 
Table 12 
Total farm size 
ha             
 
  Poor HHs 6.83 0.88 
140 -1.78 0.08 -2.46 
-5.19 to 
-0.28   Non-poor HHs 9.29 1.07 
Table 12 
Total farm size 
ha – FF 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 7.59 1.52 
66 -0.84 0.41 -1.77 
--5.99 to 
2.45   Non-poor HHs 9.36 1.44 
Table 12 
Total farm size 
ha – NF             
 
  Poor HHs 6.29 1.06 
72 -1.56 0.12 -2.91 
-6.62 to 
0.80   Non-poor HHs 9.2 1.62 
Table 12 
Total farm size 
ha – poor HHs 
    
  
  
 
FF 7.59 1.52 
70 0.73 0.47 1.3 
-2.27 to 
4.88   NF 6.29 1.06 
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Reference 
  
Description Mean SE df  
 
T- 
Statistic 
p value Mean 
difference 
95% CI 
 
 
Table 12 
Total farm size 
ha - non-poor 
HHs             
 
  FF 9.36 1.4 
68 0.075 0.94 0.16 
-4.16 to 
4.48   NF 9.2 1.62 
Table 13, 
Appendix 5 
Total livestock 
holding (TLU) 
    
  
  
 
FF 1.46 0.3 
111.24 1.43 0.5 0.5 
-0.18 to  
1.17   NF 0.97 0.18 
Table 13, 
Appendix 5 
Total livestock 
holding (TLU)             
 
  Poor HHs 1.12 0.23 
141 -0.528 0.6 0.34 
-0.86 to 
-0.5   Non-poor HHs 1.3 0.26 
Table 14 
Durable good 
index 
    
  
  
 
FF 36.76 7.07 
109.5 2.2 0.03 17.98 
1.8 to 
34.15   NF 18.78 4.08 
Table 14 
Durable good 
index             
 
  Poor HHs 20.27 5.18 
136.39 -1.79 0.08 -14.48 
--30.45 to 
1.50   Non-poor HHs 34.75 6.2 
Table 14 
Durable good 
index FF 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 22.22 9.52 
66.34 -1.88 0.07 -25.73 
-53.11 to 
1.65   Non-poor HHs 47.95 9.87 
Table 14 
Durable good 
index NF             
 
  Poor HHs 18.88 5.82 
72 0.027 0.98 0.22 
-16.30 to 
16.75   Non-poor HHs 18.66 5.64 
Table 14 
Durable good 
index – poor 
HHs 
    
  
  
 
FF 18.66 5.64 
72 0.027 0.98 0.22 
-17.77 to 
24.44   NF 18.88 5.82 
Table 14 
Durable good 
index - non-
poor HHs             
 
  FF 47.95 9.87 
59.14 2.58 0.012 29.29 
6.55 to 
52.03   NF 18.66 5.64 
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Reference 
  
Description Mean SE df  
 
T- 
Statistic 
p value Mean 
difference 
95% CI 
 
Table 17 
Number of fish 
farmer visits to 
extension 
agents 
 
          
 
 
Poor HHs 1.34 0.47 
  
  
  
  Non-poor HHs 2.97 0.75 60.74 -1.83 0.07 -1.63 
-3.41 to 
0.14 
Table 17 
No of extension 
visits to FF             
 
  Poor HHs 1.28 0.46         
 
  Non-poor HHs 3.18 0.89 66 -1.72 0.09 -1.9 
-4.11 to 
0.30 
Table 22 
Area individual 
pond size- FF 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 408.34 67.75 
49.68 -1.62 0.112 -251.55 
-563.64 to 
-60.55   Non-poor HHs 659.89 139.81 
Table 22 
Total area 
ponds owned – 
FF             
 
  Poor HHs 787.22 175.83 
59.91 -1.37 0.18 -400.29 
-986.82 to 
186.23   Non-poor HHs 1187.52 234.64 
Table 22 
Total area 
functional 
ponds – FF 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 681.46 117.29 
50.9 -1.87 0.07 -483.83 
-1002.82 
to 35.16   Non-poor HHs 1165.29 230.36 
Section 
5.2.8 
Production 
cycle –FF             
 
  Poor HHs 11.18 1.1 
50 1.83 0.07 2.32 
-.35 to 
4.98   Non-poor HHs 8.87 0.73 
Table 21, 
Appendix 5 
Total tilapia 
harvest – FF 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 40.38 8.59 
38.65 -2.37 0.02 -91.07 
-168.69 to 
-13.45   Non-poor HHs 131.44 37.39 
Table 21, 
Appendix 5 
Total amount 
Tilapia sold – 
FF             
 
  Poor HHs 21.54 5.86 
38.08 -2.51 0.016 -87.68 
-158.38 to 
-16.98   Non-poor HHs 109.22 34.43 
Table 21, 
Appendix 5 
HH tilapia 
consumption – 
FF 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 11.88 3.67 
63 -0.37 0.71 -2.91 
-18.58 to 
12.77   Non-poor HHs 14.78 6.23 
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Reference 
  
Description Mean SE df  
 
T- 
Statistic 
p value Mean 
difference 
95% CI 
 
Table 21, 
Appendix 5 
HH tilapia 
given away – 
FF             
 
  Poor HHs 6.96 2.01 
63 -0.27 0.79 -0.87 
-7.13 to 
5.38   Non-poor HHs 7.84 2.4 
Table 21, 
Appendix 5 
HH revenue 
sell tilapia – FF 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 74.5 23.71 
39.19 2.49 0.017 -285.18 
-516.89 to 
53.47   Non-poor HHs 359.68 112.09 
Table 22, 
Appendix 5 
 
Total catfish 
harvest – FF             
 
  Poor HHs 20.65 6.54 
32.56 -2.5 0.018 -104.35 
-189.19 to 
-19.5   Non-poor HHs 125 41.17 
Table 22, 
Appendix 5 
Total amount 
catfish sold – 
FF 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 15.12 5.95 
32.53 -2.24 0.03 -85.54 
-163.24 to 
-7.85   Non-poor HHs 100.67 37.7 
Table 22, 
Appendix 5 
HH catfish 
consumption – 
FF             
 
  Poor HHs 3.52 0.98 
32.22 -1.74 0.09 -12.18 
-26.45 to 
2.09   Non-poor HHs 15.7 6.94 
Table 22, 
Appendix 5 
HH catfish 
given away – 
FF 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 2.02 0.75 
33.18 -1.63 0.11 -12.18 
-26.45 to 
2.09   Non-poor HHs 8.64 4 
Table 22, 
Appendix 5 
HH revenue 
sell catfish – 
FF             
 
  Poor HHs 59.46 24.04 
33.23 -2.19 0.04 128.62 
-543.53 to 
-20.30   Non-poor HHs 341.38 126.36 
Table 23 
Total fish 
harvest – FF 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 55.8 11.83 
38.09 -2.62 0.013 -184.01 
326.18 to 
-41.84   Non-poor HHs 239.81 69.23 
Table 23 
Total fish yield 
(kg/ha/year) – 
FF 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 1303.14 310.14 
41.58 -1.58 0.12 -1183.68 
-2694.89 
to 327.54   Non-poor HHs 2487.24 681.35 
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Reference 
  
Description Mean SE df  
 
T- 
Statistic 
p value Mean 
difference 
95% CI 
 
Table 23 
Total amount 
total fish sold – 
FF             
 
  Poor HHs 35.57 10.35 
37.87 -2.48 0.018 -160.7 
-292.06 to 
-29.34   Non-poor HHs 196.27 64.05 
Table 23 
Total on-farm 
fish 
consumption – 
FF 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 15.07 4.2 
42.99 -1.69 0.19 -18.7 
-46.81 to 
9.42   Non-poor HHs 33.77 13.29 
Table 23 
 
Total per capita 
on-farm fish 
consumption – 
FF             
 
  Poor HHs 1.86 0.5 
42.9 -1.69 0.098 -2.84 
-6.22 to 
0.55   Non-poor HHs 4.7 1.6 
 
Table 23 
HH fish given 
away - FF 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 8.84 2.35 
63 -0.95 0.35 -6.47 
-20.06 to 
7.12   Non-poor HHs 15.31 5.63 
Table 23 
HH revenue sell 
total fish – FF             
 
  Poor HHs 129.71 40.53 
38.63 -2.44 0.019 -525.2 
-960.31 to 
-90.1   Non-poor HHs 654.92 211.19 
Table 27 
Total HH 
income 
    
  
  
 
FF 5123.88 571.54 
140 1.74 0.085 1224.55 
-169.52 to 
2618.62   NF 3899.34 425.59 
Table 27 
Total HH 
income             
 
  Poor HHs 2043.39 146.28 
78.23 -8.5 <0.001 -4954.48 
-6115.4 to 
-3793.57   Non-poor HHs 6997 564.51 
Table 27 
Total HH 
income-FF 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 2173.43 253.42 
43.76 -6.09 <0.001 -5279.75 
-7026.07 
to 3533.44   Non-poor HHs 7453 828.47 
Table 27 
Total HH 
income – NF             
 
  Poor HHs 1950.5 174.84 
34.39 -5.86 <0.001 -4506.69 
-6069.65 
to 2943.73   Non-poor HHs 6457.19 749.27 
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Reference 
  
Description Mean SE df  
 
T- 
Statistic 
p value Mean 
difference 
95% CI 
 
Table 27 
Total HH 
income – poor 
HHs 
    
  
  
 
FF 2173.43 253.42 
70 0.75 0.46 222.93 
-370.66 to 
816.53   NF 1950.5 174.84 
Table 27 
Total HH 
income - non-
poor HHs             
 
  FF 7453.19 828.47 
68 0.88 0.38 996 
-1269.03 
to 3261.03   NF 6457.19 749.27 
Table 27 
Total farm 
income 
    
  
  
 
FF 3541.59 407.36 
140 0.5 0.62 286.6 
-857 to 
1430.96   NF 3254.99 409.56 
Table 27 
Total farm 
income             
 
  Poor HHs 1694.81 130.11 
78.71 -6.8 <0.001 -3443.35 
-4451.72 
to 
-2434.99   Non-poor HHs 5138.16 489.58 
Table 27 
Total farm 
income – FF 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 1719.57 189.81 
43.7 -5 <0.001 -3260.46 
-4574.12 
to 1946.81   Non-poor HHs 4980.03 623.44 
Table 27 
Total farm 
income – NF             
 
  Poor HHs 1677.12 178.97 
34.25 -4.54 <0.001 -3648.82 
-5281.89 
to 
-2015.75   Non-poor HHs 4432.8 783.62 
Table 27 
Total farm 
income – poor 
HHs 
    
  
  
 
FF 1719.57 189.81 
70 0.16 0.87 42.45 
-487.73 to 
572.43   NF 1677.12 178.97 
Table 27 
Total farm 
income - non-
poor HHs             
 
  FF 4980.03 623.44 
68 -0.35 0.73 -345.91 
-2319.6 to 
1627.79   NF 5325.94 783.61 
Table 27 
Total off-farm 
income 
    
  
  
 
FF 1582.29 383.31 
88.73 2.27 0.02 937.94 
115.8 to 
1760.09   NF 644.35 155.77 
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Reference 
  
Description Mean SE df  
 
T- 
Statistic 
p value Mean 
difference 
95% CI 
 
Table 27 
Total off-farm 
income             
 
  Poor HHs 348.58 94.78 
77.47 -3.84 <0.001 -1511.13 
-2294.7 to 
-727.56   Non-poor HHs 1858.71 381.96 
Table 27 
Total off-farm 
income – FF 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 453.87 205 
44.53 -3.03 0.004 -2019.29 
-3360.98 
to 
-677.60   Non-poor HHs 2473.16 633.61 
Table 27 
Total off-farm 
income – NF             
 
  Poor HHs 273.38 71.45 
33.89 -2.53 0.016 -857.87 
-1546.84 
to -168.9   Non-poor HHs 1131.25 331.26 
Table 27 
Total off-farm 
income – poor 
HHs 
    
  
  
 
FF 453.87 205 
70 0.94 0.35 180.49 
-203.27 to 
564.24   NF 273.38 71.45 
Table 27 
Total off-farm 
income - non-
poor HHs             
 
  FF 2473.16 633.61 
55.09 1.88 0.07 1341.91 
-90.99 to 
2774.81   NF 1131.25 331.36 
Table 27 
Per capita 
income 
    
  
  
 
FF 626.44 60.09 
140 1.38 0.17 113.37 
-49.53 to 
276.26   NF 513.07 56.36 
Table 27 
Per capita 
income             
 
  Poor HHs 222.58 11.6 
74.6 -11.91 <0.001 -699.41 
-816.43 to 
-582.38   Non-poor HHs 921.99 57.58 
Table 27 
Per capita 
income – FF 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 232.81 16.89 
40.72 -9.18 <0.001 -704.38 
-859.47 to 
-549.3   Non-poor HHs 937.19 74.9 
Table 27 
Per capita 
income – NF             
 
  Poor HHs 215.27 15.89 
32.92 -7.5 <0.001 -688.66 
-875.44 to 
-501.87   Non-poor HHs 903.93 90.41 
Table 27 
Per capita 
income – poor 
HHs 
    
  
  
 
FF 232.81 16.89 
70 0.74 0.46 17.54 
-29.55 to 
64.62   NF 215.27 15.89 
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Reference 
  
Description Mean SE df  
 
T- 
Statistic 
p value Mean 
difference 
95% CI 
 
 Table 27 
Per capita 
income - non-
poor HHs   
68 0.29 0.78 33.26 
-198.94 to 
265.47 
  
FF 937.19 74.9 
  NF 903.93 90.41 
Table 28 
Percentage 
income from 
fish farming 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 7.62 2.69 
67 -0.13 0.9 -0.46 
-7.45 to 
6.52   Non-poor HHs 8.08 2.27 
Table 29 HH Asset index 
    
  
  
 
FF 50.5 7.72 
105.11 2.36 0.02 20.68 
-3.28 to 
38.09   NF 29.82 4.17 
Table 29 HH Asset index             
 
  Poor HHs 31.55 5.33 
132.45 -1.91 0.057 -16.62 
-58.92 to 
-0.085   Non-poor HHs 48.17 6.86 
Table 29 
HH Asset index 
FF 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 33.88 9.77 
67 -1.99 0.058 -29.42 
-58.92 to       
-0.085   Non-poor HHs 63.29 11.09 
Table 29 
HH Asset index 
- NF             
 
  Poor HHs 29.88 6 
72 0.51 0.99 0.14 
-16.76 to 
17.04   Non-poor HHs 29.74 5.68 
Table 29 
HH Asset index 
-poor HHs 
    
  
  
 
FF 33.88 9.77 
70 0.37 0.72 3.99 
-17.71 to 
25.7   NF 29.88 6 
Table 29 
HH Asset index 
-non-poor HHs             
 
  FF 63.29 11.09 
55.84 2.69 0.01 33.55 
8.59 to 
58.51   NF 29.74 5.68 
Table 30 
Number of days 
eat fish - DS             
 
  FF 6.12 0.22 
109.64 -1.59 0.12 -0.41 
-0.92 to 
0.1   NF 6.53 0.13 
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Reference 
  
Description Mean SE df  
 
T- 
Statistic 
p value Mean 
difference 
95% CI 
 
Table 30 
Number of 
days eat meat - 
DS 
    
  
  
 
FF 2.96 0.29 
128.98 -0.23 0.82 -0.84 
0.80 to 
0.63   NF 3.04 0.22 
Table 30 
Number of 
days milk 
consumed – DS             
 
  FF 0.84 0.19 
141 0.55 0.58 0.14 
-.36 to 
0.63   NF 0.7 0.17 
Table 30 
Number of 
days fish is 
eaten - DS 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 6.47 0.15 
141 1.13 0.26 0.29 -.22 to .79   Non-poor HHs 6.18 0.21 
Table 30 
Number of 
days meat is 
eaten - DS             
 
  Poor HHs 2.61 0.22 
141 -2.24 0.03 -0.78 
-1.48 to  
-.09   Non-poor HHs 3.39 0.27 
 
Table 30 
Number of 
days milk is 
consumed - DS 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 0.51 0.14 
141 -2.09 0.04 -0.51 
-1 to 
-.27   Non-poor HHs 1.03 0.21 
Table 30 
Number of 
days fish eaten 
- FF DS             
 
  Poor HHs 6.57 0.2 
58.33 1.95 0.057 0.8 
0.023 to 
1.62   Non-poor HHs 5.77 0.36 
Table 30 
Number of 
days meat is 
eaten - FF DS 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 2.2 0.37 
67 -2.4 0.019 -1.34 
-2.45 to 
-0.22   Non-poor HHs 3.54 0.4 
 
 
Table 30 
Number of 
days milk is 
consumed  - FF 
DS             
 
  Poor HHs 0.3 0.11 
47.19 2.94 0.005 -0.96 
-1.61 to 
-.30   Non-poor HHs 1.26 0.31 
Table 30 
Number of 
days fish eaten 
- NF DS 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 6.4 0.21 
66.55 -1.17 0.25 -0.28 
-0.77 to 
0.20   Non-poor HHs 6.69 0.13 
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Reference 
  
Description Mean SE df  
 
T- 
Statistic 
p value Mean 
difference 
95% CI 
 
Table 30 
Number of 
days meat is 
eaten - NF DS             
 
  Poor HHs 2.9 0.27 
72 -0.71 0.48 -0.31 
-1.19 to 
0.56   Non-poor HHs 3.22 0.36 
Table 30 
Number of 
days milk is 
consumed - NF 
DS 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 0.67 0.22 
72 -0.25 0.81 -0.08 
-0.75 to 
0.59   Non-poor HHs 0.75 0.26 
Table 30 
Number of 
days eat fish - 
RS             
 
  FF 5.87 0.24 
6.98 -2.32 0.02 -0.63 
-1.17 to 
-0.09   NF 6.5 0.13 
Table 30 
Number of 
days eat meat - 
RS 
    
  
  
 
FF 2.88 0.29 
128.59 -0.13 0.89 -0.005 
-0.77 to 
0.67   NF 2.93 0.22 
Table 30 
Number of 
days milk 
consumed - RS             
 
  FF 1.06 0.23 
141 0.45 0.65 0.14 
-.47 to 
0.75   NF 0.92 0.21 
Table 30 
Number of 
days fish is 
eaten - RS 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 6.36 0.16 
141 1.23 0.22 0.33 
-0.20 to 
0.87   Non-poor HHs 6.03 0.22 
 
Table 30 
Number of 
days meat is 
eaten - RS             
 
  Poor HHs 2.56 0.23 
141 -2.01 0.047 -0.71 
-1.41 to 
-0.01   Non-poor HHs 3.27 0.27 
Table 30 
Number of 
days milk is 
consumed -RS 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 0.62 0.17 
124.88 -2.41 0.017 -0.73 
-1.33 to 
-0.13   Non-poor HHs 1.35 0.25 
Table 30 
Number of 
days fish eaten 
- FF RS             
 
  Poor HHs 6.37 0.25 
63.77 1.98 0.07 0.88 
-0.006 to 
1.77   Non-poor HHs 5.49 0.37 
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Reference 
  
Description Mean SE df  
 
T- 
Statistic 
p value Mean 
difference 
95% CI 
 
Table 30 
Number of 
days meat is 
eaten - FF RS 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 2.17 0.37 
66.95 -2.3 0.03 -1.27 
-2.37 to 
-0.17   Non-poor HHs 3.44 0.41 
Table 30 
Number of 
days milk is 
consumed - FF 
RS             
 
  Poor HHs 0.27 0.11 
44.41 -3.71 0.001 -1.4 
-2.16 to 
- .64   Non-poor HHs 1.67 0.36 
Table 30 
Number of 
days fish eaten 
- NF RS 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 6.36 0.21 
65.84 -1.34 0.19 -0.33 
-0.82 to 
0.163   Non-poor HHs 6.69 0.13 
Table 30 
Number of 
days meat is 
eaten - NF RS             
 
  Poor HHs 2.83 0.3 
72 -0.52 0.61 -0.23 
-1.11 to 
0.16   Non-poor HHs 3.06 0.33 
Table 30 
Number of 
days milk is 
consumed -NF 
RS 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 0.88 0.28 
72 -0.21 0.84 -0.09 
-0.94 to 
0.76   Non-poor HHs 0.97 0.32 
Table 31 FCS RS             
 
  FF 37.58 1.06 
141 -0.27 0.78 -0.38 
-3.12 to 
2.36   NF 37.96 0.9 
Table 31 SFC RS 
    
  
  
 
FF 53.87 2.37 
126.44 -0.33 0.75 -0.95 
-6.77 to 
4.86   NF 54.82 1.73 
Table 31 FCS RS             
 
  Poor HHs 36.63 0.77 
123.75 -1.69 0.094 -2.32 
-5.04 to 
0.4   Non-poor HHs 38.94 1.14 
Table 31 SFC RS 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 52.01 1.79 
141 -1.64 0.103 2.88 
-10.43 to 
0.96   Non-poor HHs 56.75 2.26 
Table 31 FCS FF RS             
 
  Poor HHs 35.3 0.57 
45.38 -2.15 0.04 -4.03 
-7.81 to 
-0.26   Non-poor HHs 39.33 1.79 
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Description Mean SE df  
 
T- 
Statistic 
p value Mean 
difference 
95% CI 
 
Table 31 SFC FF RS 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 48.9 2.85 
67 -1.87 0.07 -8.79 
-17.78 to 
0.19   Non-poor HHs 57.69 3.49 
Table 31 FCS NF RS             
 
  Poor HHs 37.57 1.25 
72 -0.49 0.62 -0.9 
-4053 to 
2.74   Non-poor HHs 38.47 1.29 
Table 31 SFC NF RS 
    
  
  
 
Poor HHs 54.24 2.26 
72 -0.39 0.70 -1.36 
-8.37 to 
5.66   Non-poor HHs 55.59 2.73 
Table 32 
Food 
Vulnerability 
Easy/Very easy 
months 
    
  
  
 
FF 10.03 0.32 
141 1.79 0.08 -0.83 
-0.08 to 
1.73   NF 9.2 0.33 
Table 32 
Food 
Vulnerability 
Easy/Very easy 
months  
Non-poor HHs 
    
  
  
 
FF 10.36 0.41 
69 1.68 0.09 1.07 
-0.2 to 
2.35   NF 9.28 0.5 
Notes:  (1) Tables refer to those in Chapter 5 unless otherwise stated 
(2) df = degrees of freedom 
(3) CI = confidence interval 
FF = fish farming households, NF = non-fish farming households 
FCS = Food Consumption Score 
 SFC = Simple Food Count 
DS = dry season, RS = rainy season 
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 APPENDIX 8: ENDOGENEITY TEST RESULTS FOR THE 
INCOME DETERMINATION MODEL PRESENTED IN 
CHAPTER 5 
 
Variables tested 
for endogeneity 
Hausman's Specification Test Results 
(log) per capita 
income and: 
Efficient 
under H0 
 
Consistent 
under H1 
 
 
df 
 
Statistic Pr > ChiSq 
Hypothesis test 
result 
All fish farmers 
OLS 2SLS 15 10.73 0.7713 
H1 is rejected, 
model is efficient 
under OLS 
Fish farmers  
type A 
OLS 2SLS 16 10.81 0.8209 
H1 is rejected, 
model is efficient 
under OLS 
Fish farmers 
type B 
OLS 2SLS 15 11.61 0.7083 
H1 is rejected, 
model is efficient 
under OLS 
Notes: If there is endogeneity, the probability limit of the OLS and 2SLS estimators will differ (the 
2SLS estimator is consistent whereas the OLS estimator is inconsistent), and H0 is rejected. If 
there is no endogeneity, the probability limit of the OLS and 2SLS estimators will be the same 
(they are both consistent estimators, but OLS is efficient), and H0 is not rejected. 
 OLS = Ordinary Least Squares 
 2SLS = 2 Stage Least Squares 
df = degrees of freedom 
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 APPENDIX 9: ESTIMATED BUDGETS USED FOR 
MULTIPLIER ESTIMATIONS 
 
Estimated budget for small-scale fish farmers 
(fish farming type A) in Ashanti Region 
 
Budget 
(GH¢) 
% of 
Total 
Cost 
% of input which is 
regionally non tradable 
% of input which is 
nationally non tradable 
Fixed costs (1) 
 Pond construction (labour) 100 20 VA VA 
Pond construction 
(materials - PVC pipes) 20 4 0 100 
Variable costs 
 Hired labour 30 6 VA VA 
Lime 7 1 100 100 
Fertiliser 10 2 100 100 
Fingerlings 162 32 0 100 
Transportation 43 9 20 20 
Feed 119 24 100 100 
Equipment (water 
pump/nets) 9 2 0 100 
 Total cost (GH¢) 500 
   Total Revenue (GH¢) 533 
   Profit (GH¢) 33 
 
VA VA 
Gross profit margin (%) 6 
   Notes: Budget based on 1 pond of 600m
2 
producing tilapia and catfish. 
Budget estimates based on participatory budgets (see Table 24, Chapter 5, Section 5.2.9) 
and key informant interviews. 
VA = value added 
(1) Fixed costs of pond construction (labour and materials) annualised over 20 years 
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Estimated budget for commercial SME cage farmers  
 
Budget 
(GH¢) 
% of Total 
Cost 
% of input which 
is regionally non 
tradable 
% of input which is 
nationally non 
tradable 
Farmer fixed costs  
 Cage materials 817 1 8 46 
Cage labour 148 0.2 VA VA 
Land rent 200 0.3 VA VA 
Boat 40 0.05 100 100 
Equipment 20 0.03 0 100 
Miscellaneous 42 0.05 50 100 
Farmer variable costs 
 Fingerlings 9000 12 10 100 
Feed 65760 85 5 10 
Labour 960 1 VA VA 
 Trader variable costs (1) 
    Fish 99840 95 
  Ice 947 1 100 100 
Transport 3946 4 20 20 
Degutting 474 0.45 VA VA 
 Farmer total cost (GH¢) 76,987 
   Farmer total revenue (GH¢) 99,840 
   Farmer profit (GH¢) 22,853 
 
VA VA 
Farmer gross profit margin (%) 23 
   
 Trader total cost (GH¢) 105,207 
   Trader total revenue (GH¢) 113,099 
   Trader profit (GH¢) 7,892 
 
VA VA 
Trader gross profit margin (%) 7 
   Notes: Budget based on 4 cages for 6 month production cycle 
VA = value added 
(1) Trader costs and revenues are included to estimate forward linkages 
 
